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1600 to 1604





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



Observations  
Vpon Caesars Commentaries  
setting forth the Practise of y<sup>e</sup> Art  
militarie in the time of the Romaine  
Empire for the better direction  
of our moderne Wars  
By  
Clement Edmonds  
Remembrancer of the Citie of  
London  
Printed at LONDON for  
Mathew Lownes 1604.



M

1st ed. 1600 G. K. after 199





TO THE PRINCE HIS  
HIGHNES, HENRY FRE-  
DERICKE, ELDEST SONNE TO  
OVR SOVERAIGNE LORD  
THE KING.

**H**Auing heretofore (most worthie Prince) published a part of this booke, describing the practife of former times, as a Paralel to the fashion of our moderne warres: I was purposed after that Essay, not to proceed any further therein, but to leaue the rest to the gaine of euery priuate indeuour. Yet when I found in his Maiesties princely pen, how much his Excellent wisdom doth value these Commentaries, for the worthinesse of the matter aboue al prophane Histories; iudging the Author worthie more honour, then any of the Ethnicke Emperours or other great Commanders of the world; I was incouraged to adde that which remained, and make the worke perfect with all his parts. Which being brought to an end, I do in all humbleness present to the gracious Patronage of your Princely fauor. And the rather, for-



THE EPISTLE DEDICATORIE.

asmuch as those maine principles of warre which his Maiestie hath set downe by way of precept to informe you, are here confirmed by Cæsars example, and proued at large frō the true grounds of that Art, according to the practise of the best discipline. Wherein if this indeuour of mine shall anie way seeme worthie your Princely regard, whose high vnderstanding in this your tenderesse, is admired by the world: I shall euer vowe my after-times to your seruices; and thinke this time improued to the vtmost. And albeit my pen hath treated of warre, yet my prayers shall euer be to the Almighty, to giue your Highnes a wise and vnderstanding heart, that you may beautifie all your dayes with the ornaments of peace; and make them happie with abundance of pietie, as the chiefeest blessings of a Princely condition.

*Your Highnesse*

*most humble seruant,*

CLEMENT EDMONDS.

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
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


## TO THE READER.

**I***T may be said, that Many talke of Robin Hood that neuer shot in his bow. But it must be vnderstood, that as well incompetent iudges as impertinēt discourfers, are within this compasse. Such Martialists as are acquainted with the discipline of warre, or know what is fitting the cariage of an Armie, are they to whom the iudgement belongeth, that must either approoue or disallow these labours. Amongst whom, the former part of this worke hath alreadie found that passage, as by their good fauor, may happely serue to drawe the sequele into the like fortune. Howsoever, my desire is, that such as shall be pleased to view these Essayes, will accept the same with that minde as I offer them, hauing bent my indeuor to gratifie such as fauour the reading of this Historie: without either attribute to mine owne, or preiudice to any other mans iudgement. Farewell.*







READING AND DISCOURSE,  
ARE REQUISITE TO MAKE A SOVL-

dier perfect in the Arte militarie, how great soe-  
*uer his knowledge may be, which long experi-*  
ence and much practise of Armes  
*hath gayned.*



WHEN I consider the weaknesse of mans iudgment in censuring things best knowne vnto it selfe, and the disability of his discourse in discovering the nature of vnacquainted objectes; choosung rather to hold any sensible impression, which custome hath by long practise inured, then to hearken to some other more reasonable perswasion: I do not maruell that such soldiers, whose knowledge groweth only from experience and consisteth in the rules of their owne practise; are hardly perswaded, that history and speculatiue learning are of any vse in perfecting of their Arte, being so different in nature from the principles of their cunning, and of so small affinity with the life of action; wherein the vse of Armes and atchievements of war seeme to haue their chiefe being. But those purer spirits embilished with learning, and enriched with the knowledge of other mens fortunes; wherein variety of accidents affordeth variety of instructions, and the mutuall conference of thinges happened, begetteth both similitudes and differences, contrary natures, but yet iointly concurring to season our iudgment with discretion, and to enstall wisdom in the gouernment of the minde: These men I say, mounting aloft, with the winges of contemplation, doe easily discover the ignorance of such Martialistes, as are only trained vp in the schoole of practise, and taught their rudiments vnder a few yeares experience, which serueth to interpret no other author but it selfe, nor can approue his maximes, but by his own authority; and are rather moued to pittie their hard fortune, hauing learned onely to be ignorant, then to enuie their skill in matter of war, when they oppose themselues against so manifest a truth as this: that a meere practicall knowledge cannot make a perfect soldier.

A i.

Which



Which proposition that I may the better confirme, giue me leaue to reason a little of the groundes of learning, and dispute from the habitude of Arts and sciences; which are then said to be perfectly attained, when their particular parts are in such sort apprehended, that from the variety of that indiuiduality, the intellectuall power frameth generall notions and maximes of rule, vniting tearms of the same nature in one head, and distinguishing diuerſities by differences of properties, aptely diuiding the whole body into his greatest and smallest branches, and fitting each part with his descriptions, duties, cautions and exceptions: for vnlesse the vnderstanding be in this sort qualified and able by logical discouſe, to ascend, by way of composition, from singularitie to catholike conceptions; and returne againe the same waie, to the lowest order of his partitions, the minde cannot be saide to haue the perfection of that Arte, nor instructed in the true vse of that knowledge: but guiding her selfe by some broken preceptes, feeleth more want by that shee hath not, then benefite by that shee hath. Whereby it followeth, that a science deuided into manie braunches, and consisting in the multiplicite of diuers members, being all so interessed in the Bulke, that a Mayme of the smallest part causeth either debilitie or deformitie in the bodie, cannot be saide to bee throughlie attayned, nor conceiued with such a profiting apprehension as stealeth the minde with true iudgement, and maketh the scholler maister in his Arte, vnlesse the nature of these particularities bee first had and obtained.

And for as much as no one science or faculty whatsoeuer, in multitude and pluralitie of partes, may anie waie be comparable to the Arte militarie, wherein euery small and vnrespected circumstance quite altereth the nature of the Action, and breedeth such disparitie and difference, that the resemblance of their equall participating properties is blemished with the dissimilitude of their disagreeing partes; it cannot be denied, but he that is acquainted with most of these particular occurrences, and best knoweth the varietie of chances in the course of warre, must needes be thought a more perfect souldier, and deserueth a title of greater dignity in the profession of Armes, then such as content themselves with a fewe common precepts and ouer-worne rules: without which, as they cannot be said at all to be souldiers, so with them and no more, they no way deserue the name of skilfull and perfect men of war. Now whether meere experience, or experience ioyned with reading and discouſe, doe feast the minde with more variety and choise of matter, or entertaine knowledge with greater plentie of nouelties, incident to expeditions and vse of Armes, I will vse no other reason to determine of this question, then that which Franciscus Patricius alleadgeth in his parallely, where he handleth this argument which I intreat of.

He that followeth a warre (saith he) doth see either the course of the whole, or but a part onely. If his knowledge extend no farther then a part, he hath learned lesse then he that sawe the whole: but admit he hath seene and learned the instructions of one whole warre, he hath notwithstanding learned lesse then he that hath seene the proceeding of two such warres. And hee againe hath not  
seene

leeue so much as another that hath serued in three seuerall warres: and so by degrees, a souldier that hath serued ten yeares, must needes knowe more then one that hath not serued so long. And to conclude, he that hath receiued 22 yeares stipend (which was the iust time of seruice amongst the Romans before a souldier could be dismist) hath greater meanes of experience than another that hath not so long a time followed the campe, and cannot challenge a discharge by order and custome: And hence it consequently followeth, that if in one or more or all these warres, there haue happened few or no actions of seruice, which might teach a souldier the practise of Armes; that then his learning doth not counteruaile his labour: And if the warre through the negligence, or ignorance of the chiefe commanders haue bene ill caried, he can boast of no knowledge, but that which acquainted him with the corruptions of militarie discipline; if the part which he followed were defeated and ouerthrowne, he knoweth by experience howe to loose, but not how to gaine: And therefore it is not onely experience and practice which maketh a souldier worthe of his name, but the knowledge of the manifold accidents which rise from the variety of humane actions, wherein reason and error, like merchants in trafficke, enterchange contrarie euentures of fortune, giuing sometime copper for siluer, and balme for poyson, and repaying againe the like commoditie as time and circumstances doe answere their directions: And this knowledge is onely to be learned in the registers of antiquitie and in histories, recording the motions of former ages.

Caius Iulius Cæsar (whose actions are the subiect of these discourses) after his famous victories in France, and that he had gotten the prouinces of Spaine, broken the strength of the Romaine Empire at Pharsalia; was held a souldier surmounting enuie and all her exceptions; and yet notwithstanding all this, the battell he had with Pharnaces king of Pontus, was like to haue buried the glorie of his former conquestes, in the dishonourable memorie of a wilfull ouerthrow: for hauing posselt himselfe of a hill of great aduantage, he began to encampe himselfe in the topp thereof. Which Pharnaces perceiuing, (being lodged likewise with his campe vpon a mountaine confronting the Romaines) imbattelled his men, marched down from his campe into the valley, and mounted his forces vp the hill, where the Romaines were busied about their intrenchments, to giue them battell. All which, Cæsar tooke but for a brauado; and measuring the enimie by himselfe, could not be perswaded that any such foolehardines could carrie men headlong into so dangerous an aduenture, vntill they were come so neere, that he had scarce any time to call the legions from their worke, and to giue order for the battell: which so amazed the Romaines, that vnlesse, as Cæsar himselfe saith, the aduantage of the place and the benignitie of the gods had greatly fauoured them; Pharnaces had at that time reuenged the ouerthrow of Pompei and the Senat, and restored the Romaine Empire to libertie. Which maie learne vs how necessary it is (besides experience, which in Cæsar was infinit) to perfect our knowlege with variety of chances: and to meditate vpon the effectes of other mens aduentures, that their harmes maie be our warnings, and their happie proceedings our fortunate directions.

And albeit amongst so manie decades of Historie, which pregnant wits haue

presented to these latter ages, we seldome or neuer meete with any one accident which iumpeth in all pointes with an other of the like nature, that shall happen to fall out in managing a warre, or setting forth of an armie; and so doe seeme to reape little benefit by that we reade, and make small vse of our great trauell. Yet we must vnderstand that in the Audit of Reason, there are many offices, which through the soueraigne power of the discoursive faculty, receiue great commodities by whatsoeuer falleth vnder their iurisdiction, and suffer no action to passe without due triall of his nature, and examination of his state; that so the iudgment maie not be defrauded of her reuenues, nor the minde of her learning: for notwithstanding disagreeing circumstances, and differences of formes, which seeme to cut off the priuiledge of imitation, and frustrate the knowledge we haue obtained by reading, the intellectuall facultie hath authoritie to examine the vse, and looke into the inconueniences of these wants and diuersities, and by the helpe of reason to turne it to her aduantage; or so to counterpoise the defect; that in triall and execution it shall not appeare anie disadvantage. For as in all other sciences, and namely in geometrie, of certaine bare elements, and common sentences, which sense admitteth to the apprehension, the powers of the soule frame admirable Theoremes and Problemes of infinit vse, proceeding with certaintie of demonstration, from proposition to proposition, and from conclusion to conclusion, and still make new wonders as they go, besides the strangenesse of their Architecture, that vpon such plaine and easie foundations, they should erect such curious and beautifull buildings: so in the Arte Military, these examples, which are taken from histories, are but plaine kinde of principles, on which the minde worketh to her best aduantage, and vseth reason with such dexterity, that of inequalities she concludeth an equality, and of dissimilitudes most sweete resemblances; and so she worketh out her owne perfection by discourse, and in time groweth so absolute in knowledge, that her sufficiency needeth no further directions: but as Lomazzo the Milinese, in that excellent worke which he writ of picturing, saith of a skilfull painter, that being to drawe a portraiture of gracefull lineaments, will neuer stand to take the symmetrie by scale, nor marke it out according to rule; but hauing his iudgment habituated by knowledge, and perfected with the variety of shapes and proportions; his knowledge guideth his eie, and his eie directeth his hand, and his hand followeth both with such facilitie of cunning, that each of them serue for a rule wherby the true measures of nature are exactly expressed. The like may I say of a skilfull Souldier, or any Artizan in his faculty, when knowledge hath once purified his iudgment, and tuned it to the key of true apprehension.

*Lib. 3.*

And although there are many that will easily admit a reconciliation of this disagreement, in the resemblance of accidents being referred to the arbitrement of a well tempered spirit; yet they will by no means acknowledge, that those monstrous and inimitable exâples of valour & magnanimity (whereof antiquity is prodigall, & spendeth as though time should neuer want such treasure) can anie way auaille the maners of these daies, which if they were as they ought to be, would appeare but conterfeit to the luster of a golden age, nor yet comparable



ble to siluer or brasle, or the strength of yron, but deserue no better title then earth or clay, whereof the frame of this age consisteth. For what resemblance (say they) is betweene the customs of our times, & the actions of those ancient Heroes? They obserued equity as well in warre as in peace: for vertue rather flourished by the naturall disposition of men, then by lawe and authority; the tenure of their Empire was valour in warre and concord in peace; the greatest treasure which they esteemed, were the deedes of armes which they had atchieued for their countrey, adorning the temples of their gods with pietie, and their priuate houses with glory, pardoning rather then prosecuting a wrong, and taking nothing from the vanquished but ability of doing iniury: But the course of our times hath another bias, for couetousnesse hath subuerted both faith and equity, and our valour affecteth nothing but ambition, pride and cruelty tyrannize in our thoughtes, and subtilty teacheth vs to carrie rather a faire countenance, then a good nature; our meanes of getting are by fraud & extortion, and our manner of spending is by wast and prodigality; not esteeming what we haue of our owne, but coueting that which is not ours; men effeminated and women impudent, vsing riches as seruants to wickednesse, and preuenting natures appetite with wanton luxury; supplanting vertue with trecherie, and vsing victory with such impiety, as though *iniuriam facere, were imperio uti*: and therefore the exemplarie patternes of former times wherein true honour is expressed, may serue to be gazed vpon, but no way to be imitated by this age, being too subtile to deale with honesty, and wanting courage to incounter valour. I must needs confesse, that he that compareth the history of Liuius with that of Guichardine shall finde great difference in the subiects which they handle; for Liuius triumpheth in the conquestes of vertue, and in euery page erecteth trophes vnto valour, making his discourse like Cleanthes table, wherein vertue is described in her entire maiestie, and so sweetned with the presence & seruice of the graces, that all they which behold her are rapt with admiration of her excellencie, and charmed with the loue of her perfection: but Guichardine hath more then Theseus taske to performe, being to winde through the labyrinthes of subtilty, and discover the quaint practises of politicians, wherein publike and open designs are oftentimes but shadowes of more secret proiectes, and these againe serue as foiles to more eminent intentions; being also discoloured with dissimulation, and so insnared in the sleighes of subtilty, that when you looke for war, you shall finde peace; and expecting peace, you shall fall into troubles, dissentions and wars: So crabbed and crooked is his argument in respect of Liuius fortune, and such arte is required to vnfolde the truth of these mysteries.

But to answer this obiection in a word, and so to proceede to that which followeth, I say those immortall memories of vertue which former time recordeth, are more necessary to be knowne, then any stratagemes of subtler ages: for equitie and valour being truly apprehended so season the motions of the soule, that albeit in so corrupt a course, they cannot peraduenture stir vp imitation; yet they oftentimes hinder many malicious practises, and diuelfish deuises, when euill is reprobued by the knowledge of good, and condemned by the



authority of better ages. And if we will needs follow those steppes which the present course of the world hath traced, and plaie the Cretian with the Cretian; this obiection hindereth nothing, but that historie, especiallie these of latter times, affordeth sufficient instructions to make a souldier perfect in that point.

Let not therefore anie man despise the sound instructions which learning affordeth, nor refuse the helps that historie doth offer to perfect the weaknesse of a short experience, especially when no worth can counteruaile the waight of so great a businesse: for I take the office of a chiefe commander, to be a subiect capable of the greatest wisdome that may be apprehended by naturall meanes, being to manage a multitude of disagreeing mindes, as a fit instrument to execute a desigine of much consequence and great expectation, and to qualifie both their affections and apprehensions according to the accidentes which rise in the course of his directions; besides the true iudgement, which he ought to haue of such circumstances as are most important to a fortunate end, wherein our prouidence cannot haue enough either from learning or experience, to preuent disaduantages, or to take holde of opportunities. Neither can it be denied, but as this knowledge addeth perfection to our iudgment, so it serueth also as a spur to glory, and increaseth the desire of honour in such as beholde the archieuments of vertue, commended to a perpetuall posteritie, hauing themselves the like meanes to consecrate their memorie to succeeding ages, wherein they may serue for examples of valour, and reape the reward of true honour. Or to conclude, if we thirst after the knowledge of our owne fortune, and long to foresee the ende of that race which we haue taken, which is the chiefeest matter of consequence in the vse of Armes; what better coniecture can be made, then to looke into the course of former times, which haue proceeded from like beginnings, and were continued with like meanes, and therefore not vnlikely to fort vnto like endes?

Salust. de  
bello Inгур.


And now if it be demanded whether reading or practice haue the first place in this Arte, and serueth as a foundation to the rest of the building? Let Marius answere this question, who enuying at the nobilitie of Rome, saith thus. *Qui postquam consules facti sunt, acta Maiorum & Gracorum militaria precepta legere ceperint: homines praposteri, nam legere quam fieri, tempore posterius, re & usu prius est.* Whereas (saith he) reading ought to go before practise (although it follow it in course of time, for there is no reading, but of some thing practised before,) these preposterous men, after they are made Consuls and placed at the helme of gouernment, begin to reade, when they should practise that which they had read; and so bewray their insufficiencie of knowledge by vsing out of time that, which in time is most necessarie. This testimonie gaue Marius of reading & booke learning, being himselfe an enemy to the same, for as much as all his knowledge came by meere experience. But howsoever his iudgment was good in this point: for since that all motion and action proceedeth from the soule, and cannot well be produced, vntill the Idea thereof be first imprinted in the minde, according to which patterne the outward being and sensible resemblance is duely fashioned; how is it possible that any action can be well expref-

sed,

fed, when the minde is not directed by knowledge to dispose it in that sort, as shall best agree with the occurrences of such natures, as are necessarily interested both in the meanes and in the end thereof? And therefore speculative knowledge as the Tramontane, to direct the course of all practise is first to be respected.

But that I may not seeme partiall in this controuersie, but carrie an equall hand betweene two so necessarie yokefellowes, giue me leaue to conclude in a word, the benefite of practise, and define the good which commeth from experience; that so nothing that hath bene spoken may seeme to come from affection, or proceede from the forge of vniust partiality. And first it cannot be denied, but that practise giueth boldnesse and assurance in action, and maketh men expert in such things they take in hand, for no man can rest vpon such certainty, through the theorie of knowledge; as he that hath seene his learning verified by practise, and acknowledged by the testimony of assured prooffe: Besides, there are many other accomplements gotten only by practise, which grace the presence of knowledge, & giue credit to that which we haue read; as first to learne the vse and aduantage of the armes which we beare; secondly, by frequent aspect and familiarity of dangers, and accidents of terrour, to learne to feare nothing but dishonour, to make no difference betweene heate and cold, sommer and winter, to sleepe in all places as on a bed, and at the same time to take paines and suffer penury, with many other difficulties which custome maketh easie, and cannot be gotten but by vse and practise.

And thus at length, I haue brought a shallow discourse to an abrupt end, wishing with greater zeale of affection then I am able with manifest prooffe of reason, to demonstrate the necessity, that both these partes were by our souldiers so regarded, that neither practise might march in obstinate blindness without learned knowledge; nor this againe be entertained with an idle apprehension without practise: but that both of them may be respected, as necessarie partes to make a compleat nature; wherein knowledge as the intellectuall part giueth life and spirit to the action, and practise as the materiall substance maketh it of a sensible being, and like a skilfull workman expresseth the excellency, which knowledge hath fore conceiued: wishing no man to despaire of effecting that by practise which the Theorike of knowledge commendeth. For *Cur desperes nunc posse fieri, quod iam toties factum est?*



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THE ... OF ...

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THE SVMMME OF THE  
FIRST BOOKE OF CÆSARS  
COMMENTARIES, WITH OBSER-  
uations vpon the same, discouering the  
excellencie of Cæsars militia.

THE ARGVMENT.

**I**N this first booke, are contained the specialities of two great wars, begun and ended both in a summer: the first, between Cæsar & the Heluetij: the second, between him and Ariouistus king of the Germans. The historie of the Heluetians may be reduced to three principall heads: vnder the first, are the reasons that moued the Heluetians to entertaine so desperate an expedition; and the preparation which they made for the same. The second, containeth their defeate by Cæsar: and the third, their returne into their countrey. That of Ariouistus deuידeth it selfe into two parts: the first giueth the causes that induced Cæsar to vndertake that war: the second intreateth of the warre it selfe, and particularly describeth Ariouistus ouerthrow.

Switcheys.

CHAP. I.

Gallia described: the Heluetians dislike their native  
seate, and propound to themselves larger territories in  
the continent of Gallia. Orgetorix feedeth  
this humor, for his owne ad-  
uantage.



**G**ALLIA is diuided into three partes, differing one from another in manners, in language, and in lawes. The first part is inhabited by the Belgæ: the second by the Celtæ, whom we call Galli: and the third by the Aquitani. Belgia is the northeast part of Gallia, bounded on the East with the riuer Rhene, and deuided from the Celtæ, with the riuers Marne and Sene. The inhabitants of this Belgia, are without comparison the stoutest and best men at armes amongst all the Gallies: for besides, that they are far remote from the ciuility of the Roman Prouince, and vnacquainted with traffike or entercourse of stran-  
gers,

Cæsar.

Matrona &  
Sequena.



Two states in  
the duchie of  
Burgundie.

The lake of  
Geneua.  
Mont ionx.

gers, they are in continuall warres with the Germans, which maketh them hardy, expert and valorous. The Celta possesse the greatest part of Gallia, and haue the Ocean, Sene, Garum, and the upper part of Rhene for their confines. Aquitania is limited with the riuer Garume and the Perinaan hils. In each of these partes are diuers states and common weales, governed for the most part by the Annuall magistracie of their nobility, but all divided into factions and parties; whereof the Hedui and Sequani, are contrarie, chiefe and opposite ring-leaders.

The chiefe reason that moued the Heluetians to forsake their countrey, was the good opinion they had of their owne vertue and magnanimity, and the smal capacity and circuit of their territories: For Heluetia being bounded with the famous riuers Rhene and Rhone, and with the lake Lemanus, and the high hanging rockes of the hill Iura, extending it selfe within these boundes, but 24 miles in length and 180 in breadth, seemed too narrow a roome to containe so warlike a people, that long before had ouerflowne the marches of their countrey, with the conceit they had of their owne valour, and that it heard that nature should oppose it selfe by riuers and mountaines against the Prowesse, which no enemy could euer resist: and therefore, they resolved to forsake their countrey, which first gaue them breath and being, rather then it should hinder a correspondent proceeding to their warlike nature. These coles of ambition were first kindled, and daily blowne, by the earnest perswasions and impulsions of Orgetorix, the chiefe man of authority amongst the Heluetians, both for his wealth and nobility, who not contented to be greatest in that manner he was; but affecting the greatnesse of princely dignity, thought no meanes fitter to shadowe the alteration of their state, then the change of their soile, and in their new seate and place of rest to laie the foundation of a new gouernment.

#### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



HE that will examine this expedition of the Heluetians, by the transigrations and sittings of other nations, shall finde some vn-exampled particularities in the course of their proceeding: for first it hath neuer beene heard, that any people vtterly abandoned that countrey which nature or prouidence had allotted them; vnlesse they were driuen thereunto by a generall calamity, as the infection of the aire, the cruelty & oppression of a neighbour nation, as were the Sueuians, who thought it great honor to suffer no man to border vpon their confines; or some other vniuersal, which made the place inhabitable and the people willing to vndertake a voluntarie exile. But oftentimes we read, that when the inhabitants of a country were so multiplied, that the place was ouercharged with multitudes of offspring, and like a poore father had more children then it was able to sustaine, the abounding surplus was sent out to seeke new fortunes in forraigne countries, and to possesse themselves of a resting seat; which might recompence the wants of their natieue country, with a plenteous reuenuue of necessary supplementes: And in this sort, we read that Rome sent out manie Colonies into diuers parts of her Empire: And in this maner the ancient Galles disburdened themselves of their superflui-ty,

ty, and sent them into Asia. The Gothes came from the Ilandes of the Balticke sea, and in Sulla his time swarmed ouer Germany: besides many other nations whose transmigrations are particularly described by Lazius. But amongst all these, we find none that so forsooke their country, but there remained some behind to inhabit the same, from whence as frō a fountaine, succeeding ages might deriue the streame of that ouerflowing multitude, and by them take notice of the causes, which moued them vnto it: for their maner was in all such expeditions, and sending out of Colonies, to deuide themselves into two or three parts, equall both in equality and number. For after they had parted their common people into euen companies, they deuided their nobility with as great equality as they could, among the former partitions; and then casting lots, that part which went out to seeke new aduentures, left their landes and possessions to the rest that remained at home; and so by industrie they supplied that defect which continuance of time had drawen vpon them. And this was the means which the first inhabitants of the earth found out after the floud, to people the vnhabited places, and to keepe off the inconueniences of scarcity and famine.

#### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



E that would prognosticate by the course of these seuerall proceedings, whether of the two betokened better succeſſe, hath greater reason to foretell happines to these which I last spake of, then to the Heluetians; vnlesse their valour were the greater, & quitted all difficulties which hatred and enuie would cast vpon them: for an action which sauoureth of necessitie, (which was alwaies vnderstood in sending out a colonie) hath a more plausible passport amongst men, then that which proceedeth from a proud voluntarie motion: for as men can be content to tolerate the one, if it concerne not their particular; so on the other side, they count it gaine to punish pride with shame, and to oppose themselves against the other.

#### THE THIRD OBSERVATION.



Rgetorix, thirsting after princely dignity, discouereth the humor of vaine glory. For not contented with the substance of honor, being already of greatest power amongst the Heluetians, and ordering the affaires of the state by his owne direction, thought it nothing without the markes and title of dignitie, vnto which the inconueniences of maiestie are annexed: not considering that the best honour sitteth not alwaies in imperial thrones, nor weareth the diadems of Princes; but oftentimes resteth it selfe in meaner places, and shineth better with obscurer titles. For prooſe whereof, to omit antiquity, take the familie of the Medices in Florence, and particu-

B ij.

larly

larly Colimo and Lorenzo, whole vertue railed them to that height of honour, that they were nothing inferiour to the greatest potentates of their time, being themselves but priuate gentlemen in that state, and bearing their proper names as their greatest titles. But howsoever the opportunity of changing their soile, was well obserued by Orgetorix, as the fittest meanes to attempt an innouation; but the successe depended much vpon the fortunate proceeding of their expedition: for as a multitude of that nature, can be content to attribute a great part of their happines, wherein euery man thinketh himselfe particularly interessed, to an eminent leader; and in that vniuersall extasie of ioye will easily admit an alteration of their state: so if the issue be in any respect vnfortunate, no man will acknowledge himselfe faultie, but euery one desiring to discharge his passion vpon some object: A chiefe director is likeliest to be the marke, at which the darts of their discontent will be throwen, and then he will finde it hard to effect what he intendeth.

## C H A P. II.

Orgetorix practises are discovered: his death: the  
*Heluetians continue the resolution of their ex-*  
pedition, and prepare themselves  
accordingly.

Cæsar.



**B**UT Orgetorix failed in the first entrance into his proiectes, for seeking to colour his attempt by the example of Casticus, a man of the like authority amongst the Sequani, and Dumnorix amongst the Hedui, (whom he perswaded) in their seuerall states to clime the same steps of ambition, he reuealed his intent, and ended it also: for being called by the Heluetians to answer that treason, before he came to triall, his body was found dead, not without suspicion of murthering himselfe. The Heluetians notwithstanding continued their determined voyage, making preparations correspondent for the same; and for their better prouision of victuals, they thought two yeares little enough to study tillage, to furnish themselves with conuenient store of corne; and in the meane time to provide themselves of cartes and cariages, that nothing might be wanting to make the iourney easie and the end fortunate. And that no neare borderer might interrupt with newe troubles, a designe of such hope, they made peace with all their neighbour nations, and resolved for their owne aduantage, to part friendes with those, whom they had euere liued with in continuall iars. And lastly, considering the mutability of mans nature, which scarce continueth constant the space of one houre, but altereth his determinations, according as he diuersly apprehendeth the same subiect, least any of them should change their minde, and suffer the difficulties of the action to ouersway the honour that might ensue thereof: in the heate of their forwardnes they made a law, which at the ende of two yeares, commanded their departure.

THE



## THE OBSERVATION.



As these prouisoers were all requisite, so one thing was omitted, which might haue furthered their good fortune more then any thing thought of, which was to haue concealed by all meanes the time of their departure: for all the beastes of the wood must needs stand at gaze, when such Lyons roused themselves out of their dens, and be then very watchfull of their safety when they knewe the instant of time, when some of their spoiles must needs be offered to appease their furie: Or at the least it behooued them so to haue dealt by hostages and treaty, that such as were likeliest and best able to crosse their designements, might haue bene no hinderance of their proceedings: considering there were but two waies out of their countrey by which they might go, the one narrow and difficult betwene the hill Iura and the riuer Rhone, by the countrey of the Sequani: the other through Prouence far easier and shorter, but not to be taken but by the permission of the Romans. But howsoever their errour was, that after two yeares prouision to go, and hauing made an exterminating decree which inioyned them to go, when they came to the point they knew not what way to go.

*The omission  
in the Helue-  
tian expedi-  
tion.*

## CHAP. III.

Cæsar denieth the Heluetians passage through the  
*Roman Prouince: he fortifieth the passage*  
betweene the hill Iura, and the  
*lake of Geneva.*



Cæsar proconsull of the prouince in Gallia, being then at Rome, and hearing what course the Heluetians purposed to take, made great iourneyes to hasten into the Prouince, least it should receiue any detriment by them: and to that ende he gathered what forces he could at his first arriuall, which was but one legion, and caused the bridge at Geneva to be broken downe, to hinder their passage what he might: And then too late the Heluetians began to perceiue their omissions, for finding themselves ready to depart, they raised all their walled townes being twelue in number, and burnt 400 villages besides priuat houses, with the rest of the corne which they could not carrie with them, and appointed a day to meete all upon the bankes of Rhone, which day was the fift of the Calendes of Aprill, in the Consulship of Lu. Piso, and A. Gabinius: at their arriuall under-

*Cæsar.*

*B iii.*

*standing*



*standing of the resistance which Cæsar made; they sent unto him some of the chiefeſt of their Tribes, to intreat a quiet paſſage through the Province. Although Cæsar was reſolved to deny the their paſſport, yet for that time he thought it beſt to ſtand doubtfull of an anſwere; that he might the better provide himſelfe in the meane time, to make good his deniall if it were reſuſed. The reaſon that moued him to deny them paſſage, was grounded vpon the ouerthrow which L. Cæſius a Roman Conſull had receiued by the Heluetians, wherein the Conſull himſelfe was ſlaine, and the ſouldiers ſolde for bodſlaues: And this accident procured their hinderance for two reſpects; firſt, he thought that the people of Rome could not with the maiesty of their Empire, ſhewe any fauour to a nation that had ſo ſoiled them, leaſt they ſhould ſeeme to ſtand in feare of ſuch as durſt make head againſt their armies, and buckle with the ſtrength of their legions. Secondly, he thought it impoſſible that the Heluetians hauing lent them ſuch a blow, could paſſe through their Province without further violence: and therefore in this time of deliberation, hee made a ditch, and a rampier from the hill Iura to the lake of Geneva, containing 19 miles in length. The rampier was 16 foote high with an anſwerable latitude and depth of the ditch: and this he fortified with many caſtles well manned with ſouldiers, and ſtored with munition. Notwithſtanding the Heluetians attended peaceably their daie of audience; and then returned and receiued a deniall.*

#### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



*His manner of prolonging of time to renforce the troupes or get ſome other aduantage, as it was then of great uſe to Cæſar, and hath oftentimes bene practiſed to good purpoſe; ſo doth it diſcouer to a circumſpect enemie, by the directions in the meane time (which cannot eaſily be ſhadowed) the drift of that delay; and ſo inuited him with greater courage, to take the oportunitie of that preſent aduantage; eſpecially if tract of time maie ſtrengthen the one, and not further the other, which is eaſily diſcerned by the circumſtances of the action.*

#### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



*He requeſt of the Heluetians ſeemed to deſerue a facile anſwere, being in effect no more then nature had giuen to the riuer Rhone, which was to paſſe through the province, with as much ſpeed & as little hurt as they could: but Cæſar looking further into the matter and comparing things already paſt, with occurrences that were to follow after, found the maiesty of the Roman Empire to be intereſſed in the anſwere, being either to maintaine her greatnes by reſiſting her enemies, or to degenerate from ancient vertue, by gratifying ſuch as ſought her ruin, which in matter of ſtate are things*

things of great consequence. And further, he knew it to be an vnwise courte to suffer an enemy to haue meanes of doing hurt; considering that the nature of man is alwaies prone to loade him with further wronges whom he hath once iniured: not but that he could peradventure be content to end the quarell vpon that aduantage; but fearing the other, whom he wronged, to expect but an oportunitie of reuenge, he gets what aduantage he can before hand, and so ceaseth not vntill he haue added a bloudie end to an iniurious beginning.

## THE THIRD OBSERVATION.



Concerning this marvellous fortification, betwene the hill and the lake, how seruiceable such workes were vnto him in all his warres; in what sort, and in howe small time, they were made, I will defer the treatise of them vntill I come to the height of Aleſia, where he gaue some ground of that hyperbolicall speech: *An me deſeto, non ammaduertebatis decem habere lectas quidem legiones populum Romanum, quæ non ſolum vobis obſistere ſed etiam cælum diruere poſſent?*

## CHAP. IIII.

The Heluetians failing to paſſe the Rhone, take the way through the countrey of the Sequani. Caſar haſteth into Italie, and there inrolleth more legions: and returning, ouerthroweth part of them at the riuer Arar.



He Heluetians perceiuing Caſars determination, reſolved to redeeme the ouerſlip they had committed in the courſe of their proiect, with the power of their forces; and to open a way by valour and armes, where peaceable intreatie had no paſſage: and therefore, they endeuoured ſome by boats, and others by ſordes & ſhallowes, to paſſe the Rhone, and enter into Prouince, maugre Caſar and his legion. But being eaſily repelde by meanes of the fortification, they made a vertue of neceſſity, and tooke the narrow and difficult way, through the territories of the Sequani: of whom by Dumnorix interceſſion they obtained a friendly through-fare. In the meane time, Caſar haſted into Italie, & there inrolled two new legions, and tooke three more out of their ſtanding campes in Aquileia: and with theſe ſiue legions returned ſpeedily into Gallia. At his returne hee vnderſtood, that the Heluetians had paſſed the ſtraites, and were now ſacking the territories of the Edui, a ſtate that had alwaies deſerued well of the people of Rome.

Caſar.

The

Zuricke,

The Ambari complained in like manner of the same hostilitie: and so did the Allobroges which inhabited beyond the Rhone. Caesar not thinking it convenient to linger any longer, and understanding that three partes of their troupes had already past the riuer Arar, and a fourth remained to be transported, he thought it not good to forslow that advantage: and therefore at the third watch of the night, he marched out of his campe with three legions, to the place where they laie, and finding them scattered and dispersed; he put the greatest part of them to the sword, and the rest escaped into the woods neere adioyning. This part that was thus defeated, was named Pagus Tigurinus.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



His defeat being chiefly a seruice of execution vpon such as were taken at a dangerous disadvantage, which men call vnaware, containeth these two aduises. First, not to neglect that advantage which Sertorius by the haire of his horse taile hath proued to be very important, that beginning with a part, it is a matter of no difficulty to ouercome the whole. Secondly, it may serue for a caueat, so to transport an Armie ouer a water, where the enemy is within a reasonable march, that no part may be so seuered from the bodie of the Armie, that advantage may thereby be taken to cut them off all together, and separate them from themselves. The safest and most honourable way, to transport an Armie ouer a riuer, is by a bridge, placing at each end sufficient troupes of horse and foote, to defend the Armie from sudden assaults, as they passe ouer the water; and thus went Caesar ouer the Rhene into Germanie two seuerall times.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

The manner of  
their watch.

Concerning the circumstance of time, when Caesar went out of his campe, which is noted to be in the third watch, we must vnderstand that the Romans diuided the whole night into foure watches, euerie watch containing three houres; and these watches were distinguished by seuerall notes & sound of cornets or trumpets, that by the distinction and diuersitie therof, it might easily be knowne what watch was sounded. The charge & office of sounding the watches, belonged to the chiefeest Centurio of a legion, whom they called Primipilus; or Primus Centurio, at whose pavilion the trumpeters attended, to be directed by his houre-glasse. The first watch began alwaies at sunne-setting, and continued three houres, (I vnderstand such houres as the night contained, being diuided into twelue: for the Romans diuided their night as well as their day into twelue equall spaces, which they called houres) the second watch continued vntill midnight; and then the third watch began, and contained likewise three houres; the fourth was equall to the rest, and



and continued vntill sunne rising. So that by this phrale *de tertia vigilia*, we vnderstand that Cæsar went out of his campe in the third watch, which was after midnight: and so we must conceiue of the rest of the watches, as often as we shal finde them mentioned in historie.

## CAP. V.

Cæsar passeth ouer the riuer Arar: his horsemen  
*incountred with the Heluetians and were*  
put to the worst.



HE Heluetians hauing passed the riuer, Cæsar made haste to followe after, and making a bridge he transported ouer his legions in one day, which the Heluetians could scarce doe in twentie: And sending all his horse to the number of foure thousand which he had raised in the Prouince and amongst the Hedui, to discover what waie the enemy tooke, it happened that they fell so neare vpon the rereward of the Heluetians, that they were forced to giue battell in a place of disadvantage, and by that meanes some of them were slaine and the rest put to flight. The Heluetians made insolent with this victory, for as much as 500 of their men had put to route so great a multitude, began now boldly to resist, and sometimes part of their rereward would violently assault the Roman legions. Cæsar held his men from giuing battell, thinking it sufficient for the present to keepe the enemy from pillaging, forrage, and depopulation: and so they marched fiftene daies together in such sort, that there was not aboute foue or six miles between the rereward of the Heluetians and the vanguard of the Romans.

Cæsar.

## THE OBSERVATION.



His example of the Heluetians maie lesson a commander, not to waxe insolent vpon euery overthrow which the enemy taketh, but duely to waite the true causes of a victorie gotten or an overthrowe taken; that apprehending the right currant of the action, he maie neither vaunt of a blinde victorie, nor be dismayed at a casuall mishappe. And herein let a heedfull warines so moderate the sequels of victorie in a triumphing spirit, that the care and deuotion to keepe still that sweete sounding fame on foot, maie as farre surpass the industrie, which he first vsed to obtaine it, as the continuance of happiness doth exceede the beginning of good fortunes. For such is the nature of our soule, that although from her infancy euen to the manhood of her age, she neuer found want of that which she lusted after; yet when she

C j.

meeteth



meeteth with a counterbuste to checke her appetite, and retraineth her affections from their satisfaction; she is as much troubled in that want, as if she had neuer received anie contentment at all: for our will to euerie object which it seeketh after, begetteth alwaies a new appetite, which is not satisfied with a former quittance, but either seeketh present paiement, or returneth discontentment vnto the minde. And as our soule is of an euermlasting being, and cannot thinke of an end, to her beginning; so she seeketh a perpetuall continuance of such thinges which she lusteth after: which hee, that meaneth to holde fortune his friend, will endeuour to maintaine.

## CHAP. VI.

Cæsar sendeth to get the aduantage of a hill, and so  
to giue the Heluetians battell: but was put off by  
false intelligence: the oportunitie being lost,  
hee intendeth prouision of  
corne.

Cæsar.



ÆSAR being aduertised by his discoverers, that the Heluetians laie vnder a hill, about eight miles distant from his campe, and understanding that the ascent vnto the toppe of the hill, on the further side from the enemy was readie and easie: in the third watch he sent Labienus with two legions, to possesse themselves of the said hill, and he himselfe followed with the rest of the Armie in the fourth watch. His direction to Labienus was, that

as soon as he perceiued him to charge the enemy below in the valley, that then he should descend with as violent a shooke as he could, and so the Heluetians should bee charged both in front and flanke at one instant. But this intent was at that time frustrated through the causelesse feare of one Publius Caudius, a man helde very skilfull in matter of warre, for his experience first vnder Sulla, and afterward with Crassus; who being sent by Cæsar to discouer whether Labienus had tooke the Hill, was stroken with such a terrour being so neare an enemy of that fame, that seeing the Roman ensignes displaied vpon the mountaine, could not be perswaded but they were the Heluetians, & returned that aduertisement to Cæsar: wherupon he desisted for that time from following his purpose, and retired to the next hill, where he imbattailed his souldiers with aduantage of the place. This oportunitie being thus lost, because the day of measuring corne vnto the souldiers, was within two daies: he would in no wise omit that care (although peradventure he might haue had the like oportunitie within a daie or two) but turned towardes Bibracte a great and opulent citie of thei Hedui 18 miles distant from his campe, and there purposed to prouide corne to paie his souldiers.

Bray in the  
county of Re-  
sell.

THE

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**H**He getting of this hill as a place of aduantage, was maruellous important to the happy successe of the battell: for the aduantage of the place is not only noted as an especial cause of easy victory, throughout this historie; but in al their warres from the very cradle of their Empire; it cleared their Armies from all difficulties, to what extremitie soeuer they were put. The first reason may be in regard of their darts and slinges, and especially their piles, which being a heaule deadly weapon, could not any waie be so available, being cast countremont or in a plaine leuell, as when the declinitie and downfall of a swelling banke did naturally second their violent impression: Neither can the shocke at handy-blowes bee anie thing so furious (which was a point of great respect in their battels) when the souldiers spent their strength in franchising the iniurie of a rising mountaine, as when the place by a naturall inclination did further their course. And to conclude, if the battell succeeded not according to their desire, the fauour of the place afforded them meanes of a strong retrait, in the highest part wherof, they had commonly their campes well fenced and fortified against all chances. If it be demaunded whether the vpper ground be of like vse, in regard of our weapons: I answere, that in a skirmish of shot, I take the aduantage to lie in the lower ground rather then on the hill; for the pieces being hastily charged, as commonly they are after the first volley, if the bullet chance to lie loose, when the nose of the peece is lower then the breech, it must needes flie at randome, and be altogether vnesfectuall: but when the nose shall be raised vpward to the side of a hill, the bullet beingrammed in with his owne waight, shall flie with greater certaintie and furie; considering the nature of the powder to be such, that the more it is stoppe and shut in, the more it seeketh to enlarge his roome, and breaketh forth with greater violence and fury. Concerning other weapons, I take the vpper ground in the shocke and incounter, to be aduantageous, as well for the sword as the pike, and would deferue as great respect, if the controuersie were decided by these weapons, as seldome times it is:

*Places of ad-  
uantage in  
the Roman  
warres.*

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**B**Y Caufidius his demeanour, we see that verified which phisitions affirme, that nothing will sooner carrie our iudgment out of her proper seate, then the passion of feare: and that amongst souldiers themselves, whom custome hath made familiarly acquainted with horror and death, it is able to turne a flocke of sheepe into a squadron of corselets, and a few canes or osiers into pikes and lancers: which may serue to aduise a discreet Generall, not easily to credit a relation of that nature, when a man of reputation, in so perfect a discipline and so experienced in the seruice of three famous Chieffes, was so surprised with feare, that he could not discern his friends from his enemies: but I wil speake more of this passion in the war, with Ariouistus.

C ij.

THE

## THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

*Their manner  
of victualing*



N every relation throughout the whole course of this historie, the first wordes are commonly these, *Re frumentaria comparata*; as the foundation & strength of every expedition, without which no man can manage a warre, according to the true maximes and rules of the Art military, but must be forced to relieue that inconvenience, with the losse of many other aduantages of great cōsequence: Which gaue occasion to Gaspard de Coligni that famous Admiral of France amongst other oracles of truth, wherewith his minde was maruellously enriched, often to vse this saying: That he that will shape that beast (meaning warre) must begin with the belly: And this rule was diligently obserued by Cæsar, who best knewe how to expresse the true portraiture of that beast, in due proportion and liuely resemblance.

The order of the Romans was, at the daie of measuring, to giue come to every particular souldier, for a certain time, which was commonly defined by circumstances: And by the measure which was giuen them, they knew the daie of the next payment; for euery footman receiued after the rate of a bushell a weeke, which was thought sufficient for him and his seruant: for if they had paid them their whole stipend in money, it might haue beene walted in vnnecessarie expences; but by this meanes they were sure of prouision for the time determined; and the sequell of the warre was prouidently cared for by the Generall.

The come being deliuered out, was husbanded, ground with hand-milles, which they carried alwaies with them, & made into hattie cakes, daintie enough for a souldiers mouth, by no other but themselves and their seruants: Neither could they sell it or exchange it for bread; for Salust reckoneth this vp amongst other dishonours, of the discipline corrupted, that the souldiers sold away their come, which was giuen them by the treasurer, & bought their bread by the day. And this manner of prouision had many speciall commodities, which are not incident to our custome of victualing: for it is impossible, that victualers should followe an Armie vpon a seruice, in the enemies countrey twentie or thirtie daies together, with sufficient prouision for an Armie: And by that meanes the Generall cannot attend aduantages and fittest oportunities, which in tract of time are often offered, but is forced either to hazard the whole, vpon vnequall tearmes, or to found an vnwilling retrait. And whereas the victualers are for the most part voluntarie, respecting nothing but their gaine; and the souldiers on the other side, carelesse of the morrow and prodigall of the present, in that turbulent marmarket, where the seller hath an eie onely to his particular, and the buyer respecteth neither the publike good nor his priuate commoditie, there is nothing to be looked for, but famine and confusion. Whereas the Romans by their manner of prouision, imposed the generall care of the publike good vpon the chiefe commander, whose dutie it was to prouide store of come for his Armie; and the particular care vpon euery priuate souldier, whome it especially



efpecially concerned to see, that the allowance which the common weale had in plentifull manner giuen him, for his maintenance, might not be wasted through negligence or prodigalitie; which excellent order, the nature of our victuals will no way admit. Their prouinces and the next confederate states furnished their Armies continually with corne; as it appeareth by this place, that for prouision of graine, he depended altogether vpon the Hedui. And when they were in the enemies country, in the time of haruest, the souldiers went out to reape and gather corne, and deliuered it thrashed and densed to the treasurer, that it might be kept vntill the daie of payment. But to leane this frugall and prouident manner of prouision as vnpossible to be imitated by this age, let vs returne to our historie, and see how the Heluetians were led, by a probable errour, to their last ouerthrow.

CHAP. VII.

The Heluetians follow after Cæsar, and ouertake the rereward. He imbattailleth his legions vpon the side of a hill, and giueth order for the battell.



HE Heluetians, vnderstanding of the Romans departure by fugitives that came vnto them, were fullie perswaded that feare was the greatest cause of their retraite: for the daie before having the upper ground, they durst not vse the advantage of the same: and hoping withall to intercept them from victuals, they followed after them with what speed they could, & as they over-

Cæsar.

tooke them they charged vpon the rereward. Which when Cæsar perceiued, he sent his horsemen to sustaine the assault, & in the meane time he drew his forces vnto the next hill, and in the side thereof about the middle of the hill, hee made a triple battell of foure olde legions, on the toppe of the hill he placed two newe legions, which he had last inrolled in Italie, with the associate forces; and to these hee commended the baggage and impediments of the whole Armie, and filled all the rest of the hill with light armed men. The Heluetians on the other side, conuaid their carriage and impedimentes into one place; and hauing beaten backe Cæsars horsemen, with a thicke thronged batallion, they put themselves into a phalanx, and so pressed vnder the first battell of the Roman legions.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



Concerning the true sense of this triple battell, which Cæsar made vpon the side of the hill, I vnderstand it according to the ancient custome of the Romans; who in the infancie of their militarie discipline, diuided their Armie into three sortes of souldiers, Hastati,

The manner of their im-  
battailing.

C. iij.

Principes,



By triplex  
Acies.

*Principes*, and *Triarij*: for I omit the *velites*, as no part of their standing battells, and of these they made three severall battells from front to backe: in the first battell were the *Hastati*, and they possessed the whole front of the Armie; and were called *Acies prima*. Behinde these in a convenient distance, stood the *Principes*, in like sort and order disposed, and were called *Acies secunda*: and lastly in a like correspondent distance, were the *Triarij* imbattelled and made *Aciem tertiam*. Their legion consisted of ten companies, which they called cohorts, and euerie cohort consisted of three small companies, which they named *Manipuli*: a maniple of the *Hastati*, a maniple of the *Principes*, and an other of the *Triarij*, as I will more particularly set downe in the second booke. And as these three kinds of souldiers were separated by distance of place from front to backe: so was euerie battell deuided into his maniples; and these were deuided by little allies and waies, one from an other, which were vsed to this purpose: The *Hastati* being in front did euer begin the battell, and if they found themselves too weake to repell the enemy, or were happily forced to a retrait, they drew themselves through these allies or distances, which were in the second battell betweene the maniples of the *Principes* into the space, which was betweene the *Principes* and the *Triarij*, and there they rested themselves whilest the Princes took their place and charged the enemy: Or otherwise, if the commanders found it needfull, they filde vp those distances of the *Principes*, and so vnited with them into one bodie, they charged the enemy all in grosse; and then if they preuailed not, they retired into the spaces between the *Triarij*, and so they gaue the last assault, all the three bodies being ioyned all into one.

Now if we examine by the current of the historie, whether Caesar obserued the same order and diuisions in his warres, we shall find little or no alteration at all, for first this *triplex Acies* here mentioned, was no other thing but the diuision of the *Hastati*, *Principes* and *Triarij*, according to the manner of the first institution. And least any man should dreame of that ordinarie diuision, which is likewise threefold, the two cornets and the battell, and in that sence he might saie to haue made *triplicem Aciem*, let him vnderstand, that the circumstances of the diuision haue no coherence with that diuision; for in that he saith of the Heluetians, *successerunt Aciem primam*, pressed neare the first battell or vangard, he maketh it cleare that the Armie was deuided into a triple battell from front to backe: for otherwise, he would haue said, *successerint, dextrum aut sinistrum cornu, aut mediam Aciem*: for so were the partes of that diuision tearmed. Againe, in the retrait which the Heluetians made to the hill, when hee saith that the first and second battell followed close vpon the enemy, and the third opposed it selfe against the *Boij* and *Tulingi*, and stood readie at the foote of the hill, to charge the legions in the flanke and on the backe. It is manifest, that no other diuision can so fidly be applied to this circumstance, as that from front to backe.

But that place in the first of the ciuill warres taketh away all scruple of controuersie, where he vseth the verie same tearmes of *prima*, *secunda* and *tertia Acies*: for being to incampe himselfe neare vnto Afranius, and fearing least his souldiers

souldiers should be interrupted in their worke, he caused the first and second battell to stand in Armes and keepe their distance to the end they might shroud and couer the third battell (which was imployed in making a ditch behind them) from the view of the enemie; and this kind of imbattailing Caesar obserued, in most of his fights: by which it appeareth that he vsed the verie same order and discipline for imbattailing, as was instituted by the old Romans.

Concerning the auncient names of *Haslati*, *Principes* and *Triarij*, which Ramus in his Militia Iulij Cæsaris, vrgeth to be omitted throughout the whole historie: I grant they are seldome vsed in these Commentaries, in the sense of their first institution: for the *Haslati*, when the discipline was first erected, were the youngest and poorest of the leginarie souldiers. The *Principes* were the lustie, and able bodied men: and the *Triarij* the eldest and best experienced. But in Cæsars campe, there was little or no difference either of valour or yeares, betweene the *Haslati*, *Principes* or *Triarij*, which he nameth *Prima*, *Secunda* and *Tertia Acies*; and therefore were neuer tearmed by those names, in respect of that difference. Notwithstanding in regard of order and degrees of discipline, that vertue might bee rewarded with honour, and that time might challenge the priuiledge of a more worthie place, the said distinctions and tearmes were religiously obserued: for in the battell with Petreius at Ilerda in Spaine, he mentioneth the death of Q. Fulginius, *ex primo Haslato legionis quartæ decimæ*: and in the overthrow at Dirrachium he saith, that the eagle bearer, being grievously wounded, commended the safetie of his ensigne to the horsemen, all the centurions of the first cohort being slaine, *præter principem Priorem*. And for the *Triarij*, there is no tearme more frequent in Caesar then *Primipilus*, which name by the rules of the ancient discipline, but to the chiefeest Centurion of the first maniple of the *Triarij*: wherby it appeareth that the maniples kept the same names in regard of a necessarie distinction, although peradventure the *Haslati* were as good souldiers, as either the *Principes* or the *Triarij*. As touching the spaces betweene the maniples, whereinto the first battell did retire it selfe if occasion vrged them. I neuer found any mention of them in Caesar. Excepting once here in England, where in a skirmish the Brittaines so vrged the court of guard, which kept watch before the Roman campe, that Caesar sent out two other cohortes to succour them, who making distance betweene them as they stoode, the court of guard retired it selfe in safetie, through that space into the campe; otherwise we neuer finde that the first battell made any retrait into the allies betweene the maniples of the second battell, but when it failed in any part, the second and third went presently to second them, as appeareth in the battell following with Ariouistus and in diuers others.

Concerning the vse of this triple battell, what can be said more then Lipsius hath done? where he laieth open the particular commodities thereof as farre forth as a speculative iudgment can discern of thinges so farre remote from the vse of this age, which neuer imitateth this triple battell but only in a march: for then commonly they make three companies, a vangard, a battell and a rereward: but in imbattailing, they drawe these three companies all in front, making two cornets and the battell, without any other troupes to second them. But

Lib. 1. de bello  
Ciuili.

Lib. 3. de bello  
Ciuili.

Lib. 5. de mi-  
litia Romana.

let

let this suffice concerning Cæsar his manner of imbattailing and his *triplex A-*  
*cies*, vntill I come to the second booke, where I will handle more particularly the  
 parts of a legion, and the commodity of their small battailions.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

*A phalanx  
described.*



He Macedonian Phalanx is described by Polybius to be a square  
 battell of pikemen, consisting of 16 in flankes and 300 in front; the  
 souldiers standing so close together that the pikes of the first ranke  
 were extended three foote beyond the front of the battell; the rest  
 whose pikes were not seruiceable by reason of their distance from the front,  
 couched them vpon the shoulders of those that stood before them, and so loc-  
 king them in together in file, pressed forward to holde vp the swaie or gising  
 backe of the former ranks, and so to make the assault more violent and vntes-  
 tible. The Grecians were very skilfull in this part of the *Arte militarie*, which  
 containeth order and disposition in imbattailing, for they maintained publike  
 professors whom they called *Tactici*, to teach and instruct their youth the pra-  
 ctise and Art of all formes conuenient for that purpose. And these *Tactici* found  
 by experience, that 16 in flankes so ordered as they were in a phalanx, were able  
 to beare any shooke how violently soeuer it charged vpon them: which number  
 of 16 they made to consist of foure doubles, as first vnitie maketh no order; for  
 order consisteth in number and pluralitie; but vnitie doubled maketh two, the  
 least of all orders, and this is the double: which doubled againe maketh the se-  
 cond order of foure souldiers in a file, which doubled the third time maketh 8;  
 & this doubled maketh 16, which is the fourth doubling from a vnitie; and in it  
 they staied as in an absolute number and square, whose roote is 4 the Quadruple  
 in regard of both the extremes: for euery one of these places, the *Tactici* had  
 severall names, by which they were distinctly knowne. But the particular de-  
 scription requireth a larger discourse, then can be comprehended in these short  
 obseruations: he that desireth further knowledge of them; may roade *Elianus*,  
 that liued in the time of *Adrian* the Emperour: and *Arianus* in his historie  
 of *Alexander* the great: with *Mauritius*, and *Leo* imperator, where hee shall  
 haue the diuisions of *Tetrafalangia* *difalangia*, *Phalangia* vnto a vnitie, with all  
 the discipline of the Grecians.

The chiefest thing to be obserued is, that the Grecians hauing such skill in  
 imbattailing, preferred a phalanx before all other formes whatsoeuer; either be-  
 cause the figure in it selfe was very strong, or otherwise in regard that it fitted  
 best their weapons, which were long pikes and targets. But whether Cæsar rear-  
 med the battell of the *Heluetians* a phalanx in regard of their thicke manner of  
 imbattailing onely, or otherwise, for as much as besides the forme, they used the  
 naturall weapon of a phalanx which was the pike, it remaineth doubtful: *Branc-*  
*atio* in his discourses vpon this place, maketh it no controuersie, but that eu-  
 rie souldier carried a pike and a target, the target is particularly named in this  
 historie: but it cannot so easily be gathered by the same, that their offensive wea-  
 pons



pons were pikes. In the fight at the baggage it is said, that manie of the legionarie souldiers were wounded through the cart wheelcs, with *tragulas* & *materas*, which are commonly interpreted speares and iauelins: and I take them to bee weapons longer then common darts, but whether they were so long as the sarissas of the Macedonians, I cannot tell. Howsoeuer, this is certaine, that the Heluetians haue euer beene reputed for the true *phalangita*, next vnto the Macedonians; and that in their thicke and close imbattailing, they failed not at this time of the forme of a phalanx: for they roofed it so thicke with targets, that Cæsar saith they were sore troubled, because many of their targets were fastned and tied together, with piles darted through them: Which argueth that their phalanx was very thicke thronged, whatsoeuer their weapon was.

## CHAP. VIII.

Cæsar sendeth away all the horses of ease:  
*exhorteth his men: and beginneth*  
 the battell.



*BOTH* the Armies being in this forwardnesse, Cæsar to take away all hope of safetie by flight, first caused his owne horse and then all the prinate horses of ease, of the Legates, Tribunes, and the rest of the chiefe leaders, to be carried out of the battell, and using some motiues of courage according as the circumstances afforded him occasion, he gaue the signe of battell. The Romans casting their piles with the aduantage of the hill, did easily breake the Heluetian phalanx; and then taking themselues to their swordes, they did second the furie of the pile with a rude and violent close.

Cæsar.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



*H*e ancient sages found it necessary, to a faithfull and serious execution of such an action, to prepare the mindes of their men with wordes of encouragement, and to take away all scruple out of their conceites, either of the vnlawfulnesse of the cause, or disaduantage against the enemy: for if at anie time that saying be true, that *oratio plus potest quam pecunia*, it is here more powerfull and of greater effect. For a donatiue or liberanca, can but procure a mercenarie indeuour euer yeelding to a better offer, and doe oftentimes breede a suspition of wrong, euen amongst those that are willingly enriched with them; and so maketh them slacke to discharge their seruice with loialtie: yea oftentimes of friends to become enemies. But in as

*Speeches of  
 encouragement  
 must before  
 they gaue  
 battell.*

D j.

much



Lib. 7. de bello  
gallico.

much as speech discloseth the secrets of the soule, and discovereth the intent and drift of euerie action, a few good wordes laying open the iniurie which is offered to innocencie, how equity is controlled with wrong, and iustice controlled by iniquitie (for it is necessarie that a commander approue his cause, and settle an opinion of right in the minde of his souldiers, as it is easie to make that seeme probable which so many offer to defend with their blood, when indeed euerie man relieth vpon anothers knowledge, and respecteth nothing lesse the right) a few good words I say, will so stirre vp their mindes in the feruentnes of the cause, that euery man will take himselfe particularly ingaged in the action by the title of equity; and the rather for that it iumpeth with the necessitie of their condition. For men are willing to doe well, when welldoing agreeth with that they would doe, otherwise the Acte may formerly be effected, but the mind neuer approueth it by assent. And this maner of exhortation or speech of encouragement, was neuer omitted by Cæsar in any conflict mentioned in this historie: but he still vsed it as a necessarie instrument to set vertue on foote, and the only meanes to stirre vp alacrity: Or if it happened that his men were at any time discouraged by disaster or crosse accident, as they were at Gergobia, and at the two ouerthrowes he had at Dirrachium; he neuer would aduerture to giue battell vntill he had encouraged them againe, and confirmed their mindes in valour and resolution. But this age hath put on so scornfull a humor, that it cannot heare a speech in this key, found it neuer so grauely, without scoffing and derision: and on the other side discontinuance of so necessarie a part, hath bred at length such an *inutilem pudorem* in our chiefe commanders, that they had rather loose the gaine of a great aduantage, then buy it with wordes to be deliuered in publike.

#### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

The Roman  
Pile described

**I**N this Chapter we may further obserue the violence of the Roman pile, which being a heauie deadly weapon, could hardly be frustrated with any resistance, and in that respect was very proper and effectual against a phalanx, or any other thicke and close battell, or wheresoeuer els, the stroke was certaine, or could hardly deceiue the aime of the caster: for in such incounters it so galled the enemy, that they were neither able to keepe their order, nor answere the assault with a resisting counterbuffe. By which it appeareth that the only remedie against the pile was, to make the ranks thin, allowing to euery souldier a large podisme or place to stand in, that so the stroke might of it selfe fall without hurt, or by foresight be preuented; as it shal plainly appeare by the sequell of this historie, which I will not omit to note, as the places shall offer themselues to the examination of this discourse. But as touching the pile, which is so often mentioned in the Roman historie, Polybius describeth it in this manner. A pile (saith he) is a casting weapon, the staffe whereof is almost 3 cubites long, and it hath *palmare diametrum*, a hand breadth in thicknesse. The staues were armed with an head of yron, equall in length to the staffe  
it

it selfe : But in that sort that halfe the head was fastened vp to the middle of the staffe, with plates of yron like the head of a Halbert : and the other halfe stucke out at the ende of the staffe like a pike, containing a fingers breadth in thicknes, and so decreasing lesse and lesse vnto the point which was barbed : This head was so slender toward the point, that the waight of the staffe would bend it as it stucke, as appeareth in this battell of the Heluetians. This weapon was peculiar to the Romans, and was called *Pilum*, as Varro noteth of *Pilum* a Pestell, *quod Hostes feriret ut Pilum*. Lipsius finding that *Palmarem diametrum*, was too great a thicknesse to be managed by any mans hand, interpreteth it to be foure inches in circuit, if the staffe were either round or square, for they had of both sortes, and so he maketh it very manageable; but nothing answerable to the description giuen by Polybius either in forme or waight. Patricius in his Paralleli, maketh the staffe to haue *palmarem diametrum* in the butte end, but the rest of the staffe he maketh to decrease taper wise, vnto the head of yron, where it hath the thicknesse of a mans finger, and so it answereth both in forme and waight to a Pestell, as may be seene by the figure, and I take it to be the meaning of Polybius. Patricius in that place setteth downe foure discommodities of the Pile. First a furious and hoat spirited enemie will easily preuent the darting of the pile, with a nimble and speedie close : And so we read, that in the battell which Cæsar had with Ariouistus, the Germans came so violently vpon them, that the souldiers cast away their piles, and betooke them to their swordes. And likewise in that worthy battell betweene Cætiline and Marcus Petreius, they cast away their piles on either part. The second discommoditie was, that the piles being so heauie, could not be cast any distance; but were only seruiceable at hand. Thirdly, they could not be cast with any aime, or as they say point blanke. And lastly the souldiers were to take aduantage of ground backward when they threw them, which might easily disorder their troupes, if they were not very wel experienced.

Lib. 3. de militiâ Romana.

Lib. 5.

Salust.

## THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

**T**He last thing which I obserue in this speciality is, that the legionarie souldiers had no other offensive weapon, but one pile or two at the most, and their swordes. By which it may be gathered, that all their victories came by buckling at handy-blowes, for they came alwaies so neare before they cast their pile, that they left themselues no more time then might conueniendly serue them to draw their swordes : neither would their armes of defence, which was compleat, besides a large target which they carried on their left arme, suffer them to make any long pursuit, or continued chase whensoever a light armed enemie did make any speedy retrait, as will more plainly appeare by that which followeth.

Dij. CHAP.

## CHAP. IX.

The Heluetians fainting in the battell, retire to a hill, the Romans follow after, and the battell is continued.

Caesar.

Them of Borbon and Lo: same.

**T**HE Heluetians were sore troubled with the Roman piles, which stucke so fast in their shields, that they were neither able to pull them out, nor to use their targets to any purpose: and therefore after a wearisome toile, they chose rather to cast them away, and to hazard their nakednesse upon agilitie and readinesse; then to betray their life with an unmanageable weapon: but at length fainting with woundes, they began to giue place, and made their retrait to a hill not farre off, the better to saue themselves from the furie of the Romans. The hill being taken, and the legions following on to drine them from thence, the reregard of the Heluetians, which were the Boy and Tulingi, consisting of 15000 men stood readie at the foote of the hill, to charge the Romans in flanke and to inuiron them round about: which the Heluetians no sooner perceiued, but they returned and began a fresh from the hill to renew the battell, and so the legions were set upon both in front and flanke at one instant. To remedie this difficultie, conuersa signa bipartito intulerunt, saith the history: the first and second battell fought against the Heluetians that returned from the hill, and the third battell turned themselves to beare the assault of the rereward, which stood readie to inclose them about, and to charge them on the backe. And here the fight was doubtfull and vehement for a long time, untill at length they were no longer able to indure the violence of the legionarie souldiers, part of them fled to the tappe of the hill, and the rest betooke themselves to the place, where their baggage and impediments were lodged. And hitherto, here was not one man seene to haue turned his backe in all the conflict, although the fight continued from the seventh houre vntill the euening.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

The ensignes of the Romans




Concerning the ensignes of the Romans: we are to vnderstand that the chiefest ensigne of euery legion was an Eagle, which alwaies attended vpon the Primipile, or chiefe Centurion of the said legion. The ensigne of a manipule was, either a Hand or a Dragon, a wolfe or a Sphinx, as it appeareth (besides the testimonie of history) by the Columne of Traiane in Rome, wherein the ensignes are figured, with such paitraitures: so that these ensignes, resembling the proportions of liuing creatures, had their fore partes alwaies caried that way which the legions were to march, or where they were to fight: and therefore in this historie, by the aspect and carrying of the ensignes, the front of the Armie was commonly noted: as in this place







THE BATTLE OF MARCH CASAR HAD



WITH THE HELVETIANS.





place it is said, that the ensignes of the first and second battell were carried towards the hill, whither the Helueticans had made their retrain; and the ensignes of the third battell looked an other waie, towards the *Boij* and *Tulingi*, which stood of the foot of the hill: By which is signified, how the legions were diuided to resist the brunt of the double encounter.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



Concerning the time of the daie: we are to vnderstand that the Romans vsed not the same diuision of the daie as we commonly do: for they diuided their artificiall (which is the space betweene sunne rising and setting) into 12 equall partes, which the Astronomers called vnequall or planetarie houres. The first houre of the daie began alwaies at sunne rising; the sixt houre was alwaies high noone; and the twelfth houre was sunne setting. And as the day waxed longer or shorter, so these houres were either greater or lesse; neither did they agree with equall or equinoctiall houres, such as are now vsed, but only at the *Aequinoctium*: so that by this maner of reckoning, *ab hora septima ad vespertum*, is meant the battell began about one of the clocke according to our Computation, and continued vntill the euening. The like we must vnderstand, throughout this whole historie, as often as there is mention made of the circumstance of time.

*The diuision  
of their day.*

## CHAP. X.

The Helueticans continue their fight, at the cariages:  
*but at length they left the field, and marched towards Langiers.*



HE like courage was also shewed on either side at their baggage, the place being fortified with carres and wagons in stead of a rampier, which so troubled the Romans that they could not winne it vntill it was late in the night: for the Helueticans being fenced with their cariages, so called the legions with darts and helmets, under the chariots and from betwene the wheelles, that the victory was not easily achieved: At last being able no longer to resist, they left the place and marched all that night, without any intermission, and the fourth day they came into the confines of the *Allobroges*, being about 230000 that escaped in the battell.

*Caesar.*

*Langiers.*

## THE OBSERVATION.



F we consider the nature of the action, and looke into the true causes of their ouerthrow, as farre as the right sense of the historie shall direct our iudgment, we shall finde valour not to be wanting in the Helueticans, but rather superlatiuey abounding in the Romans. For that vehement opi-

D iij.

nion



nion of their valiancie and manhood, which carried them out of the streights of the country, to seeke larger fortunes in other kingdomes, was not so abated with the losse of the fourth part of their Host at the riuer Arar; nor with the terrible furie of those veteran legions: but it yeelded this effect, which Caesar in his estimate of valour thought memorable, that for fīue houres space or more, there was not one man seene to haue turned his backe. Their manner of imbattailing, had not the Romans beene the enemy, was vnresistable: for being cast into a phalanx, which in the plaines of Asia had made Alexander the great and the Macedonians famous, they did as farre surpasse any other forme of imbattailing (supposing that the conueniencie of the place did fit that disposition) wherin the strength of the whol is deuīded into many particulars, as the violence of a great bodie exceedeth the force and motion of his partes, when it is diuīded into smaller cantons. For as in a phalanx, many particular souldiers are by a close and compact order incorporated into one entire bodie: so their seuerall vertues are gathered into one head, and are as partes vnited into one generall force, which easily swalloweth vp the ability of many other lesser quantities, into which a greater strength is equally diuīded.

The aduantage of the place which they got by retrait, and the double charge wherewith they engaged the Romans both in front and flanke, was able in an indifferent conflict to haue made fortune fugitiue, and beare armes on their side; or at the least so to haue steemed the swelling tide of victorie, which carried the Romans so violently in the chase, that they might haue beene equall sharers in the honour of the daie: had it not flowed from an Ocean of valour, whose course could not be hindered with any stops and oppositions, vntill it came to that height, which true valour and vnexampld resolution affected. And yet the height of this courage could not so alaie the heate of the Heluetians furie; but it brake forth into dangerous flames, when they came to the place where their cariages were laide, and cost much bloud and many mens liues before they quitted the place: for they fought with that spirit and indutry, as though they meant to make triall whether their fortune would proue no better in the night then it had done in the daie.

The ouerthrow of the Tigurine Canton at the riuer Arar, proceeded rather from want of good directions (which is the lesse to be marvelled at, considering they had no chiefe commander as we read of) then from any defect of valour: for the rules of militarie gouernment require especiall care in passing ouer a water; for then especially an Armie is in greatest danger, when it is disordered and diuīded. And therefore the Romans atchieued this victorie by the horrible vigilancie as Tully calleth it, of their commander: who alwaies watched *opportunitates rei bene gerenda*, as necessarie and speedie meanes to overcome in all his warres.

*Periculum  
semper ab  
hostibus gra-  
uissimum su-  
stinet diuīsus  
et inordinatus  
exercitus.*

CHAP.

## CHAP. XI.

Cæsar after three daies respite, followeth after the Heluetians: he taketh them to mercie, and sendeth them backe againe to the country.



**C**ÆSAR abode three daies in the place where the battell was fought, as well to burie the dead, as to refresh the wearied spirits of his overlaboured souldiers, that their woundes might the better be cured: and in the meane time he sent letters to the \* Lingones, not to furnish the Heluetians either with corne, or any other prouisions: for if they did, he would esteeme of them as of enemies, and take them in the number of the vanquished Heluetians; and at the three daies end, he made after them with all his forces. The Heluetians constrained through penurie and want of necessarie supplements, sent embassadors to Cæsar to intreat an acceptation of rendrie: who meeting him on the waie, threwe themselues at his feete, and with manie teares and supplications, they craued such fauourable conditions of peace, as might best comfort a distressed people, and beseeeme the glory of so famous a Conquest. Cæsar first sent them word to attend his coming in the place where they were: and at his comming he commanded them to deliuer vnto him a sufficient number of hostages and pledges, 2. to giue vp all the Armes and weapons they had, 3. and to deliuer vp the fugitiues that were fled vnto them in the time of the war. Whiles these thinges were a doing, part of the Heluetians to the number of 6000, stole out of the campe in the night, and tooke their iourney towardes the Rhene, and the Confines of the Germans: which when Cæsar vnderstood, hee sent presently to those cities, through whose territories the Heluetians had passed; and commaunded them to bring them backe againe: which being diligently performed, he welcommed them with the entertainment of an enemy, and put them all to the sword. The rest he commanded to returne into their country from whence they came, and because they had neither corne nor any other sustenance, he caused the \* Allobroges to supply their necessities, and willed the Heluetians to reedifie their townes and citties which they had before destroied, and to inhabit in those friendly places which had giuen to their ancestors and themselues greater fortunes, then could elsewhere be afforded them: Wherein he was the more carefull, least if their country lying waste, the fertilitie of the soile might inuite the Germans from beyond the Rhene to tast the sweetnes which the Gallies enioyed, and so the prouince should be sure of an vnquiet neighbour. In the campe of the Heluetians was found a register, containing the particular summes of all that were in that iourney, amounting to the number of 368000, whereof 92000 were fighting men: they that returned and saw the fortune of both their states, were 110000. And thus ended that warre.

Cæsar.

\* Lingres.

\* Sauiogens.

## THE OBSERVATION.



**T**He directions concerning their rendrie and returne, were very sound, and of good consequence. For first in that he commanded them to attend his comming in the place where they were, he tooke away all motions

tions

tions of new trouble which often remoues might haue caused, by the oportunitie of some accident which might haue happened: assuring himselfe that their abode in that place would increase their miseries, and consequently ripen that desire of peace which they made shew of; considering that the Lingones in whose territories they were, durst not for feare of Cæsars displeasure, furnish the with any necessaries in that extremity. Touching the security which the Romans required of the loialty of such people as they conquered; their manner was, to take as hostages a sufficient number of the men-children of the chiefeest men of that nation, whose liues depended vpon their parentes fidelitie, and ended with the first suspicion of their rebellion; which custome besides the present good, promised the like or better security to the next age, when as those children by conuersation and acquaintance should be so affected to the Roman Empire, that returning to their owne country, their actions might rather tend to the aduancement thereof, then any way be preiudiciall to the same. And least the loue of liberty and freedome should preuaile more with them, then that affection which nature had inioyned them to beare to their children: he did what he could to take away the meanes and instruments of their rebellion, by causing them to deliuer vp such Armes and weapons as were there present: and so to become suitable to that petition of peace, which they had made. The sum of all is this. He corrected the insolencie of a furious people, & reduced them to a feeling of their owne madnes. He kept the from sacking the possessions of manie thousandes, in the continent of Gallia; and sent them backe againe to continue their name and nation in the place, where they first inhabited; which continueth vnto this day. And thus we see, that there is no humour so headstrong, nor so backt with strength of circumstances, but it may meete with a remedie to qualifie the insolencie thereof, and make it subiect to correction and controlment.

## CHAP. XII.

**The states of Gallia congratulate Cæsars victorie:  
they call a councell, and discouer their inward  
griefe concerning Ariouistus, and  
his forces.**

*Caesar.*



**T**HE Heluetian warre being so happely ended, the Princes and chiefe men of all the states of Gallia, came to Caesar to congratulate the happinesse of his victorie: and with all they besought him that with his good liking, they might call a Generall councell; wherein they had matters of great importance to be handled, which they desired with a common consent, to prefer to his consideration. Which being granted, and the day of meeting appointed, they bound themselves by oath not to reueale the causes of their assembly, but to such as they should make choice of, to be their Oratours.



Orators. The counsell being ended, the same Princes returned to Caesar, and in lamentable manner cast themselves at his feet, contending with as great earnestnesse, that those things which they deliuered might not be reuealed, as they did to haue their petition granted: forasmuch as they saw, that the discouerie of such declarations as they propounded, would necessarily pull on most grieuous afflictions. Diuitiacus the Heduan was made speaker for the rest, and in effect deliuered these wordes.

That Gallia was unhappely diuided into two factions, the Hedui were the head of the one, and the Auerni of the other. These two states contending manie yeares for the principalltie, the Auerni with the Sequani their Clients, finding themselves the weaker partie, hired the Germans to take their part, who at the first sent them 15000 men to strengthen their faction: but afterward tasting the sweetenesse and pleasure of the Gallies, the barbarous people so liked the country, that now there were no lesse then one hundred and twentie thousand, that were come out of Germanie and seated in their Territories. With these the Hedui and their Clients had once or twise fought, hoping by their prowesse, both to chastice the malice of the Sequani, and to cleare their countrie of a barbarous enemy: but their labour effected nothing but their owne calamitie, and the utter ouerthrowe of their nobilitie and Senate: for they were driuen to deliuer the chiefeest of their citie, as pledges to the Sequani, and to binde themselves by oath neuer to seeke their release or freedome, nor to implore the aide of the people of Rome, but euer to remaine their perpetuall bondmen: Only Diuitiacus amongst all the Hedui could neuer be brought to that thraldome, but vsing that libertie which his resolution afforded him, he went to Rome and boldly opened his distressed case vnto the Senate. But in the ende, the victorie became as grieuous to the Sequani, as to the Hedui. For Arionistus king of the Germans, was alreadie possesst of the third part of their Territories, and at that instant he commanded them to let go another third part: for there were 24000 Germans come newly vnto him, that were allotted to that inheritance. If this violent course were not staid by the opposition of some greater motion, the Gallies would soone be driuen out of their country, and be forced to imitate the Heluctians in seeking new habitations and seates of rest, farre remote from the crueltie of the Germans. Caesar might by his owne authoritie, or by the presence of his Armie, or by the renoune of his late victorie, or by the name of the people of Rome, keepe the Germans from transporting any more Colonies into Gallia.

The people  
of Auerngne.

#### THE OBSERVATION.



IN this relation, there are diuers points worthily recommended to the discretion of such, as are willing to be directed by other mens misaduentures. As first into what extremities ambition doth driue her thirstie fauourites, by suppressing the better faculties of the soule, & setting such vnbrideled motions on foot, as carrie men headlong into most desperate attempts: for as it had deserued commendation in either faction so to haue carried their emulation, that by their owne meanes and strength appli-

E j.

ed



ed to the rule of good gouernment, their authority might wholly haue swaied the inclinations of the weaker states; so was it most odious in the Sequani, to call in forraine forces to satisfie the appetite of their vntempered humor, and in the ende were accordingly rewarded. Secondly, it appeareth how dangerous a thing it is, to make a stranger a stickler in a quartell which ciuill dissention hath broched, when the partie that called him in, shall not be as able to refuse his assistance vpon occasion, as he was willing to entertaine it for aduantage. Lastlie, the often discontents of these states shew the force of a present euill, which possesseth so vehemently the powers of the soule, that any other calamity either already past or yet to come, how great soeuer, seemeth tollerable and easie in regard of that smart which the present griefe inflicteth. So the Sequani chose rather to captiuatise their libertie to the Barbarisme of a sauage nation, then to indure the Hedui to take the hand of them: and againe, to make themselues vassals to the Romans, rather then indure the vsurping cruelty of the Germans: and finally (as the sequell of the historie will discouer) to hazard the losse of life and country, then to suffer the taxes and impositions of the Romans: So predominant is the present euill in mens affections, and so it preuaileth at the seate of our iudgment.

## CHAP. XIII.

The reasons that moued Cæsar to vndertake  
*this warre.*

Cæsar.



O these petitions of the Galles Cæsar made an answer, comporting the mildnesse of his naturall disposition, promising them his best furtherance in the cause, and doubted not but that Ariouistus would be intreated in any reasonable matter: and so he dismissed the assembly. Amongst many inducements, there were two of especiall importance, which urged him to vndertake this warre: the first was the dishonour and blot of infamie, wherewith the present age might haue noted the Roman Empire, if vpon complaint and imploration of aide, they should haue suffered a barbarous nation to haue held the Hedui in thraldome, who in the maiesty of their Senate had oftentimes been called their brethren and kinsmen, and graced with such titles of respect, as by the tenure of loyalty and sincerity of affection, might command greater dueties then these which were required. The second reason was the feare he had, least the Germans accustoming more and more to transport the superfluitie of their increasing families ouer the Rhene, and to plant them in the fertile seates of the Galles, the Roman Prouince might at length be endangered, and Italie it selfe attempted. And therefore it seemed best vnto him, to send embassadours to Ariouistus, to will him to thinke of some conuenient place of parley, where they might meete to intreat of matters concerning the publike good.

THE

## THE OBSERVATION.

**M**aie here take an occasion, to speake somewhat concerning the authoritie of the Roman Generals, which we see to be verie large, considering that Cæsar of himselfe, without any further leaue of the Senate and people of Rome (for what may be gathered by this historie) did vndertake a warre of that consequence, and put in ieopardie the Legions, the Prouince, or what other interest the Romans had in Gallia. Wherein we are to vnderstand, that when the state of Rome did allot the gouernment of any Prouince to a Proconfull, they did likewise recommend vnto him the careful managing of such accidents, as might any way concerne the good of that regiment. For considering that such causes as may trouble a well ordered gouernment, are as well external and forraine, as internall and bred within the bounds of that Empire: it had beene to small purpose to haue giuen him onely authoritie, to maintaine a course of wholesome gouernment at home, and no meanes to take awaie such oppositions, which forraine accidentes might set vp against him: And so we see that Cæsar vndertooke the Heluetian warre, in regard of the safetie of the Prouince: And this againe with Ariouistus, least the Germans should so multiplie in Gallia, that the Prouince it selfe might at length bee endangered. Neither had their Generals authoritie onely to vndertake these wars, but the absolute disposition also of the whole course thereof, whether it were to treat, capitulate, compound, or what els they thought conuenient for the aduancement of the common weale, did wholly rest vpon their direction: *republice bene gesta*, being the stile of the warrant for all their actions. Neither may we thinke that any subordinate or depending authority can be so powerfull in the course of busineses, as that which absolutely commandeth without controlment, and proceedeth according to the oportunitie of time and occasion, further then either prescription or limitation can direct it. And therefore whensoever the Roman affaires were distressed and driuen to an exigent, they created a Dictator that had *regiam potestatem*, such an absolute command, that whatsoeuer power rested either in the Consuls, or in the Tribunes, in the Senate or in the people, it gaue waie to the greatnes of that magistrate; that there might be no let or retracting power to weaken that course, which nothing but an absolute command could establish, for the good of the common weale. And yet notwithstanding this absolute gouernment, they attributed such power to the course of humane actions, that by the punishment which they inflicted vpon dissolute and vnfortunate leaders, they seemed to acknowledge that no man, how circumstance soeuer, could promise more then likelihoods or probabilities of good fortune, as farre forth as his meanes and industrie could atchieue it. For olde M. Fabius, pleading for the life of his gallant sonne, and opposing the rigor of Papyrius the dictator with examples of antiquity, saith: *Populi quidem, penes quem potestas omnium rerum esset, ne iram quidem vnquam atrociorẽ fuisse in eos qui temeritate atque inscitia exercitus amisissent, quam vt pecunia eos multaret: capite*

The authoritie of the Roman Generals

Linie lib. 8.

E ij.

pite

*pite anquisitum ob rem male gestam de imperatore nullum ad eam diem esse.* The people (saith he) in whome the soueraigne power of thinges consisteth, neuer shewed greater displeasure against such, as had lost an Armie either by rashnesse or vnskilfulnesse, then imposing a fine vpon them: but to bring the life of a Generall in question for failing in his indeuours, was neuer heard of to that daie.

*Lib. 3. de bello  
Cinili.*

The condition of the inferiour officers of their campe, was farre otherwise in regard of militarie discipline: for prescription guided them in all their seruices, and the chiefest part of their duetie was obedience; although they saw euident reason to the contrarie, & found their directions vnperfect in that behalfe: And therefore Cæsar saith vpon that occasion: *alia sunt legati partes atque imperatoris, alter omnia agere ad præscriptum, alter libere ad summam rerum consilere debet.* The office of a legate or lieutenant, differeth from that of a generall: The one doing all things by prescription; and the other freely deliberating of whatsoeuer may concerne the cause. And this course the Romans helde, concerning the authoritie of their Generals.

### CHAP. XIII.

#### Ariouistus his answere: a second embassage, with the successe thereof.

*Cæsar.*



*T*O that embassage Ariouistus answered, that if his occasions had required Cæsars assistance, he would haue furthered them with his owne presence. And he thought it as reasonable that if it were in his meanes to pleasure the Romans, Cæsar ought not to thinke much of the like labour: for his owne part, he durst not come into those quarters without an Armie, neither could he leuie an Armie without great charge. The thing that he most wondered at was, what the Romans had to doe in that part of Gallia, which the law of Armes had made his inheritance. Vpon the returne of this message, Cæsar framed a second embassage, the purport whereof caried this sense: For as much as he thus requited the honour wherewith the people of Rome had beautified his best dignitie (for in Cæsars Consulship by that controlling authoritie of their Empire, they had vouchsafed to esteeme of him as a king in his dominions, and as a friend vnto their state) that he disdained to admit of a Parlee concerning the common good: let him knowe that these were the thinges which he required to be performed by him. First that he should not suffer any more sauage troupes of the Germans to be transported ouer the Rheine into Gallia: secondly, that he should deliuer up those Hostages which he had from the Hedui and Sequani, and should cease to molest them with further iniuries. These thinges if he did performe, Cæsar would assure him of a gratefull acceptation, in the behalfe of the people of Rome: otherwise for as much as he himselfe was Proconsull  
of



of the Prouince in Gallia, his charge extended by the same commission to the defence of their associates and friends; and therefore he would not neglect the iniurie of the Hedui.

To these mandates Ariouistus thus answered: the lawe of Armes kept this tenure among all nations, that a conquerour might gouerne a subdued people according as he thought best for his owne safetie. The people of Rome did not direct the course of their gouernment by another mans prescript, but by their owne arbitrement: and as he had not directed the Romans, so ought not they to hinder the course of his proceedings. The Hedui hauing tried the fortune of the war, and hauing hazarded their life and libertie in the casualtie of many battels, were by right become stipendarie to his Empire, whose Hostages he would retaine according to the couenants by which they made their peace. If Cæsar would needes undertake that quarell; let him know that no man euer contended with Ariouistus, but to his owne destruction. Tria when hee would, he should find what valour consisted in the Germans, that for 14 yeares space were neuer couered with any other rooffe then the Heauens.

#### THE OBSERVATION.

**A**Nd thus farre proceeded Cæsar with Ariouistus, in debating the wronges and agreeuances of the Hedui: Wherin appeareth the difference betweene a matter handled, according to morall ciuilitie in tearmes of mildnesse and pleasing accent, and that which is rudely deliuered, and dependeth rather vpon the plainnesse of the proiect, then suited with wordes fit for perswasion. For that which Ariouistus alleadged, to make good his interest in Gallia, was as consonant to reason, as any thing to the contrarie vrged by Cæsar. But as the Lacedemonian said of one, that he spake the truth otherwise then it should be spoken: so it may be said of Ariouistus answere, that it wanted that sweeting humanitie which giueth credit to veritie it selfe; for as much as it proceedeth from a well tempered spirit, wherein no turbulent passion seemeth to controll the force of reason, nor hinder the sentence of true iudgment; but rather seasoning her conceptions with humilitie, doth couertly complaine of open wrong, and strengthen her assertions with a pleasing deliuerie. And therefore how great focuer the controuersie be, that partie which exceedeth not the boundes of modestie, but maketh mildnesse his chiefe aduocate, will so preuaile in any auditorie, that albeit equitie doth disallow her title; yet the maner of his carriage will cleare him from offering wrong, in that he vseth the sequels of innocencie to proue his interest in that which he demandeth. But to leaue this circumstance, as only to be noted; let vs proceed to the war it selfe, which I made the second part of this historie.



## CAP. XV.

The Treuiri bring newes of one hundred townships  
of the Sweui that were come to the Rhene. Caesar  
taketh in Befanson: his souldiers are surpri-  
sed with an extreame feare of  
the Germans.

Caesar.  
\* Triers.  
\* The country  
about Cöflace  
in Germanie.



\* Le doux.

At the same instant, as this countermessage returned from Ariouistus, there came messengers from the Hedui and \* Treuiri unto Caesar: the Hedui complained that the \* Harudes, which were lately come into Gallia, did sacke their country and spoile their territories: neither could they conclude any peace with Ariouistus; but by giuing sufficient pledges for their allegiance. The Treuiri brought newes of one hundred townshippes of the Sueui that were come unto the riuer Rhene to seeke a passage into Gallia, conducted by Nasua and Cimerius two brethren. Whereat Caesar being moued thought his best means of preuention to consist in celerity, least the difficultie of resisting should grow greater, when those newe forces of the Sueui were ioyned with that power which was already with Ariouistus. And therefore hauing provided corne, he made haste to seeke the Germans, and hauing gone three daies iourney on his way, he had intelligence that Ariouistus with all his forces was going to take in Befanson, and that he was three daies iourney on his waie already. Caesar knowing how much it imported him to preuent that disadvantage (for as much as the scite of the towne was of that strength, that he that commanded it might prolong the warre at his owne pleasure, being incircled with the riuer \* Alduabis, excepting a small space of 600 foote, which was fortified with an exceeding high hill, and the hill strengthened with a wall, and so ioyned to the towne) made al the haste he could to take in the towne, & left a strong garrison in the same. And as he rested there a few daies to make prouision of corne, his whole Armie was surprisid with such an extraordinarie feare, that their mindes were not a little troubled therewith. For the Romans enquiring of the Galles and marchant-men concerning the quality of the Germans, understood that they were men of a huge stature, of courage inuincible, and of great practise and experience in feates of Armes: Whereof the Galles had oftentimes made triall, for when they incountred them they were not able to indure so much as the sternenes of their countenance, or the fearcenesse of their looks: whereat the whole Armie conceiued such a feare, that the courage of his men was wonderfullie appalled. The feare began among the Tribunes, and Prefects, and such other as accompanied Caesar in this iourney, and had small or no skill in matter of warre, these men faining some one excuse, and some an other of verie earnest businesse which called them home, desired leane to depart. The rest whom shame would not suffer to forsake the campe, bewraied the like passion by their countenances and hauiour: For hiding themselves in their tentes, they either bewailed their destiny secretly

secretly to themselves; or otherwise with their acquaintance and familiar friends, they lamented the danger they were all like to fall into: so that throughout the whole campe there was nothing but making and signing of testaments. And through the talke and fearefulnesse of these men, the olde souldiers and Centurions and such as had great experience in the campe, began by little to apprehend the terrour, where-with the rest were amazed: and those that would seeme to be lesse fearefull, said they feared not the enemy, but the narrownesse of the waies, the greatnesse of the woods that were betweene them and Ariouistus; or otherwise they cast doubtles where they might haue prouision of corne; and manie stucke not to tell Caesar, that whensoever he should giue commandement to march forward or to aduance the standards, the souldiers would refuse to doe it.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**W**Herein, for that we finde a strange alteration, no waie answerable to that courage, which a late gotten victorie doth vsually breede in noble spirits; it shall not be amisse a little to insitt vpon the quality of the accident, and to gather such breefe instructions from their weakenesse, as may best serue to qualifie the amasement of horror, and mitigate the frensie of so violent a passion. And albeit my ignorance in the works of nature cannot promise any such learning, as may discouer the true meanes and secret motions, whereby a sore conceiued feare doth trouble the senses and astonish the minde; yet since the historie offereth it to our scanning, giue me leaue only to note the strangenes of the circumstance, & rudely to delineate the purtraiture of a beast oftener scene then well known, vsing the vnweldie pile for my pensile, and siting my speech to a warlike audiorie. I know not how it happeneth, but thus it may happen, that when the senses receiue intelligence of an eminent euill, which may either dispossesse the soule of this earthly mansion, or trouble the quiet wherein she resteth: the spirits (as it seemeth) by the direction of their soueraigne mistresse, retire themselves into the inner cabinets and secreter pauillions of the body, where the chiefe part of the soule is most resident, and so they leaue the frontire quarters of her kingdome naked and vngarrisoned, the better to strengthen that capitall citie of the heart, out of which the life cannot flie but to the vter ruine and destruction of the whole body: For feare is not onely a perturbation of the soule, proceeding from the opinion it hath of some euill to come, but it is also a contraction, and closing vp of the heart, when the blood and the spirits are recalled from the outward partes, to assist that place which giueth life and motion to all the rest. In this chaos and confusion of Humors and spirits, when the multiplicite of faculties (which otherwise require an ordinate distinction in their seruice, and by the order of nature should be disposed into seuerall instruments, and be dilated throughout the body) are thus blended confusedly together, the conceptions of the minde, which presently rise from these aduertisements, are suddenly choaked with the disordered mixture of so many seuerall properties, and are stifled as it were in the

The nature of  
feare.

the throng, before they can be transported to our iudgment, or examined by reason, for want of that ordinate vniformitie of place which nature requireth in the powers of the minde. And hence proceedeth that amazednesse and astonishment, which so daunteth the hearts of men when they are taken with this passion, that because the soule giueth no counsell, the body can afford no motion, but standeth frozen through the extremitie of the perturbation, benumbed in sense, and forsaken of the spirits. So we read that Theophilus the Emperour in an ouerthrow which hee had giuen him by the Hagerans, was stricken with such an excessiue feare, that he could not betake himselfe to flight, *Adeo paor etiam auxilia formidat*, vntill one of his chiefe commanders shaking him by the shoulder, as though he were to awake him out of a deepe sleepe, threatened him with present death if he would not prevent the ruine of the Empire, by vsing that meanes, which was only left for his safetie.

Againe, if in that turbulent consistorie, the spirits chance distinctly to receiue any apprehension proceeding from the forging facultie of the soule, they carie it presently to execution before it be examined by reason, and follow the action with such vehemencie, that they leaue no place for better aduice and reknowledge. And this is the cause that oftentimes through extremitie of feare to auoide one euill we run headlong into a worse, and finde a greater danger in the meanes we vse to auoide a lesse, because reason did not first trie the apprehension before it was deliuered to externall agents. And so we finde in the battel betweene Germanicus and the Almains, that two grosse troupes of souldiers were driuen into such an extasie of feare, that taking contrarie courses to auoide one and the same danger, they either of them fled to that place, which the other had quitted: neither could they bee aduised by each others flight, that the places which they sought after afforded them no remedie.

And albeit reason be called to counsell, when a parlee is summoned of composition, yet it beareth so small a sway in the consultation, that the will of it selfe concludeth to betraie vertue to dishonour; and so to purchase peace with the losse of the soules chiefe treasure: which ought euer to be estimated at a higher rate, then any other happinesse which can betide the minde. For among all the sensible thinges of this world, there is no creature that hath such a confused feare, or is more amazed therewith, then man is: neither is there anie miserie greater, or any bondage more shamefull, seruile, or vile, then this which maketh men very abiects, of all other creatures, to redeeme the euill which the danger threatneth: and then doth shame follow after so base a part, and aggrauateth the burthen of the sinne with loathsome disgrace, and penitent discontentment, adding oftentimes aloes to wormewood, and making the end grieuouser then the beginning. And thus doth danger breed feare, and feare yeeldeth to dishonour, and dishonour bringeth shame, and shame being alwaies mingled with wrath and anger, reuengeth it selfe vpon it selfe, and bringeth more perill then the first danger could threaten. Vherby it appeareth, that as the affections of the mind are bred one of another: so on the contrarie part, some are bridled and restrained by others; for as enuie, hatred and anger, rise oftentimes of loue; so is ioue lessened with griefe, enuie with mercie, and feare with shame.

But



But for as much as all such perturbations proceede of ignorance and inconsideratenesse, whereby we thinke that the euill is greater then indeede it is; let vs consider what disposition of our iudgment best moderateth the violent heate of these affections. And first touching the passages, whereby the soule receiueth her aduertisements, as they are of diuers natures, the chiefest whereof are the eie and the eare, so are their auisos different in qualitie, and require a seuerall consideration to bee rightly discerned. The intelligence by the eie is more certaine, then that which commeth by the way of hearing: forasmuch as the eie is a witnes it selfe of euery action, whereof it taketh notice; neither is it deceiued in her proper object: and therefore the iudgment is not much troubled, to determine definitiue how great or how small the danger is, when the relations catie alwaies that certainty. And albeit the eare in like manner be not deceiued in her proper object, for it faithfully giueth vp that sense, which sound hath deliuered vnto it: yet for as much as the fantasie hath greater scope to coine her vaine conceptions, in regard of the absence of the action, it is necessarie that the discoursing facultie be called for an assitant before the iudgment can truly determine: and then it will appeare, that the truth doth not alwaies answere the report which is made thereof, in as much as diseased spirits will not sticke to dilate or qualifie relations, according to the key wherein they themselues are tuned. And therefore this first commeth to bee considered of in all such violent commotions, by which of these two senses the first intelligence was receiued. But concerning the iudgment it selfe this is most certaine, that the more it is infected with the corruptions of the flesh, the more violent are the affections of the soule: And againe, the purer the iudgment is, and the higher it is lifted vppe from earthly natures, being no further interessed therein, then to holde a resolution of well doing, the fewer and lighter are the affections, which trouble and molest it; for then it better discerneth the truth and falsehood, good or euil that is in things.

To redresse this inconuenience, Caesar betooke himselfe to the fittest & most proper remedie, which was by the authoritie of his speech to restore reason to her former dignitie, & by discourse which feare had interrupted in them, to put downe a vsurping passion which had so troubled the gouernment of the soule; recalling it to the meane of true resolution, which was to moderat audacity with warines, but not to choake valour with beaulty cowardice: for these Oratorie inducing perswasions were not the least point of their discipline, considering how they framed the inward habite of the minde (being the fountaine and beginning of all motion) to giue life and force to those actions which the seuerity of outward discipline commanded. For as lawes and constitutions of men inforce obedience of the bodie: so reason and perswasions must winne the soules consent, according to that saying, *homines duci volunt, non cogi.*



## CAP. XVI.

Cæsar his speech to the Armie, concerning  
this feare.

Cæsar.



ÆSAR calling a Councell of war, wherein the Legates, Tribunes and Centurions of all the orders and degrees were assembled, he greatly blamed them: First, that any man should bee so inquisitive as to imagine to himselfe, whither and upon what service they were carried. Concerning Ariouistus, he had in the time of Cæsars Consulshippe, most earnestly sued for the friendship of the people of Rome; and why then should any man misdeeme, that he should so vnadvisedly goe backe from his duty? For his owne part he was verelie perswaded, that if Ariouistus once knew his demandes, and vnderstood the reasonable offers that he would make him, that he would not easily reiect his friendship, nor the fauour of the people of Rome. But if he were so madde, as to make warre upon them, why should they be affraid of him? or why should they despaire either of their owne prowesse, or of Cæsars circumspectnesse? For if it came to that point, the enemye that they were to incounter, had bene tried what he could doe twise before. First, in their fathers daies, when the \* Cimbri and the Teutoni were vanquished by Marius; and now of late againe in Italie, at the insurrection of the bondmen, who were not a little furthered through the practise & discipline which they receiued of the Romans, whereby it might be discerned how good a thing it is to be constant and resolute: in as much as whom for a time they feared without cause being naked and vnarmed, the same men afterwarde (although well armed and Conquerors withall) they nobly ouercame. And to be short, these were no other Germans, then those whom the Heluetians had vanquished in diuers conflicts, not onely in their owne country where the Heluetians dwelt themselves, but also euen at home at their owne doores; and yet the same Heluetians were not able to make their partie good against our Armies. Concerning the Gallés, they were overcome more by cunning & pollicie, then by force; which although it tooke place against sauage and unskilfull people, yet was not Ariouistus so simple as to thinke that he could ensnare our Armies with the like subtilties. As for those that fained the cause of their feare to be the difficultie of prouision of corne, and the dangerousnesse of the way, they tooke more vpon them then became their place, in presuming to teach their Generall what he had to doe, as if he had not knowne what pertained to his duty. The Sequani and Lingones had undertooke that charge, and what the waies were, should shortly be seene: Whereas it was reported that the souldiers would not obey his mandates, nor aduance their standarts, he little esteemed it; for he was well assured, that if an Armie refused to be obedient to their Generall, it was either because he was thought unfortunate in his enterprises; or els for that hee was notoriously conuicted of Auarice: but the whole course of his life should witnesse his innocencie, and the ouerthrow of the Heluetians his happines. And therefore that which he was minded to haue put off for a longer time, he would now put in execution out of hand: for the night following at the fourth watch he would dislodge from thence, that

\* Cimbri, a nation came out of Germanie and drove out the Aduatici and are now the Zelanders. Teutoni, Germans.

that without further delay he might vnderstand, whether shame and respect of dutie would preuaile more with them, then feare and cowardice. And though he wist that no man els would follow him: yet notwithstanding he would go with the tenth legion alone, of which he doubted nothing, and would accept it as the chiefe band and guard of his person. Vpon the making of this speech, the mindes of all men were wonderfully changed: for it bred in euery one a great alacritie and desire to fight: neither did the tenth legion forget to giue him thanks by their Tribunes, for the good opinion he had of them, assuring him of their readinesse to set forward to the warre.

#### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**I**N the speech it selfe are presented many specialities, both concerning their discipline and militarie instructions, which deserue examination; amongst which I note first, the extraordinary number admitted to the Councell, *Omnium ordinum ad id concilium adhibitis Centurionibus*: Whereas there were vsually no more admitted to their councell of warre but the Legates, Questor, Tribunes, and the Centurions of the first orders, which I vnderstand to be the first *Hastate*, the first *Princeps*, and the first *Pilum* of euery legion. And this is manifestly proued out of the fift Commentarie where Cicero was besieged by Ambiorix, in which amongst other there were two valiant Centurions, Pulio, and Varenus: betweene whom there was euerie yeare great emulation for place of preferment, *Et iam primis ordinibus appropinquabant*, saith Cæsar, that is, they had passed by degrees through the lower orders of the legion, and were very neare the dignitie of the first cohort, wherein as in all the rest there were 3 maniples, and in euerie maniple two orders.

#### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**T**He first motiue which he vseth to recall their exiled iudgment, discovered their breach of discipline: for contrarie to the course of militarie government, they had presumed not only to make inquirie, but to giue out whither, and vpon what seruice they were caried; which in the rigour of campe pollicie, could not passe without due punishment: for what can more contradict the fortunate successe of an expedition, then to suffer to be measured with the vulgar conceit? or waied in the ballance of such false iudgements? especially when those weake Censors are to be Actors, and executioners of the designe: for then euerie man will sute the nature of the action according to his own humor, although his humor be led with blindness, and haue no other direction, then an vncertaine apprehension of profit or disadvantage. And in this case there cannot be a better president then nature hath prescribed: for as natural Agents, whilst they concur to produce a worke of absolute perfection, neither know what they doe, nor can discern the things they looke vpon; but yeeld themselves to be guided by a moderator

of infinite knowledge: so ought a multitude to submit their abilitie to the direction of some wise and prudent captaine, that beholdeth the action in true honour; and balanceth the losse of many particulars, with the health and safetie of the publike good. For if euery man should prescribe, who should obay? *Tam nescire quædam milites, quam scire oportet*, saith Otho in Tacitus vpon the like disorder: and againe, *parendo potius quam imperia ducum sciscitando res militares continentur*; which proueth that the greatest vertue which is required in a souldier is obedience, as a thing wherein the force of all discipline consisteth.

### THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

Whether men  
haue greater  
courage in  
their owne or  
in a strangers  
country.

**I**N the reason which he vseth to proue their disparitie of valour, in regard of the Romans, being superiour to the Heluetians that had oftentimes ouerthrowen the Germans; he strengtheneth the argument with the aduantage of the place, and saith that the Heluetians had put them to the worst, not onely where the Heluetians dwelt themselves; but euen in their owne country, and at home at their owne dores: as though an enemy were charged with greater furie in the presence of a mans own country and dearest friendes, then in a strange and vknowne land. This question was handled in the Roman Senate, by Fabius Maximus, and Scipio surnamed Africanus, when they sate in counsell how to ridde their country of that subtle Carthaginian, that for sixteene yeares space had fretted like a canker the beautie of Italie, wasted the land and brought it to desolation: sacked their confederates, or alienated them from their duety, ouerthrowen their Armies, slaine their Consuls, and threatned their imperiall cittie with ruine and destruction. Fabius vpon the motion to make warre in Africke, thought it agreeable to nature, first to defend that which was their owne, before they attempted other mens possessions: when peace was established in Italy, then let warre be set on foot in Africke; and first let them be without feare themselves, before they went about to terrifie others: for those forces afforded little hope of victorie in another kingdome, that were not able to free their owne country from so dangerous an enemy. Alcibiades ouerthrew the Athenian common weale with the like counsel: and concerning Hannibal, let them be sure of this, that they should finde him a forer enemy in his owne country, then in an other kingdome. Scipio on the other side, caried on with the honour of so glorious an enterprise, wanted neither reasons nor examples to impugne Fabius his authoritie: for he shewed that Agathocles the Syracusan king, being a long time afflicted with the Punicke warre, auerted the Carthaginean from Cicily, by transporting his forces into Africke: but how powerfull it was to take awaie feare, by retorting danger vpon the oppressor, could there be a presenter example then Hannibal? There was great difference in the nature of the action, betweene the spoile and wast of a strangers country, and to see their owne natie country wasted with sword and destruction: *plus animi est inferenti periculum, quam propulsanti*, for he that inuadeth an others kingdome, easily discouereth both the aduantage which

may



may be taken against the enemy, and the strength whereupon he relyeth: And amongst the variable euent of warre, many vnexpected occasions arise which present victory to him that is ready to take it; and many strange chances so alter the course of thinges, that no foresight can discerne what may happen. With these and the like remonstrances, this question of no lesse doubt then importance, was handled by two famous and worthy Captaines, whose mindes as it seemed, were intangled with such particular affections for the present, as might rather draw them to wrest reason to their owne humor, then to determine in sincerity of iudgment, vpon what specialities the truth was grounded, in the contrariety of their positions. But to leaue other commodities or disadvantages, which are annexed vnto either part, I will only set downe some reasons to proue how valour and courage may either grow or be abated, by the accidents which rise in a warre of that nature. And first this cannot be denied, the testimonie of an vnfallible truth being grounded vpon the property of mans nature; that as aduantage bringeth hope of victorie, and hope conceiue such spirites as usually follow, when the thing which is hoped for, is effected; and thereby the courage becommeth hardie and resolute in victorie: so on the other side disadvantage and danger breede feare, and feare so checketh valour, and controlleth the spirits, that vertue and honor giue place to distrust, and yeelde vp their interest to such directors, as can afford nothing but diffidence & irresolution: Neither can it be denied, but he that setteth vpon an enemy in a strange country, and so preuenteth such attemptes as might be made vpon his owne territories, hath that aduantage which giueth life vnto action, and stealeth his enterprise with resolution; for besides the commoditie of leauing when he list, and proceeding as far forth as he shall finde his meanes able to fortunate his attemptes; hee knoweth that the strife and controuersie is not for his native country, which he quietly enioyeth, and is reserued at all times to entertaine him, howloeuer fortune shal fauour his designs: but for a strangers kingdome which his ambition thirsteth after; wherein for as much as the riches and wealth of that state are laide before them as the recompence of their labour, besides the honour which is archieued thereby, euerie mans valour soareth at a high pitch, and their courage is increased without any trouble or disturbance of the other faculties of the minde. But when a Prince shall be assaulted in his owne kingdome, and in the sight of his subiectes haue his land consumed with ruine and destruction: the danger will so disturbe the powers of the soule, that through the turbulent disorder of the weaker partes, the better faculties will lose their prerogative of aduising how the enemy may be best resisted; when as euery man shal apprehend the terrour of the danger, and few or none conceiue the true meanes to auoide it. And albeit the presence of such thinges as are dearest to his soule, as the pietie and respect of aged parents, the tender affection towards wife and children, are sufficient to raise valour to the highest point of resolution: yet the motives are of such waight as will rather make them diffident of their owne worth as vn-sufficient to maintaine so great a cause, then hold them in that key which true honour affecteth: for as much as the terrour and feare of so great a danger will present a greater measure of woes to their minde, then the hope of victory



can afforde them ioy. Hence therefore groweth the difference betweene him, that seeketh to maintaine that estate which he hath in possession by force of Armes; and an other, that seeketh to increase his meanes by valour. For the former is presented with the danger of loosing all his estate, which affrighteth and troubleth, hauing no other reward propounded vnto him; and the other looketh vpon the aduantage, which he gaineth by ouercomming; which much increaseth his valour, without any losse or disaduantage, if he chance to be put to the worst. And therefore there is alwaies great ods betweene him that hath already lost his goods, and is by that meanes become desperate, hauing nothing further to loose; and another, that yet keepeth his substance, but is in danger to loose it: for feare will so dismay his mind, that he will rather distrust his owne ability, then entertaine a resolution of valour. To proue this, we neede not seeke other examples, then those imperiall cities, in whose cause this controuersie was first moued. For when Hanniball was come into Italy and had defeated Sempronius the Consull at Trebeas, the Romans were driuen into such an extasie of terrour, that they beleueed verely that the enemy was then comming to assault the citie; neither had they any hope or aid in themselves to keepe or defend the same. On the other side, Scipio was no sooner landed in Africke, but there was such a tumult in Carthage, as though the citie had been already taken: neither could the opinion of victory, which Hanniball by a conquering Armie in Italy had confirmed for sixteene yeares together, preuaile in the apprehension of so imminent a danger: And then that which Fabius borrowed of nature to teach the Romans (that first men ought to defend their own, before they seeke other mens possessions) was carefully followed by the Carthaginians: for with all speed they sent for Hanniball out of Italy, to be their Champion against young Scipio. If therefore other things be correspondent, as there are many other particularities concerning the power and strength of either nation to be considered, I take it much better for a Prince to inuade an enemy in his owne country, then to attend him at home in his owne kingdome.

#### THE FOVRTH OBSERVATION.



He last circumstance which I note in this speech, was the trust which he reposed in the tenth legion, being in it selfe peraduenture as faultie as any other: wherein he shewed great arte and singular wisdom. For he that hath once offended and is both burthened with the guilt of conscience, and vpbraided with the reproch of men, can hardly be perswaded that his fault can bee purged with any satisfaction. And although the punishment be remitted, yet the memorie of the fact will neuer be blotted out with any vertuous action; but still remaineth to cast dishonour vpon the offender, and to accuse him of disloialtie: And therefore it oftentimes happeneth, that an error being once rashly committed, through despaire of remission admitteth no true penitencie, but either draweth on more grieuous crimes, confirming that of the Poet, *Scelere scelus luendum est*; or maintaineth his error by wilfull

wilfull obtinacie: as it is saide of the Lyon that being found by hunters in a caue, will rather die in the place then quit it, for shame that he was found in so base a place of refuge; and therefore his propertie is thus expressed, *ingrediendo cecus, exeundo proteruus*. This did Cæsar wisely preuent, by cleering the tenth legion of that, which he accused the rest of the Armie, which made them so much the more earnest to answere his expectation, in as much as they were witnes to themselves of a common errour: and the other legions, enuying at their fortune, resolued to shew as great alacrity in the sequell of the warre, and to deserue more then the iudgment of the Emperour had imputed to their fellows.

## CHAP. XVII.

The treatie betweene Cæsar and  
*Ariouistus.*

THE rest of the legions in like manner dealt with their Tribunes and chiefeſt Centurions, to ſatiſſie Cæſar of their obedience, affirming that they neuer doubted nor feared, no nor ſo much as thought that it belonged to them, to determine any thing concerning the courſe of the warre, but that it was onely left to their Emperour; their purgation accepted, and good inſtructions being taken by Diuitiacus, in the fourth watch he marched forward ac-

Cæſar.

cording to the purport of his former ſpeech: The ſeuenth day as he continued on his iourney, his eſpialles brought him word, that Ariouſtus with all his forces was within 24 miles of that place: who alſoone as he vnderſtood of Cæſars comming, ſent embafſadours vnto him, declaring that forasmuch as he was come ſomewhat nearer, and that he might doe it without danger, he was content to admit of a parlee, vpon this condition, that Cæſar would bring no footmen to the meeting (for he feared to be ſurpriſed by treacherie) but onely horſemen, and in that ſort he would meeete him. Cæſar accepted of the condition, hoping at length that he would harken to reaſon and deſiſt from wilfull obſtinacie: and becauſe he durſt not commit himſelfe to the French horſemen, he thought it beſt to take their horſes, and to ſet the ſouldiers of the tenth legion vpon them, that if he ſtood in neede he might haue a faithfull guard of his friendes about him. There was a great and open plaine, and in the middeſt thereof a riſing mount, and thither they came to the parlee: the legion which Cæſar had brought with him on horſebacke; he placed 200 paces from the ſaid mount; and likewise the horſemen of Ariouſtus ſtood in the ſame diſtance: Ariouſtus requested that they might talke on horſebacke, and bring each of them ten perſons to the parlee. Their expoſtulations were the ſame in effect, with thoſe meſſages which were carried betweene them by embafſadours. Much unkindnes tooke by Cæſar, conſidering the friendſhip which the Romans had ſhewed vnto Ariouſtus, that he would not vouchſafe to treat with them: and on the other ſide as great iniurie conceived by him, forasmuch as the law of nations gaue no ſuch prerogative to any one people that they ſhould challenge in other countries by

deſert:

desert: but that generally it had giuen dominion to valour, and kingdomes to conquering armies. But while the treatise thus continued, it was told Caesar that Ariouistus his horsemen were comming neerer vnto the mount, and that they began to skirmish with his soldiours; whereupon Caesar brake off the treatie, and withdrew himselfe to his men, commaunding them that they should not cast a weapon at the enimie: for although hee perceived that without peril of his legion hee might haue encountered with Ariouistus men, yet he would not giue occasion by putting them to flight, to haue it said, that he had entrapped them vnder pretence of parlee. At his returne, when it was reported to the common soldiours, howe arrogantly Ariouistus had caried himselfe in the treaty, forbidding the Romaines all Gallia, and that his men of armes did offer to assault the legion, insomuch that the treaty was thereby broken off; the soldiours were more desirous of battell then before, and by these degrees they obtained it. Two daies after Ariouistus sent againe to Caesar, to haue those thinges persued which were begun in the treaty. Caesar thought it not good to make any further meeting in his owne person, and the rather because the Germaines had no stae of themselves the daie before, but they threw darts and stones at his men; and whome soeuer of his men hee should send vnto him should go into great danger, as cast into the hands of a sauage people. The best way he could thinke of was, to send Valerius Procillus, a well accomlisht yong man, that spake the French tounge well, and had no waie offended the Germaines, and with him he sent Marcus Titius, a man well knowne to Ariouistus, vsing sometimes to resort as a guest vnto him: To these he gaue in charge that they should diligentlie marke, and iustlie report vnto him what Ariouistus said; But as soone as Ariouistus sawe them in his campe, hee cried out to them in the presence of his army, asking them what they had to do there, and whether they came as spies? And as they went about to make their answer, he would not heare them, but caused them to be cast into irons. The same day he remoued, and incamped vnder the side of a hill 6. miles from Caesars campe; the next day he came two miles beyond Caesar, neerer to the middest of Gallia, of purpose to cut off all corne and conuoie as should be sent vnto the Romaines, by the Hedui and Sequani. From that day forward, by the space of five daies together, Caesar imbattaile his men before his campe, to the intent that if Ariouistus pleased to giue battell, he might haue libertie when hee would; but Ariouistus all this while kept his armie within his campe, and daily sent out his horsemen to skirmish with the Romaines. This was the manner of fighting which the Germaines had practised: there were 6000. horsemen, and as many strong and nimble footmen, whom the horsemen had selected out of the whole host, euerie man one for his safegard; these they had alwaies at hand with them in battell, and vnto these they resorted for succour; if the horsemen were overcharged, these euer stept in to helpe them; if any one were wounded and unhorsed, they stood about him and succoured him: if the matter required either to aduventure forward, or to retire speedilie backe againe; their swiftnesse was such through continuall exercise, that hanging on the horse maine by the one hand, they would run as fast as the horses.

#### THE OBSERVATION.

Footemen in-  
termingled  
amongst  
horsemen.

**I**T may seeme strange vnto the soldiours of our time, that the footmen should bee mingled pell mell amongst the horsemen, without hurte and disaduantage to themselves: so vnlikely it is that they should either succour the



the horsemen in any danger, or annoy the enemy: and therefore some haue imagined that these footmen in the intcounter cast themselues into one bodie, and so charging the enemy assisted the horsemen. But the circumstances of this place, and of others which I wil alleage to this purpose, plainly euince that these footmen were mingled indifferently amongst the horsemen, to assist euery particular man as his fortune and occasion required: and therefore the choise of these footmen was permitted to the horsemen, in whose seruice they were to be imploied, that euery man might take his friend in whom he reposed greatest confidence: When they were ouercharged these stept in to helpe them; if anie man were wounded or vnhorsed he had his footeman ready to assist him; and when they were to go vpon any speedie seruice, or suddainly to retire vpon advantage, they staied themselues vpon the maine of the horses with one hande, and so ran as fast as the horsemen could go: which seruices they could not possible haue performed without confusion and disorder, if the footmen had not seuerally attended vpon them, according to the affection specified in their particular election. The principall vse of these footmen of the Germanes consisted in the aide of their owne horsemen vpon any necessity, not so much regarding their seruice vpon the enemy, as the assistance of their horsemen. But the Romains had long before practised the same Arte to a more effectuell purpose, namely as a principall remedy not onely to resist, but to defeat far greater troupes of horse, then the enemy was able to oppose against them. Whereof the most ancient memory which history mentioneth, is recorded by Liuius in the second punicke war, at the siege of Capua, vnder the regiment of Quintus Fuluius the Consul: where it is said, that in all their conflicts, as the Romaine legions returned with the better, so their caualry was alwaies put to the worst: & therefore they inuented this means to make that good by Art which was wanting in force. Out of the whole army were taken the choisest young men, both for strength & agilitie, and to them were giuen little round bucklers, and seuen darts apeece in steed of their other weapons; these soldiours practised to ride behind the horsemen, and speedily to light from the horses at a watchword giuen, & so to charge the enemy on foot: And when by exercise they were made so expert that the nouelty of the inuention no whit affrighted them, the Romaine horsemen went forth to incounter with the enemy, euery man carying his foot soldior behinde him, who at the encounter suddainly alightning charged vpon the enemy with such a fury, that they followed the in slaughter to the gates of Capua: And hence saith Liuius grew the first institution of the Velites, which euer after that time were inrolled with the legions. The author of this strategem is said to be one Q. Nauius a Centurion, & was honorably rewarded by Fuluius the consull for the same. Salust, in the history of Iugurth, saith, that Manius mingled the Veclites with the Cauallrie of the associates, *ut quacunq; inuaderent equitatus hostium propulsarent*. The like practise was vsed by Caesar, as appeareth in the thirde booke of the Ciuill warre; sauing that instead of the velites, hee mingled with his horsemen 400. of the lustiest of his legionarie soldiours, to resist the caualrie of Pompei, while the rest of his armie passed ouer the riuer Genusum, after the ouerthrow he had at Dirrachium, *qui tantum proficere*, saith the text; *Vt eque-*



Lib. 6.

Lib. 3. de  
excid.

Lib. 3.

De bello A-  
fricano.

*stri pralio commisso, pellerent omnes, complures interficerent, ipsique incolumes ad agmen se reciperent.* Many other places might be recited, but these are sufficient to proue, that the greatest Captaines of auncient times strengthened their cavalrie with footemen disperfed amongst them. The Romaine horsemen, (saith Polibius) at the first caried but a weake limber pole, or staffe, and a little round buckler; but afterwards, they vsed the furniture of the Grecians, which Iosephus affirmeth to bee a strong launce or staffe, and three or foure dartes in a quiuier with a buckler, and a long sword by their right side. The vse of their launce was most effectuell when they charged in troupe, pouldron to pouldron; and that maner of fight afforded no meanes to intermingle footmen: but when they vsed their dartes, euerie man got what aduantage of ground he coulde, as our Carbins for the most part do, and so the footemen might haue place among them: or otherwise, for so good an aduantage, they woulde easilie make place for the footmen to serue among them: But howsoeuer it was, it appeareth by this circumstance howe little the Romaines feared troupes of horse, considering that the best meanes to defeate their horse was by their foote companies. But to make it more plaine, of many examples I will onely alleage two; the one out of Liuij, to proue that the Romaine horsemen were not comparable for seruice to footemen: the other out of Hirtius, to shewe the same effect against strangers, and Numidian horsemen, In the Consulships of L. Valerius, and Marcus Horatius: Valerius hauing fortunatelie ouerthrowne the Equi and the Volsci, Horatius proceeded with as great courage in the warre against the Sabines, wherein it happened, that in the day of battell, the Sabines reſtued 2000. of their men to giue a fresh assault vpon the lesſe corner of the Romaines, as they were in conflict, which tooke such effect, that the legionarie footemen of that corner were forced to retire. Which the Romaine horsemen beeing in number 600. perceiuing, and not being able with their horse to make head against the enemy; they presently forooke their horses, and made haste to make good the place on footes; wherein they caried themselves so valiantly, that in a moment of time they gaue the like aduantage to their footemen, against the Sabines; and the betooke themselves againe to their horses, to pursue the enemy in chase as they fled. For the second point. The Numidians, as Cæsar witnesſeth, were the best horsemen that euer hee met with, and vsed the same Arte as the Germanes did, mingling among them light armed footemen: an Ambuscado of these Numidians charging the legions vpon a suddaine, the history saith, that *primo impetu legionis Equitatus & leuis armatura hostium, nullo negotio, loco pulsa & deiecta est de colle.* And as they sometimes retired, and sometimes charged vpon the rereward of the armie, according to the manner of the Numidian fight; the historie saith, *Cæsariani interim non amplius tres aut quatuor milites veterani si se conuertissent & pila viribus contorta in Numidas infestos coniecissent, amplius duorum millium ad unum terga vertebant.* So that to free himselfe of this inconuenience, he tooke his horsemen out of the rereward, and placed his legions there, *ita vim hostium per legionarium militem commodius sustinebat.* And euer as he marched hee caused 300. soldiours of euerie legion to bee free and without burthen, that they might be ready vpon all occasions, *Quos in Equi-*  
tatum

*tum Labieni immisit. Tum Labienus, conuersis equis, signorum conspectu perteritus turpissime contendit fugere, multis eius occisis, compluribus vulneratis, milites legionarioj ad sua se recipiunt signa, atque iter inceptum ire caperunt.* I alleage the verie wordes of the historie, to take awaie all suspition of falsifying, or wresting anie thing to an affected opinion. If any man will looke into the reason of this disparitie, he shall finde it to be chiefly the worke of the Roman pile; an vnresistable weapon, and the terrour of horsemen, especially when they were cast with the aduantage of the place, and fell so thicke, that there was no meanes to auoid them.

But to make it plaine, that any light armed footmen could better make head against a troupe of horse, then the Cavalry of their owne partie, although they bare but the same weapons: Let vs consider how nimble and readie they were, that fought on foote, either to take an aduantage, or to shunne and auoide anie danger; casting their darts with farre greater strength and more certaintie, then the horsemen could doe. For as the force of all the engines of olde time, as the *Balista*, *Catapulta* and *Tolenones*, proceedeth from that stabilitie and resting Center, which nature affordeth, as the onely strength and life of the engine; so what force soeuer a man maketh, must principally proceede from that firmenes & stay, which nature by the earth or some other vnmoueable rest, giueth to the body, from whence it taketh more or lesse strength, according to the violence which it performeth; as he that listeth vp a waight from the ground, by so much treadeth heauier vpon the earth, by how much the thing is heauier then his bodie. The footmen therefore, hauing a surer staie to counterpoise their forced motion, then the horsemen had, cast their dartes with greater violence, and consequently with more certaintie.

## CHAP. XVIII.

Cæsar preuenteth Ariouistus of his purpose, by  
making two Campes. *The superstition*  
of the Germans.



*W*HEN Cæsar perceiued that Ariouistus meant nothing lesse then to fight, but kept himselfe within his campe; least peraduenture he should intercept the Sequani and other of his associates, as they came with conuoijs of corne to the Romans, beyond that place wherein the Germans abode about 600 paces from their campe; he chose a ground meete to incampe in: and marched thither in three battels, commanding two of them to stand readie in Armes, and the third to fortifie the campe. Ariouistus sent 15000 footmen, and all his horse to disturbe the souldiers, and to hinder the intrenchment. Notwithstanding Cæsar as he had before determined, caused two battels to withstand the enemy, and the third to go through with the

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worke:

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worke: which being ended, he left there two legions, and part of the associate forces, and led the other foure legions backe againe into his greater campe, and so he rested secure concerning the conuoyes from the Sequani, and by his greater campe cut off the passages betweene Ariouistus and the Rhene. The next day Caesar according to his custome, brought his whole power out of both his campes, and marching a little from the greater campe, he put his men in aray and profered battell to the enemy; but perceiuing that Ariouistus would not stir out of his trenches, about noone he conuaid his Armie into their seuerall campes. Then at length Ariouistus sent part of his forces to assault the lesser campe: the incounter continued very sharpe on both parts, untill the euening; and at sunsetting after many woundes giuen and taken, Ariouistus conuaid his armie againe into their campe. And as Caesar made inquirie of the captaines what the reason was, that Ariouistus refused battell: he found this to be the cause, The Germans had a custome, that their women should by casting of lots, and southsaying, declare whether it were for their behoofe to fight or no, and that they found by their Arte, the Germans could not get the victorie if they fought before the newe moone.

#### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



If we may obserue what especiall importance, this manner of incamping carried in that absolute discipline which the Romans obserued, and by which they conquered so many nations: for besides the safetie which it afforded their own troupes, it serued for a hold well fenced and manned, or as it were a strong fortified towne in any part of the field, where they saw aduantage: and as oft as they thought it expedient, either to fortifie themselves, or impeach the enemy by cutting off his passages, hindering his attempts, blocking vp his campe, besides many other aduantages, all auerring the saying of Domitius Corbulo: *dolabra vincendum esse hostem*: a thing long time neglected, but of late happely renewed by the commanders of such forces as serue the states in the vnited prouinces of Belgia: whom time and practise of the warres hath taught to entertaine the vse of the spade, and to hold it in as great reputation as any weapons whatsoeuer, which maie bee thought worthie executioners of the deedes of Armes.

#### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



IN the second place we may obserue, that there was no nation so barbarous (for I vnderstand the Germans to be as barbarous in regard of the motions of religion as any knowne nation of that time, being in a Climate so neare the North, that it afforded no contemplation at all) that could not make vse in their greatest affaires, of that superstition to which their minde was naturally intrhalld; and forge prophesies and diuinations as well to stir vp as to moderate the irregular motions of a multitude, according as they might best



best serue to aduantage their proceedings. Neither did Cæsar let slip the occasion of making vse of this their religion: for vnderstanding by their prisoners, that their diuinations forbad them to fight before the newe moone, he vsed all the meanes he could to prouoke them to battell; that their religious opinion of mischieuing might preiudice their resolution to returne conquerers. Which may serue to proue that a superstitious people are subiect to many inconueniences, which industry or fortune may discouer to their ouerthrow. It is recorded that Columbus, being Generall of some forces, which Ferdinando king of Castile sent to discouer the west Indies, & suffering great penury for want of victuals in the Ile of Iamaica: after that he had obserued how the Ilanders worshipped the moone, and hauing knowledge of an Eclipse that was shortly after to happen, he tolde the inhabitants that vnlesse they would furnish him with such necessaries as he wanted for the time, the wrath of their God should quickly appeare towards them, by changing his bright shining face into obscuritie and darkenesse: which was no sooner happened, but the poore Indians, stricken with a superstitious feare of that which the course of nature required, kept nothing backe that might assist their enemies to depopulate, and ouer runne their owne countrie.

## CHAP. XIX.

Cæsar seeketh meanes to giue them battell, and the  
*Germans dispose themselues therunto.*



*C*ÆSAR foreflowed not that aduantage: but the next daie in the morning leauing a sufficient garrison in each of his camps, for as much as the number of his legionarie souldiers was small in respect of the multitude of the Germans, he placed at the auxiliarie troupes, for a shew before the lesser campe, and putting his legions into a triple battell, he marched towards the campe of Ariouistus. And then at length were the Germans constrained to bring out their power, setting euery tribe & people by it selfe in a like distance and order of battell, and inuironing their whole Armie with their cartes and cariage, that there might be no hope at all left to saue any man by flight, that durst not abide the fortune of the battell: In these chariots they placed their women, that they by their outstretched handes and teares mouing pittie, might implore the souldiers as they descended by course into the battell, not to deliuer them, the authors of their life and being, into the bondage and thraldome of the Romans. Cæsar assigned to euerie legion a Legate and a Questor, that euerie man might haue an eie witnesse of his valour: and he himselfe began the battell with the right cornet; for as much as he perceined that part of Ariouistus Armie to be the weakest.

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## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**T**HE Romaines euen from the infancie of their state were euer zealous admirers of true honour, and alwaies desired to beholde with the eye, to what measure of vertue euerie man had attained; that the young with greater feruency of spirit might founde out the celebration of *Macte virtute*, which imported more honour then any wealth that could be heaped vpon them. Neither was this the least part of their wisdom, considering that the most pretious things that are, loose much of their worth, if they be not sited with other correspondent natures, whose sympathie addeth much more excellencie then is discerned, when they appeare by themselves without such assistance. For how small is the beauty which nature hath giuen to the eiepleasing diamond, when it is not adorned with an artificall forme? or what perfection can the forme giue without a foile to strengthen it? or what good is in either of them if the light doe not illuminate it? or what auaille all these where there wanteth an eye to admire it, a iudgement to value it, and an heart to imbrace it? such a vnion hath nature imprinted in the diuersitie of creatures concurring to perfection, and especially in morall actions, In whose cariage there is a far greater exactnes of correspondency required to approue them honorable, then was requisite to make the iewell beautiful. And this did Cæsar in all his battels; amongst the rest that at Alesia is particularly noted in this manner, *Quod in conspectu imperatoris res gerebatur, neque recte aut turpiter factum celari poterat, utrosque & laudis cupiditas & timor ignominia ad virtutem excitabat.* And when Liuius would expresse how valiantly an action was caried, he saith no more but *in conspectu imperatoris res gerebatur*, which is as much to saie, that forasmuch as the Romaines were diligent obseruers of euerie mans worth, rewarding vertue with honor, and cowardice vvith reproch; euerie man bent his vvhole indeuour to deserue the good opinion of his Generall, by discharging that duty which he owed to the common wealth, with all loyalty and faithfulness of spirit.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**T**HE Romaines had foure formes of the front of their battell, the first was called *Acies recta*, when neither the cornets nor the battell was aduanced one before another, but were all caried in a right line, and made a straight front; and this was their most vsuall manner of imbattailing.

The second forme of the front was called *obliqua*, when as one of the cornets was aduanced neerer vnto the enemy then the rest, to beginne the battell: and this was commonly as Vegetius noteth, the right cornet: for the right cornet of an army had great aduantage against the left of the enemies, in regarde of

of their weapons and furniture: But Cæsar did it in this place, becaule hee perceived that the enemy was weakest in that part; following a maxime of great authoritie, that the weakest part of an enemy is in the beginning to be charged with the strength of an army: for so fauorable are mens iudgements to that which is already happened, that the sequell of euery action dependeth for the most part vpon the beginning, *Dimidium facti qui bene capit habet*, (saith a Poet) and not without great reason, so forcible continually is the beginning, and so connexed to the sequel by the nature of a precedent cause, that the ende must needes erre from the common course, when it doth not participate of that qualitie which was in the beginning. Neither can there be any good ende without a good beginning: for although the beginning bee oftentimes disastrous and vn lucky, and the end fortunate and happie, yet before it came to that end there was a fortunate beginning: for the bad beginning was not the beginning of a good, but of an euill end. And therefore that his men might foresee a happy ende in a good beginning, it behooued him with the best of his armie to assault the weakest part of the enemy.

The third forme of the front is called *Sinuata*, when both the cornets are aduanced forward, and the battell standeth backward off from the enemy, after the fashion of a halfe moone. Scipio vsed it in Spaine, hauing obserued some daies before, that the enemy continually so disposed of the battell, that his best soldiours were alwaies in the midst; and therefore Scipio put all his old soldiours in the cornets, and brought them out first to charge vpon the weakest part of the enemy, that those might decide the controuersie, before the other that were in the midst could come to fight.

The last forme is called *gibbosa* or *gibbera Acies*, when the battell is aduanced, and the two cornets lag behinde. This forme did Haniball vse in the battell of Cannas, but with this Art, that he strengthened his two cornets with the best of his soldiours, and placed his weakest in the midst, that the Romaines following the retreit of the battell, which was easily repeld, might be inclosed on each side with the two cornets.

## CHAP. XX.

### The battell betweene Cæsar and Ariouistus.



HE signe of battell was no sooner giuen, but the Romaines charged vpon the enemy so fiercely, as though they ment to giue themselves the lye: for seeming to acknowledge that they once conceiued any feare of the Germanes; and the enemy on the other side returned so speedie a counterbuss, that the legions had no time to cast their Piles, and therefore they speedilie betooke them to their swordes. But the Germanes putting themselves according to their manner into a Phalanx, receiued the force of their swordes, without any daunger or losse at all. In the battell there

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there were many legionarie souldiers, that were seene to keepe upon the phalanx, & to pull up with their hands the targets that couered it, and so to wound & kil those that were underneath: and by that means, they brake & dispersed it, and so the left cornet of the enemy, was ouerthrowne & put to flight. Now while the right cornet was thus busied, the left cornet was ouercharged with an vnequall multitude of the Germans, which young Crassus the Prefect of the horsemen no sooner perceiued (hauing more scope and libertie then any of the commanders that were in the battell) he sent tertiam Aciem, the third battell, to rescue and aide their fellows that were in danger, by meanes whereof the fight was renewed, and all the enemy was put to flight and neuer looked backe untill they came to the Rhene, which was about five miles from the place where they fought; where some few of them saued themselues by swimming, others found a fewe boates and so escaped; Ariouistus lighting vpon a little barke tied to the shore, with much a doe recovered the other side of the Rhene, and so saued himselfe: the rest were all slaine by the horsemen. As Caesar pursued the German horsemen, it was his chance to light vpon Valerius Proculus, as he was drawne vp and downe by his keepers, bound with three chaines, which accident was as gratefull to him as the victorie it selfe; being so fortunate to recover his familiar friend, whom the barbarous enemy, contrarie to the law of nations, had cast into prison; & in his own presence had three seuerall times cast lots vpon his life, whether he should be then burned or reprimed vnto another time; and still he was saued by the fortune of the lots: and Marcus Titius was found in like manner and brought vnto him. The fame of this battell being caried beyond the Rhene: the Sueui that were come to the bankes of Rhene, returned home againe, whom the inhabitants belonging to the saide riuer pursued, and slew a great number of them. Caesar hauing thus ended two great warres in one sommer, he brought his Armie into their wintering campes, somewhat sooner then the time of the yeare required.

#### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



His phalanx here mentioned, can hardly be proued to be the right Macedonian Phalanx; but we are rather to vnderstand it to be so tearmed, by reason of the close and compact imbattailing, rather then in any other respect: and it resembled much a *testudo*, as I said of the Heluetian phalanx. Secondly, I obserue, that Cæsar kept the olde rule concerning their discipline in fight: for although the name of *Triaries* be not mentioned in his historie; yet he omitted not the substance, which was, to haue *primam, secundam, & tertiam Aciem*; and that *prima Acies* should begin the battell, and the second should come fresh and assist them; or peradventure if the enemy were many and strong, the first and second battell were ioyned together, and so charged vpon the enemy with greater furie and violence: but at all aduentures, the third battell was euer in subsidio, as they tearmed it, to succour any part that should be ouercharged; which was a thing of much consequence, and of great wisdom. For if we either respect the incouragement of the souldiers, or the casualltie of fortune; what could be more added to their discipline in this behalfe, then to haue a second & a third succour, to giue strength to the fainting weaknes of their men, and to repaire the disaduantage which any accident



accident should cast vpon them? or if their valour were equally balanced, and victorie stood doubtfull which of the two parties shce should honour; these alwaies slept in, being fresh, against wearie and ouerlaboured spirits, and so drew victorie in despite of casualltie vnto themselves.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



Concerning vse of lots, it shall not be amisse to looke into the nature of them, being in former times so generall, that there was no nation ciuill or barbarous, but were directed in their greatest affaires, by the sentence of lots. As we may not refuse for an vndoubted truth, that which Salomon saith the 16 of Prouerbs: The lots are cast into the lap: but the direction thereof belongeth to the Lord: Through the knowledge whereof, Iosua was directed to take Achan, the Mariners Ionas, and the Apostles, to consecrate Matthias. So whether the heathen and barbarous people, whose blindness in the way of truth could direct them no further then to senselesse superstition, and put them in minde of a dutie which they owed; but could not tell them what it was, nor how to be performed: whether these I say, were perswaded that there was any supernaturall power in their lotteries, which directed the action to the decree of destenie, and as the Gods would haue it, it remaineth doubtfull. Aristotle the wisest of the heathen, concerning things naturall, nameth that euent casuall, or proceeding from fortune; of which the reason of man could assigne no cause, or (as he saith) which hath no cause: So that whatsoever happened in any action besides the intent of the agent and workeman, was tearmed an effect of fortune, or chance of habnab. For all other effects which depended vpon a certaine and definite cause, were necessarily produced; and therefore could not be casuall or subiect to the inconstancie of chance: And because manie and sundrie such chances daily happened, which like *terra filij* had no father, and could not be warranted, as lawfull children, either to nature or to reason, by the appearance of an efficient cause, they reduced them all to the power of fortune; as the principall efficient and soueraigne Motor of all such vnexpected euent, that is, they made nothing else the gouernesse, and directresse of many things: which afterward grew to such credit amongst men, that it surpassed in dignity all naturall causes, and was deified with celestially honour, as the Poet saith, *Nos te facimus fortuna deam caloque locamus*. By the prouidence of this blinde goddesse which held her deity by the tenure of mens ignorance, were all casuall actions directed, and especially lots; the euent whereof depended onely vpon her pleasure and decree: neither could their direction be assigned to any other power, for then their nature had been altered from chance to certainty, & the euent could not haue been called *Sors*, but must haue been reputed in the order of necessary effects, whereof discourse of reason acknowledgeth a certaine foregoing cause. Whereby we see vpon how weake an axletree, the greatest motions of the godlesse world were turned, hauing irregularitie and vncertaintie, for the *intelligentie*, that gouerned their reuolutions. All herein all sortes of men, (although in diuers respectes) rested as well contented, as if an Oracle had spoken vnto them, and reuealed the mysteries of fatall destinie.


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lots.




Rome directed the maine course of her gouernment, by the fortune of this mocke destiny. For although their Consuls and Tribunes were elected by the people, who pleased their own fancie with the free choice of their commanders, and suted their obedience with a well liking authority: yet the publike affaires, which each Consull was seuerally to manage, was shared out by lots. For if an enemie were entered into their confines to depopulate and wast their territories, the lots assigned this Consull for the gouernment of the cittie; and the other to command the legions, and to manage the war. If forces were to be sent into diuers prouinces and against seuerall enemies, neither the Senate nor the people could giue to either Consull his taske: but their peculiar charges were authorised by lots. If any extraordinarie action were to be done in the citie, as the dedication of a temple, the sanctifying of the Capitoll after a pollution, *Sors omnia versat*, did all in all. And yet (notwithstanding the weake foundation of this practise in their Theologie & deepest diuinitie) we may not thinke but these skilfull Architects of that absolute gouernment, wherein vertue ioyned with true wisdom, to make an vnexampled patterne: we may not thinke I say, but they foresaw the manifold danger, which in the course of common actions could no otherway be preuented, but by the vse of lots. For when things are equally leuelled betweene diuers objects, and run with indifferencie to equall stations, there must be some controlling power, to draw the current towards one coast, and to appropriate it vnto one chanell, that the order of nature be not inuerfed, nor a well established gouernment disturbed: So the state of Rome casting many things with equall charge vpon her two soueraigne magistrates, which could not be performed but by one of them; what better meanes could there be inuented to interesse the one in that office and to discharge the other, then to appoint an arbiter, whose decree exceeded humane reason? Of which it could not be saide why it was so, but that it was so: for if the wisdom of the Senat had been called to counsell, or the voices of the people calculated to determine of the matter; it might easily haue burst out into ciuill discord, considering the often contentions between the Senat and the people, the factions of Clients, & the constant mutabilitie of euery mans priuate affections necessarily inclining vnto one, although their worth were equal & by true reason indiscernable; which might haue made the one proud of that which peradventure he had not, and cast the other lower then would haue well becomed his vertues: And therefore to cut off these, with many other inconueniences, they inuented lots; which without either reason or will might decide such controuersies. By this it appeareth how little the ancient law-makers respected the ground & reason of an ordinance, so the commoditie were great, and the vse important to the good of the state: for as they saw the thing it selfe to be casuall, so they saw that casuall thinges are sometimes more necessarie, then demonstratiue conclusions: neither ought the nature, and speculatiue consideration of lawes and statutes, belong to the common people: but the execution and obedience thereof maketh the common weale flourish. And thus endeth the first Commentarie of Cæsar his warre in Gallia.

THE













## THE SECOND COMMENTARIE OF THE WARS IN GALLIA.

### THE ARGUMENT.

**L**Ike as when a heauy bodie lyeth vpon the skirt of a larger continued quantity, although it couer but a small parcell of the whole surface; yet the other quarters are burthened & kept vnder with a proportionable measure of that waight; and through the vnion and continuation which bindeth all the parts into one totalitie, feele the same suppression which hath really seased but vpon their fellow part: In like maner the Belgæ, inhabiting the furthest skirt of that triple continent, seemed to repine at that heauy burthen, which the Romaine Empire had laide vpon the Prouince, the Hedui, and other states of that kingdome. And least it might in time be further remoued and laide directly vpon their shoulders, they thought it expedient whilest they felte it but by participation to gather their seuerall forces into one head, and trie whether they coulde free their neighbour nations from so greuous a yoak; or at the least keepe it frō comming any neerer vnto themselues: And this is the Argument of this second booke, which deuideth it selfe into two partes: the first containing the warres betweene Cæsar and all the states of Belgia vnited together: the secōd recording the battailes which he made with some of the states thereof in particular, as time and occasion gaue him meanes to effect it.

### CHAP. I.

Cæsar hasteth to his army, marcheth towardes the confines of the Belgæ, & taketh in the men of Rheims.



**T**HE report of this confederacie being brought vnto Cæsar, whilest he wintred beyond the Alpes, as wel by letters from Labienus, as by the common hearesay of the worlde: hee leuied two new legions in Lumbardie, and sent them by Q. Pedius into Gallia, and as soone as there was any forrage in the fieldes he himselfe came to the armie. At his arriual, vnderstanding by the Senones & the rest of

H ij.

Cæsar.

the Galles that bordered vpon the Belgæ (to whom he gaue in charge to learne what was done amongst them,) that there was nothing in Belgia but mustering of soldiers, and gathering their forces into one heade: he thought it not safe to make anie further delaie, but hauing made prouision of corne, he drew out his army from their wintering camps, and within fiftene daies he came to the borders of the Belgæ. Assoone as he was come thither, which was much sooner then was looked for; the men of Rheimes being the uttermost of the Belgæ, next adioining to the Celsæ, thought it best to entertaine a peaceable resolution, and sent Iccius and Antebrogius, two of the cheefe men of their state, vnto Cæsar, to submit themselves and all that they had, to the mercy of the Romaine Empire; affirming that they were innocent both of the counsel of the Belgæ, and of their conspiracie against the Romaines: For prooffe wherof they were ready to giue hostages, to receiue them into their towns, and to furnish them with corne or what other thing they stood in neede of. That the rest of the Belgæ were al in armes, and the Germanis on the other side of the Rhene had promised to send them succour: yea their madnesse was so great, that they themselves were not able to hold backe the Sueffones from that attempt, being their brethren and kinsmen in blood, and vsing the same lawes and customes as they did, hauing both one magistrate and one forme of government; but they would needs support the same quarrel which the rest of the Belgæ had vndertaken.

#### THE OBSERVATION.



Might heere take occasion to speake somewhat of a particular reuolt in a generall cause; and howe a confederate state may in regarde of their owne safetie, forsake a common quarrell, or whatsoeuer the vniuersall societie hath enacted preiudiciall to their common weale: but that I onely intende to discouer warlike practises, leauing these questions of lawe and policie to men of greater iudgement and better experience. Onlie I obserue in the behalfe of the Romaine government, that such cities as yellected to the Empire, and became tributarie to their treasury (howsoeuer they were otherwise combined by confederacy) seldome or neuer repented them of their facte, in regard of the noble patronage which they found in that state, and of the due respect obserued towards them.

#### CHAP. II.

### The power of the Belgæ, and their preparation for this warre.

Cæsar.



Cæsar inquiring of the Ambassadors which came frō Rheimes what the states were that had taken armes, and what they were able to do in matter of war: found the Belgæ to be descended from the Germanes; who passing ouer the Rhene time out of minde, droue away the Galles and seated themselves in their possessions: and that these only of al the Galles kept the Cimbri and Teutoni frō entering into their

their country: and in that regard they chalenged to themselves great authoritie, & vaunted much in their feats of armes. Concerning their number they had these aduertisements; the <sup>a</sup> Bellouaci exceeded all the Belga in prowesse, authoritie, and number of men, and promised 60000. men: and in that regard they demanded the administration of the whole warre. The <sup>b</sup> Sueffones inhabiting a large and fertile countrey, and having 12. walled towns, promised to set out 50000. The <sup>c</sup> Neruij as many; the <sup>d</sup> Atrebatij 15000. the <sup>e</sup> Ambiani 10000. the Velocassij, and <sup>f</sup> Veromandui as many; the <sup>g</sup> Morini 25000. the Menapij 7000. the Caletani 10000. the Catuaci 19000. the <sup>h</sup> Eburones, Condrusones, and others 40000. Caesar incouraging the men of Rheimes to persist their faithfulness to the Romaine Empire, propounded vnto them great offers and liberall promises of recompence, and commanded all their senate to come before him, and bring with them their noble mens sonnes to be giuen vp for hostages, which they diligently performed by a day appointed. And hauing receiued two especial aduertisements from the men of Rheimes, the one concerning the multitude of the enemy; and the other touching the singular opinion which was generally held of their manhood: hee provided for the first by perswading Diuitiacus the Heduan, that it much imported the whole course of those businesses, to keepe asunder the powre of the enemy; and to withhold their forces from making a head, that so he might auoide the danger of incountering so great a power at one instant. Which might easilie be brought to passe, if the Hedui would enter with a strong power into the marches of the Bellouaci, and sacke their territories with sword and confusion, which Diuitiacus promised to performe, and to that purpose he speedily returned into his country. Vpon the second aduertisement which presented vnto him the great valour and manhood of his enemies, he resolved not to be too hasty in giuing them battell, but first to proue by skirmishing with his horsemen what his enemies by their prowesse could do, and what his own men durst doe.

<sup>a</sup> The country about Beau-vois.

<sup>b</sup> The country about Soissons

<sup>c</sup> The people about Turnai & Arras.

<sup>d</sup> Amyens. <sup>e</sup> Vermandois.

<sup>f</sup> Teruene <sup>g</sup> Leige.

<sup>h</sup> 296000. in al.

#### THE OBSERVATION.



His rule of making triall of the worth of an enemy, hath alwaies been obserued by prudent and graue commanders, as the surest principle whereon the true iudgment of the euent may be grounded. For if the doctrine of the old Philosophers, which teacheth that the worde *non putabam* was neuer heard out of a wise mā's mouth, haue any place in the course of humane actions, it ought especiallie to be regarded in managing these main points, whereon the state of kingdomes and empires dependeth. For vnlesse we be perswaded that blind chance directeth the course of this worlde vvith an vncertaine confusion, and that no foresight can swaie the balance of our hap into either part of our fortune; I see no reason why we should not by al means indeuor to grounde our knowledge vpon true causes, and leuel our proceedings to that certainty which riseth from the things the selues. And this is the rather to be vrged, inasmuch as our leaders are oftentimes deceiued when they look no further then to match an enemy vvith equalitie of number, referring their valour to bee tried in the battell; not considering that the eye of it selfe cannot



discerne the difference betweene two champions of like presence and outward carriage, vnlesse it see their strength compared together and waied as it were in the scale of triall: which Cæsar omitted not diligently to obserue, before he would aduenture the hazard of battell. For besides his owne satisfaction, it gaue great encouragement to his men, when they sawe themselues able to counter-match an enemie, and knew their taske to be subiect to their strength: Neither did he obserue it onely at this instant, but throughout the whole course of his actions; for we finde that he neuer incountered any enemie, but with sufficient power, either in number or in valour to make head against them: which equality of strength, being first laide as a sure foundation, he vsed his owne industrie and skill, and the discipline wherein his men were trained, as aduantages to ouer-sway his aduersarie: and so drew victorie maugre fortune vnto himselfe, and sel-dome failed in any of his battels.

## CHAP. III.

\* *La disne.*

Cæsar passeth his Armie ouer the riuer \*Axona,  
leauing Titurius Sabinus incamped on the  
other side with sixe cohorts.

Cæsar.



AS SOONE as Cæsar vnderstood, as well by his discoverers, as from the men of Rheimes, that all the power of the Belgæ was assembled together into one place, and was now making towardes him no great distance off; he made all the haste he could to passe his Armie ouer the riuer Axona, which deuided the men of Rheimes from the other Belgæ. Whereby he brought to passe, that no enemie could come on the backe of him to worke any disadvantage: and that corne might be brought vnto him from Rheimes, and other citties without danger. And further, that he might command the passage backe againe, as occasion should serue to his best aduantage, he fortified a bridge which he found on the riuer, with a strong garrison of men, and caused Titurius Sabinus a Legate, to incampe himselfe on the other side of the riuer with sixe cohortes, commaunding him to fortifie his campe with a rampier of 12 foote in altitude, and a trench of 18 foote in breadth.

## OBSERVATION.



IF it be demaunded, why Cæsar did passe his Armie ouer the riuer, leauing it on his backe; and did not rather attend the enemie on the other side, and so take the aduantage of hindering him, if he should attempt to passe ouer? I will set downe the reasons in the sequell of this warre, as the occurrences shall fall out to make them more euident. In the meane time let vs enter into the particularitie of these sixe cohortes, that wee maie the better iudge of such troupes which were imploied in the seruices of this warre: but that wee may the better coniecture what number of souldiers these

these fixe cohortes did containe, it seemeth expedient, a little to discourse of the companies and regiments, which the Romans vsed in their Armies.

And first we are to vnderstand, that the greatest and chiefeest regiment in a Roman Armie, was tearmed by the name of Legio: as Varro saith, *quod leguntur milites in delectu*: or as Plutarch speaketh, *quod lecti ex omnibus essent milites*; so that it taketh the name Legio of the choise and selecting of the soldiers. Romulus is said to be the first author & founder of these legions, making euery legion to containe 3000 soldiers: but shortly after they were augmented, as Festus recordeth vnto 4000: and afterward againe from 4000 to 4200. And that number was the common rate of a legion vntill Hanniball came into Italie, and then it was augmented to 5000, but that proportion continued onely for that time. And againe, when Scipio went into Africke, the legions were increased to 6200 footmen, and 300 horse. And shortly after the Macedonian warre, the legions that continued in Macedonie to keepe the Prouince from rebellion, consisted of 6000 footmen and 300 horse. Out of Caesar it cannot be gathered, that a legion in his time did exceede the number of 5000 men; but oftentimes it was short of that number: for he himselfe saith, that in this warre in Gallia his soldiers were so wasted, that he had scarce 7000 men in two legions. And if we examine that place out of the 3. of the ciuill war, where he saith, that in Pompei his Armie were 110 cohortes, which amounted to the nuber of 55000 men: And being manifest as well by these number of cohortes, as by the testimonie of diuers authors, that Pompei his Army consisted of 11 legions; if we deuide 55000 into 11 partes, we shall finde a legion to consist of 5000 men. Which number or thereabout, being generally knowne to be the vsuall rate of a legion, the Romans alwaies exprested the strength of their Armie by the number of legions that were therein: as in this warre it is said, that Caesar had eight legions, which by this account might arise to 40000 men, besides associates, and such as necessarily attended the Armie. Further we are to vnderstand, that euery legion had his peculiar name, by which it was knowne and distinguished from the rest, and that it tooke either from their order of muster, or inrolment; as that legion which was first inrolled, was called the first legion; and that which was second in choice, the second legion; and so consequently of the rest; and so we reade in this historie, the seuenth, the eighth, the ninth, the tenth, the eleuenth and twelfth legion: or otherwise from the place of their warfare, and so we read of *legiones Germanica, Panonica, Britannica*, and such others; and sometime of their Generall, as *Augusta, Claudia, Vitelliana, legiones*, and so forth. Or to conclude, from some accident or qualitie, as *Rapax, Victrix, Fulminifera* and such like. And this much of the name and number of a legion, which I must necessarily distinguish into diuers kindes of souldiers, according to the first institution of the olde Romans, and the continuall obseruation thereof vnto the decay of the Empire, before I come to the description of these smaller partes, whereof a legion was compounded.

First therefore we are to vnderstand, that after the Consuls had made a generall choise and sworne the souldiers, the Tribunes chose out the youngest and poorest of all the rest, and called them by the name of Velites. Their place

*A legion  
what it was.  
Lib. 4.  
De vita Ro-  
muli.*

*Lin. lib. 22.*

*Tacitus 3.  
hist.*

*Velites.*

in

*Hastati.**Principes.**Lib. 6.**Lib. 1. de mil.  
Rom.**The use of  
this diuision.**The distincti-  
on of their  
companies.  
Manipuli.**Ordo.*

in regard of the other souldiers was both bate & dishonorable: not only because they fought a farre off, and were lightly armed; but also in regard they were commonly exposed to the enemy, as our forelorne hopes are. Hauing chosen out a competent number for this kinde, they proceeded to the choise of them which they called Hastati, a degree aboue the Velites, both in age and wealth, and tearmed them by the name of Hastati; forasmuch as at their first institution they fought with a kind of Iauelin, which the Romaines called Hasta: but before Polybius his time they vsed Piles; notwithstanding their ancient name continued vnto the latter time of the Empire. The third choise which they made was of the strongest and lustiest bodied men, who for the prime of their age were called Principes; the rest that remained were named Triarii, as Varro saith, *Quod tertio ordine extremis subsidio deponuntur*: These were alwaies the eldest and best experienced men, and were placed in the third diuision of the battell, as the last helpe and refuge in all extremity. Polybius saith, that in his time the Velites, Hastati, and Principes, did consist of 1200 men a peece; and the Triarii neuer exceeded the number of 600. although the generall number of a legion were augmented: wherof Lypsius allegeth these reasons. First bicause these Triarii consisted of the best of the soldiours, and so might counteruaile a greater number in good worth and valour. Secondly, it feldome came to buckle with the enemy, but when the controuersie grewe very doubtfull. Lastly, wee may well coniecture that the voluntaries and extraordinarie folowers, ranged themselves amongst these Triaries, and so made the third battel equal to either of the former; but howsoeuer, they neuer exceeded the number of 600. And by this it appeareth, that in Polybius his time the common rate of a legion was 4200.

In this diuision of their men consisted the ground of that well ordered discipline; for in that they distinguished them according to their yeeres and abilitie, they reduced their whole strength into feuerall classes; & so disposed of these different parts, that in the generall cōposition of their whole bodie euery part might be fitted with place and office, according as his worth vvas answerable to the same: & so they made not only a number in grosse, but a number distinct by parts and properties, that from euery accident which met with any part of the armie, the iudgement might determine how much or howe little it imported the whole bodie: besides the great vse vvhich they made of this distinction in their degrees of honour and preferment; a matter of no final consequence, in the excellencie of their gouernment.

The soldiours, at their inrolement beeing thus deuided according to their yeeres and abilitie, they then reduced them into smaller companies, to make them fitter for command and fight: and so they deuided the Hastati, Principes, and Triarii, each of them into 10 companies, making of those 3. sortes of soldiours 30. small regiments, vvhich they called Manipuli: And againe, they subdeuided euerie maniple into two equall parts, and called them Ordo, vvhich was the least companie in a legion; and according to the rate set down by Polybius, contained 60. soldiours. In euerie Ordo there was a Centurion, or Captaine, and a Lieutenent, whom they named Optio or Tergiductor. The maniples of the Triarii were much lesser then the maniples of either the Hastati or the Principes;



cipes; for as much as their whole band consisted but of 600. men. The Velites were put into no such companies, but were equally distributed amongst the other Maniples; and therefore the Hastati, Principes, and Triarii were called *subsignanos milites*, to make a difference between them and the Velites, which were not devided into bandes; and so consequently had no ensigne of their own, but were distributed amongst the other companies: so that every Maniple had 40. Velites attending vpon it. And now I come to the description of a cohort, which the history heere mentioneth.

The worde *Cohors* in latine doth signifie that part of ground which is commonly inclosed before the gate of a house, which from the same word we call a court: and Varro giueth this reason of the metaphor. As in a farme house, saith he, many out-buildings ioined together make one inclosure; so a cohort consisteth of severall maniples ioined together in one body. This cohort consisted of three maniples; for euery legion had ten cohorts, which must necessarily comprehend those thirty maniples: but these 3. maniples were not al of one and the same kind of soldiours, as three maniples of the Hastati, 3. of the Principes, and 3. of the Triarii, as Patricius in his Paralleli seemeth to affirme; for so there would haue remained an odde maniple in euery kind, that could not haue been brought into any cohort: But a cohort contained a maniple of the Hastati, a maniple of the Principes, and a maniple of the Triarii; and so al the 30. maniples were included into 10. cohorts; & euery cohort was as a little legion; forasmuch as it consisted of al those sortes of soldiours that were in a legion. So that making a legion to containe 5000. men; a cohort had 500. and so these 6. cohorts, which he incamped on the other side of the riuer, vnder the command of Titurius Sabinus, contayned 3000. soldiours: but if you make a legion to consist but of 4200. which was the more vsuall rate, there were 2520. soldiours in these fixe cohortes.

By this therefore it may appeare, that a legion consisted of foure sorts of soldiours, which were reduced into ten cohorts, and euery cohort contained 3. maniples; & euery maniple 3. orders; and euery order had his Centurion marching in the head of the troupe; and euery Centurion had his optionem, or Lieutenāt, that stood in the taile of the troupe.

When a legion stoode ranged in battell ready to confront the enemy, the least body or Squadron that it contained was a maniple; wherein the two orders were ioined together, making jointly ten in front, and twelue in file: and so euery five files had their Centurion in front, and Lieutenant in the rereward, to direct them in all aduentures. In the time of the Emperours, their battalions consisted of a cohort, and neuer exceeded that number how great soeuer the army were.

Polybius distinguishing a maniple into two centuries or orders, saith, that the Centurion first chosen by the Tribunes, commanded the right order, which was that order which stoode on the right hand, knowne by the name of *Primus ordo*: and the Centurion elected in the second course, commanded the left order; and in the absence of either of them, hee that was present of them two, commaunded the whole maniple. And so wee finde that the Centurion of the

I j.

first

*Cohors.*  
*Lib. 3. de re*  
*rust.*

*A legion rang-*  
*ed in battell.*

*The first order*



3. De bello  
civil.

Prima cohors

The benefit of  
this discipline

first place was called *Prior Centurio*: in which sense Cæsar is to be vnderstood, where hee saith, that all the Centurions of the first cohorte were slaine, *præter principem priorem*. From whence we gather two specialities, first; the prioritie betweene the Centurions of the same maniple: for a cohorte consisting of 3. maniples, vwhereof the first maniple vvere Triarij, the second Principes, and the thirde Hastati; and euerie maniple containing two orders; and euerie order a Centurion: he saith, that all the Centurions of this cohort vvere slaine; sauing the first or vpper Centurion of the Principes. The second thing vvhich I obserue, is the title of the first cohort: for these 10. cohortes, vwhereof a legion consisted, vvere distinguished by degrees of worthinesse; and that vvhich vvas held the vvortheist in the censure of the Electors, tooke the prioritie both of place and name, and vvas called the first cohort: the next, the second cohort; & so consequently vnto the tenth and last.

Neither did the legions want their degrees of preheminence, both in imbatailing & in incåping, according either to the seniority of their inrolement, or their fauor of their General, or their own vertue: And so we read that in these vvares in Gallia, the tenth legion had the first place in Cæsar's army. And thus much concerning the diuisions, and seuerall companies of a legion, and the degrees of honour which they held in the same.

Vpon this description it shall not be amisse, briefelie to laie open the most apparant commodities depending vpon this discipline; the excellency vvhich of more plainly appeareth, being compared to that order, vvhich nature hath obserued in the frame of her vvortheist creatures: for it is euident, that such workes of nature come neere to perfect excellencie, vvhose material substance is most particularlie distinguished into partes, and hath euerie part indued vvith that propertie, which best agreeth to his peculiar seruice. For beeing thus furnished with diuersitie of instruments, and these directed vvith fitting abilities; the creature must needs expresse many admirable effects, and discover the vvorth of an excellent nature: vvhereas those other bodies, that are but slenderly laboured, and find lesse fauour in nature's forge, being as abortiues, or barbarously composed, vvanting the diuersitie both of partes and faculties; are no vvay capable of such excellent vses, nor fit for such distinct seruices, as the former that are directed vvith so many properties, and inabled vvith the power of so wel distinguished faculties. Which better workes of nature the Romans imitated in the Architecture of their army, deuinding it into such necessary & seruiceable partes, as were best fitting all vses and imploiments: as first into legions, and legions into cohortes, and cohortes into maniples, and maniples into centuries or orders, and these into files; wherein euerie man knewe his place, and kept the same without exchange or confusion. And thus the vniuersall multitude was by order disposed into partes, vntill it came vnto a vnitie: for it cannot be denied, but that these centuries were in themselves so sensiblie distinguished, that euerie Soldiour caried in his minde the particular Mapped of his whole centurie: for in imbatailing, euerie centurie was disposed into 5. files, containing twelue in a file, whereof the leaders were alwayes certaine, and neuer changed but by death or some other especiall occasion: and euerie leader

leader knew his follower, and euerie second knewe the third man, and so consequently vnto the last.

Vpon these particularities it plainly appeareth, how easie a matter it was, to reduce their troupes into any order of a march or a battell, to make the front the flanke, or flanke front, when they were broken and disfrankt to rallie them into any forme, when euerie man knew both his owne and his fellowes station. If any companies were to be imploied vpon sudden seruice, the generall Idea of the Armie being so deeply imprinted in the minde of the commanders, would not suffer them to erre in taking out such conuenient troupes, both for number and quality, as might best agree with the safetie of the Armie, or nature of the action: At all occasions and oportunities, these principles of aduantage offered themselves, as readie meanes, to put in execution any desigine, or stratagem whatsoeuer; the proiect was no sooner resolued of, but euerie man could readily point out the companies that were fit to execute the intention. And which is more important, in regard of the life and spirit of euerie such part, their sodalitie was sweetned, or rather strengthened with the mutuall acquaintance, and friendship one of another, the captaine marching alwaies in the head of the troupe, the ensigne in the midst, and the lieutenant in the reeward, and euerie man accompanied with his neighbour and his friend; which bred a true and vnfaigned courage, both in regard of themselves, and of their followers. Besides these specialities, the places of title and dignity depending vpon this order, were no small meanes to cutte off all matter of ciuill discorde, and intestine dissention: for here euerie man knew his place in the file, and euerie file knewe his place in the Centurie, and euerie Centurie in the Maniple, and euerie Maniple in the Cohort, and euerie Cohort in the Legion, and euerie Legion in the Armie; and so euerie souldier had his place, according to his vertue; and euerie place gaue honour to the man, according as their discipline had determined thereof.

The want of this discipline hath dishonoured the martiall gouernment of this age, with bloudshed and murders; whereof France is too true a witness, as well in regard of the French themselves, as of our English forces that haue beene sent thither to appease their tumults: for through defect of this order, which allotteth to euerie man his due place, the controuersie grew between Sir William Drurie and Sir Iohn Bowrowes, the issue wherof is too well known to the world: wherein as our commanders in France haue been negligent, so I may not forget to giue due commendation to the care which is had of this point amongst the English troupes, in the seruice of the states in the vnited prouinces, where they are very curious in appointing euerie man his place in the file, and euerie file in the troupe, and find much benefit thereby, besides the honour of reuiuing the Roman discipline.

To conclude this point, I will onely touch in a word the benefite, which the Romans found in their small battailions, and the disaduantage, which we haue in making great squadrons. And first it cannot be denied, but that such troupes stand best appointed for disposition and array of battell, which standing strong to receiue a shock, bring most men to fight with the enemy: for the principall

I ij.

things

*The benefite of  
small battailions:  
and the  
disaduantage  
of great squadrons.*

things which are required in letting of a battell, are lo to order the troupes, that the depth in flanke may serue conueniently to withstand the assault, taking vp no more men then may well serue for that purpose; and giuing meanes to the rest to fight with the enemy; and in these two points, were both their defensiu and offensiu considerations comprehended. But smaller troupes and battailons afforde this conueniencie better then great squadrons, which drowne vp manie able men in the depth of their flanks, and neuer suffer them to appeare, but when the breaking of the Squadron doth present them to the butcherie of the enemy. The Macedonian Phalanx, as I haue noted in the first booke, neuer carried about 16 in flanke, and brought 500 to fight in front. And these little battailons (considering them as they stood in battell ray) made as great a front or greater, then that of the Phalanx, keeping a depth answerable to the same; besides the 2 and 3 battell, which alwaies were to succour them, which the Phalanx wanted: neither would their thicke and close imbattailing admit any such succour behind them. Now if we cõpare the aduantages & discommodities, which by place and accident were incident to either of these, we shall find great ods betwene them. These great squadrons are not faisable, but in plaine and open places, where they may either stand immouable, or make easie and slow motions without shaking, or disordering their bodie: but the lesser are a scantling for all places, champion or wooddie, leuell or vneuen, or of what site or quality fouer. And to conclude, if two or three ranks of these great battailons chance to be broken and disordered, the whole body is as much interessed in the disorder, as the said ranks are; and hath lesse meanes to rally it selfe, then any other lesser companie: but if any violence chance to rout a maniple, it proceedeth no further in the Armie, then that part which it taketh: Neither can the disfranking of any one part, betraie the safetie of the Armie to disorder and confusion; for as much as their distinction serued to cut off such inconueniences, and yet no waie hindered the generall uniting of their strength into one body. More may be said concerning this matter, but I onely point at it, and leaue the due consideration therof, to the iudgment of our commanders, & returne to our history.

### CHAP. IIII.

#### The Belgæ attempt the surprise of \* Bibrax:

*Cæsar sendeth succour vnto it.*

\* Bray in the  
county of Re-  
sell.



*Here was a towne called Bibrax, belonging to the state of Rheimes, about eight mile from Cæsars campe; which the Belgæ thought to haue surprised, as they came along to meete with Cæsar, and suddenly assaulted it with such furie, that the townesmen could hardly hold out the first daie. The Celte and Belgæ vse one and the same manner, in assaulting a towne: for hauing beset the whole compasse of the wall with ranks of souldiers, they neuer cease flinging of stones untill they finde*



finde the wall naked of defendantes; and then casting themselves into a Testudo, they approach to the gate and undermine the walles. Assoone as the night had made an end of the assault, Iccius of Rheimes, a man of great birth and authoritie in his countrey, who at that time was gouernour of the towne, and had beene before with Caesar, to treat and conclude a peace: sent him word by messengers, that if there came not present succour, he was not able to holde out any longer. The same daie about midnight (vsing the same messengers for guides) he sent both Numidian and Cretian Archers, and slingers of the Iles of Baleares, to relieue the towne; by meanes whereof, the townesmen were put in good hope to make their partie strong, and the enemy made hopeles of winning the towne: and therefore after a small stay, hauing populated their fieldes, and burned their villages and out-buildings, they marched with all their power towards Caesars campe, and within lesse then two miles of his Armie, they incamped their whole host: which, as was gathered by the smoake and fire, occupied more ground then eight miles in breadth.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**I**N the description of their assault, we are to obserue two circumstances: The first is, the manner they vsed in a sudden surprise: The second is, the forme and quality of a Testudo. Although Caesar seemeth to attribute this manner of assaulting a towne, as peculiar, to the Galles; yet wee maie not thinke but that the Romans vsed it, as often as they had occasion to surprise any cittie: but because the Galles knew no other means to take a towne but this, therefore he setteth it downe as peculiar vnto them. The Romans called this manner of assault *Corona*; and so we read oftentimes this phrase, *Cingere urbem corona*: for as much as the souldiers inclosed the towne with a circle, and so resembled a crowne or garland. Ammianus speaketh of a triple crown of souldiers, which incompassed a towne: And Iosephus telleth of Iotapatam, which the Romans besieged *duplici peditum corona*: and besides these, there was a third circle of horsemen vtmost of all. There is no further matter to be obserued but this, that in surprising a towne, they incircled it round about with thick continued rankes of men, and where they found the wall weakest, there they entered as they could.

To take a  
towne by sur-  
prise.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**T**he Testudo requireth a larger discourse, and is liuely described in Liuius, after this manner. In the Amphitheater, where the people did often assemble to see strange fightes and publike shewes, were brought in (saith he) 60 lustie young men, who after some motion, and seemely march, cast themselves into a square troupe, & roofing their heads close with their targets, the first ranke which made the front of the Testudo, stood vpright on their feete; the second ranke bowed it selfe somewhat lower;

A Testudo  
described.  
Lib. 44.



the third and fourth rankes did more incline themselues, and so consequentlie vnto the last ranke, which kneeled on the ground, and so they made a bodie relembling halfe the side of an house, which they called Testudo. Vnto this Squadron thus strongly combined together, came two soldiours running some fiftie foot off, and threatning each other with their weapons, ran nimbly vp the side of the rooffe; and sometimes making as though they would defend it against an enemy, that would haue entred vpon it; sometimes againe incountering each other in the midst of it, leaped vp and downe as steddily as if they had been vpon firme ground. And which is more strange, the front of a Testudo being applied to the side of a wall, there ascended many armed men vpon the said Testudo, and fought in an equall height with other soldiours, that stood vpon the said wal to defend it. The dissimilitude in the composition was this, that the soldiours that were in front, and in the sides of the square, caried not their Targets ouer their heads, as the other did; but couered their bodies with them, and so no weapons either cast from the wall, or otherwise throwne against it, coulde any waie hurt them; and whatsoeuer waight fell vpon the Testudo, it quicklie glided downe by the decliuitie of the rooffe, without anie hurte or annoyance at all.

Thus far Liuius goeth, neither doe I know what to saie further of it: the chiefest vse thereof was in a surprise or suddaine attempt against a towne, before the townes men were thoroughly prepared to defend the same. This inuention serued them to approach the wall with safetie, and so either to vndermine it, or to clime vp: and to that ende they oftentimes erected one Testudo vpon another. Tacitus saith, that the soldiours climed vpon the wall, *super iteratam testudinem*, by one Testudo made vpon an other; and this was the ancient forme and vse of a Testudo in a suddain assault or surprise.

Lib. 49.

Dio Cassius in the actes of Anthonie, saith, that beeing galled with the Parthian Archers, hee commanded his whole armie to put it selfe into a Testudo, which was so strange a sight to the Parthians, that they thought the Romaines hadde sunke downe for wearinesse and faintnesse; and so forsaking their horse, drewe their swordes to haue made execution: and then the Romaines at a watch-worde giuen, rose againe with such a furie, that they put them all to sworde and flight. Dio describeth the saide Testudo after this manner, They placed, saith hee, their baggage, their light armed men and their horsemen, in the midst; and those heauie armed footemen that caried long gutter-tiled Targettes, were in the vtmost circles nexte vnto the enemy; the reste which bare large Ouall Targettes were thronged together throughout the whole troupe, and so couered with their Targets both themselues and their fellows, that there was nothing discerned by the enemy but a rooffe of Targets, which were so tiled together, that men might safely go vpon them.

Further, wee oftentimes reade, that the Romaines cast themselues into a Testudo, to breake through an enemy, or to route and disranke a troupe. And this vse the Romaines had of a Testudo in field seruices, and only by the benefit of their Target. It was called a Testudo, in regarde of the strength, for that it

couered

couered and sheltred, as a shell couereth a fish. And let this suffice concerning a Testudo.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION:



Hirdly we may obserue, how carefully Cæsar prouided for the safetie of such succours, as he sent vnto Bibrax: for hee commanded the same messengers to direct them that came from the towne, as the best and surest guides in that iourney, least peraduenture through ignorance of the way, they might fall into inconueniences or dangers: a matter of no small consequence in managing a warre, but deserueth an extraordinary importunitie, to persuaide the necessitie of this diligence. For a Generall that hath perfectlie discovered the nature of the countrey, through which he is to march, and knoweth the true distances of places, the qualitie of the waies, the compendiousnesse of turnings, the nature of the hils and the course of the riuers, hath all these particularities as maine aduantages, to giue meanes of so many seuerall attempts vpon an enemy: And in this point Hanniball had a singular dexterity, and excelled all the commanders of his time in making vse of the way, by which he was to passe. But he that leadeth an army, by an vnknown and vndiscovered way, and marcheth blindfold vpon vncertaine aduentures, is subiect to as many casualties and disadvantages, as the other hath opportunitie of good fortune. Let euery man therefore persuaide himselfe, that good discoverers are as the eyes of an army, and serue for lights in the darkenesse of ignorance, to direct the resolutions of good prouidence, and make the path of safetie so manifest, that we neede not stumble vpon casualties. Cæsar in his iourney to Ariouistus vsed the helpe of Diuitiacus the Heduan, in whome amongst all the Galles, he reposed greatest confidence to discover the waie, and acquaint him with the passages; and before hee would vndertake his voyage vnto \* Britanie, he well enformed himselfe by marchants and traualers, of the quantity of the Iland, the quality of the people, their vse of warre, and the oportunitie of their hauens: Neither was he satisfied with their relations, but hee sent Caius Volusenus in a ship of warre, to see what hee could further discover, concerning these points. Suetonius addeth moreouer, that hee neuer caried his army, *per insidiosa itinera*, vnlesse he had first well discovered the places.

Concerning the order, which skillfull leaders haue obserued in discoveries, we are to knowe that this point consisteth of two partes: the one in vnderstanding the perfect description of the countrey; and the second in obseruing the motions of the enemy. Touching the first, we finde as well by this as other histories, that the Romans vsed the inhabitants of the country for guides, as best acquainted with their natie places, that they might not erre in so important a matter; prouided alwaies, that their owne scoutes were euer abroad to vnderstand what they could of themselues, that they might not altogether relie vpon a strangers direction. The motions of the enemy were obserued by the horsemen, and these for the most part were Veterani, well experienced in the matter of

*The necessitie  
of good disco-  
uery.*

*\* Now Eng-  
land.*

*The order  
which is to be  
observed in  
discovery.*

of warre, and so the generall receiued sound aduertisements: and yet they were not too forward vpon any new motion, vnlesse they found it confirmed by diuers waies: for some espials may erre, either through passion or affection, as it happened in the Heluetian warre. If therefore the vse and benefit, which prudent and wise commanders made of this diligence, or the misfortune which the want of this knowledge brought vpon the ignorant, haue any authoritie to perswade a circumspect care herein, this little that hath beene spoken may be sufficient, for this point.

#### THE FOUORTH OBSERVATION.

Slingers with  
their arte  
and vse.



He souldiers which Cæsar sent to relieue Bibrax, were Archers of Creta and Numidia, and slingers of the Iles Baleares, which are now called Maiorica, and Minorica: which kinde of weapon, because it seemeth ridiculous to the souldiers of these times, whose conceites are held vp with the furie of these fierie engines; I will in brieft discouer the nature and vse of this weapon.

The Latines (saith Ildore) called this weapon *funda: quod ex ea fundantur lapides*. Plinie attributeth the inuention thereof to the Insulairs called Baleares. Florus in his third booke and eighth chapter, saith, that these Baleares vsed three sortes of slinges, and no other weapon besides: for a boy had neuer any meate giuen him, before he had first strooke it, with a sling. Strabo distinguisheth these three sortes of slings, which the Baleares vsed; and saith that they had one sling with long raines, which they vsed when they would cast a farre off: and another with short raines, which they vsed neere at hand: and the third with raines of a meane sise, to cast a reasonable distance. Lipsius saith, that in *Columna Antonina* at Rome, he obserued that the Balearean was made with one sling about his head, another about his bellie, and the third in his hand; which might be their ordinarie manner of carrying them. The matter whereof they were made was threefold, the first was hempe or cotton, the second haire, and the third sinewes: for of either of these stufes, they commonly made them: the forme and fashion of a sling resembled a platted rope, somewhat broad in the middest, with an Ouall compasse; and so by little and little decreasing into two thongs or raines. Their manner of slinging was to whirle it twise or thrise about their head, and so to cast out the bullet. Virgill speaking of Mezentius saith,

*Ipse ter adducta circum caput egit habena.*

But Vegetius preferreth that skill, which cast the bullet with once turning it about the head. In Suidas we find, that these Baleares did commonly cast a stone of a pound waight, which agreeth to these dames in Cæsar, *fundas, librales*. The leaden bullets are mentioned by Salust, in the warre with Iugurth; and by Liuius, where he saith, that the Consull provided great store of arrowes, of bullets, and of small stones to be cast with slings. This weapon was in request amongst diuers nations, as well in regard of the readines, & easie reiterating of the blow, as also for that the bullet fledde verie farre, with great violence: the distance which



which they could easily reach with their sling, is expressed in this verse,

*Fundum Varro vocat, quem possis mittere funda.*

Which Vegetius interpreteth to be 600 foote: Their violence was such, as the same author affirmeth in his first booke and sixteenth chapter, that neither helmet, gaberдинe, nor corselet could beare out the blow; but he that was hit with a sling, was slaine *sine inuidia sanguinis*, as he saith in the same place. Lucrece, Ouid, and Lucan, three of the Latine Poets saie, that a bullet skilfully cast out of a sling, went with such violence that it melted as it flew: vvhwhereof Seneca giueth this reason, motion (saith he) doth extenuate the aire, and that extenuation or subtilitie doth inflame: and so a bullet cast out of a sling melteth as it flieth. But howsoever, Diodorus Siculus affirmeth, that these Balearian slingers brake both target, headpiece, or any other armour vvhathsoever.

There are also two other sorts of slings, the one mentioned by Liuius; and the other by Vegetius: that in Liuius is called *Cestrophendo*, vvhich cast a short arrowe with a long thicke head: the other in Vegetius, is called *fustibalus*, vvhich was a sling made of a coard and a staffe. But let this suffice for slinges and slingers, vvhich were reckoned amongst their light armed souldiers, and vsed chiefly in assaulting, and defending townes, and fortresses, vvhwhere the heauie armed souldiers could not come to buckle; and present the place of our Hargebutiers, which in their proper nature, are *leuis armaturæ milites*, although more terrible then those of ancient times.

Lib. 2.

Lib. 2. naturæ  
questions.

## CHAP. V.

Cæsar confronted the Belgæ in forme of battell, but  
without any blow giuen: the Belgæ attempt the  
passing of the riuer Axona; but in vaine, and  
to their losse: they consult of breaking vp the warre.



**C**ÆSAR at the first resolued not to giue them battell, as well in regard of their multitude, as the generall fame and opinion conceiued of their valour: notwithstanding he daily made triall by light skirmishes with his horsemen, what the enemy could do, and what his owne men durst doe. And when he found that his men were nothing inferiour to the Belgæ, he chose a conuenient place before his campe and put his Armie in battell: the banke where he was incamped rising somewhat from a plaine leuell, was no larger then would suffice the front of the battell; the two sides were steepe, and the front rose a slope by little & little, untill it came againe to a plaine, where the legions were imbat-tailed. And lest the enemy abounding in multitude, should circumsent his men and charge them in flanke as they were fighting, he drew an ouerthwart ditch behind his Armie, from one side of the hill to the other, 600 paces in length, the ends whereof

Cæsar.



he fortified with butwarkes, and placed therein store of engines: and leaning in his campe the two legions which he had last inrolled in Lombardie, that they might bee readie to be drawne forth when there should neede any succour, he imbattailed his other sixe legions in the front of the hill, before his campe. The Belga also bringing forth their power, confronted the Romans in order of battell. There laie between both the Armies a small Marish, ouer which the enemy expected that Caesar should haue passed; and Caesar on the other side, attended to see if the Belga would come ouer, that his men might haue charged them in that troublesome passage. In the meane time the Cavalrie on both sides incountered betweene the two battels, and after long expectation on either side, neither partie aduenturing to passe ouer, Caesar hauing got the better in the skirmish betweene the horsemen, thought it sufficient for that time, both for the incouraging of his owne men, and the contesting of so great an Army; and therefore he conuained all his men againe into their campe. From that place the enemy immediately tooke his way to the riuer Axona, which laie behinde the Romans campe, and there finding foordes they attempted to passe ouer part of their forces, to the end they might either take the fortresse which Titurinus kept, or to breake downe the bridge, or to spoile the territories of the state of Rheimes, and cut off the Romans from prouision of corne. Caesar hauing aduertisement thereof from Titurinus, transported ouer the riuer by the bridge all his horsemen and light armed Numidians, with his slingers and archers, and marched with them himselfe: the conflict was hoat in that place, the Romans charging their enemies as they were troubled in the water, slewe a great number of them; the rest like desperate persons, aduenturing to passe ouer upon the dead carcases of their fellowes, were beaten backe by force of weapons: and the horsemen incompassed such as had first got ouer the water, and slewe euerie man of them.

When the Belga perceined themselves frustrated of their hopes, of winning Bibrax, of passing the riuer, and of drawing the Romans into places of disadvantage, and that their owne prouisions began to faile them: they called a councill of war, wherein they resolu'd, that it was best for the state in generall, and for euerie man in particular, to breake vp their campe, and to returne home vnto their own houses: and into whose confines or territories soeuer, the Romans should first enter to depopulate and waste them in hostile maner, that thither they should hasten from al parts, and there to giue them battell, to the end they might rather trie the matter in their own countrie, then abroad in a strange and vnkowne place; and haue their owne household prouision alwaies at hand to maintaine them. And this the rather was concluded, for as much as they had intelligence, that Diniacius with a great power of the Hedui, approached neare to the borders of the Bellouaci, who in that regard, made haste homeward to defend their country.

#### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



Ifst we may obserue the Arte, which he vsed to counteruaile the strength of so great a multitude, by choosung out so conuenient a place, which was no broader in front then would suffice the front of his battell; and hauing both the sides of the hill so steepe, that the enemy

enemy could not ascende nor clime vp, but to their own ouerthrow; hee made the backe part of the hil strong by Art, & so placed his soldiours as it were in the gate of a fortresse, where they might either issue out, or retire at their pleasure. Whereby it appeareth how much he preferred securitie and safetie before the vaine opinion of foole-hardie resolution, which fauoreth of Barbarisme rather then of true wisdom: for he euer thought it great gaine, to loose nothings; and the day brought alwaies good fortune, that deliuered vp the army safe vnto the euening; attending, vntil aduantage had laid sure principles of victory: and yet Cæsar was neuer thought a coward.

And now it appeareth, what vse hee made by passing his army ouer the riuer, and attending the enemy on the further side, rather then on the side of the state of Rheimes: for by that meanes he brought to passe, that whatsoeuer the enemy should attempt in any part or quarter of the lande, his forces were ready to trouble their proceedings; as it happened in their attempt of Bibrax: & yet notwithstanding, he lost not the opportunitie of making slaughter of the, as they passed ouer the riuer. For by the benefite of the bridge which hee had fortified, he transported what forces he would, to make heade against them, as they passed ouer; and so hee tooke what aduantage either side of the riuer could afford him.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION



Nd heere the reader may not maruel, if when the hills are in labour, they bring forth but a mouse; for how soone is the courage of this huge army abated? or what did it attempt worthy such a multitude? or answerable to the report which was bruted of their valour? But beeing hastily caried together by the violence of passion, were as quickly dispersed vpon the sight of an enemy, which is no strange effect of a suddaine humour. For as in nature all violent motions are of short continuance, and the durabilitie, or lasting qualitie of all actions, proceedeth from a slowe and temperate progression; so the resolutions of the minde that are caried with an vntemperate violence, and fauour so much of heat and passion, do vanish awaie euen with the smoke thereof, and bring forth nothing but leasurabie repentance; and therefore it were no ill counsell for men of such natures, to qualifie their hastie resolutions, with a mistrustfull lingering, that when their iudgement is well informed of the cause, they may proceed to a speedie execution.

But that which most bewraeth their indiscreet intemperance, in the hote pursuit of this enterprise, is, that before they had scarce seene the enemy, or had opportunity to contest him in open field, their victual began to faile them: for their mindes were so caried away with the conceits of warre, that they had no leasure to provide such necessaries, as are the strength and sinew of the warre. It was sufficient for every particular man, to be knowne for a soldiour in so honorable an action, referring other matters to the care of the state. The state

in like manner thought it inough to furnish out forty or fiftie thousand men a peece, to discharge their oath, and to saue their hostages, committing other requisites to the generall care of the confederacie: which, beeing directed by as vnskillful gouernours, neuer looked further then the present multitude, which seemed sufficient to ouerthrow the Romaine Empire. And thus each man relied vpon an others care, and satisfied himselfe with the present garbe; so many men of all sortes and qualities, so many helmets and plumed crests, such strife and emulation, what state should seeme in greatest forwardnesse; were motiues sufficient to induce euerie man to go, without further inquiry, how they should goe. And herein the care of a Generall ought especially to bee seene, considering the weakenesse of particular iudgements, that hauing the liues of so many men depending altogether vpon his prouidence, and engaged in the defence of their state and country; he do not faile in these maine points of discipline, which are the pillars of all warlike designs. To conclude this point, let vs learne by their error, so to carrie a matter (especially of that consequence) that we make it not much worse by ill handeling it, then it was before we first tooke it to our charge; as it heere happened to the Belgæ. For their tumultuous armes sorted to no other ende, then to giue Cæsar iust occasion to make warre vpon them, with such assurance of victorie, that he made small account of that which was to follow, in regard of that which had already happened: considering that hee should not in all likelihood, meet with the like strength againe, in the continuance of that warre. And this was not onely *grauius bellum successori tradere*, as it often falleth out in the course of a long continued warre; but to drawe a dangerous warre vpon their heads, that otherwise might haue liued in peace.

## CHAP. VI.

**The Belgæ brake vp their Campe: and as they  
returne home, are chased and slaughtered  
by the Romaines.**



Cæsar.

**H**IS generall resolution beeing entertained by the consent of the whole Councell of warre; they departed out of their Campe with a great noise and tumult, without any order (as it seemed) or gouernement: euerie man pressing to bee foremost on his iourney in such a turbulent manner, that they seemed all to run away: Whereof Cæsar hauing notice by his spies, and mistrusting some practise, not as yet perceiuing the reason of their departure, he kept his armie within his Campe. In the dawning of the day, vpon certaine intelligence of their departure, hee sent first his horsemen to staie the reuerward, commanding Labienus to followe after with three legions: these ouertaking the Belgæ, and chasing them many miles, slew a great number of them: And while the reuerward staied, and valiantlie receiued the charge of the Romaines, the vanguard being out of danger, and vnder no government,

asfoone



as soone as they heard the alarum behind them, brake out of their ranks and betooke themselves to flight; and so the Romaines slewe them as long as the sunne gaue them light to pursue them; and then sounding a retrain, they returned to their campe.

## OBSERVATION.

**T**Hath beene an olde rule amongst soldiours, that a great and negligent error committed by an enemy, is to be suspected as a pretence to trecherie. We reade of Fuluius a Legate in the Romaine armie, lying in Tuscany, the Consul being gon to Rome to performe some publike dutie: the Tuscans tooke occasion by his absence to trie whether they could drawe the Romaines into any inconuenience; and placing an ambuscado neere vnto their campe, sent certaine soldiours, attired like shepherdes, with droues of cattell to passe in view of the Romaine army, who handled the matter so, that they came euen to the rampier of the campe; whereat the Legate wondering as at a thing void of reason, kept himselfe quiet vntill he had discovered their treacherie, and so made frustrate their intent: In like maner Cæsar not perswaded that men should bee so heedles, to carry a retrain in that disorderly and tumultuous maner, would not discampe his men to take the oportunity of that aduantage, vntill he had found that to be true, which in all reason was vnlikely. And thus 296000. Belgæ were chased and slaughtered by three legions of the Romaines, for want of gouernment and order in their departure.

## CHAP. VII.

Cæsar followeth after the Belgæ into the Countrey of the Sueffones; and there besiegeth \* Nouiodunum.



**T**H E next day after their departure, before they could recover themselves of their feare and flight; or had time to put themselves againe in breath: Cæsar as it were continuing still the chase and victorie, led his armie into the countrey of the Sueffones, the next borders vnto the men of Rhrimes: and after a long iourney came vnto Nouiodunum, a towne of good importance, which he attempted to take by surprize, as he passed along by it. For he vnderstoode, that it was altogether vnfortified of defensiuè provision, hauing no forces within to defende it: but in regard of the breadth of the ditch and heigh of the wall, he was for that time disappointed of his purpose: and therefore hauing fortified his campe, hee began to make preparation for a siege. The night following the whole multitude of the Sueffones, that had escaped by flight, were receiued into the towne: howbeit when the Vineæ were with great expedition brought vnto the wall, the mount raised, and the turrets built; the Gallies being amazed at the highnes of the workes, such as they had

\* Noyon.

Cæsar.

\* Soissons.



neuer scene nor heard of before, and the speede which was made in the dispatch thereof, sent ambassadours to Caesar, to treat of giving up the towne, and by the mediation of the men of Rheimes obtained their suite.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**I**N this relation we may obserue the industrious art, which the Romans vsed in assaulting, and taking holdes and townes; wherein we find three sortes of engines described, Vineæ, Agger, and Turres.

\* Lib. 4.  
A vinea or  
vine descri-  
bed.

Vinea is thus described by Vegetius: A little strong built house or houell, made of light wood, that it might be removed with greatest ease; the rooffe was supported with diuers pillars of a foote square, vvhrofe the formost were 8 foot high, and the hindmost 6; and betweene euerie one of these pillars, there was 5 foot distance: it was alwaies made with a double rooffe; the first or lower rooffe was of thicke planks, and the vpper rooffe of hurdles, to breake the force of a waight, without further shaking or disioyning the building: the sides were likewise walled with hurdles, the better to defend the soldiers that vv ere vnder it: the vv hole length vv as about 16 foot, and the breadth 7: the vpper rooffe vv as commonly couered vv ith greene or raw hides, to keepe it from burning. Many of these houels vv ere ioined together in ranke, vv hen they went about to vndermine a vval: the higher end was put next vnto the wal, that all the waights which vv ere throwen vpon it might easily tumble down, without any great hurt to the engine: the foure sides and groundfills, had in euery corner a vv heele, & by them they vv ere driuen to any place as occasion serued: the chiefest vse of them vv as to couer and defend the souldiers, as they vndermined or ouerthrew a vval. This engine vv as called Vineæ, which signifyeth a vine; for it sheltered such as vv ere vnder the rooffe thereof, as a vine couereth the place vv here it groweth.

Agger or  
mount.

Agger, vv hich vve call a mount, is described in diuers histories to be a hill or elevation made of earth and other substance, vv hich by little and little was raised forward, vntil it approached neate vnto the place, against vv hich it vv as built; that vpon this mount they might erect fortresses and turrets, and so fight with an aduantage of height. The matter of this mount, vv as earth and stones, fagots, and timber. Iosephus saith, that at the siege of Ierusalem, the Romans cut downe all the trees vv ithin 11 mile compasse, for matter and stufte to make a mount. The sides of this Agger vv ere of timber to keepe in the loose matter: the front vv hich was towards the place of seruice, was open without any timber worke: for on that part they stil raised it & brought it nearer the wals. That vv hich was built at Massilia vv as 80 foot high, and that at Auaricum 80 foot high and 30 foot broad. Iosephus and Egesippus vv rit, that there was a fortress in Iudea, 300 cubites high, vv hich Sulla purposing to vv in by assault, raised a mount 200 cubites high; and vpon it, he built a castle of stone 50 cubites high, and 50 cubites broad; and vpon the said castell he erected a turret of 60 cubites in height, and so took the fortress. The Romans oftentimes raised these mounts in the mouth of a haue, and commonly to ouer-toppe a towne, that so they might fight with much aduantage.

Amongst

Amongst other engines, in vñ amongst the Romans, their moueable Turrets were verie famous; for they were built in some safe place out of danger, and with wheeles put vnder them, were driuen to the walles of the towne These Turrets were of two sortes, either great or little: the lesser sort are described, by Vitruuius, to be 60 cubites high; and the square side 17 cubites; the breadth at the top was a fift part, of the breadth at the base; and so they stood sure without any danger of falling: the corner pillars were at the base, 9 inches square; & 6 inches at the top: there were commonly 10 stories in these little turrets, & windowes in euerie storie. The greater sort of towers were 120 cubites high, and the square side was 24 cubites, the breadth at the top was a fift part of the base; and in euerie one of these were commonly 200 stories. There was not one and the same distance kept betweene the stories, for the lowest commonly was 7 cubites, and 12 inches high: the highest storie 5 cubites, and the rest 4 cubites, and a third. In euerie one of these stories, were souldiers and engines, ladders, and casting bridges, by which they got vpon the wall and entered the towne. The forepart of these Turrets were couered with yron, and wet coverings, to saue them from fire. The souldiers that remoued the tower to and fro, were alwaies within the square thereof, and so they stood out of danger. The new water-worke by broken Wharfe in London much resembleth one of these towers.

*Towers or  
Turrets de-  
scribed.*


#### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



Pon the building of these mightie engines, it was no maruell if the Suesones submitted themselues to such powerfull industrie. For whatsoeuer is strange and vnusuall, doth much affrighte the spirits of an enemy, and breede a motion of distrust and diffidencie, when as they finde themselues ignorant of such warlike practises: for noueltie alwaies breedeth wonder, in as much as the true reasons and causes being vnknown, we apprehend it, as diuers from the visuall course of thinges, and so stand gazing at the strangeness thereof: and wonder as it addeth worth to the noueltie; so it inferreth diffidencie, and so consequently feare, the viter enemy of martiall valour.

#### CHAP. VIII.

Caesar carieth his Armie to the Territories of the  
*Bellouaci, Ambiani and the Neruij.*



CAESAR taking for pledges the chiefe of their cittie, vpon the delinerie of all their Armes, receiued the Suesones to mercie: and from thence led his Armie against the Bellouaci; who hauing conuained both themselues and their goods into the towne, called Bratipantium, and understanding that Caesar was come within fve mile of the place, all the elder sort came forth to meete him, signifying their

*Caesar.*

*The Bellouaci taken to mercie.*

their submission, by their lamentable demeanour. For these Diuitiacus became a mediator (who after the Belga had broken up their campe, had dismissed his Heduan forces and was returned to Caesar) the Hedui (saith he) haue alwaies found in the Bellouaci, a faithfull and friendly disposition to their state: and if they had not beene betrayed by their nobilitie, (who made them belceue, that the Hedui were brought in bondage by the Romaines, and suffered all villanie and despight at their handes,) they had neuer withdrawne themselves from the Hedui, nor consented to conspire against the Romaines. The authors of this counsel, perceiuing into what great miserie they had brought their country, were fled into Britanie: wherfore not onelie the Bellouaci, but the Hedui also in their behalfe besought him to use his clemencie towards them. Caesar in regarde of the Hedui and Diuitiacus, promised to receiue them to mercie; but forasmuch as the state was verie great and populous, hee demanded 600. hostages: Which being deliuered, and their armour brought out of the towne, he marched from thence into the coast of the Ambiani, who without further lingering, gaue both themselves and al that they had into his power. Vpon these bordered the Neruij, of whom Caesar found this much by inquirie, that there was no recourse of marchants vnto them: neither did they suffer any wine, or what thing else might tende to riot, to bee brought into their country: for they were perswaded, that by such thinges their courage was much abated, and their vertue weakened. Further, he learned that these Neruij were a sauage people, and of great valour, often accusing the rest of the Belga, for yeelding their neckes to the Romaine yoke, openly affirming, that they would neither sende ambassadors nor take peace vpon any condition.

The Ambiani yeeld up themselves.

The Neruij.  
\*Sabis neere  
Namours.

Caesar hauing marched three daies iourney in their country, he understood that the riuer \* Sabis was not past ten miles from his campe, and that on the further side of this riuer, all the Neruij were assembled together, and there attended the coming of the Romaines: with them were ioined the Atrebatij, and Veromandui, whom they had perswaded to abide the same fortune of warre with them. Besides, they expected a power from the Aquatici; the women and such as were vnmeet for the fildes, they bestowed in a place vnaccessible for any armie, by reason of fens and bogs, and marshes. Vpon this intelligence, Caesar sent his discoverers and Centurions before, to chosse out a fit place to incampe in.

Now whereas many of the surrendred Belga, and other Galles were continually in the Romaine army, certaine of these (as it was afterward known by the captiues) obseruing the order which the Romaines used in marching, came by night to the Neruij and tolde them, that betweene euerie legion went a great sort of cariages; and that it was no matter of difficultie, as soone as the first legion was come into the campe, and the other legions yet a great way off; to set vpon them, vpon a suddaine, before they were disburdened of their cariages; and so to ouertrowe them: which legion being thus cut off, and their stuffe taken, the rest would haue smal courage to stande against them. It much furthered this aduice, that, forasmuch as the Neruij were not able to make any power of horse, that they might the better resist the caualerie of their borderers, whensoever they made anyroade into their marches; their manner was to cut yong trees halfe asunder, & bowing the tops down to the ground, plashed the boughes in breadth, and with thornes and briers planted between them, they made them so thicke, that it was impossible to see through them, so hard it was to enter or passe through them; so that, whenby this occasion, the passage of the Romaine army must needs be hindred, the Neruij thought the foresaid counsell not to be neglected.


The







CÆSARS march where in every Legion had his Cariadges in front



*Cariadges.*

CÆSARS march where the Enemy was neerer at hand

61

62

The place which the Romaines chose to incampe in, was a hill, of like leuell from the top to the bottome, at the foot whereof ran the riuer Sabis: and with the like leuell, on the other side, rose an other hill directly against this, to the quantity of 200. paces; the bottome whereof was plaine and open, and the upper part so thicke with wood, that it could not easilie be looked into: within these woods the Neruians kept themselues close, and in the open ground, by the riuer side were onely seene a few troupes of horse, and the riuer in that place was about 3. foot deepe,

Caesar sending his horsemen before, followed after with all his power; but the manner of his march differed from the report which was brought to the Neruii: for inasmuch as the enemy was at hand; Caesar (as his custom was) led 6. legions alwaies in a readines, without burthen or carriage of any thing, but their armes: after them hee placed the impediments of the whole army. And the two legions which were last inrolled were a rereward to the army, and garded the fluffe.

## OBSERVATIONS.



His trecherous practise of the surrendred Belgæ, hath fortunatelie discovered the maner of Cæsars march, as well in safe passages, as in dangerous and suspected places: which is a point of no final consequence in martiall discipline, being subiect to so many inconueniencies, and capable of the greatest arte that may be shewed in managing a war. Concerning the discreet carriage of a march, by this circumstance. it may be gathered, that Caesar principally respected safetie: and secondly conueniency. If the place afforded a secure passage, and gaue no suspicion of hostilitie, hee was content in regarde of conueniency, to suffer euery legion to haue the oversight of their particular carriages, and to insert them among the troupes, that euery man might haue at hand such necessaries as were requisite, either for their priuate vse or publike discipline. But if he were in danger of any sodain attempt, or stood in hazard to be impeached by an enemy; hee then omitted conuenient disposition, in regard of particular vse, as disadvantageous to their safety: & caried his legions in that readines, that if they chanced to be ingaged by an enemy, they might without any alteration of their march, or incumbrance of their carriages receiue the charge, in that forme of battell, as was best approoued by their military rules, & the ancient practise of their fortunate progenitors.

The old Romaines obserued likewise the same respects, for in vn safe & suspected places, they caried their troupes *agmine quadrato*, which as Liuius seemeth to note, was free from all carriage and impediments, which might hinder them in any sodaine alarm. Neither doth that of \* Hirtius any way contradict this interpretation, where he saith, that Caesar so disposed his troupes against the Bellouaci, that 3. legions marched in front, & after them came all the carriages, to which the 10. legion serued as a rereward; & so they marched, *pene agmine quadrato*. \* Seneca in like maner noteth the safety of *agmen quadratum*, where he saith, that where an enemy is expected, wee ought to march *agmine quadrato*, readie to fight. The most material consequence of these places alleadged is, that as ofte as they suspected anie onset or charge, their order in a march little or nothing

L j.

differed

The maner of the Romaine march.

The two respects which Caesar had in ordering a march.

1 Safety.  
2 Conueniency

*Agmen quadratum.*

\* Lib. 8. de bel. Gall.

\* 60. Epistle.



differed from their visuall maner of imbattailing; and therefore it was called *agmen quadratum*, or a square march, inasmuch as it kept the same disposition of parts, as were obserued in *quadrata Acie*. For that triple forme of imbattailing, which the Romaines generally obserued in their fights, hauing respect to the distances between each battel, contained almost an equal dimension of front and file: and so it made *Acie quadratam*; and when it marched, *Agmen quadratum*.

Lib. 6.

Polybius expresseth the same in effect, as often as the place required circumspection; but altereth it somewhat in regard of the cariages: for he saith that in time of danger, especially where the countrey was plaine and Châpion, and gaue space & free scope to cleere themselves, vpon anie accident, the Romains marched in a triple battel, of equal distâce one behind an other, euery battel hauing his feuerall cariages in front: And if they were by chance attacked by an enemy, they turned themselves according to the oportunity of the place, either to the right or left hande, and so placing their cariages on the one side of their army, they stood imbattailed ready to receiue the charge.

Agmen longū

The contrary forme of marching, where the place afforded more security, & gaue scope to conueniency, they named *agmen longum*; when almost euery maniple or order, had their feuerall cariages attending vpon them, & stroue to keep that way which they found most easie, both for themselves & their impediments. Which order of a march, as it was more commodius then the former, in regard of particularity, so was it vn safe and dangerous, where the enemy was expected: And therefore Cæsar much blamed Sabinus and Cotta, for marching, when they were deluded by Ambiorix, *longissimo agmine*; as though they had receiued their aduertisements from a friend, and not from an enemy.

Lib. 5. de bel. Gallico.

The use that may be made of this in our moderne wars

And albeit our moderne wars are far different, in quality, frō them of ancient times; yet in this point of discipline, they cannot haue a more perfect direction, then that which the Romaines obserued, as the two poles of their motions, safety and conueniency: whereof the first dependeth chiefly vpon the prouident disposition of the leaders; and the other wil easily follow on, as the commodity of euerie particular shal giue occasion.

Concerning safety in place of danger, what better course can bee taken then that maner of imbattailing, which shall be thought most conuenient, if an enemy were present to confront them? for a well ordered march must either carie the perfect forme of a battell, or containe the distinct principles and elements thereof, that with little alteration it may receiue that perfection of strength, which the fittest disposition can afford it. First therefore, a prudent and circumspect leader, that desireth to frame a strong and orderly march, is diligentlie to obserue the nature and vse of each weapon in his army, howe they may be placed for greatest vse and aduantage, both in respect of their different and concurring qualities, as also in regard of the place wherein they are managed: and this knowledge will consequentlie inferre the best and exactest disposition of imbattailing, as the said forces are capable of; which if it may be obserued in a march, is no way to be altered. But if this exactnes of imbattailing wil not admit conuenient carriage of such necessarie adiuncts, as pertaine to an armie; the inconuenience is to bee relieued, with as little alteration from that rule, as in a wary

a warie iudgment (hall be found expedient: that albeit the forme be somewhat changed; yet the principles and ground wherein their strength and safetie consisteth, maie still be retained.

Neither can any man well descend to more particular précepts in this point: he may exemplifie the practises of manie great and experienced commanders; what sort of weapon marched in front, and what in the rereward, in what part of the Armie the Munition marched, and where the rest of the cariage was bestowed, according as their seuerall iudgments thought most expedient, in the particular nature of their occurrences. But the issue of all will fall out thus; that he that obserued this rule before prescribed, did seldome misscarrie through an vn safe march. Let a good Martialist well know their proper vse in that diuersity of weapons in his Armie; how they are seruiceable or disaduantageous, in this or that place, against such or such an enemy: and he will speedily order his battell, dispose of his march, and bestow his cariages, as shall best fall out both for his safetie, and conueniencie.

Cæsars custome was, to send his Causalrie and light armed footmen, before the body of his Armie, both to discouer and impeach an enemy; for these troupes were nimble in motion and fit for such seruices: but if the danger were greater in the rereward then in the front, the horsemen marched in the tayle of the Armie, and gaue securitie where there was most cause of feare. But if it happened that they were found vnfit to make good the seruice in that place, as oftentimes it fell out, and especially in Africa against the Numidians: he then removed them, as he best found it conuenient, and brought his legionarie souldiers, which were the sinewes and strength of his forces, and marched continually in the bulke of the Armie, to make good that which his horsemen could not performe. And thus he altered the antique prescription, and vniformitie of custome, according as he found himselfe best able to disaduantage an enemy, or make waie to victorie.

## CHAP. IX.

The Romans begin to fortifie their campe: but are interrupted by the Neruij. Cæsar maketh haste, to prepare his forces to battell.



THE Roman besauien, with the slingers, and archers, passed o-  
uer the riuer, and incountered the Causalrie of the enemy: who  
at first retired backe to their companies in the wood, and from  
thence sallied out againe vpon them: but the Romans durst not  
pursue them further then the plaine and open ground: in the  
meane time the fixe legions that were in front, hauing their  
worke measured out vnto them, began to fortifie their campe.

But assoone as the Neruij perceiued their former cariages to be come in sight, which

L. ij.

was

Cæsar.

was the time appointed amongst them to give the charge; as they stood imbattaile within the thicket, so they rushed out with all their forces, and assaulted the Roman horsemen: which being easily beaten backe, the Nervij ranne downe to the river, with such an incredible swiftnesse, that they seemed at the same instant of time to bee in the woods at the river, and charging the legions on the other side: For with the same violence, having passed the river, they ranne up the hill to the Roman campe, where the souldiers were busied in their intrenchment. Caesar had all partes to plaie at one instant, the flagge to be hung out, by which they gaue the souldiers warning to take armes, the battell to be proclaimed by sound of trumpet, the souldiers to be recalled from their worke, and such as were gone farre off to get turfe and matter for the rampier, to bee sent for; the battell to be ordered, his men to be encouraged, and the signe of battell to be giuen: the most of which were cut off by shortnesse of time, and the sudden assault of the enemye.

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

The description  
of the Ro-  
man campe,  
with all the  
parts belong-  
ing unto it.

**A**S the Romans excelled all other nations in many good customes; so especially in their campe-discipline, they stroue to be singular: for it seemed rather an Academie, or a citie of ciuill gouernment, then a campe of souldiers: so carefull were they both for the safetie, and skilfull experience of their men at armes. For touching the first, they neuer suffered their souldiers to lodge one night without a campe; wherein they were inclosed with ditch and a rampier, as in a walled towne: neither was it any newe inuention or late found out custome in their state, but in vse amongst the auncient Romans, and in the time of their kinges; their manner of incamping was included within these circumstances.

The Centuri-  
ons made  
choise of the  
place.

The Præto-  
rium.

The Centurions, that went before to chooe out a conuenient place, hauing found a fit situation for their campe, first assigned the standing for the Emperours pauillion, which was commonly in the most eminent place of the campe; from whence he might easily ouerview all the other partes, or any alarum or *signum pugnae*, might from thence be discovered to all quarters. This pauillion was knowne by the name of *Prætorium*, for as much as amongst the auncient Romans the Generall of their Armie was called *Prætor*: in this place where the *Prætorium* was to be erected, they stucke vpon a white ensigne, and from it they measured euery waie 100 foote, and so they made a square, containing 200 foot in euery side, the Area, or content whereof, was almost an acre of ground: the forme of the *Prætorium* was round and high, being as eminent amongst the other tentes, as a temple is amongst the priuate buildings of a citie: and therefore Iosephus compareth it to a church. In this *Prætorium* was their Tribunal or chaire of the estate, and the place of diuination, which they called *Augurale*, with other appendices of maiestie and authoritie.

The lodging  
of the legions.

The Generals tent being thus placed, they considered which side of the pauillion laie most commodious for forrage and water, and on that side they lodged the legions, euery legion deuided one from another by a street or lane of 50 foote



foote in breadth; and according to the degree of honour, that euery legion had in the Armie, so were they lodged in the campe, either in the midst which was counted most honourable, or towardes the sides, which was of meaner reputation. And againe, according to the place of euery cohort in his legion, so was it lodged nearer the pauillion of the Emperour, towardes the harte of the campe; and so consequently euery maniple tooke place in the cohort, distinguishing their preheminance, by lodging them either toward the middle or to the outsideward; according as they distinguished the place of their legions, there went a streete of fiftie in breadth ouerthwart the middest of all the legions, vvhich was called *Quintana*; for that it deuided the fift cohort of euery legion from the sixt.

*Quintana.*

Betweene the tentes of the first maniples in euery legion and the *Pratorium*, there went a waie of 100 foote in breadth throughout the whole campe; which was called *Principia*; in this place the Tribunes sate to heare matters of iustice, the souldiers exercised themselves at their weapons, and the leaders and chiefe commanders frequented it as a publike place of meeting; and it was helde for a reuerent and sacred place, and so kept with a correspondent decencie. On either side the Emperours pauillion, in a direct line to make euen & straight the vpper side of the *Principia*, the Tribunes had their tentes pitched, euery Tribune confronting the head of the legion whereof he was Tribune: aboue them, towardes the head of the campe, were the Legates and Treasurer: the vpper part of the campe was strengthened with some select cohorts and troupes of horse, according to the number of legions that were in the Armie.

*Principia.**The tentes of the Tribunes.*

Polybius describing the manner of incamping which the Romans vsed in his time, when as they had commonly but two legions in their Armie, with as manie associates, placeth the *Ableti* and *extraordinarij*, which were select bandes and companies, in the vpper part of the campe; and the associates on the out-sides of the legions.

The ditch and the rampier, that compassed the whole campe about, was 200 foote distant from any tent: vvhenceof Polybius giueth these reasons; first, that the souldiers marching into the campe in battell array, might there dissolue themselves into maniples, centuries, and decuries, without tumult or confusion: for order was the thing which they principally respected; as the life and strength of their martiall body. And againe, if occasion vvere offered to sallie out vpon an enemie; they might verie conueniently in that spacious roome, put themselves into companies and troupes: and if they vvere assaulted in the night, the darts and fire vvorke, vvhich the enemie should cast into their campe, would little indammage them, by reason of the distance betweene the rampier and the tentes.

*The space betweene the tentes and the rampier.*

Their tentes were all of skinnes and hides, helde vp with props, and fastened with ropes: there were 11 souldiers, as Vegetius saith, in euery tent, and that societie was called *Contubernium*, of whom the chieftest was named *Decanus*, or *Caput Contubernij*.

*Contubernium.*

The ditch and the rampier were made by the legions, euery maniple hauing his part measured out, and euery Centurion ouersceing his Centurie; the

*The ditch and the rampier.*



approbation of the whole worke belonged to the Tribunes. Their maner of intrenching was this; the soldiours being girt with their swords and daggers, digged the ditch about the campe, which was alwaies 8 foot in breadth at the least, and as much in depth, casting the earth thereof inward; but if the enemy were not farre off, the ditch was alwaies 11. or 15. or 18. foot in latitude, & altitude; according to the discretion of the General: but what scandling foueer was kept, the ditch was made *directis lateribus*, that is, as broad in the bottome as at the top. The rampier from the brim of the ditch was three foot in heighth, and sometimes foure, made after the maner of a wall, with greene turfs cut all to one measure, halfe a foot in thicknesse, a foot in breadth, and a foot and a halfe in length. But if the place, wherein they were incamped, would afford no such turfe; they then strengthened the loose earth, which was cast out of the ditch, with boughs and fagots, that it might be strong and wel fastened. The rampier they properly called *Agger*: the outside whereof, which hung over the ditch, they vsed to stick with thicke and sharpe stakes, fastened deep in the mound, that they might be firme; and these for the most part were forked stakes, which made the rampier very strong, and not to be assaulted but with great difficulty. Varro saith, that the front of the rampier thus stucke with stakes, was called *vallum*, a *varicando*, for that no man could stride or get over it.

*Agger.*

*Vallum.*

*Prætoria porta.*

*Porta Decumana.*

*Porta principales.*

*Læua.*

*Dextra.*

*Castra Aestiva.*

*Hiberna.*

The campe had foure gates, the first was called *prætoria porta*, which was alwaies behind the Emperours tent: and this gate did vsually looke either toward the east, or to the enemy, or that way that the army was to march. The gate on the other side of the campe opposite to this, was called *Porta Decumana* a *decimis cohortibus*, for the tenth or last Cohort of euery legion, was lodged to confront this gate: by this gate the soldiours went out to fetch their wood, their water, and their forrage, and this waie their offendours were caried to execution. The other two gates were called *Porta principales*, forasmuch as they stood opposite to either end of that so much respected place, which they called *principia*, onely distinguished by these titles, *læua principalis* and *dextra*, all these gates were shut with doores, and in standing Campes fortified with Turrets, vpon which were planted Engines of defence, as Balistæ, Catapultæ, Tolenones and such like.

The Romaines had their summer Campes, which they tearmed *Aestiva*, and their winter Campes, which they called *Hiberna*, or *Hibernacula*: their summer campes were, in like maner differenced, according to the time, which they continued in the. For if they remained in a place but a night or two, they called the *Castra* or *Mansiones*; but if they continued in them any long time, they called the *Aestivas* or *Sedes*. And these were more absolute, aswel in regard of their tents, as of their fortification, then the former, wherein they staid but one night. The other which they called *Hiberna*, had greater labor & coast bestowed vpon them, that they might the better defend them frõ the vvinter season. Of these we read, that the tents were either thatched with straw, or roofed with boards, & that they had their armory, hospital, & other publike houses. These cāps haue bin the beginning of many famous towns, especially whē they continued long in a place, as oftentimes they did vpon the banks of Euphrates, Danow, & the Rhenie. The order



Porta  
THE ROMAIN



Principia




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
Quintana



Porta Dec




a Prætoria  
INE CAMPE




Prætorium



Principia




Quintus



Decumana







order which they alwaies obserued in laying out their camp, was so vniforme, & well knowne to the Romaines, that when the Centurions had limited out euery parte, and marked it with different ensignes and colours, the soldiours entered into it, as into a knowne and familiar Citie: wherein euerie societie or small contubernie, knewe the place of his lodging: and which is more, euery particular man could assigne the proper station of euerie companie, throughout the whole armie.

The vse and commodity of this incamping, I briefly touched in my first booke: But if I were worthie any way to commend the excellency thereof to our moderne soldiours, or able by perswasion to reestablish the vse of incamping in our warres; I woulde spare no paines to atchieue so great a good, and vaunt more in the conquest of negligence, then if my sense had compassed a new found out meanes; and yet reason would deeme it a matter of small difficultie, to gaine a point of such worth, in the opinion of our men, especiallie when my discourse shall present security to our forces, and honour to our leaders, maiestie to our armies, and terrour to our enemies, wonderment to strangers, and victorie to our nation. But sloth hath such interest in this age, that it commendeth vaine glory and foole-hardinesse, contempt of vertue, and derision of good discipline, to repugne the designs of honour, and so far to ouer-maister reason, that it suffereth not former harmes to beare witness against error, nor correct the ill atchieuements of ill directions: and therefore ceasing to vrge this pointe anie further, I wil leaue it to the careful respect of the wise.

The commodity of this incamping.

#### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



He fury of the enemy, and their sodaine assault, so disturbed the ceremonies which the Romaine discipline obserued, to make the soldiours trulie apprehend the waight and importance of that action, which might cast vpon their state either soueraignty or bondage; that they were all for the most part omitted; notwithstanding they are here noted vnder these titles, the first was *vexillum proponendum, quod erat insigne cum ad Arma concurrere oporteret*: for when the Generall had determined to fight, hee caused a skarlet coate or red flag to bee hung out vpon the top of his tent, that by it the soldiours might be warned, to prepare themselves for the battell; and this was the first warning they had, which by a silent aspect presented bloud and execution to their eyes, as the onlie meanes to worke out their owne safetie, and purchase eternall honour. The second was *Signum tuba dandum*; this warning was a noise of manie trumpets, which they tearmed by the name of *classicum a calando*, which signifieth calling: for after the eie was filled with species suitable to the matter intended; they then hastened to possesse the eare, and by the sense of hearing to stir vp warlike motions, and fill them with resolute thoughts, that no diffident or base conceites might take hold of their mindes. The third was, *milites cohortandi*, for it was thought conuenient to confirme this valour, with motiues of reason, which is the strength and perfection of al such motions.

The

The ceremonies which they used in their preparation to battel.

the vse and benefit whereof I somewhat enlarged in the Heluetian warre, and could afford much more labour to demonstrate the commoditie of this part, if my speech might carrie credit in the opinion of our souldiers, or be thought worthie regard to men so much addicted to their owne fashions. The last was *signum dandum*, which, as some thinke, was nothing but a word, by which they might distinguish and know themselves from their enemies. Hirtius in the war of Afrike saith, that Cæsar gaue the word *Felicitie*; Brutus and Cassius gaue *Libertie*; others haue giuen *Virtus*, *Deus nobiscum*, *Triumphus Imperatoris*, and such like wordes, as might be ominous to a good successe: Besides these particularities, the manner of their deliuerie gaue a great grace to the matter. And that was distinguished by times, and cues: whereof Cæsar now complaineth; that all these were to be done at one instant of time: for without all controuersie, there is no matter of such consequence in it selfe, but may bee much graced with ceremonies and complements, which like officers or attendants ad much respect and maiestie to the action; which otherwise being but barely presented, appeareth farre meaner and of lesse regard.

## CHAP. X.

The battell betweene Cæsar and the  
Neruij.

Cæsar.



*I*N these difficulties, two things were a help to the Romans; the one was, the knowledge and experience of the souldiers: for by reason of their practise in former battels, they could as well prescribe vnto themselves, what was to be done, as any other commander could teach them. The other was, that notwithstanding Cæsar had giuen commandement to euerie Legate, not to leaue the worke or forsake the legions, vntill the fortifications were perfited; yet when they sawe extremitie of danger, they attended no countermaund from Cæsar: but ordered all things as it seemed best to their owne discretion. Cæsar hauing commanded such things as he thought necessarie, ranne hastelie to encourage his souldiers, and by fortune came to the tenth legion, where he v-sed no further speech, then that they should remember their ancient valour, and valiantly withstand the brunt of their enemies. And for as much as the enemy was no further off, then a weapon might be cast to encounter them, he gaue them the signe of battell: and hastening from thence to another quarter, he found them already closed and at the encounter. For the time was so short and the enemy so violent, that they wanted leasure to put on their headpieces, or to vncase their targets: and what part they lighted into from their worke, or what ensigne they first met withall, there they staid; least in seeking out their owne companies, they should loose that time as was to be spent in fighting. The Armie being imbattailed rather according to the nature of the place, the decliuitie of the hill, and the breuitie of time, then according to the rules  
of

And there-  
fore I rather  
take it to bee  
something els  
then a word.

of art; as the legions encountered the enemy in diuers places at once, the perfect view of the battell being hindered by those thicke hedges before spoken of, there could no succors be placed any where; neither could any man see what was needful to be done: & therefore in so great uncertainty of things, there happened diuers casualties of fortune.

The soldiers of the ninth and tenth legion, as they stood in the left part of the Army, casting their pikes, with the advantage of the hill, did driue the Attrebatij, breathles with running & wounded in the incounter, down into the riuer; & as they passed ouer the water, slew many of them with their swordes: Neither did they sticke to follow after them ouer the riuer, and aduenture into a place of disadvantage, where the battell being renewed againe by the enemy, they put them to flight the second time. In like maner two other legions, the 11 and the 8, hauing put the Veromandui from the upper ground, fought with them upon the bankes of the riuer; and so the front & the left part of the campe was well neere left naked. For in the right corner were the 12 and the 7 legions, where as all the Neruij, vnder the conduct of Boduognatus, were heaped together; and some of them began to assault the legions on the open side, and other some to possesse themselves of the highest part of the campe.

At the same time the Roman horsemen, and the light armed footmen that were intermingled amongst them, and were at first all put to flight by the enemy, as they were entering into the campe, met with their enemies in the face, and so were drinen to flie out another way. In like manner, the pages and souldiers boies, that from the Decumane port and toppe of the hill, had scene the tenth legion follow their enemies in pursuit ouer the riuer, and were gone out to gather pillage, when they looked behind them, and saw the enemy in their campe; betooke them to their heeles as fast as they could. Which accident so terrified the horsemen of the Treuiri (who for their promesse were reputed singular amongst the Galles, and were sent thither by their state, to aide the Romans) first when they perceiued the Roman campe to be possessed, by a great multitude of the enemy, the legions to be ouercharged and almost inclosed about, the horsemen, slingers, and Numidians to be dispersed and fled, that without anie further expectation they tooke their waie homeward, and reported to their state, that the Romans were utterly ouerthrowen.

Cesar departing from the tenth legion, to the right corner, found his men exceedingly ouercharged, the ensignes crowded together into one place, and the souldiers of the 12 legion so thicke thronged on a heape, that they hindered one another; all the Centurions of the fourth cohort being slaine, the ensigne beaver kild and the ensigne taken, and the Centurions of the other cohorts either slaine, or sore wounded; amongst whom Pub. Sextus Baculus, the Primipile of that legion, a valiant man, so grienously wounded, that he could scarce stand upon his feete; the rest not verie forward, but many of the hindmost turning taile and forsaking the field; the enemy on the other side, giuing no respite in front, although he fought against the hill, nor yet sparing the open side, and the matter brought to a narrow issue, without any meanes or succour, to relieue them: he tooke a target from one of the hindmost souldiers (for he himselfe was come thither without one) and pressing to the front of the battell, called the Centurions by name, and encouraging the rest, commanded the ensignes to be aduanced toward the enemy, and the Maniples to be enlarged, that they might with greater facilitie and readinesse vse their swordes.



## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

The place  
and office of a  
primipile.



His Publius Sextus Baculus was the chiefeſt Centurion of the 12 legion, being the firſt Centurion of that Maniple of the Triarij, that was of the firſt Cohort in that legion; for that place was the greateſt dignitie that could happen to a Centurion; and therefore he was called by the name of *Centurio primipili*, or ſimplie *Primipilus*, and ſometimes *Primopilus*, or *Primus Centurio*. By him were commonly publiſhed, the mandates and edicts of the Emperour, and Tribunes: and therefore the reſt of the Centurions, at all times had an eie vnto him; and the rather for that the eagle, which was the peculiar enſigne of euerie legion, was committed to his charge and carried in his Maniple. Neither was this dignitie, without ſpeciall commoditie, as may be gathered out of diuers authors. We reade further, that it was no diſparagement for a Tribune, after his Tribunality was expired, to be a Primipile in a legion; notwithstanding, there was a law made, I know not vpon what occaſion, that no Tribune ſhould afterward be Primipile. But let this ſuffice concerning the office and title of P. S. Baculus.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

The Target  
deſcribed.



And heere I may not omit to giue the Target any honour I may, and therefore I will take occaſion to deſcribe it in Cæſars hand, as in the place of greateſt dignitie, and much honouring the excellencie therof. Polybius maketh the Target to containe two foot and an halfe in breadth, ouerthwart the conuex ſurface thereof; and the length foure foote, of what forme or faſhion ſoeuer they were of: for the Romans had two ſortes of Targets amongſt their legionarie, the firſt caried the proportion of that figure, which the Geometricians call Ouall, a figure of an vnequall latitude, broadest in the miſt, and narrow at both the endes, like vnto an egge, deſcribed in *Plano*: the other ſorte was of an equall latitude, and reſembled the faſhion of a guttertile; and thereupon was called *Scutum imbricatum*. The matter whereof a target was made, was a double board, one faſtened vpon another, with lint and Buls glew; and couered with an Oxe hide, or ſome other ſtiſſe leather; the vpper and lower part of the target were bound about with a plate of yron, to keepe it from cleauing; and in the middeſt there was a boſſe of yron or braſſe, which they called *Vmbo*. Romulus brought them in firſt amongſt the Romans; taking the vſe of them from the Sabines. The wood whereof they were made, was for the moſt part either fallow, alder, or figtree: whereof Plinie giueth this reaſon, for as much as theſe trees are colde and wateriſh, and therefore any blow or thruſt that was made vpon the wood, was preſently contracted and ſhut vp againe. But for as much as the Target was of ſuch reputation amongſt the Roman Armes, and challenged ſuch intereſt in the greateſt of their Empire, let vs enter a little into the

Lib. 16. c. 40.

the consideration of the vse and commoditie thereof; which cannot be better vnderstood, then by that conference, which Polybius hath made betweene the weapons of the Romans and the Macedonians: and therefore I haue thought it good to insert it in these discourses. And thus it followeth.

## Of the difference of the Roman and Macedonian

### *Weapons.*

**P**romised in my sixt book that I would make a comparison, between the weapons of the Romans, and Macedonians. And that I would likewise write of the disposition of either of their armies; how they do differ one from another: & in what regard, the one, or the other, were either inferiour, or superiour: which promise I wil now with diligence endeavour to performe. And for as much as the armies of the Macedonians haue giuen so good testimonies of themselves by their actions, by ouercomming the armies as wel of those of Asia, as of Greece; and that the battailes of the Romans haue conquered, as well those of Africa as all the Easterne countries of Europe: It shall not be amisse, but very profitable, to search out the difference of either; especially seeing that these our times haue not once, but many times scene triall, both of their battailes and forces; that knowing the reason why, the Romans do ouercome, and in their battailes carie awaie the better: we doe not as vaine men were wont to do, attribute the same to fortune; and esteeme them without reason happy victors; but rather looking into the true causes, we giue them their due praises, according to the direction of reason, and sound iudgment. Concerning the battels betweene Hanniball and the Romans; and concerning the Romans their losses, there is no neede that I speake much. For their losses are neither to be imputed to the defect of their Armes, or disposition of their Armies; but to the dexteritie and industrie of Hanniball: but wee haue entreated therof when we made mention of the battels themselves, and the end it selfe of that warre doth especiallie confirme this our opinion. For vwhen they had gotten a captaine equall vvith Hanniball, euen consequentlie vvith all his victories vanished. And hee had no sooner ouercome the Romans, but by and by, reiecting his owne weapons, hee trained his Armie to their weapons, and so taking them vp in the beginning, he continued them on vnto the ende.

And Pyrrhus in his war against the Romans, did vse both their weapons and order, and made as it were a medlie both of the cohort, and phalanx: but notwithstanding it serued him not to get the victory, but alwaies the euent by some meanes or other, made the same doubtfull: concerning whom it were not vnfit, that I should saie something, least in being altogether silent, it might seeme to preiudice this mine opinion. But notwithstanding I will hasten to my purposed comparison.

Now touching the phalanx, if it haue the disposition, and forces proper to it,

M ij.

nothing

nothing is able to oppose it selfe against it, or to sustaine the violence thereof; as maie easily by many documents be approued. For when an armed man doth stand firme in the space of three foote in so thicke an array of battell, and the length of their pikes being according to the first basis, or scantling sixteene foote; but according to the true and right conueniencie of them, 14 cubits, out of which are taken foure allowed for the space betweene the left hand, which supporteth the same, and the butte ende thereof, vvhiles he standes in a readinesse to attend the incounter: being thus ordered, I saie, it is manifest that the length of tenne cubites doth extend it selfe before the bodie of euerie armed man, where with both his handes he doth aduance it readie to charge the enemy: By vvhich meanes it followeth, that some of the pikes doe not onely extend themselves before the second, third, and fourth ranke, but some before the formost, if the phalanx haue his proper and due thicknesse, according to his naturall disposition, both on the sides and behinde, as Homer maketh mention vvhien he saith, that one target doth enclose and fortifie another; one headpiece is ioyned to another, that they maie stande vnited and close together.

These circumstances being rightly and truely set downe, it must follow, that the pikes of euerie former ranke in the phalanx, doe extend themselves two cubites before each other, which proportion of difference they haue betweene themselves: by which maie euidently be seene the assault, and impression of the whole phalanx, what it is, and what force it hath, consisting of 16 rankes in depth, or thicknesse; the excessse of which number of rankes aboute foue. For as much as they cannot commodiously couch their pikes, without the disturbance of the former, the points of them not being long inough to enlarge themselves beyond the formost rankes, they grow vtterly vnprofitable, and cannot man, by man, make any impression, or assault: but serue onely, by laying their pikes vpon the shoulders of those which stand before them, to sustaine and hold vp the swaies and giuing backe of the former rankes, which stand before them to this end, that the front may stand firme and sure; and with the thicknes of their pikes they doe repell all those darts, which passing ouer the heads of those that stand before, would annoy those rankes which are more backward.

And farther by mouing forward, with the force of their bodies, they doe so presse vpon the former, that they doe make a most violent impression. For it is impossible that the formost rankes should giue backe.

This therefore being the generall and particular disposition of the phalanx: we must now speake on the contrarie part, touching the properties and differences, as well of the armes, as of the whole disposition of the Roman battell. For euerie Roman soldier for himselfe, and his weapon is allowed three foot to stand in, and in the incounter, are moued man, by man, euery one couering himselfe with his target; and mutually moouing whensoever there is occasion offered. But those which vse their swordes, do fight in a more thinne and distinct order; so that it is manifest, that they haue three foote more allowed them to stand in both from shoulder to shoulder, and from backe to bellie, that they maie vse their weapons with the better commoditie. And hence it cometh to passe, that



that one Romaine soldiour taketh vp as much ground, as two of those which are to encounter him of the Macedonian Phalanx: so that one Romain is as it were to oppose himselfe against tenne pikes, which pikes the said one soldiour can neither by any agilitie come to offende, or else at handy blowes otherwise annoy: And those which are behinde him, are not onely vnable to repell their force, but also with conueniencie to vse their owne weapons. Whereby it may easily be gathered, that it is impossible, that any battaile being assaulted, by the front of a phalanx, should be able to sustaine the violence thereof, if it haue his due and proper composition.

What then is the cause that the Romaines do ouercome, and that those that doe vse the phalanx are voyde of the hope of victorie? (Euen from hence) that the Romaine armies haue infinite commodities, both of places, and of times, to fight in. But the phalanx hath only one time, one place, and one kinde, whereto it may profitablie applie it selfe: so that if it were of necessitie, that their enemy shoulde incounter them at that instant, especiallie with their whole forces, it were questionlesse not only, not without danger, but in all probability likelie, that the phalanx should euer carrie away the better. But if that may be auoided, which is easily done: shal not that disposition then, be vtterlie vnprofitable, and free from all terror? And it is farther euident, that the phalanx must necessarily haue plaine & champion places, without any hinderances, or impediments; as ditches, vneuen places, vallies, little hils and riuers: for al these may hinder & disioine it. And it is almost impossible to haue a plaine of the capacity of 20. *stadia*, much lesse more, where there shall bee found none of these impediments: But suppose there bee found such places, as are proper for the phalanx: If the enemy refuse to come vnto them, and in the meane time, spoile, and sacke the cities, and countrie round about; what commodity, or profit shal arise by an army so ordered? for if it remaine in such places, as hath beene before spoken of; it can neither relieue their friends, nor preserue themselves. For the Conuoies which they expect from their friends, are easily cut off by the enemy, whiles they remaine in those open places.

And if it happen at any time, that they leaue them vpon any enterprise, they are then exposed to the enemy. But suppose, that the Romaine army should find the phalanx in such places, yet would it not aduerture it selfe in gresse at one instant; but would by little & little retire it selfe; as doth plainly appeare by their vsual practise. For there must not bee a coniecture of these things by my words only, but especially by that which they do. For they do not so equally frame their battaile, that they doe assault the enemy altogether, making as it were but one front: but part make a stande, and parte charge the enemy, that if at any time the Phalanx doe presse them, that come to assault them and bee repelled; the force of their order is dissolued. For whether they pursue those that retire, or flie from those that do assault them, these doe disioyne themselves from part of their armie; by which meanes there is a gap opened to their enemies, standing and attending their opportunitie: so that nowe they neede not anie more to charge them in the front, where the force of the phalanx consisteth: but to assault where the breach is made, both behind, and vpon the sides. But if at any



time the Romaine armie may keepe his due proprietie, and disposition, the phalanx by the disadvantage of the place, being not able to doe the like: doth it not then manifestlie demonstrate the difference to be great, betweene the goodnes of their disposition, and the disposition of the phalanx?

To this may bee added the necessities imposed vpon an army, which is to march through places of all natures, to encampe themselues, to possesse places of aduantage, to besiege, and to be besieged; and also contrary to expectation sometimes to come in viewe of the enemy: For all these occasions necessarilie accompanie an armie; and oftentimes are the especial causes of victory, to which the Macedonian phalanx is no way fit, or conuenient: Forasmuch as neither in their generall order, nor in their particular disposition, without a conuenient place, are able to effect any thing of moment: but the Romaine army is apt for all these purposes. For euerie foldiour amongst them, beeing once armed and ready to fight, refuseth no place, time, nor occasion; keeping alwaies the same order, whether he fight together with the whole body of the army, or particularlie by himselfe, man to man.

And hence it happeneth, that as the commodity of their disposition is aduantageous: so the end doth answere the expectation.

These things I thought to speake of at large, because many of the Grecians are of an opinion, that the Macedonians are not to bee ouercome. And againe, many wondered, how the Macedonian phalanx should bee put to the worst by the Romaine army, considering the nature of their weapons.

Thus far goeth Polibius, in comparing the weapons and imbattailing of the Romaines, with the vse of armes amongst the Macedonians: wherein we see the Pike trulie, and exactlie ordered, according as the wise Grecians could best proportion it with that forme of battell, which might giue most aduantage to the vse thereof: so that if our squadrons of Pikes iumpe not with the perfect manner of a phalanx, (as wee see they doe not) they fall so much shorte of that strength, which the wisdom of the Grecians and the experience of other nations, imputed vnto it. But suppose wee could allow it that disposition, in the course of our wars, which the nature of the weapon doth require; yet forasmuch as by the authority of Polybius, the said maner of imbattailing is tied to such dangerous circumstances of one time, one place, and one kinde of fight: I hold it not so profitable a weapon, as the practise of our times doth seem to make it, especially in woody countries, such as Ireland is; where the vse is cut off by such inconueniences, as are noted to hinder the managing thereof. And doubtles, if our commanders did but consider of the incongruity of the Pike & Ireland, they would not proportion so great a number of the in euery company, as there is; for commonly halfe the company are pikes, which is as much to faile in the practise of our wars, that halfe the army hath neither offense nor defense weapons, but only against a troupe of horse. For they seldom or neuer come to the push of pike, with the foot companies, where they may charge & offende the enemy: & for defence, if the enemy think it not safe to buckle with the at hand, but maketh more aduantage to play vpon the at a far off with shot; it affordeth smal safety to shake a long pike at them, and stand faire in the meane time, to entertaine

a vollee of shot with the body of their battailion. As I make no question, but the pike in some seruices is profitable, as behind a rampier, or at a breach; so I assure my selfe, there are weapons if they were put to triall, that would counteruaile the pike euen in those seruices, wherein it is thought most profitable.

Concerning the Target, we see it take the hand, in the iudgement of Polybius, of all other weapons whatsoever, aswell in regard of the diuers and sundrie sortes of imbattailing, as the qualitie of the place whersoever: for their vse was as effectuell in small bodies and centuries, as in grosse troupes and great companies; in thinne and spacious imbattailing, as in thicke thronged Testudines. Neither could the nature of the place make them vnseruiceable; for whether it were plaine or couert; leuel or vnequall; narrow or large, if there were any commodity to fight, the Target was as necessarie to defend, as the sword to offend: besides the conueniency, which accompanieth the Target in any necessitie imposed vpon an armie, whether it bee to march through places of all natures, to make a fast march, or a speedie retraite, to incampe themselves, to possesse places of aduantage, to besiege and to be besieged, as Polybius saith, with manie other occasions which necessarilie accompanie an armie. The vse of this weapon hath beene too much neglected in these latter ages, but may be happily renewed againe in our nation, if the industrie of such as haue laboured to present it vnto these times, in the best fashion, shall finde anie fauour in the opinion of our commaunders. Concerning which Target, I must needs saie this much, that the light Target will proue the Target of seruice, whensoever they shall happen to be put in execution: for those which are made prooffe, are so heauie and vnielddie, (although it be somewhat qualified with such helps as are annexed to the vse thereof,) that they ouercharge a man, with an vnsupportable burthen, and hinder his agilitie and execution in fight, with a waight disproportionable to his strength. For our offensive weapons, as namely the Harquebusers and musketiers, are stronger in the offensive part, then any armes of defence, which may be made manageable and fit for seruice. Neither did the Romans regard the prooffe of their Target further, then was thought fit for the readie vse of them in time of battel, as it appeareth in many places, both in the ciuill warres and in these Commentaries: for a Romaine pile hath often times darted through the Target, and the bodie of the man that bare it, and fastened them both to the ground, which is more then a musket can wel do; for the bullet commonly resteth in the bodie. And although it may be said that this was not comon, but rather the effect an extraordinary arme, yet it serueth to proue, that their Targets were not prooffe to their offensive weapons, when they were well deliuered and with good direction. For I make no doubt, but in their battailes there were oftentimes some hinderances, which woulde not suffer so violent an effect, as this which I speake of: for in a volley of shotte, wee must not thinke that all the bullets flie with the same force, and fall with the like hurt; but as armour of good prooffe will hardly hold out some of them; so slender armes and of no prooffe, will make good resistance against others. And to conclude, in a battell or incounter at hand, a man shall meete with more occasions, suting the nature and commoditie of this light Target, then such as will aduantage the

the heauie Target of prooffe, or counteruaile the furplus of waight, which it carieth with it.

Some men will vrge, that there is vse of this Target of prooffe, in some places and in some seruices: which I deny not to thole, that desire to bee secured from the extremity of peril: but this falleth out in some places and in some particular seruices, and hindereth not but that the vniuersal benefit of this weapon consisteth in the multitude of light Targetiers, who are to manage the most important occasions of a warre.

This much I am further to note, concerning the sworde of the Targetiers, that according to the practise of the Romaines, it must alwaies hang on the right side; for carying the Target vpon the left arme, it cannot be that the sword should hang on the left side, but with great trouble and annoiance: And if any man say, that if it hang on the right side, it must bee verie short, otherwise it will neuer bee readilie drawne out. I saie that the sworde of the Targetiers, in regard of the vse of that weapon, ought to be of a very short scantling, when as the Targetier is to command the point of his sword within the compasse of his Target, as such as looke into the true vse of this weapon, will easily discouer. But let this suffice concerning the vse of the pike and the Target.

## CHAP. XI.

### The battell continueth, and in the ende

*Caesar ouercommeth.*

*Caesar.*



*The presence of their Generall, the soldours conceiued some better hopes, and gathering strength and courage againe, when as euery man bestirred himselfe in the sight of the Emperour, the brunt of the enemy was a litle staied. Caesar perceiuing likewise the seuenth legion, which stood next vnto him, to bee sore overlaide by the enemy, commaunded the Tribunes by litle and litle, to ioin the two legions together, and so by ioining backe to backe, to make two contrarie fronts: and beeing thus secured one by another from feare of being circumuented, they began to make resistance with greater courage. In the meane time the two legions, that were in the reuerwarde to guard the cariages, bearing of the battell, doubled their pace, and were discried by the enemy vpon the top of the hill. And Titus Labienus, hauing won the campe of the Neruij, and beholding from the higher ground what was done on the other side of the riuer, sent the tenth legion to helpe their fellowes, who vnderstanding by the horsemen and Lackies that fled, in what case the matter stood, and in what daunger the campe, the legions, and the Generall was, made all the haste they possibly could. At whose comming there happened such an alieration and change of things, that euen such as were sunke downe, through extreame grieue of their woundes, or leaened vpon their Targets, began againe to fight a fresh, and the Pages and the boies perceiuing the enemy amazed, ran vpon them vnarmed, not fearing their weapons: the*



the horsemen also striving with extraordinarie valour, to wipe away the dishonour of their former flight, thrust themselves in all places before the legionarie souldiers. Howbeit the enemy in the utmost perill of their liues, shewed such manhood, that as fast as the formost of them were ouerthrowen, the next in place bestrid their carcases, and fought upon their bodies: and these being likewise ouerthrowen, and their bodies heaped one upon another, they that remained, possessed themselves of that mount of dead carcases as a place of aduantage, and from thence threw their weapons, and intercepting the piles, returned them againe to the Romans. By which it may be gathered, that there was great reason to deeme them men of haucie courage, that durst passe ouer so broade a riuer, climbe vp such high rockes, and aduenture to fight in a place of such inequality. The battell being thus ended, and the nation and name of the Neruij being well neare swallowed vp with destruction, the elder sort with the women and children, that before the battell were conuaid into Ilands and Bogs, when they heard thereof, sent ambasadours to Caesar, and yeelded themselves to his mercie; and in laying open the miserie of their state affirmed, that of 600 Senatours they had now left but three; and of 60000 fighting men, there was scarce fise hundred that were able to beare Armes. Caesar, that his clemencie might appeare to a distressed people, preserved them with great care, granting unto them the free possession of their townes and country, and streightly commanding their borderers, not to offer them any wrong or iniurie at all.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**A**nd thus endeth the relation of that great and dangerous battell, which Ramus complaineth of as a confused narration: much differing from the direct and methodicall file, of his other Commentaries. But if that rule holde good, which learned Rhetoritians haue obserued in their Oratorie, that an vnperfect thing ought not to be told in a perfect maner; then by Ramus leaue, if any such confusion do appeare, it both sauoureth of eloquence, and wel suteth the turbulent cariage of the action, wherein order and skill gaue place to fortune, and prouidence was swallowed vp with peraduenture. For that which Hirtius saith of the ouerthrow he gaue to Pharnaces, may as well be said of this; that he got the victorie, *plurimum adiuuante deorum benignitate, qui cum omnibus belli casibus interfunt, tum praeipue ijs quibus nihil ratione potuit administrari.* For so it fell out in this battell, and the danger proceeded from the same cause, that brought him to that push in the battell with Pharnaces: for he well vnderstood that the Neruij attended his comming on the other side the riuer Sabis: Neither was he ignorant how to fortifie his camp in the face of an enemy, without feare or danger, as we haue seene in his war with Ariouistus; when he marched to the place where he purposed to incamp himselfe with 3 battels, and caused two of them to stand ready in armes to receiue any charge, which the enemy should offer to giue, that the third battell in the meane time might fortifie the camp. Which course would easily haue frustrated this stratagem of the Neruij, and made the hazard lesse dangerous; but he little expected any such resolution,

N j.

so

*Li. de militia  
In. Ca.*



so contrarie to the rules of militarie discipline, that an enemy should not ticke to passe ouer so broad a riuer, to clime vp such steepe and high rocks; to aduventure battell in a place so disaduantagious, and to hazard their fortune vpon such inequalities. And therefore, hee little mistrusted any such vnlikelie attempt, wherein the enemy had plotted his owne ouerthrow, if the legions had beene ready to receiue them. Which may teach a generall that which Cæsar had not yet learned, that a leader cannot be too secure in his most assured courses; nor too carefull in his best aduised directions; considering that the greatest means may easily bee preuented, and the safest course weakened with an vnrespected circumstance: so powerful are weake occurrences in the maine course of the waightiest actions; and so infinite are the waies, wherby either wisdom or fortune may worke. Neither did this warne him, to prouide for that which an enemy might do, how vnlikelie soeuer it might seeme vnto him, as appeareth by that accident in the battel with Pharnaces: which practise of attempting a thing against reason and the arte of warre, hath found good successe in our moderne wars; as appeareth by the French histories: notwithstanding it is to be handeled sparingly, as no way sauoring of circumspect and good direction, forasmuch as *temeritas non semper felix*, as Fabius the great answered Scipio.

The chiefest helpes which the Romaines founde, were first the aduantage of the place; whereof I spake in the Heluetian warre. Secondlie, the experience, which the soldiours had got in the former battailes, which much directed them in this turbulent assault; wherein they caried themselves as men acquainted with such casualties: lastly, the valour and vndanted iudgment of the General, which ouerswaied the peril of the battel, and brought it to so fortunate an end. Wherin we may obserue, that as in a temperate course, when the issue of the battel rested vpon his directions, he wholly intended warines & circumspection, so in the hazard and peril of good hap, he confronted extremity of danger with extremity of valor, and ouertopt fury, with a higher resolution.

## CHAP. XII.

### The Aduatici betake themselves to a strong hold, and are taken by Cæsar.

Cæsar.  
\* either Doway  
or Bossleduke  
in Brabant.



THE \* Aduatici before mentioned, comming with all their power to aide the Neruij, and vnderstanding by the way of their ouerthrow, returned home againe; and forsaking all the rest of their townes, and castles, conuained themselves and their wealth into one strong and wel fortified town, which was compassed about with mighty rocks and steepe downefalls, sauing in one place of 200. foot in breadth, where there was an entry by a gentle and easie ascent, which passage they had fortified with a double wal of a large altitude,

altitude, and had placed mightie great stones and sharpe beames upon the walles ready for an assault. This people descended from the Cimbri and Teutons, who in their iourney into Italy had left such cariages on this side of the Rhene, as they could not conueniently take along with them, in the custodie of these forces; who after the death of their fellows being many yeares disquieted by their neighbours, sometimes inuading other states, and sometimes defending themselves, at length procured a peace, and chose this place to settle themselves in: At the first comming of the Romaine army, they sallied out of the towne, & made many light skirmishes with them: but after that Caesar had drawne a rampier about the towne of 12 foot in height, 15 miles in compasse, and had fortified it with castles very thicke about the towne: they kept themselves within the wall: And as they beheld the vines framed, the mount raised, and a towre in building a far off; at first they began to laugh at it, and with scoffing speeches from the wal, began to aske: with what hands, & with what strength, especially by men of that stature (for the Romaines were but little men in respect of the Galles) a towre of that huge masse waight should bee brought vnto the walles? But when they saw it remoued, and approaching neere vnto the towne, as men astonished at the strange and vnaccustomed sight thereof, they sent ambassadors to Caesar, to intreat a peace with this message: They beleueed that the Romaines did not make war, without the special assistance of the gods, that could with such facility transport engines of that height, & bring them to incounter at hand, against the strongest part of their town: and therefore they submitted both themselves, and all that they had, to Caesars mercy; desiring one thing of his meere clemency, that he would not take away their armes, forasmuch as all their neighbors were enemies vnto them, and enuied at their valour; neither were they able to defend themselves, if they should deliuer up their armor: so that they had rather suffer any inconuenience by the people of Rome, then to be butcherly murdered by them, whom in former time they had held subiect to their command.

To this Caesar answered, that hee would saue the city rather of his owne custome, then for any desert of theirs; so that they yeelded before the Ram touched the wal: but no condision of remedy should be accepted, without present deliuey of their armes; for he would do by them as he had done by the Neruij, and giue comendement to their neighbours, that they should offer no wrong to such, as had commended their safety to the people of Rome. This answer being returned to the city, they seemed contented to doe whatsoeuer hee commanded them, and thereupon casting a great part of their armour ouer the wal into the ditch, insomuch as they fild it almost to the top of the rampier: and yet (as after ward was known) concealing the third part, they set open the gates, and for that daie caried themselves peaceably. Towards night Caesar commanded the gates to be shut, and the soldiours to be drawne out of the towne. But the Aduatici hauing consulted together before, forasmuch as they beleueed that vpon their submission, the Romaines would either set no watch at all, or at the least, keepe it verie careleslie; partlie with such armour as they had retained, and partly with Targets, made of barke or wrought of wicker, which vpon the sodaine they had couered ouer with leather, about the third watch where the ascent to our fortifications was easiest; they issued sodainly out of the towne with all their power: but signification thereof being giuen by fiers, as Caesar had commanded, the Romans hastened speedilie to that place. The enemy fought very desperatelie, as men in the last hope of their welfare, incountering the Romans in a place of disadvantage, at length with the slaughter of 4000. the rest were driuen backe into the towne. The

N y.

next

next daie when Cæsar came to breake open the gates, and found no man at defence, he sent in the soldiours, and sold al the people and spoile of the towne: the number of persons in the towne amounted to 53000. bondslaves.

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

*Circumvallatio*

**I**N the surprise, attempted by the Belgæ vpon Bibract, I set downe the maner, which both the Galles and the Romaines vsed in their sodaine surprising of a towne: whereof if they failed (the place importing any aduantage in the course of the war) they then prepared for the siege, in that maner, as Cæsar hath described in this place. They inuironed the town about with a ditch and a rampier, and fortified the saide rampier, with many castles and fortresses, erected in a conuenient distance one from another; and so they kept the town from any forraigne succor or reliefe: and withal secured themselves frō sallies or other stratagems, which the townsmen might practise against them. And this manner of siege was called *circumvallatio*; the particular description whereof, I refer vnto the history of Alesia, where I will handle it, according to the particulars there set down by Cæsar.

*In the seventh  
commentaries.*

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

*Aries or the  
Ram.*

*Cales.*

*Aries simplex*

*Aries com-  
posita.*



He Ram, which Cæsar heere mentioneth, was of greatest note amongst all the Romaine Engines, and helde that place which the Canon hath in our warres. Vitruuius doth attribute the inuention thereof, to the Carthaginians, who at the taking of Cadiz, wanting a fit instrument to raze and ouerthrow a castle, they tooke a long beame or timber tree, and bearing it vpon their armes and shoulders, with the one end thereof they first brake downe the vppermost ranke of stones: and so descending by degrees, they ouerthrewe the whole towne. The Romaines had two sortes of Rams, the one was rude and plaine; the other artificial and compound: the first, is that which the Carthaginians vsed at Cadiz, and is purtraited in the column of Traian at Rome.

The compound Ram is thus described by Iosephus; a Ramme (saith he) is a mighty great beame, like vnto the mast of a ship, and is strengthened at one end with a head of yron, fashioned like vnto a Ram; and thereof it tooke the name. This Ram is hanged by the middest with roapes vnto an other beame, which lieth crosse a couple of pillars, and hanging thus equallie balanced, it is by force of men thrust forward, and recoiled backward; and so beateth vpon the wall with his yron heade: neither is there any towre so strong, or wal so broad, that is able to stande before it. The length of this Ramme was of a large scantling, for Plutarch affirmeth, that Anthonie in the Parthian warre had a Ram eighty foote long: and Vitruuius saith, that the length of a Ramme was vsuallie 106. and sometimes 120; and this length gaue great strength and force to the engine.



engine. It was managed at one time with a whole Centurie or order of souldiers: and their forces being spent, they were seconded with another Centurie; and so the ramme plaied continually vpon the wall, without intermission. Iosephus saith, that Titus, at the siege of Ierusalem, had a ramme for euerie legion: it was oftentimes couered with a vine, that the men that managed it might bee in more safetie. It appeareth by this place, that if a towne had continued out vntill the ramme had touched the wall, they could not presume of any acceptation of rendrie; for as much as by their obstinacie, they had brought in perill the liues of their enemies, and were subdued by force of Armes, which affoordeth such mercie as the victor pleaseth.

## THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

**T**He Aduaticis, as it seemeth, were not ignorant of the small securitie, which one state can giue vnto another, that commendeth their safetie to be protected by it: for as Architas the Pythagorean saith, a bodie, a familie, and an Armie are then well gouerned, when they containe within themselves the causes of their safetie; so we must not looke for anie securitie in a state, when their safetie dependeth vpon a forraine protection. For the olde saying is, that *Neque murus, neque amicus quisquam teget, quem propria arma non texere*. Although in this case the matter was well qualified, by the maiestie of the Roman Empire, and the late victories in the continent of Gallia, wherof the Hedui with their associates were very gainful witnesses: but amongst kingdomes, that are better suted with equalitie of strength & authority, there is small hope of safetie to be looked for, vnlesse the happy gouernment of both do mutually depend vpon the safetie of either nation. For that which Polybius obserued in Antigonus king of Macedonia, taketh place for the most part amongst all Princes; That kinges by nature esteeme no man, either as a friend or an enemy, but as the calculation of profit shall finde them answerable to their proiectes. And contrariwise, it cutteth off many occasions of practises & attempts, when it is knowne that a state is of it selfe able and readie to resist the designs of forraine enemies, according to that of Manlius: *Ostendite modo bellum, pacem habebitis: videant vos paratos ad vim, ius ipsi remittent*.

## THE FOVRTH OBSERVATION.

**T**He manner of signifying any motion or attempt by fire, was of great vse in the night season, where the fortification was of so large an extension: for fire in the night doth appeare far greater then indeed it is, for as much as that part of the aire, which is next vnto the fire, as it is illuminated with the light thereof, in a reasonable distance cannot be discerned from the fire it selfe, and so it seemeth much greater then it is in substance: and contrariwise,

To giue notice of an Alarm by fire.



in the daie time it sheweth lesse then it is; for the cleare brightnesse of the aire doth much obscure that light, which proceedeth from a more grosse and materiall bodie: and therefore their custome was to vse fire in the night, and smoake in the daie, suting the transparent middle with a contrarie qualitie, that so it might more manifestly appeare to the beholder.

### THE FIFT OBSERVATION.

Lib. 25.

The punish-  
ments which  
the Romans  
laied vpon a  
conquered na-  
tion.



And albeit after the victorie, the Romans inflicted diuers degrees of punishment, according to the malice which they found in an enemy; yet as Flavius Lucanus saith in Liuië, there was no nation more exorable, nor readier to shew mercie, then the Romans were. The punishments which we find them to haue vsed towards a conquered nation, were these; either they punished them by death, or solde them for bondslaues, *sub corona*, or dismissed them *sub iugum*; or merced them, in taking away their territories; or made them tributarie states.

Of the first we finde a manifest example in the third of these Commentaries, where Cæsar hauing ouerthrowne the Veneti by sea, in as much as they had retained his ambassadours by force, contrarie to the law of nations, he put all the Senate to the sword, and sold the rest *sub corona*.

Festus saith, that an enemy was said to be sold *sub corona*, in as much as the captiues stood crowned in the market place, where they were set out to sale; as Cato saith in his booke *de re militari, ut populus sua opera potius ob rem bene gestam coronatus supplicatum eat, quam re male gesta coronatus vaneat*. And Gellius affirmeth the same thing, but addeth also another reason, for as much as the soldiers that kept them while they were in selling, incircled them round about, to keepe them together; and this round-about-standing was called *Corona*. Festus saith, that oftentimes they vsed a speare; and therefore they were said to be sold *sub hasta*: for as much as amongst the Greekes, by the speare or pike, was signified the power of Armes, and maiestie of Empires.

When they dismissed them *sub iugum*, their order was to erect three trees like a paire of gallows, vnder which they caused all the captiues to passe, as a signe of bondage: for they had so conquered them by force of Armes, that they laide vpon their necke the yoake of thraldome. Liuië saith, that Quintius the dictator dismissed the *Aequos sub iugum*; and this *iugum* was made of 3 speares, whereof two were stucke vpright in the ground, and the third was tied ouerthwart them. The souldiers that passed *sub iugum*, were vngirt, and their weapons taken from them, as Festus saith.

Sometimes againe they tooke awaie their landes and territories, and either solde it for mony, & brought it into the treasure; or deuided the land amongst the Roman people, or let it out to farme rent: of all which Liuië hath manie pregnant examples.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XIII.


**Crassus taketh in all the maritime cities that lie  
to the Ocean: the legions are carried into  
their wintering camps.**



**T**HE same time Pub. Crassus, whom he had sent with one legion to the maritime cities that laie to the Ocean, aduertised him that al those states had yeelded themselves to the people of Rome. The war being thus ended, and all Gallia being settled in peace, there went such a fame of this warre among vther barbarous people, that from nations beyond the Rhene there came ambassadours to Caesar, offering both hostages and obedience to whatsoever he commanded them. But Caesar willed them to repaire vnto him againe in the beginning of the next sommer, for as much as he then hasted into Lombardie, after he had placed his legions in their wintering camps. For these thinges, vpon the sight of Caesars letters, a generall supplication was proclaimed in Rome for 15 daies together, which honour before that time had happened to no man. And thus endeth the second Commentarie.

Caesar.

Of this supplication I will speake in the latter ende of the 4 booke.



OBSER-

# OBSERVATIONS VPON THE THIRD BOOKE OF CÆSAR HIS COMMENTARIES.

## THE ARGUMENT.

**T**His Commentarie beginneth with an Accident, which happened in the latter end of the former sommer; wherein the Belgæ had so leane a haruest: and then it proceedeth to the warre betweene Cæsar and the Veneti; Crassus and the Aquitani; Titurius Sabinus and the Curiosolitæ: And Titus Labienus, with the Treuiri.

## CHAP. I.

Sergius Galba, being sent to cleere the passage of  
*the Alpes, was besieged by the Seduni*  
and Veragri.

Caesar.



**C**ÆSAR taking his iourney into Italie, sent Sergius Galba with the twelfth legion, and part of the horsemen unto the Nantuates, Veragri & Seduni: whose territories are extended from the riuer Rhone, and the lake Lemanus, unto the tops of the highest Alpes. The ende of this voyage was chiefly to cleare the Alpes of theeues and robbers, that liued by the spoile of passengers that trauelled betweene Italie and Gallia: Galba hauing order, if he found it expedient to winter in those partes, after some fortunate incounters and the taking of some castles and holdes, he concluded a peace, and resolved to place two cohortes of his legion, amongst the Nantuates; and himselfe to winter with the other cohortes, in a towne of the Veragri, named Octodurus. This towne being sited in a narrow valley, and incircled about with mightie high hills, was deuided by a riuer into two partes, whereof he gaue one part to the Galles, and the other he chose for his wintering campe, and fortified it about with a ditch and a rampier. After he had spent many daies of wintering, and giuen order, that corne should be brought thither for prouision; he had intelligence vpon a sudden, that the Galles, in the night time, had all left that part of the towne that was allotted unto them; and that the hills which hung ouer the valley, wherein the towne stood, were possesst with great multitudes of the Seduni, and Veragri. The reasons of this sudden commotion were cheefly the

the paucitie of the Roman forces, not making a compleat legion; for as much as two cohorts wintered amongst the Nantuates: besides many particulars, that were wanting upon necessarie occasions. And to make them more contemptible in regard of themselves, the place afforded such aduantage, that they were perswaded by reason of the steepe declinitie of the hill, that the Romans would not indure the brunt of the first assault: besides this, it greened them exceedingly to haue their children taken from them, vnder the title of hostages; and the Alpes, which nature had exempted from habitation, and placed as boundes betweene two large kingdomes, to be seased vpon by the Roman legions, and vnitied to their Prouince.

Vpon these aduertisements, Galba not hauing as yet finished the fortification of his campe, nor made prouision of corne and forrage for the winter season, in that he little feared any motion of warre, being secured of their amitie, and obedience, both by hostages and rendrie: he presently called a counsell of warre, to determine what course was best to be taken. In which counsell the mindes of many were so amazed, with the terrour of so v unexpected a danger, when they beheld the hills pestered with armed soldiers, the passages taken and intercepted by the enemy, and no hope left of any succour or reliefe, that they could thinke of no other waie for their safetie, then leaning behind them their baggage and impediments, to sallie out of their campe, and so to saue themselves by the same waie they came thither: notwithstanding the greater part concluded, to referre that resolution to the last push; and in the meane time, to attend the fortune of the euent, and defend the campe.

#### THE OBSERVATION.



Hich aduise although at this time sorted to small effect; yet it better suited the valour of the Romans, and fauoured more of tempered magnanimitie, then that former hazard, which argued the weakenesse of their mindes, by their ouer hastie and too forward resolution. For as it imported greater danger, and discovered a more desperate spirit, to breake through the thickest troupes of their enemies, and so by strong hand to saue themselves by the helpe of some other fortune; so it manifested a greater apprehension of terrour, and a stronger impression of feare, which can afford nothing but desperate remedies: for desperate and inconsiderate rashnes riseth sooner of feare, then of any other passion of the mind. But such as beheld the danger with a lesse troubled eie and qualified the terrour of death with the life of their spirite, reseruing extremitie of helpe to extremitie of perill, and in the meane time attended what chances of aduantage might happen vnto them, vpon any enterprise the enemy should attempt; I say, they so gaue greater scope to fortune and enlarged the boundes of changing accidents.



## CHAP. II.

## The enimie setteth vpon the wintering campe:

*Galba ouerthroweth them.*

Cæsar.



THE counsell being dismissed, they had scarce time to put in execution such thinges, as were agreed vpon for their defence: but the enimie at a watchword giuen assaulted the campe, on all sides with stones and dartes, and other casting weapons: the Romans at first when their strength was fresh, valiantly resisted the brunt of the charge; neither did they spend in vaine any weapon which they cast from the rampier; but what part soeuer of their campe seemed to be in greatest danger, and want of helpe, thither they came with succour and reliefe; but herein they were ouermatched. For the enimie being spent and wearied with fight, whensoever anie of them gaue place and forsooke the battell, there were alwaies fresh combatants to supplie it: but the Romans by reason of their small number, had no such helpe. For their extremitie in that point was such, that no man was permitted neither for wearinesse nor woundes, to forsake his station, or abandon his charge. And hauing thus fought continually the space of sixe houres, when both strength and weapons wanted, the enimie persisting with greater furie to fill the ditch and breake downe the rampier, and their hopes relying vpon the last expectation: P. Sex. Baculus the Primipile of that legion, whom we said to be so sore wounded in the Neruian battell, and Caius Volusenus Tribune of the souldiers, a man of singular courage and wisdom, ranne speedily to Galba and tolde him, that the only waie of safetie was to breake out vpon the enimie, and to trie the last refuge in that extremitie: Whereupon they called the Centurions, and by them admonished the souldiers to surcease a while from fighting, and onely to receiue such weapons as were cast into the campe; and so to rest themselues a little and recouer their strength: and then at a watchword to sallie out of their campe, and laie their safety vpon their verue; which the souldiers executed with such alacritie and courage of spirite, that breaking out at all the gates of the campe, they gaue no leasure to the enimie to consider what was done, nor to satisfie his iudgement touching so vnexpected a noueltie. And thus fortune being suddenly changed, they slewe more then the third part of 30000, and put the rest to flight, not suffering them to staie vpon the hils neere about them.

## OBSERVATIONS.

The force of  
nouelty turning  
the fortune of a bat-  
tell.



Which strange alteration liuely describeth the force of noueltie, and the effectuall power of vnexpected aduētures: for in the first course of their proceeding, wherein the Romans defended the campe, and the Galles charged it by assault, the victorie held constant with the Galles, and threatned death and mortality to the Romans. Neither had they any meanes

meanes to recouer hope of better successe, but by trying another waie; which so much the more amazed the Galles, in that they had vehemently apprehended an opinion of victorie, by a set fight continuing the space of sixe houres, without any likelihood of contrarietie, or alteration. Which practise, of frustrating a desaigne intended by an indirect and contrary answer, serued the Romans oftentimes to great aduantage; as besides this present example, in this Commentarie we shall afterward read, how Titurius Sabinus defeated the Vnellos, with the same stratagem; and ouerthrew them by eruption and sallying out, when they expected nothing but a defensiu resistance from the rampier. From whence a commander may learne, to auoide two contrarie inconueniences, according as the qualitie of the warre shall offer occasion: first (if other things be answerable, which a iudicious eie will easily discouer) that a sallie made out at diuers portes of a holde, will much mitigate the heate of a charge, and controll the furie of an enemy. And on the other side, he that besiegeth any place what aduantage foeuer he hath of the defendant, may much better assure himselfe of good fortune, if he appoint certaine troupes in readines to receiue the charge of any eruption, that the rest that are busily imploied in the assault may prouide to answer it, without disorder or confusion. Which order, if the Galles had taken, they had not in likelihood so often been deceived.

## CHAP. III.

Galba returneth into the Prouince: the Vnelli  
giue occasion of a new warre.



HE enemy being thus defeated, Galba was unwilling to trie fortune any further; and the rather for that he wanted both corne and forrage: and therefore hauing burned the towne, the next daie he returned towards the Prouince, and without let or resistance, brought the legion safe into the Nantuates; and from thence to the \* Allobroga, and there he wintered.

Cesar.

After these things were dispatched: Caesar supposing for manie reasons, that all Gallia was now in peace, and that there was no further feare of anie new warre, the Belga being ouerthrowen, the Germans thrust out, and the Seduni amongst the Alpes subdued and vanquished; in the beginning of the winter, as he went into Illyricum, hauing a great desire to see those nations: there grewe a sudden tumult and disension in Gallia vpon this occasion. Pub. Crassus wintering with the seuenth legion in Aniou neare vnto the Ocean, and finding scarcitie of corne in those partes; he sent out the Prefects of the horsemen, and Tribunes into the next cities to demaund corne, and other prouisions for his legion, of whom Titus Terrasidius was sent vnto the \* Venelli, Marcus Trebius to the \* Curiosolita, Q. Velanius, and Titus Silius to the \* Veneti. These Veneti were of greatest authoritie amongst all the maritimate nations in that coast, by reason of their great store of shipping, with

\* Sauoien.

\* Le Perche.  
\* Cornouaille  
in Britaine  
\* Vannes.

which they did trafficke into Britanie, and exceeded all their neighbour states in skill and experience of sea-faring matters; hauing the most part of such as vsed those seas, tributaries to their state: These Veneti first aduentured to retaine Silius and Velanius, hoping thereby to recover their hostages which they had giuen to Crassus. The finitime cities inducd by their authoritie and example, for the same reason, laide hold vpon Trebius and Terrasidius; and sending speedie ambassages one vnto another, coniured by their Princes and chiefest magistrates, to approue their fact by common consent, and to attend all the same euent of fortune; solliciting also other cities and states, rather to maintaine that libertie, which they had receiued of their Ancestors, then to indure the seruite bondage of a stranger.

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

*The weakenes  
of our iudg-  
ment in re-  
gard of the  
knowledge of  
future times.*



He circumstance in this historie, which noteth the sudden breaking out of warres, when the course of thinges made promise of peace: sheweth first, what small assurance our reason hath of her discourse, in calculating the natiuitie of *After-chances*; which so seldome answered the iudgment we giue vpon their beginnings, that when we speake of happinesse, we finde nothing but miserie: and contrariwise, it goeth often well with that part, which our Art hath condemned to ill fortune. And therefore I do not marvel, if when almost all nations are at oddes, and in our best conceites, threaten destruction one to another, there happen a sudden motion of peace; or if peace be in speech, soothing the world with pleasing tranquillitie, and through the vncertainty of our weake probabilities, promise much rest after many troubles: there follow greater wars in the ende, then the former time can truly speake of. Which being well vnderstood, may humble the spirits of our hautie polititians, that thinke to comprehend the conclusions of future times, vnder the premisses of their weake proiectes, and predestinate succeeding ages, according to the course of the present motion: when an accident so little thought of, shall breake the maine streame of our iudgment, and falsifie the Oracles which our vnderstanding hath vttered. And it may learne them withall, how much it importeth a wise commander, to preuent an euill that may crosse his desigine, (how vnlkely soeuer it be to happen) by handling it in such manner, as though it were necessarily to confront the same. For then a thing is well done, when it hath in it selfe both the causes of his being; and the direct meanes to resist the repugnancie of a contrarie nature: and so hap what will, it hath great possibility to continue the same.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



His practise of the Veneti may instruct a circumspect Prince in cases of this nature, to haue a more watchfull eie ouer that Prouince or city, which shall be found most potent and mightie amongst the rest, then of any other inferiour state of the same nature and condition: for as example of  
it

it selfe is of great Authoritie, making improbabilities seeme full of reason, especially when the intention shal sympathize with our will; so when it shall happen to be strengthened with powerfull meanes, and graced with the Acte of superior personages: it must needes be verie effectuell to stirre vp mens mindes, to approue that with a strong affection, which their owne single iudgment did no waie allow of. And therefore equalitie bringeth this aduantage to a Prince, which differencie can not afford, that albeit example doe set on foote any rebellious motion, yet no supereminencie shall authorise the same.

*The Authority of example.*

## CHAP. IIII.

Cæsar hauing aduertisement of these new troubles; *hasteth into Gallia and prepareth for the warre.*



*ALL* the maritime states being by this meanes drawne into the same conspiracie, they sent a common ambassage vnto Crassus; that if he would haue his men againe, he must deliuer up the hostages, which he had taken from them. Whereof Cæsar being certified by Crassus, in as much as he was then a great way distant from his Armie, he commanded Gallies and Shippes of warre to be built vpon the riuer \* Loier, which runneth into the Ocean; and that Gallie men, Mariners, and Shipmasters should be mustered in the Prouince: which being speedely dispatched, as soone as the time of the yeare would permit him, he came into Gallia. The Veneti and the rest of the confederacie, vnderstanding of Cæsars arrivall, and considering how haynous a fact they had committed, in detaining the ambassadours and casting them into yrons, whose name is held sacred and inuiolable amongst all nations: prepared accordingly to answer so eminent a danger, & especially such necessities, as pertained to shipping & sea-fights.

*Cæsar.*

\* *Ligeris.*

## THE OBSERVATION.



*ROM* hence I may take occasion, briefly to touch the reuerent opinion, which all nations, howe barbarous soeuer, haue generally conceived of the qualitie and condition of ambassadours: and what the groundes are of this vniuersall received custome, which in all ages, and times hath held Authentickall. And first we are to vnderstand, that all man kinde (as indued with the same nature and properties) are so linked together in the strict alliance of humane society; that, albeit their turbulent and disagreeing passions (which in themselves are vnnaturall, as proceeding from corruption and defect) driue them into extreme discord and disunion of spirit, and breake the bonds of ciuill conuersation, which otherwise we do naturally affect:

*The groundes of that reuerent opinion which is held of ambassadours.*



yet without a necessarie entercourse and trafficke of societic, we are not able to keepe on foote the very discord it selfe, in tearmes of reason and orderly proceeding, but all parts will be blended with disordered confusion, & go to wrack, for want of these mutuall offices performed by messengers: so streight are the bondes of nature, and so powerfull are the lawes which she enaëth. And therefore if it were for no other end, which might sort to the benefit of either partie, (as there are many good vses thereof) yet to holde vp the quarrell and keepe it from falling, making war, according to the grounds of reason, the entercourse of messengers is not to be interrupted, nor their persons to be touched with hateful violence: but that which the common reason of nations hath made a law, ought as religiously to be obserued, as an Oracle of our owne beliefe. Secondly, for as much as the ende of warre is, or at the least should be, peace: which by treatie of mutuall messengers is principally to be confirmed, to the end that no people may seeme so barbarous, as to maintaine a warre; which onelie intendeth bloud, and proposeth as the chiefeſt obieſt, the death and mortality of mankind, no way respecting peace and ciuill gouernment: such as refuse the entercourse of messengers, as the meanes of amitie and concord, are iustly condemned in the iudgment of all nations, as vnworthie of humane societic. Last of all, it is an iniurie of great dishonour, and deserueth the reward of extreme infamie, to reuenge the master his quarrell vpon a seruant, and punish ambassadours for the faults of their state: considering that their chiefeſt dutie consisteth in the faithfull relation of such mandates, as they haue receiued, which may as well tende to the aduancement and honour of that cittie, to which they are sent; as to the dishonour and ruine of the same, whereof the messengers take no notice. And therefore whether we desire warre or peace; the free libertie, and holy order of ambassadours, is reuerently to be respected, and defended from brutish and vn-naturall violence.

## CHAP. V.

The proceedings of either partie, in the entrance  
of this warre.

Caſar.



HE Veneti conceiued great hope of their enterpriſe, by reaſon of the ſtrength of their ſituation: for as much as all the paſſages by land were broken and cut off, with armes and creekes of the ſea; and on the other ſide, nauigation and entrance by ſea was ſo troubleſome and dangerous, in that the Romans were altogether vnacquainted with the chanel, and ſhelues of the coaſt. Neither did they thinke that the Roman Armie could long continue there without corne, which was not to be had in thoſe quarters. And if it happened, that the courſe of thinges were carried contrarie to this probable expectation; yet they themſelues were ſtrong in ſhipping: whereas the Romans had  
none

none at all: Neither had they knowledge of the flats and shallows, Portes and Islands of that coast, where they were to fight. And to conclude, they should finde the use of Nauigation in that narrow sea, to be farre different from that, which they were accustomed vnto, in the vast and open Ocean. In this resolution, they fortified their townes, stored them with provision, and brought all their shipping to Vannes; against whom, Caesar (as it was reported) would begin to make warre, taking the Osismi, Lexouij, Nannetes, Ambiuariti, Morini, Menapij, Diablintres, as consorts and partakers in this quarrell. Notwithstanding these difficulties, many motives stirred up Caesar to undertake this war: as namely, the violent detaining of the Roman knights: their rebellion, after they had yeilded themselves by rendrie, and giuen hostages of their loialtie: the conspiracie of so manie citties, which being now neglected, might afterward incite other nations and states to the like insolencie. And therefore understanding, that almost all the Galles were inclining to noueltie and alteration, and of their owne nature, were quicke and readie to undertake a warre; and further, considering that all men by nature desired libertie, and hated the seruile condition of bondage: he preuented all further insurrections of the other states, with the presence of the Roman forces: and sent Titus Labienus with the Cavalrie, vnto the \*Treuiri, that bordered vpon the Rhene: to him he gaue in charge, to visit the men of Rhemes and the rest of the Belgæ, to keepe them in obedience; and to hinder such forces, as might peraduenture be transported ouer the riuer by the Germans, to further this rebellious humour of the Galles. He commanded likewise Pub. Crassus, with 12 legionarie cohortes, and a great part of the horse to go into Aquitaine, least there might come any aide from those nations. He sent also Q. Titurius Sabinus with three legions, vnto the Lexouij, Curiosolita, Vnelli, to disappoint any practise which rebellious mindes might intend. And making D. Brutus chiefe Admirall of the nauie, he gaue him in charge, to make towards Vannes, with what speede he could: and hee himselfe marched thitherward with the rest of the foote forces.

Lendriguer.  
Lysieux.  
Nantes.  
Aurenche.  
Leondoul.  
Cities in little Britaine

\*Triers.

#### THE OBSERVATION.

**I**N the first booke, I obserued the authoritie which the Roman leaders had to undertake a warre, without further acquainting the senat with the consequence thereof: in this place, let vs obserue the care and circumspection, which the Generals had, not to undertake a troublefome and dangerous warre vpon a humor, or any other slender motion: but diligently waighing the circumstances thereof, and measuring the perill and hazard of the warre, with the good and consequence of the effect; informed their iudgments of the importance of that action; and so tried whether the benefit would answere their labour. And thus we finde the reasons particularly deliuered, that moued Caesar first to undertake the Heluetian warre: and then the causes which drew him on to the quarrell with Ariouistus: then followeth the necessitie of that warre with the Belgæ; and now the motives which induced him to this with the maritime cities of Britaine: and so consequently of his passage into Germanie, or what other enterprife he attempted: which he laith downe

downe as the groundes and occasions of those warres, and could not be auoided but with the losse and dishonour of the Roman Empire.

Further, let vs obserue the meanes he vsed to preuent the inclination of the Galles, and to keepe them in subiection and peaceable obedience, by sending his men into diuers quarters of that continent; and so settling the wauering disposition of the further skirres, with the waight of his Armie, and the presence of his legionarie souldiers, which he sent readie to stifle all motions of rebellion in the beginning, that they might not breake out to the preiudice and diminution of the Roman Empire, and the good successe of his proceedings: besides the aduantage, which he gained in the opinion of the enemy; whom he so little feared concerning the vpshot of that quarrell, that he had disperfed the greatest part of his Armie vpon other seruices, the rest being sufficient to end that war.

## CHAP. VI.

### The maner of their shipping, and their sea-fight.

Caesar.



**T**HE scite, of almost all these cities was such, that being built in pointes and promontories, they could not at full sea, which happened alwaies twice in 12 houres, be approached by foot forces, nor yet with shipping neither: for againe in an ebbe, the vessalles were laid on the ground, and so left as a praie to the enemy. And if the Romans went about to shut out the sea, with mounts which they raised equal to the wals of the town, and were at the point of entering & taking it: yet the townsmen hauing such store of shipping, would easily conuey, both themselves and their cariages, into the next townes, and there helpe themselves with the like aduantage of place. And thus they deluded Caesar the greatest part of the sommer: for the Roman fleete by reason of continuall windes and foule weather, durst not aduventure to put out of the riuer Loier into so vast a sea, wherein the hauens and roades were fewe, and farre distant one from another, and the tides great. The shipping of the Galles was thus built and rigged: the keele was somewhat flatter then the Roman shipping, the better to beare the ebbes, and shalowes of that coast: the foredecke was altogether erect and perpendicular: the poupe was made to beare the hugeness of the billowes, and the force of the tempest. And in a word, they were altogether built for strength: for the ribbes and seates were made of beames of a foote square, fastned with yron pins of an inch thicke: in steed of cables, they vsed chaines of yron; and raw hides and skins for sailes, either for want of linnen or ignorant of the vse thereof, or because sailes of linnen would hardly serue to carrie ships of that burthen.

The meeting and conflict of the Roman naue, with this kinde of ships was such, that they onely excelled them in celeritie and speedie nimblenes, with force of oares; but in all other things, either concerning the nature of the place, or the dangers of the foule weather, were farre inferiour vnto them: for the strength of them was such,



*such, that they could neither hurt them with their beake-heads, nor cast a weapon to anie purpose into them, by reason of their altitude, and high built bulkes. And if anie gust chanced in the meane time to rise, that forced them to commit themselues to the mercie of the weather, their shipping would better beare the rage of the sea; and with greater safetie shelter it selfe amongst flats and shallowes, without feare of rockes or any such hazard: of all which chances the Roman nauie stood continually in danger.*

## OBSERVATIONS.



And here, let it not seeme impertinent to the argument which we handle, considering the generall vse which we Insulairs haue of nauigation, briefly to set downe the most eminent causes of the flowing and ebbing of the sea, as farre forth as shall seeme necessarie to the knowledge of a souldier: which, albeit may fall short of the true reasons of this great secret; yet for as much as they stand for true principles of regularitie, and well approued rules in our Arte of nauigation, let vs take them for no lesse then they effect, and giue them that credit in our imagination, which tract of time hath gained to those forged circles in the heauens: that albeit their chiefest essence consisteth in conceit and supposal; yet for as much as they serue to direct our knowledge to a certainty, in that variety and seeming inconstancie of motion, we esteeme of them as they effect, and not as they are.

*The causes  
of the ebbing  
and flowing  
of the sea.*

Considering then the globe of the world, as it maketh a right spheare (for in that position, the Naturalistes chiefly vnderstand celestially influence to haue operation in this liquid element of the water) it is deuided by the Horizon and Meridian into foure quarters: the first quarter is that, betweene the east horizon and the noone meridian, which they call a flowing quarter: the second, from the noone meridian, to the west horizon; which they make an ebbing quarter: the third, from the west horizon to the midnight meridian; which they likewise call a flowing quarter: and againe, from the midnight meridian to the east horizon, the second ebbing quarter: And so they make two flowing quarters, and two ebbing quarters of the whole circuit of heauen. The instruments of these sensible qualities, and contrarie effects, are the sunne and the moone, as they are caried through these distinct partes of the heauen. And although experience hath noted the moone to be of greatest power in warrie motions; yet we may not omit to acknowledge the force, which the sunne yeeldeth in this miracle of nature.

First therefore we are to vnderstand, that when the moone or the sunne begin to appeare about the right horizon, and enter into that part of the heauen which I tearmed the first flowing quarter, that then the sea beginneth to swell: and as they mount vp to their meridian altitude; so it increaseth vntill it come to a high flood. And againe, as those lightes passing the meridian, decline to the west, and runne the circuit of the ebbing quarter: so the water decreaseth and returneth againe from whence it came. Againe, as they set vnder the west ho-



hizon and enter into the second flowing quarter; so the sea beginneth againe to flow, and still increaseth vntill they come to the point of the night meridian: and then againe, it refloweth, according as the sunne and moone are carried in the other ebbing quarter from the night meridian, to the east horizon.

*Spring tides.*

And hence it happeneth that in coniunction or new of the moone, when the sunne and the moone are caried both together in the same flowing, and ebbing quarters; that then the tides and ebbes are very great: and likewise in opposition or full of the moone, when these lightes are caried in opposite quarters, which we haue described to be of the same nature, either ebbing or flowing; that then in like manner the tides are great: forasmuch as both these Planets, through the symbolising quarters wherein they are carried, doe ioyne their forces, to make perfect this worke of nature in the ebbing and flowing of the sea. And contrariwise, in a quadrate aspect (as the Astronomers call it) or quarter age of the moone, when as the moone is caried in a flowing quarter; and at the same instant, the sunne doth happen to be in an ebbing or decreasing quarter, as the course of nature doth necessarily require: then are the tides lessened, as daillie experience doth witness.

And for as much as both the right horizon and the meridian also, deuide euerie diurnall circle, which either the sun or the moone maketh in their reuolutions, into equall parts; it followeth that euery tide is continually measured with the quantitie of 6 houres: and therefore that which Cæsar here saith, must needs be true, that in the space of 12 houres, there are alwaies 2 high tides. And least any man should imagine, that euery inland citie, standing vpon an ebbing and flowing riuer, may take the computation of the tide according to this rule: let him vnderstand that this which I haue deliuered, is to be conceiued principally of the sea it selfe; and secondarily of such portes and hauens, as stand either neare or vpon the sea: but where a riuer shall run many miles from the sea, and make many winding meanders, before it come to the place of calculation; it must needs lose much of this time before mentioned. And thus much I thought conuenient to insert in these discourses touching the ebbing and flowing of the sea, as not impertinent to martiall knowledge.

*The manner  
of their ship-  
ping.*

Concerning the shipping of the Romans, whereof posteritie hath onely receiued the bare names, and some fewe circumstances touching the manner of their Equipage, the Critiques of these times haue laboured to set forth a fleet, answerable to that, which the tearmes and title mentioned in historie seeme to report: but yet the gaine of their voyage doth not answere their charge. For manie men rest vn-satisfied, first touching the names themselves, whereof wee finde these kindes,

Names { *Longas.*  
*Onerarias.*  
*Actuarias.*  
*Triremes.*  
*Quadrirèmes.*  
*Quinquerèmes.*

The first we may vnderstand to be Gallies or ships of seruice: the second ships of

of burthen: the third, ships that were driuen forward with force of oares, and the rest sounding according to their Names; for I dare not intitle them with a more particular description. Nowe whether these Names *Longas* and *Actuarias*, were a seuerall sorte of shipping by themselves; or the generall Names of the *Quadriremes*, *Triremes*, and *Quinqueremes*, for as much as euerie kinde of these might be called both *Longas* and *Actuarias*, as it yet remaineth in controuersie: so it is not much materiall to that which wee seeke after. But that which most troubleth our sea-Criticks, is in what sense they maie vnderstand these vocabularies, *Triremes*, *Quadriremes*, and *Quinqueremes*, whether they were so tearmed in regard of the number of rowers, or watermen that haled continually at an oare, as the custome of the Gallies is at this daie; or otherwise, because a *Trireme* had three orders of oares on either side, a *Quadrirème* foure, and a *Quinquerème* foue: whereof they tooke their distinction of Names.

Such as holde, that a *Trireme* had on each side three ranks of oates, and so consequently, of a *Quadrirème* and *Quinquerème*, alleadge this place of Liuiue, to make good their opinion. In the warres betweene Rome and Carthage, Lælius meeting with Adherball in the straights of Gibraltar, each of them had a *Quinquerème*, and seauen or eight *Triremes* a piece, the current in that place was so great that it gaue no place to Arte, but carried the vessailes according to the fall of the Billow: in which vncertaintie the *Triremes* of the Carthaginean, closed with the *Quinquerème* of Lælius: which either because she was *pondere tenacior*, as Liuiue saith, or otherwise, for that *pluribus remorum ordinibus scindentibus vertices facilius regetur*; in regarde of the pluralitie of bankes of oares, which resisted the billowe and steamed the current, she sunke two of the *Triremes*, and so got the victorie. From hence they proue, that a *Quinquerème* had *plures remorum ordines*, then a *Trireme* had; and therefore it tooke the name from the pluralitie of bankes of oares, and not from the number of men that rowed at an oare.

But the contrarie opinion doth interpret *Ordo Remorum*, to be a couple of oares one answering another, on each side of the vessaile, which we call a paire of oares: So that a *Quinquerème* being far greater and longer then a *Trireme*, had more paires of oares then a *Trireme* had, and those oares were handled with foue men at one oare, according to the vse of our Gallies at this daie.

But to leaue this, and come to their manner of sea-fights, wee must vnderstand that the Romans, wanting the vse of Artillerie and managing their ships of warre with force of oares, failed not to make vse of their Arte, in their conflicts and incounters by sea: for all their shippes of seruice, which we tearme men of warre, carried a strong beake-head of yron, which they called *rostrum*, with which they ranne one against another, with as great violence and furie, as their oares could carrie them. And herein Arte gaue great aduantage; for he that could best skill to turne his ship, with greatest celeritie, and so frustrate an offer; or with speedie and strong agitation follow an aduantage: commonly got the victorie.

In the battell, which D. Brutus had with the Maffilians, we reade that two  
P ij. Triremes

Lib. 27.

Their manner  
of sea fights.

Lib. 2. de  
bello civili.

Triremes charging the Admirall, wherein Brutus was one at the one side, and the other at the other; Brutus and his Marriners so cunningly handled the matter, that when they should come to the hurt, they speedily in a trice of time, wound themselves from betweene them, and the two Triremes met with such a carriere one against another, that one brake her beakehead, and the other split with the blowe.

For this skill and fortune withall, Euphranor the Rodian was of great fame in Cæsars time; although his ende found too true the saying of the Historian, that Whom fortune honoureth with many good haps, she oftentimes reserueth to a harder destinie; as other seamen besides Euphranor, can truly witnesse.

This first brunt being ended: when they came to grapple and boarding one of another, then the art and practises of their land seruices came in vse: for they erected turrets vpon their deckes, and from them they fought with engines and casting weapons, as slinges, arrowes, and piles; and when they entered, they fought with sword and target. Neither did the legionarie souldier finde any difference, when he came to the point, betweene their fight at sea and that at land: sauing that they could not be martialed in troupes and bandes, in regard wherof the sea seruice was counted more base, and dishonourable; and the rather, in as much as it decided the controuersie, by slinges and casting weapons: which kinde of fight was of lesse honour, then buckling at handy-blows.

## CHAP. VII.

### The battell continueth: and Cæsar ouercommeth.

*Caesar.*



*THE* maner of their fightes being this, as I haue described, neither Brutus, nor any Tribune or Centurion in his nanie, knewe what to doe or what course of fight to take: for the shipping of the Galles was so strong, that the beake-head of their Quinqueremes could performe no seruice vpon them: and although they should raise turrets according to their vse, yet these would not equall in height the poupe of the enemies shipping, so that therein also the Galles had aduantage: neither had they any meanes, whereby they might foile so great a nauie, which amounted to the number of 230 shippes of warre. One thing there was amongst their prouisions which stood them in great steed: for the Romans had provided great sharpe hookes or sickles, which they put vpon great and long poles, these they fastened to the tackling which held the maine yarde to the mast; and then haling away their ship, with force of Oares, they cutte the said tackling, and the maine yard fell downe: Whereby the Galles, whose onely hope consisted in sayling and yare turning of their ships, lost at one instant, both their sailes and the vse of their shipping: And then the controuersie fell within the compasse of valour, wherein the Romans exceeded the Gals, and the rather, inasmuch as they fought in the sight of Cæsar and



and the whole Armie, no valiant act could be smothered in secret; for all the hills and cliffs, which afforded neare prospect into the sea, were couered with the Roman Armie.

Their maine yardes being cutte downe, and the Romans indenuouring with great furie to boord them, failed not to take manie of their ships: which the Galles perceiuing, and finding no remedie nor hope of resistance, began all to flie, & turning their ships to a forewind, were vpon a sudden so becalmed, that they were able to make no waie at all. Which fell out so fitly for the Romans, that of so great a nauie, verie few through the helpe of the euening escaped to land, after they had fought the space of 8 houres: with which battell, ended the warre with the Veneti, and the rest of the maritime nations. For all sort of people both young and olde, in whom there was either courage, counsell, or dignitie, were present at this battell, and all their shipping was taken and lost; so that such as remained, knew not whither to go, nor how to defend their townes any longer: and therefore yeelded themselves to Caesar, in whom he vsed the greater seueritie, that he might thereby teach all other barbarous people, not to violate the law of nations: for he slew all the Senat with the sword, and solde the people for bondslauens.

## THE OBSERVATION.

**I**N this battell I chiefly obserue the good fortune, which vsually attendeth vpon industrie: for amongst other prouisions, which the diligence of the Romans had furnished out to the vse of this war, they had made readie these hookes, not for this intent wherein they were imployed, but at all occasions & chances, that might happen, as seruiceable complements rather then principall instruments: and yet it so fell out, that they proued the only meanes, to ouerthrow the Galles. Which proueth true the saying of Caesar, that industrie commaundeth fortune and buyeth good successe, with extraordinary labour: for industrie in action is as importunitie in speech, which forceth an assent beyond the strength of reason; and striueth through continuall pursuit, to make good the motiues, by often inculcations; and at length findeth that disposition, which will easily admit whatsoeuer is required: In like manner diligence and laboursome industrie, by circumspect and heedefull cariage, seldom faile either by hap or cunning, to make good that part wherein the maine point of the matter dependeth. For euerie action is intangled with many infinite adherents, which are so interessed in the matter, that it succeedeth according as it is carried answerable to their natures. Of these adherentes, some of them are by wisdome, foreseene; and directed to that course which may fortunate the action: the rest being vnknowne, continue without either direction or preuention, and are all vnder the regiment of fortune; for as much as they are beyonde the compasse of our wisest reach, and stand in the waie either to assist or disadvantage: Of these, industrie hath greatest authoritie; in as much as she armeth herselfe for all chances, whereby she is said to command fortune.

*The force of  
industrie.*



## CHAP. VIII.

## Sabinus ouerthroweth the \* Vnelli, with the manner thereof.

\* La Perche.

Caſar.

\* Rhone.

\* Emreux.



**W**HILE these things happened in the state of Vannes, L. Titurius Sabinus entereth with his forces, into the confines of the Vnelli, ouer whom Viridoux was made chiefe commander, hauing drawne the\* Auleri and the\* Eburonices, with a great number of vagabondes and theeues into the same conspiracie: Sabinus incamping himselfe in a conuenient place, kept his souldiers within the rampier. But Viridoux, being lodged within lesse then two miles of Sabinus his campe, brought out his forces daily, and putting them in battell gaue him oportunitie to fight if he would: which Sabinus refused in such sort, that he began not onely to be suspected by the enemye of cowardice, but to be taunted with the reprochfull speeches of his owne souldiers; which opinion of feare being once settled in the mindes of the enemye, he vsed all meanes to increase it, and caried it so wel, that the enemye durst approach the verie rampier of the campe. The colour that he pretended was, that he thought it not the part of a Legate, in the absence of the Generall, to fight with an enemye of that strength, but vpon some good oportunitie, or in a place of aduantage. In this generall perswasion of feare, Sabinus chose out a subtile witted Gall, whom he perswaded with great rewards, and further promises, to flie to the enemye, and there to carrie himselfe, according to the instructions, which he should giue him. This Gall, comming as a reuolter to the enemy, laide open vnto them the feare of the Romans: the extremitie that Caesar was driuen into by the Veneti; and that the night before, Sabinus was about to withdraw his forces secretly out of his campe, and to make all the haste he could to relieue Caesar. Vpon which aduertisement, they all cried out with one consent, that this oportunitie was not to be omitted; but setting apart all other deuises, to go and assault the Roman campe. Many circumstances perswaded the Galles to this resolution; as first the lingering & doubt which Sabinus had made, when he was offered battell: secondly the intelligence which this fugitiue had brought: thirdly the want of victuals, wherein they had bin negligent and vnaduisedly carelesse: fourthly the hope they conceiued of the warre of Vannes; and lastly, for that men willingly beleeeue that which they would haue come to passe. The force of these motiues was so strong, that they would not suffer Viridoux, nor the rest of the captaines, to dismisse the councill vntill they had permitted them to take Armes, and go to the Roman campe. Which being granted, they gathered rubbish and fagots to fill up the ditch, and with cheerefull harts, as though the victorie were already gotten, they marched to the place where Sabinus was incamped, which was the toppe of a hill rising gently from a leuell, the quantitie of 1000 paces: hither the Gals hastened with all expedition; and to the intent the Romans might not haue so much time, as to put on their armour, the Galles for haste ran themselues out of breath.

Sabinus

*Sabinus encouraging his souldiers, gaue the signe of battell, and sallying out at two severall gates of his campe, it fell out that through the oportunitie of the place, the wearines and vnexperience of the enemye, the valour of the Roman soldier and their exercise in former battels, that the Galles could not indure the brunt of the first encounter; but presently tooke themselves to flight, of whom verie few escaped. And so it happened that at one time, Sabinus had newes of the overthrow at sea; and Caesar of Sabinus victory by land. Vpon these victories, all the cities and states yielded themselves to Titurinus: for as the Galles are prompt to undertake a warre; so are they weake in suffering, and impatient of the consequents and calamities thereof.*

## OBSERVATIONS.



His practise of a counterfeite feare was often put in vse by the Roman leaders, as well to disappoint the expectation of an enemye, as to draw them into an inconuenience, & so to defeat them of their greatest helps in time of battell. Caesar comming to succour the campe of Cicero made such vse of this Art, that he put to route a great Armie of the Galles, with a handfull of men: which I will referre vnto the place, where it is particularly set downe by Caesar.

The chiefeft thing in this place, which brought them to their overthrow, was disappointment: for it is a thing hardly to be digested in busineses of smal consequence, to be frustrated of a settled expectation, when the minde shall dispose her selfe to one only intent, and in the vpsshot meete with a counterbuffe to crosse her purposes, and so defeat her of that hope which the strength of her reason hath entertained: how much more then in things of such importance, when we shall proceede in a course of victorie, and humour our conceites with that we wish and would haue to happen; and in the end meete, either with bondage or death; must our best wittes be appauled? hauing neither respite nor means, to thinke how the euill may be best preuented. Which the wise Romans well vnderstood, and counted it no dishonour to be reproched with shamefull cowardice, by such as knew not the secrets of wisdom; while they in the meane time foresaw their good fortunes, shrowded vnder the cloake of a pretended distrust.

Let these examples instruct a leader, so to take the oportunitie of any such fortune, that in the execution he omit not the chiefeft points of order and discipline, as well for the better effecting of the designe, as for his owne safety and the securitie of his Armie. For order is as the sinewes and strength of martiall discipline, vniting the particular members into the firme composition of a well proportioned bodie: and so it maketh it more powerfull then any number of disunited partes, how able or infinite soeuer. I might here alleadge infinite examples to confirme this truth: but let the battell of Drux serue for all; wherein the protestantes ouercharging the catholike Army, followed the retrait so hard, that they quickly became masters of the field: and then neglecting martiall discipline, fell in confusedly with the broken multitude, to make the victorie more glorious

*The vse  
which the  
Romans made  
of a counter-  
feite feare.  
Lib. 5.*

glorious by slaughter and mortalitie: the Duke of Guise all this while bouged not a foot: but in vnexampled patience kept his regiment close together, and would not suffer them to rescue their general that was taken, vntill the regiment of the Prince of Condie was likewise dispersed and broken; and then perceiuing no difference of order, betweene the Victor Protestant, and the vanquished Catholike; he dissolued that terrible cloud that had hung so long in suspence, and so changing the fortune of the daie, that he tooke the chiefeft of their Princes prisoners, with little or no losse of his owne men: so powerfull is order in the deedes of Armes, and of such consequence in obtaining victorie. And thus we haue first seene the inconueniences, which a counterfet feare well dissembled, may cast vpon a credulous and vnaduised enemy, when pretence and appearance hath brought them into an error, which their owne credulitie doth afterward auouch: and secondly, what strength and safetie consisteth in order; and how powerfull it is to throw downe, and to set vp.

## CHAP. IX.

## The Proceedings of Crassus in Aquitanie.

*Caesar.*



*A*t the same instant of time it happened also, that Pub. Crassus comming into Aquitania, (which both in regard of the large extension of the countrey, as also for the multitude of the inhabitants, was named the third part of Gallia) and considering that he was to make warre in those partes, where L. Valerius Preconius the Legate was slaine, and the Armie ouerthrowen; and where Lucius Manilius was faine to flie with the losse of

his cariages; he thought that his affaires required no meane diligence: and therefore hauing made prouision of corne, and mustered many Auxiliarie forces, and sent for many valiant and prudent men from Tolouse and Narbone, he caried his Army into the confines of the Sontiates, which was no sooner knowne but they leuied great forces both of horse & foote, and with their horse charged vpon the Romans in their march: which being easily repelled, as they followed the retrait, the infanterie of the Galles shewed it selfe in a valley as it late in ambush. These setting vpon the Romans renewed the battell, and there the fight continued hot along time; the Sontiates being animated with the former victories, saw all the hope of Aquitanie relye vpon their vertue: and the Romans on the other side, desired to shew what they were able to doe of themselves, without their grand Captaine, and vnder the conduction of a young souldier: At length the enemy overwaged with promesse, and wearied with woundes, betooke themselves to flight; of whom the Romans slewe a great number. And then marched directlie to the towne of the Sontiates, and laid siege vnto it; the siege grew hot on both sides; the Romans approached the walles, with vines, turrets and mounts: the townesmen defended themselves some time, by sallying out; sometimes, by undermining the mounts and fortifications, wherein the Aquitani are very skilfull. But when they perceiued the industry of the Romans to exceed all that they were able to do, they intreated Crassus to accept their rendry: which

*\* Euocati.*



which being granted, and al the armie intending the deliuey of their Armes; A d-  
cantuanus their chiefe magistrate, fled out in the meane time at an other port of the  
citie, with 600. deuoted companions whom they called Solduri; but as they attempt-  
ed to escape, the soldiers that kept that part of the fortification, as they signified  
his enaſon by a clamour and shout, the reſt betooke themſelues to armes; and ſo repel-  
led him againe into the towne, where he deſired to bee taken in the number of the  
ſubmiſſiue multitude. Craſſus hauing taken hoſtages of them, went into the con-  
fines of the Vocontij.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**T**Heſe ſkilfull and experienced men, which Craſſus ſent for out of all  
the Cities in Aquitaine, were thoſe, whom the Romans called *Euocati*:  
ſuch as were free from warfare, and exempted by their lawes from gi-  
uing their names in muſters, either by reaſon of their yeares, or the magiſtracy  
which they had borne, or for ſome other cauſes, which gaue them that priui-  
ledge: And in that regard were ſent for by letters, intreating their aſſiſtance in  
the cariage of that war, as men wel acquainted with the nature of ſuch buſineſſes.  
Their places were nothing inferiour to the Centurions, for aduiſe and direction,  
although they had no part in command or authority.

*Euocati.*

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**I**N this fight we may further obſerue, their maner of defence againſt  
Mountes, and Caualleros; which we find chiefly to bee mines. Iose-  
phus in the Iewiſh warre ſaith, that the Romans hauing raiſed an ex-  
ceeding high mount, the Iewes vndermined the ſame with ſuch Art,  
that as they digged vnderneath, they ſupported the mount with huge props and  
planks, that it might not ſhrinke: and watching a time of greateſt aduantage,  
they ſet all the timber worke, which vnderpropped the mount, on fire, which ta-  
king fire with the helpe of brimſtone and pitch, the mount fell vpon a ſodaine,  
to the great terrour and amazement of the Romans.

At the ſiege of *Auaricum*, we find how the Galles by vndermining, did take  
the earth from the mount, as faſt as it was caried vnto it by the Romans; and ſo  
kept it from riſing, and made it vneſſectuell. But if it were for the moſt parte  
made of woode, or other combuſtible matter, they fought then by all meanes  
to burne it; as it happened at the ſiege of *Maſſilia*: and oftentimes when both  
burning and vndermining failed, they confronted it, with an other mount with-  
in the walles, to diſappoint the diſaduantage by equall conteſting of it; and ſo  
made it vnprofitable. Concerning mines, this much may I ſaie, without prei-  
udice to that Art: that the chiefeſt points to be reſpected are theſe: Firſt, the true  
diſtance to a deſigned place, which is beſt got by inſtrument and helpe of  
Geometrie; where other markes of certainty are wanting: ſecondlie, the  
direction of the myne, that wee may not erre in our courſe which the com-  
paſſe affoordeth: thirdlie, the ſtrengthening of the mine with timber worke,

*Lib. 7. de bel-  
lo Gall.*

Qj.

if



if neede require: lastly, the countermining and crossemeeting: All which parts haue very many circumstances, and require a larger discourse, then may bee thought pertinent for this place.

### THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

**T**He strange contract betweene these Soldurij, and their chiefetaine, may wel deserue a place amongst these obseruations, especiallie considering the obligatorie conditions, which either party stood bound to obserue: for the Captaine was to make his Soldurij partakers of all his happines in this life; in regard whereof, they were to take part of whatsoever ill chance or disafter shoulde happen to befall him. If death, which is the last end of all sensuall miserie, tooke hold of their head, these deuoted were tied voluntarilie to follow him the selfe same way: neither in any memory was there euer man found, that refused to die, if he to whom he was deuoted, chanced to be slaine. Which bloody league of amitie, as it was repugnant to the course of nature, multiplying particular destinie to a generall calamitie: so was it dangerous in a well ordered state, if the ringleader were either ambitious, or sought to practise any thing contrarie to good gouernement: for hee himselfe would presume much vpon the assistance of his Soldurij; and they on the other side, must needs wish well to his attempts that were so interested in his life & death.

### CHAP. X.

#### The Galles raise new forces, against Crassus.

Caesar.



He barbarous Galles were much troubled, that a towne of that strength should so soone bee taken; and therefore they sent ambassadours into all quarters, coniuered one with another, confirmed their couenants with mutuall hostages, and leuied what power they were able to make: sending for aide out of Spaine, and from other states that bordered vpon Aquitaine; at the comming of these forces they began to make warre, with a great power, and with many soldiours of great fame. For they appointed such leaders as had seene the experience of Sertorius his warres, and were great in the opinion of men, for their skill and knowledge in the arte militarie: these according to the custom of the people of Rome, beganne to take places of aduantage, to fortifie their campe, and to intercept the Romaines from free passage of conuoiues, and necessary entercourses. Which when Crassus perceined, and considering withall, that his owne forces were so few, that hee could not well dismember them vpon any seruice or aduantage, and that the enemy went out at his pleasure, kept the passages, and left notwithstanding, a sufficient garison in his campe; by which meanes their corne and prouision would in time grow scarce, and the enemy waxed euery daie stronger: he thought it his best course not to linger any longer, but presently to giue them battel.

The

The matter being referred to a council of warre, when hee understoode that all men were of the same opinion, he appointed the next daie to giue them battaile; and in the dawning putting his men in a double battaile, and placing the Auxiliarie forces in the middest, he attended to see what the enemy would doe. The Gallies, although they were perswaded, that they might adventure battel both in regard of their multitude and ancient prowes of warre, as also in respect of the paucitie of the Romans; yet they thought it better to blacke vp the passages, and so cut off all cariages, and conuoyes of corne; and so the victory would follow without bloodshed: and if the Romans for want of corne should offer to make a retreat, they would then set upon them as they marched, wearied with trauell, and heauilie laden with their burthens. This resolution being approued by the whole councill of the Gallies, when the Romans imbattailed their forces, they kept their men within their campe.


## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



His Sertorius had followed the faction of Marius and Cinna, and when Sylla had ouerthrowne both the elder and yonger Marius, hee fled into Spaine, and there maintained the quarrell on foote against Pompeie and Metellus; and ouerthrew them in many battels: but in the end was trecherously slaine by Perpanna at a banquet. He was a man of great spirit, and of admirable dispatch; and vnder him were these captaines brought vp, which Caesar commendeth for their skil in armes.

Sertorius.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



N histories, propounding to our consideration the deedes and monuments of former ages, we may obserue two especiall meanes, which the great commanders of the world haue entertained to atchieue victory; and ouermaster their enemies: the first by cunning and wise cariage of a matter, before it come to triall by blowes: the second, by forceable meanes & waging of battel; the one proceeding from wisdom and the better faculties of the soule; and the other depending vpon the strength and ability of the body. Concerning the first, it hath euer bin held more honorable, as better futing the worth of the spirit and the diuine essence of our nature, so to direct the course of an action, that the aduerser part may be weakened by wit, and preuented in the proiects of their better fortunes, by anticipation of meanes and occasions, & so through aduantages taken from their owne proceedings, to be driuen to that exigent, which may determine of the controuersie before they come to blowes, & conclude the matter by tearmes of arte, taken from the directions of good prouidence. For to speake a truth, the action of battel, as it is the last part in that facultie; so it is the worst in regarde of christian duty, and better fitteth the progeny of Lamech his second wife, which the Diuines do note to be borne to the ruine and destruction of mankind, then the children of grace, whose ioy consisteth in peace and loue.

Two meanes  
to atchieue  
victorie and  
to ouermaster  
their enemiesTubalcaine  
by war and  
Naamah by  
the flood.

Cæsar in the first of the ciuill warres respected the same thing, but from other grounds: for hauing shut vp Afranius, and Petreius in a place of disadvantage, and might haue cut them off without further trouble; yet forasmuch as he foresaw the victorie comming towards him without blow or wound, he thus answered his Captaines that were earnest vpon the enemy: *Cur etiam secundo prælio aliquos ex suis amitteret? cur vulnerari pateretur optime de se meritis milites? cur denique fortunam periclitaretur?* And this course did these Galles take, which vnder Sertorius had learned the Romaine Arte, and the Romaine industry; and were now become so expert, that they had almost beaten the Romans at their owne weapon. This first meanes is principally to be imbraced, as the safest waie in these vncertaine and casual euentures: for that which resteth vpon corporall strength, and maketh execution the meanes to a conclusion, is verie terrible euen to the better party, full of hazard and of little certaintie. For it were a miracle of fortune neuer heard of yet, so to carrie a battaile vpon what aduantage or meanes whatsoever, that the victor army shoulde buie so great a fortune without bloodshed or losse of men; and erect a Trophee to honour at the sole cost of the enemy, without losse or expence of his owne treasure. And for the vncertaintie in a battell, who knoweth not what infinite chanches and changes may happen in euery small moment of time, to turne the fortune of the day to this or that party, and make both sides vnconstant in their affections, by presenting them interchangeably with hope and feare, ioy and sorrow? and therefore Cæsar thought it not best to tempt the waie-wardnes of fortune, when by other meanes he might obtaine his desires. This I say is chiefly to be imbraced, if our meanes will affoord vs that happinesse: but howsoever I holde it wisdome so to entertaine this course of victorie, that we omit not the chiefest helps of furtherance when it cometh to blowes, but to thinke of this conquest by arte and wit, as necessarie, if our meanes will serue vs to compasse it, and of the other, as necessarie whether we will or no: for the historie maketh it plaine, that when Brutus found himselfe destitute of meanes to vndertake that course of victorie, which proceedeth from prouidence and discrete cariage; hee then betooke himselfe necessarilie to the latter, and by the helpe of battell, sought to free himselfe from those disadvantages, into which the Galles had brought him.

### THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

Not to forgo  
an aduantage



Obserue further out of this place, that what course soeuer be taken, a discreet leader wil not easily forgo an aduantage, without great assurance of a better fortune: nor change the certainty of a benefit, vpon probabilities of other hopes, vntill it haue paid him the interest of his expectation, and wrought that effect which it promised to performe. For so he might forgo his fortune by presuming too much vpon the fauour of future chanches, which are oftner seene to crosse our purposes, rather then to further the way which is taken.

THE



## THE FOVRTH OBSERVATION.

**F**urther I obserue, this double battell to be answerable to the paucity of the Roman forces: for their vsuall manner was, to make a triple battell, that the first might haue a second, and a third helpe: but where their number would not afford that commoditie, they then made two battels, that there might be the succour of a second supplie. But they neuer fought with one single battell, for ought that may bee gathered by their histories.

## THE FIFT OBSERVATION.

**T**he last thing which I obserue, is the place, where Crassus bestowed the Auxiliarie forces, in the disposition of his troupes to battell; which is here said to be, in *mediam Aciem*: for as their Armies were diuided into three battels; so euerie battell was deuided into three partes; the two cornets, and the battell, wherein these Auxiliarie forces were in this seruice bestowed: of these he afterward saith, that in as much as he durst not put any confidence in them, he commanded them to serue the Romans in time of battell, with stones and weapons, and to carrie earth and turfe to the mount. The reason why suspected troupes are placed in the battell, rather then in either of the cornets, is, for that the battell hath not such scope to sling out, or take aduantage of place to doe mischief, as the cornets haue: for wherefoeuer there hath beene set battels fought, the strength of their armie consisted alwaies in the cornets, as the two principall instruments of the battell; and as long as these stood sound, the victorie went alwaies certaine on that part: for the cornets kept the enemy both from incompassing about the bodie of their Armie, and had the aduantage also of charging vpon the open side of their aduersarie. At the battell of Cannas Hanniball put the weakest of his forces in the battell, and aduancing them towards the enemy, left the two cornets behind: so that, when the enemy came to charge vpon the battell, they easily bear them backe, and as they followed the retrait fell in betweene the two cornets, wherein the strength of the Armie consisted, and being by them incompassed on each side, were defeated and ouerthrowen. And thus we see the aduantage which a Generall hath, when his two cornets stand firme; although the battell shrinke in the encounter. Hanniball in the battell he had with Scipio in Africke, placed the strangers in the front and in the rereward, according peraduenture as he found their number and the vse of their Armes, which are circumstances to be considered in this case, and depend rather vpon the iudgment of a generall, then of anie prescription that can be giuen in this matter.

*The place  
where suspected  
forces  
are best be-  
stowed in bat-  
tell.*



## CHAP. XI.

*Crassus taketh the campe of the Galles: and  
with their ouerthrow endeth that  
warre.*

*Caesar.*



**C**RASSVS understanding their drift, and finding his men willing to set upon their campe, encouraged his soldiers; and to the contentment of all men, went directly to the place where they were lodged: and as some began to fill up the ditch; and others with casting weapons, to beate the Galles from the rampier, he commanded the Auxiliarie forces, of whom he had no great assurance, to bring stones and weapons to the soldiers that fought, and to carrie earth and turfe to the mount; that so they might make a shew of fighting. And on the other side, as the enemy began valiantly to make resistance, and to caste their weapon from the higher ground, to the great hurt of the Roman souldier; the horsemen in the meane time riding about the campe of the Galles, brought worde to Crassus that the rampier at the Decumane port, was not fortified with such diligence, as they found it in other places, but would admit an easie entrance. Crassus dealt earnestly with the commanders of the horse, to encourage their men with great promises and rewarde; and instructed them what he would haue done: they, according to their instructions, tooke foure cohorts that were left in the campe, and carrying them a further waie about, that they might not be discovered by the enemy; while all mens eies and mindes were intent upon the fight, they speedely came to the place of the fortifications, which the horsemen had found to be weake, which being easily broken down, they had entered the campe before the enemy could well tell what was done. And then a great clamour & shout being heard about that place, the Roman legions renewing their force, as it falleth out alwaies in hope of victorie, began to charge them a fresh with great furie: the Galles being circumuented on each side, and despairing of their safetie, casting themselves ouer the rampier, sought by flight to escape the danger. But for as much as the country was open and champion, the horsemen pursued them with that execution, that of 50000 there scarce remaineth the fourth part.

## THE OBSERVATION.

*Lib. 3.  
Auertimento  
secundo.*



**F**rom this place Brancatio taketh occasion to dispute, how an enemy that is strongly incamped, and for some aduantage will not remoue, may be dislodged, whether he will or no. A point of great consequence, in matter of warre: and therefore deserueth due consideration. Concerning which he laieth this downe for a maxime, that all forts and strong holds are taken by the foot, and that campes and lodgings are taken by the head: By which

which is meant, that he who purposeth to winne a fortresse well manned and provided, must first get the foot and take hold of the ditch; and then sease himselfe vpon the rampier, and so get the place: for he saith, that mounts and eminent eleuations are of little vse against fortresses or sconses, vnlesse they ouertop them; which may be easily preuented by raising the parapet of the fortresse in front, and the curtaine in flanke, according as the enemy shall carie his mounts aloft; and so they shall neuer come to ouertop the holdes. But all camps and lodgings are taken by the head: That is, by mountes and eleuations, which by the aduantage of their height command the champion. For he holdeth it impossible, to raise a mount within the campe in so short a time, to contest that, which the enemy shall make without. This foundation being laide, he proceedeth to discover a waie, how to raise a mount maugre the enemy, which shall dislodge them by force of Artillerie, or murder them all within their trenches. And this he taketh from Cæsar at the siege of Gergobia. The substance of the matter consisteth in a double ditch, running like vnto the line which the Geometricians call Helicall; by this double ditch, he maketh his approach to anie place of most aduantage, where he maie in a night, raise a mount high enough for the ordinance to plaie vpon any quarter of the campe. The centure of this practise, I referre to our iudicious souldiers, which may, if it please them, take a better view of the particularities of this stratagem in Brancatio himselfe. This much I dare affirme in the behalfe of these workes, that they were of high esteeme amongst the Romans, when daily experience and exigents of hazard had taught to finde out the readiest meanes, both for security and victorie. And if our souldiers could be brought to taste the commoditie of these workes, either by perswasion or impulsion, it were the best part of their warlike practises: but our men had rather flie vpon desperat aduentures, and seeke victorie in the iawes of death, then to cleare all hazard, with paines and diligence.

*Lib. de bello Gallico.*

## CHAP. XII.

### Cæsar vndertaketh the warre with the *Menapij and Morini.*



*At the same time also, although the sommer was almost at an end, yet for as much as all Gallia was in peace, and the \* Morini only with the \* Menapij stood out in armes, and had neuer either sent ambassadour, or otherwise treated of peace; Cæsar thinking that warre might quickly be ended, lead his Armie into their country. At his comming, he found them to carrie the wars farre otherwise, then the rest of the Galles had done: for vnderstanding that the greatest nations of Gallia, which had waged battell with the Romans, were beaten and overthrowen; and hauing whole continents of woods and bogs in their territories, they conuained both themselves and their goods into those quarters:*

*Cæsar*

*Cæsar.  
\* Teronine  
\* Cleue and  
Guelvres.*

Cæsar comming to the beginning of the woods, began to fortifie his campe, not discovering any enemy neare about him; but as his men were dispersed in their charges, they suddenly sallied out of the woods and assaulted the Romans; but being speedely driven in againe with the losse of manie of them, as the Romans followed them farre into the woods, had some few of their men slaine. The time that remained, Cæsar resolved to spend in cutting downe the woods; and lest the souldiers might bee taken vnawares, while they were busied in that worke, he caused them to place all the trees which they cut downe, on either side of the Armie; that they might serue for a defence, against sudden assaultes. A great quantitie of ground was thus rid within a few daies; so that their goods and cattell was taken by the Romans: but they themselves were fled into thicker woods. At which time there happened such a continuall raine, as forced them to leaue of the worke; and the souldiers could no longer indure, to lie in tentes of skins: and therefore Cæsar, after he had wasted and spoiled their country, burned their townes, and their houses; he carried backe his Armie, and placed them in such citties to winter in, as were subdued by the late warres.

## OBSERVATIONS.




He Irish rebels, hauing the like commoditie of woods and bogs, doe entertaine the like course of warre, as the Morini did with Cæsar: the meanes which he vsed to disappoint them of that practise, was to cutte downe the woods, which if it be thought monstrous in this age, or ridiculous to our men of warre; let them consider that the Roman discipline wrought greater effectes of valour, then can bee made credible by the vse of these times. For besides their exquisite discipline, which of it selfe was able to frame patterns of vnexampled magnanimitie; their industrie was admirable in the execution thereof, and carried it with such vncessant trauell, that the souldiers thought it great happines when they came to wage battell with the enimie; and could haue meanes to quit their continuall trauell, with the hazard of their liues. Neither let it seeme strange, that the Romans vndertooke to cut down the woods; but rather let vs admire their facilitie in so difficult a taske: for as the historie witnesseth: *magno spacio paucis diebus confecto, incredibili celeritate*: a great quantitie of ground was rid in a few daies with incredible speede. And after the woods were cut downe, they tooke more paines in placing it on each side of the legions, to hinder anie sudden assault, then they did in cutting it downe: which deserueth as great admiration, as the former part. There is another place in the sixth booke of these Commentaries, which expresseth more particularly the nature of such warres, and may serue to acquaint vs with that which Cæsar did in these difficulties.

The Eburones or the men of Liege, had the like commoditie of woods and bogges, and made vse of them in the warre they had with Cæsar: The matter (saith hee) required great diligence, nor so much in regard of the perill of the whole Armie, (for there could no danger come from an enimie that was frightened and dispersed) as the safetie of euerie particular souldier, which in part did

pertaine

pertaine to the welfare of the whole Armie. For the desire of bootie caried manie of the souldiers farre from the bodie of the Armie: and the woods being full of vnknowne and secret passages, would not suffer them to go either thicke together or close imbattailed. If he desired to haue the warre ended, and the race of those wicked men to bee rooted out, hee must of force make manie small companies, and deuide his men into many bodies: but if hee would haue the maniples to keepe at their ensignes, as the discipline and custome of the Roman Army required; then the place was a shelter and defence to the enemy: neither did they want courage to laie ambushments, and to circumuent such as they found alone, stragling from their companies. In these difficulties, there was as much done as diligence could doe; prouiding rather to be wanting in the offensive part (although all mens mindes were set on fire with reuenge) then to hurt the enemy with the losse of the Roman souldier. Caesar sent messengers to the bordering states, to come out and sacke the Eburones, and they should haue all the praie for their labour: that the life of the Galles rather then his legionarie souldiers might be hazarded in those woods; as also that, with so great a multitude, both the race and name of that people might bee quite extinguished.

There are many particularities in this relation, which concerne the true motion of the Irish warres, which may be better obserued by such as know those warres by experience, then by my selfe that vnderstand them onely by relation: and therefore to preuent such exceptions, as my rule shall make of the parallell in these two cases: I will leaue it to be done by themselves. And thus endeth the third Commentarie.





# THE FOURTH COMMENTARIE.

## THE ARGUMENT.

**T**He Vſipetes, and Tenchtheri are driuen to ſeeke newe ſeates in Gallia; they driue the Menapij out of their territories: but in the end are ouerthrowen by Cæſar. That warre being ended, he made a bridge vpon the Rhene, and carried his Armie ouer into Germanie. He taketh reuenge vpon the Sicambri; and giueth libertie to the Vbij: returneth into Gallia, and carrieth his Armie ouer into Britanie, with the occurrences of that warre.

## CHAP. I.

The \* Vſipetes, and \* Tenchtheri bring great multitudes of peoples, ouer the Rhene into Gallia: the nature of the Sueui.

\* Those of  
Zutphen.  
\* Of Haſſia.

Cæſar.

**T**HE winter following, Pompeie and Craſſus being Conſuls, the Vſipetes and Tenchtheri, two Germane nations, paſſed ouer the Rhene, with great multitudes of people; not far from the place, where it falleth into the ſea. The reaſon of their ſlitting, was the ill intreatie, which for manie yeares together they had receiued of the Sueui, the greateſt & warlikeſt nation amongſt the Germans. For theſe Sueui had one hundred Cantons or ſhires, which yearely furniſhed their warres, with 1000 men a piece; and kept as manie at home to maintaine both themſelues, and their Armies abroad: and theſe the yeare following were in Armes; and the other ſtaied at home, and performed the like dutie; and ſo by this meanes, they all continued their experience both of tillage, and matter of warre. They liued chiefly vpon cattell and milke, and vſed much hunting, which was the cauſe (what through the qualitie of their diet, their continuall exerciſe, and libertie of life, being neuer tied to any diſcipline, nor vrged to any thing againſt their diſpoſition) that they were ſtrong and of a large ſtature, vſing ſkins and hides for their cloathing, which couered but part of their body, the reſt being naked. Their horſemen oftentimes, in time of battell, forſooke their horſe, and fought on foot; being

being taught to stand still in one place, that when they would they might returne unto them. Neither was there any thing more base, or dishonest in the course of their life, then to use furniture for horses: & would adventure to charge upon great troupes of horse, that used Equipage, with a few of their owne qualitie. They admitted no wine to be brought in unto them, least it might effeminate their warlike inclination, or make them vnapt for labour. The greatest honour in their opinion, was to haue their bordering Territories lie wast and desolate: for so it would be thought, that manie states together, would not resist their conquering valour: and it was reported, that the country laie wast from them one waie 600 miles together.

## THE OBSERVATION.

**B**Y this practise of the Sueui, it appeareth, how little a naked resolution of valour auaieth, when it wanteth the ornaments of moral carriage and ciuill discretion, to make vse of that greatnesse which prowesse hath obtained: for notwithstanding that they were a nation both warlike, and of good abilitie, they were so vainly carried on with a conceit of manhood, that it sorted to no other ende, then to maintaine barbarisme at home, and desolation abroad; where as true valour is alwaies subordinate to the preservation of common weales, and is as the defensiuie armes of ciuill societie. Which I haue the rather noted, in as much as it resembleth an humour that aboundeth in this age, especially in the particular hauiour of our young gallants, whose naked valour reuelling it selfe onely in the lie and in the stabbe, for want of other assistant vertues to temper the heat of so brittle a mettall, leadeeth them into such inconueniences and disordered actions, that it changeth the nature thereof, into giddie headed rashnesse; and in lieu of vertues guerdon, is repaide with irrisiō.

## CHAP. II.

The motives, inducing the Vsipetes to  
come ouer the Rhene into  
Gallia.

**N**EXT vnto these Sueui, inhabited the Vbi, a very ample and potent state: and through their intercourse and trafficke with marchants, somewhat more ciuill, then the rest of the Germans. With these, the Sueui had often waged battell: and albeit they could not expell them out of their country, forasmuch as their state was very great and populous; yet by continuall incursions they brought them vnder, and much weakened their estate. In the same case were the Vsipetes and Tenchtheri: for hauing made head against the Sueui

Caesar.

R ij.

for

\* Geldres  
and Cleuna.

for many yeares together, they were constrained in the end to forsake their possessions; and wandering the space of three yeares through the continent of Germanie, at last they arrived where the \* Menapij inhabited the bankes, on both sides the riuer Rhene: but being terrified with the arrivall of such a multitude, they forsooke all their dwellings beyond the riuer, and planted themselves on this side of the water, to hinder the Germans from further passage.

The Vsipectes with their associates, having tried all meanes, and not finding themselves able to passe over by force, for want of boates; nor by stealth, by reason of the diligent watch of the Menapij, fained a retrait to their olde habitation: and after three daies journey, their horsemen in one night speedely returned againe, and slew the Menapij, both ungarded and unprouided. For they upon the departure of the Germans, feared not to returne over the riuer into their townes and houses: these being slaine, and their shipping taken, they got over the riuer, before the rest of the Menapij had anie notice of their comming: by which meanes they easily dispossessed them of their dwelling places, and liued that winter upon the prouision they found there.

Cæsar vnderstanding of these thinges, and fearing the weakenesse of the Galles, in as much as they are sudden and quicke in their resolutions, and withall desirous of noueltie: he durst no waie trust their vnconstancie; for it was their practise and custome to staie trauellours and passengers, and inquire of them what they either heard or knew, concerning anie thing that had happened; and the common people would flock about marchants in faires and markets, and learne of them whence they came, and what newes they brought from thence: and by these rumours and hearesayes they directed the maine course of their actions; wherof they could not but repent themselves, being grounded upon such weake intelligence, as was vsually coined to please the multitude. Which custome being knowne, Cæsar to preuent a greater warre, hasted to his Armie sooner then he was wont to doe.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**S**Vch as haue spent their time in the contemplation of nature, and haue made diligent search of the temperature & quality of climates and nations, haue all with one consent made choler the regent of the French complexion; distinguishing the people, with such attributes, as the saide humour vsually breedeth. Neither haue these conditions, which Cæsar so long agoe obserued in the ancient Galles, anie disresemblance from that, which the learned of this age haue deliuered, concerning the nature of the said inhabitants: but that irresolute constitution, which breeds such nouelties and contrarieties of actions, continueth the same vnto these times, in the inhabitants of that country, notwithstanding the alteration of customes, and people, or what els so long a time hath changed; which argueth the vnersittable power of celestiall influence, establishing an vniformitie of nature, according as the line of the place lieth capable of their powerfull aspect.

The cause of the diuersity in the temperature of nations, which are differenced by



by North and south, is not without apparant cause, attributed to their propinquitie, or distance from the course of the sunne, which distinguisheth by heate and cold the Northren and Southerne climates of the earth; and separateth the inhabitants thereof, by the dominion of their actiue qualities. But the reason whie two nations which are both in the same climate, and vnder the same parallel, receiuing the virtue of the celestial bodies, by the same downefal and rebound of their beames, being differenced only by East and West; are so much disunited in nature, and so vnlike in disposition, is not so apparant: whether it be as some haue imagined, for asmuch as the all inclosing spheare, which remaineth quiet and immouable about the circuit of the first motor; hath his parts diuerfly distinguished with varietie of properties; which by continuall reference and mutuall aspect, are imprinted in the correspondent quarters of the earth; and so keepe a perpetuall residency of one and the same quality, in one and the same place; and make also the varietie of fashions in such partes, as otherwise are equall favorites of the heauens maiestie, by receiuing an equall measure of light, heat and vertue; or whether the saide quarters of the earth are in themselves diuerfly noted, with seuerall qualities, which appropriate the selfe same influence to their particular nature, and so alter it into many fashions; or whether there be some other vnknown cause: I wil leaue euery man to satisfie himselfe with that which seemeth most probable vnto him, and proceed to the discouerie of this cholericke passion. Wherein I will indeuor to shew how impatiencie, sodaine resolution, and desire of noueltie, are naturall adiuncts of this humor. And if Caesar made vse of this philosophie in the managing of that warre, let it not be thought impertinent to the knowledge of a Generall, to enter into the consideration of this learning. Wherein first, I must laie for a maxime that which long experience hath made authenticall, that the motions of the minde are either quicke or slow, according as the complexion is tempered, either with heat or cold: for as the flegmaticall humor, is of a moist, cold and heauy nature, begetting weake and grosse spirits, and benumbing the instruments with a liuelie disability; so is the motion of the internall faculties, proceeding likewise after a slow maner, according to the qualitie of the instruments, whereby it moueth: and therefore men of this watrish constitution, are no way apt to receiue an impression, nor to entertaine any sensible apprehension, vnles it be beaten into them, with often and strong repetitions; and then also they proceede as slowlie in discoursing of the consequence, and linger in the choise of their resolutions. On the contrary part, this *flaua bilis*, being of a hote piercing nature, and resembling the actiue vertue of the fire, doth so purifie the instruments of sense, and quicken the spirits with the viuacity of motion, that they take the first impression as perfectly, as if it had beene oftentimes presented vnto them, with many strong circumstances. And thence it happeneth, that inasmuch as the *Species* is so readily receiued, and possesseth the apprehending facultie, with such facility of entrance, that it moueth the other powers of the soule, with as great efficacie at the first conception, as if it had beene brought in with troupes of probabilities, and strengthened with manifest arguments of vndoubted truth. It followeth therefore (by reason of the subtile and



fit disposition of the instrumentes, which proceedeth from heate the chiefeſt qualitie in choler) that the object is at the first moment ſo ſtrongly ſetteled, in the first receiuing facultie, that the other powers of the minde, with as great ſpeede manifeſt their offices, concerning the apprehenſion; and deliuer a ſentence answerable to the ſtrength of the first conception: which maketh them ſo impatient of delaie, and ſo ſodainly to alter their former reſolutions, not ſuffering the diſcourſue power to examine the ſubſtance thereof, by conference of circumſtances; nor to giue iudgment according to the courſe of our intellectual court: It behooueth therefore euery man, in that vnſteady diſpoſition, eſpecially in matter of moment, to be ſuſpicious of his owne credulity, and not to giue place to reſolution, before his iudgement be informed, by diſcourſe of the ſtrength or weakenes of the conceiued opinion.

But to leaue theſe ſpeculative meditations, to Philoſophers of learned conceit: for as much as the right uſe of paſſions is either true wiſdome, or commeth neereſt to the ſame; I will onely touch in a worde what degree of choler beſt beſitteth a ſoldier; or howe it auaileth, or diſaduantageh in matter of warre. And firſt it cannot bee denied, that there is almoſt no paſſion, that doth more eclips the light of reaſon, or ſooner corrupteth the ſinceritie of a good iudgement, then this of anger, which we now ſpeake of: Neither is there any motion that more pleaſeth it ſelfe in his owne actions, or followeth them with greater heate in the execution: And if the truth chance to ſhewe it ſelfe, and conuince a falſe pretended cauſe, as the authour of that paſſion; it oftentimes redoubleth the rage euen againſt truth and innocency. Piſo condemned a ſoldier for returning from forraging, without his companion, being perſuaded that he had ſlaine him: but at the inſtant of the execution, the other that was miſſing, returned, and with great ioy of the whole army, they were caried to the generall; thinking to haue much gratified him, with the manifeſtation of the truth: but hee through ſhame and deſpight, being yet in the torture of his wrath, redoubled his anger, and by a ſubtilty which his paſſion furniſhed him withall, he made three culpable for that he found one innocent; the firſt, becauſe the ſentence of death was paſt againſt him, and was not to bee recalled without the breach of law: the ſecond, for that hee was the cauſe of the death of his companion: and thirdly, the executioner, for not obeying his commandement.

*Saluſt.*

Concerning matter of warre, as it conſiſteth of differenced partes; ſo hath choler diuers effectes. In caſe of diſcourſe and conſultation, when as the powers of the minde ought to bee cleere of all violent affectiones, it greatly darkeneth the vnderſtanding, and troubleth the ſincerity of a good iudgement, as Cæſar noted in his ſpeech to the ſenate concerning Cateline: and therefore a commander muſt, by al meanes indeuor to auoid, euen the leaſt motions of ſo hurtfull a paſſion; and ſeaſon his affectiones, with that grauity and conſtancy of ſpirit, that no turbulent diſpoſition may, either hinder his vnderſtanding, or withhold his will from following that courſe, which reaſon appointeth, as the beſt means to a fortunate ſucceſſe: alwaies remembering, that al his actions are preſented vpon a ſtage, and paſſe the cenſure of many curious beholders, which applaud graue and patient motions, as the greateſt prooſe of true wiſdome; and

and disallow of passionate, and headstrong affection, as derogating from the sincere carriage of an action, how iust soeuer otherwise it seemeth.

Concerning execution and furie of battaile, I take anger to be a necessarie instrument to set valour on foote, and to ouerwage the difficulties of terrour, with a furious resolution: for considering that the noblest actions of the minde, stande in neede of the impulsions of passions, I take anger to bee the fittest meanes, to aduance the valiant carriage of a battaile: for as feare is trecherous and vn safe, so anger is confident and of an vnquenchable heate; and therefore a Commaunder ought by all meanes, to suggest matter of anger against an enemy, that his men may behold them with a wrathfull regard, and thirst after the daie of battell, to satisfie their furie with the blood of their aduersaries. If any vrge that it hath beene heretofore obserued of the Galles, that in the beginning of a battell they were more then men, and in the latter end they were lesse then women; and therefore a cholerick disposition is not so fit for seruice, as we seem to make it. I answer, that there is a difference between a disposition to choler, such as was obserued in the Galles, and the passion of anger, wel kindled in the minde: for the first is subiect to alteration and contrarietie of actions; but the other is furious, inuincible, neuer satisfied but with reuenge. And so that of Aristotle is proued true, that anger serueth ostentimes as a weapon to vertue; whereunto some answer very pleasantly, saying, it is a weapon of a strange nature: for wee doe manage other weapons, and this doeth manage vs; our hande guideth not it, but it guideth our hande; it possesseth vs, and not wee it, as it happened in the raigne of Tyberius, amongst the mutinous legions at *Vetera*: and therefore a Commaunder ought to take greate heede; whome he maketh the object of that anger, which kindleth in his army: for as it is a passion of terrible execution, and therefore needeth to bee wisely directed; so is it dangerous in regarde of obedience, which was the only thing which Cæsar required in his soldiours.

*Tacit.  
1. Anal.*

But to leaue this hastie matter, and fall neerer that which we seeke after. I may not omit the prognostication, which Cæsar made of the consequence of this accident, by the naturall disposition of the people; the euent whereof proued the truth of his predictions; which sheweth what aduantage a learned general that hath bin somewhat instructed in the schoole of nature, hath gained of him, whom only experience hath taught the actiue rudiments of the war, & thinketh of no further lesson in that art, then that which the office of a seriant or lanceprizado containeth.

CAP.

## CHAP. III.

Cæsar commeth to his armie, marcheth towards  
the *Germanes*, and by the way treateth of  
conditions of peace.

*Cæsar.*



*\*Liege.*

*CÆSAR* being come to his armie, found that to haue happened which he before suspected: for some of the *States* of *Gallia* had sent messengers vnto the *Germanes*, to leaue the banks of *Rhene*, and to come further into the continent, where they should find ready, whatsoeuer they desired. Whereupon the *Germanes* began to make further incursions, and to waste the lande as far as the confines of the *Eburones*. The *Princes* of the *Galles* being called together, *Cæsar* thought it best to dissemble what hee had discovered, concerning their reuolt; and confirming their mindes with an approbation of their loialtie, hee commanded certaine troupes of horse to be leuied, and resolved to make warre vpon the *Germanes*; and hauing made prouision of corne, hee directed his march towards them. From whom as he was on the way, within a few daies iourney of their campe, he receiued this message: The *Germanes* as they were not willing to make warre vpon the *Romains*, so they would not refuse to make triall of their manhood, if they were iustly prouoked; for their ancient custome was to answer an enemy by force, and not by treaty; yet this much they would confesse, that they came thither very unwillingly, being driuen by violence out of their possessions. If the *Romaine* people would accept of their friendship, and either giue them territories to inhabite, or suffer them to keepe that which they had got by the lawe of armes, they might proue profitable friends vnto them. They only yeilded to the *Sueni*, to whome the Gods in feates of armes were inferior; any other nation they would easily conquer.

*\*Colonia Agripina.*

To this *Cæsar* answered what hee thought fit; but the purport of his speech was, that he could not make any league with them, if they continued in *Gallia*: neither was it probable, that they that could not keepe their owne, would get possessions out of other mens hands. *Gallia* had no vacant place to entertaine so great a multitude: but if they would they might find a welcome, amongst the *Vbii*, whose agents were at that instant in his campe, complaining of the iniurie of the *Sueni*, and desiring aide against them; this much he himselfe would intreat of the *Vbii*. The messengers went backe with these Mandates, promising within three daies to returne againe to *Cæsar*: in the meane time, they desired him, not to bring his armie any neerer their quarters; which request *Cæsar* denied: for vnderstanding that a few daies before, a great part of their Cavalrie were passed ouer the *Mosa*, he suspected that this delay imported nothing more then the returne of their horsemen.

When *Cæsar* was come within twelue miles of their campe, their Ambassadors returned; and meeting him on the way, entreated him earnestly to march no further towards them: but being denied of their suite, they besought him to sende to those troupes of horse, which marched before the army, that they should not fight nor make any hostile encounter; and that he would giue them leaue to send messengers to the *Vbii*, of whose entertainment they would willingly accept, if the *Princes*

and



and senate would sweare faith & safe continuance vnto their people: Neither would they require more then 3. daies, to negotiat this busines. Caesar conceived this treatie to import nothing else, then the returne of their horsemen that were absent in pillage, whom they expected within 3. daies; notwithstanding hee promised them to march but foure miles further that day, to a conuenient waiting place: in the meane time he sent to the commanders of the horse that were before, not to prouoke the enemy to fight; and if they were set vpon to sustaine the charge, vntil he came neerer with the armie.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**F**irst we may obserue his dissembling of the practise of the Galles, with the Germans; & the incouragement which he gaue them in a faithful and loial affection to the people of Rome, when he himselfe knew they had started from that duty, which both their honor and a good respect of their friendes required: for he well vnderstood that his presence did take away al scruple of any further motion in that kind; & therfore to haue objected vnto the their errors, had not been to heale, but to discouer their wound: only he tooke the way, to cut off their hopes of any practises, which they might attempt against the Romaine people; and held them in the mean time in the apparance of faithful friends, that they might not bee discouraged, by the detection of their reuolt.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**S**Econdly, vpon this resolutiō that there was no league to be made with the Germans, if they continued on this side the Rhene; we may obserue how he entertained a treaty of peace, with such consents and denials, as might manifest his readines to further what he made shew of, & not weaken the meanes of his best aduantage. For as he was content they should take a quiet farewel of Gallia, and plant themselues in the possessions of the Vbij; so was he loath to yeeld to any condition, which might disaduantage his forcible cōstraint or weaken his command, if perswasion failed: for he well knewe that powerfull means to effect that which he required, would further the course of a peaceable conclusion, and carry more authoritie in a parlee, then any other motiue, howe reasonable foeuer.

Moreouer wee may obserue, howe carefull hee was not to impose vpon the Germanes a necessity of fighting; but opened a passage (by propounding vnto them the association of the Vbij) by which they might auoide the hazarde of battaile. Which thing was alwaies obserued by Commanders of ancient times, who diligently searching into the nature of thinges, founde that neither of those noble instruments, whereby man worketh such wonders (I meane the hande and the tongue) had euer brought so many excellent works to that type of perfection, vnles they had bin forced thereunto by

S j.

necessity:

*Vincitur  
hand gratis  
iugulo qui  
pronocat bo-  
stem.*



necessitie : and therefore wee are wisely to handle the course of our actions, least while we stand too strict vpon a violent garde, we giue occasion to the enemy, by the way of *Antiperistasis*, to redouble his strength; and so furnish him with that powerfull engine, which Vetius Mescius calleth *ultimum* and *maximum telum*, the last and greatest weapon; the force whereof shall better appeare by these examples.

*Lin. lib. 9.*

Some few of the Samnites, contrarie to the articles of peace between them and the Romans, hauing made incursions into the territories of the Romaine confederates; the senate of that state sent to Rome, to excuse the fact, and to make offer of satisfaction: But being reiected, Claudius Pontius generall of their forces, in an excellent oration which he made, shewed how the Romans would not harken to peace, but chose rather to be reuenged by war: and therefore necessity constrained them to put on armes: *iustum est bellum* (saith he) *quibus necessarium, & pia arma quibus, nisi in Armis, spes est.*

*Lin. lib. 7.*

Caius Manlius, conducting the Roman legions against the Veij, part of the Veian armie had entered the Romaine campe; which Manlius perceiuing, hee hastied with a band of men to keepe the breach, and to shut in the Veij: which they no sooner perceiued, but they fought with that rage and fury, that they slew Manlius; and had ouerthrowne the whole campe, had not a Tribune opened the passage, by which they fled away.

In like manner Camillus, the wisest of the Romaine Captaines, beeing entered into the citie of the Veij, that hee might take it with greater facilitie, and disarm the enemy of that terrible weapon of necessitie, hee caused it to bee proclaimed, that no Veian shoulde bee hurt, that was founde vnarmed. Whereupon euery man cast away his weapon, and so the towne was taken without bloodshed.

Let a soldiour therefore take such holde of occasions, and oportunities that are offered vnto him, that in time of battaile hee may seeme to cast necessitie vpon his own cause, and retaine it in his paie: considering how the power thereof altereth the workes of nature, and changeth their effects into contrary operations, being neuer subiect to any ordinance or lawe; and yet making that lawfull which proceedeth from it.

### CHAP. IIII.

The Germans, contrary to their owne request  
made to Cæsar, set vpon the Romaine horse-  
men, and ouerthrew them.

*Cæsar.*



Notwithstanding the Germans request, concerning the truce, as soone as they saw the Romaine horsemen, which were in number 5000, (whereas the Germans had not aboue 800. horse) they charged vpon the Romans, not expecting any hostile incounter, inasmuch as their ambassadours were newly departed from Cæsar, and had obtained that daie of truce, but being

being set upon, they made what resistance they could. The Germans, according to their vsuall custome, forsooke their horse, and fighting on foote, did easely put the Romains to flight; who neuer looked backe, vntill they came into the sight of the legions: in that battell were slaine 74. Romaine horsemen. After this battell, Caesar thought it not safe, either to harken to anie conditions, or to receiue any message from them, that by fraud and deceit had sought for peace, and ment nothing but war: And to attende any longer vntill their horsemen returned, was but to giue them that aduantage against him, especially considering the weakenesse of the Galles, amongst whom the Germans by this battell had gained great reputation; and therefore he durst not giue them space to thinke vpon it.

## OBSERVATIONS.



His cunning of the Germans offereth occasion to speake somewhat, concerning that maine controuersie of policie, which is, whether the actions of Princes and great comanders, are alwaies to bee attended with integrity, and faithful accomplishment thereof. Wherein I wil only set down such arguments, and grounds of reason, which vertue and morall honesty on the one part, (for we wil make it no question to a Christian minde) and the daily practise of states men on the other side, alleadge, to make good their contrary assertions.

The great Politicians of the world, that commend vertue in a shew, and not in esse and being, and study to maintaine their states onely with humane reason, not regarding the authority of diuine ordinance, set this downe as a maxime in their Art; That he, that is to negotiate a matter, and meaneth to bring it to an ende sorting to his contentment, must in all respects bee like qualified, both in iudgement and disposition, as the party is, with whom he dealeth: otherwise he cannot be sufficiently prepared, to hold himselfe strong in the matter, which he vndertaketh. For a wraстler that cometh with meere strength to incounter an other that hath both strength & cunning, may beshrew his strength that brought him thither, to be cast by skil, and be laught at, as an vnworthy chāpion for serious sports: in like maner in this vniuerfall confusion of infidelitie, wherein subtilty flieth at so high a pitch, he that thinketh with simplicitie of spirit to winde through the labyrinths of falshood, and auoide the snares of deceit, shall finde himselfe too weake for so difficult a taske, and beshrew his honesty, if he regard his commodity: for it is the course that euery man taketh, which must bring vs to the place, to which euery man goeth: and he that opposeth himselfe against the current of the world, may stand alone in his own conceit, and neuer attaine that which the world seeketh after. Forasmuch therefore, as craft and deceit are so general, it behooueth a man of publike negotiations, to carry a mind apt & disposed to these qualities. This was signified by that, which anciēt writers report of Achilles, who was sent to Chiron the Centaure, half a man & half a beast, to be instructed in the rudiments of princely cariage; that of the brutish part, he might learn to strengthen himself, with force & courage; & of the humane shape, so to

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manage

manage reason, that it might bee a fit instrument to answer or preuent, what soeuer mans wit might forge to ouerthrow it. Neither ought a priuate man to wonder at the strangenesse of these positions; considering that the gouernment of kingdomes, and Empires is caried with another bias, then that which concerneth particular affaires in a well ordered state: wherein truth-breakers and faithlesse-dissemblers are worthely condemned, inasmuch as they necessarilie enforce the ruine thereof. But these that sit at the helme of gouernment, and are to shape the course of a state, according to the variation of times and fortunes, deriue their conclusions from other principles, whereof inferiour subjects are no more capable, then men are able to vnderstande the workes of the Godes: and therefore they are called *arcana imperij*, to bee reuerenced rather, then lookt into.

To conclude, the affaires of particular persons are of so short extension, and incircled in so small a compasse, that a meane capacitie may easily apprehend the aduantages or inconueniences, which may ensue vpon the contract: and therefore it is requisite they should stande to the aduenture, and their iudgement is worthely taxed with the losse: but the businesse of a common weale are, both subiect to so many casualties of fortune, and relie vpon such vnexpected accidents, that it is impossible for any spirit, howe prouident soeuer, to foresee the issue, in that variety of chances. Besides that, every particular subiect is much interessed in the fortune of the euent, and may iustly challenge an alteration of the intended course, rather then suffer shipwracke through the error of their Pilot: And so the safety of the state doth balance out the losse of credit in the Gouernor.

On the other side, such as zealously affect true honour, affirme vertue to be the same both in prince and people; neither doth condition of state, or calling, or the qualitie of publike or priuate businesse, alter the nature and essence of goodnes: for to deprive the tongue of truth and fidelitie were to breake the bond of ciuill societie, which is the basis and ground plot of all states and commonweales. They doe not denie but that a wise Prince maie so carrie a treatie, that he maie seeme to affect that most which he least intendeth; or answer doubtfully concerning the propositions; and that he maie vse with great honour the practises and stratagems of warre, when the fortune of both parties consisteth vpon their owne industrie: but to breake any couenants agreed vpon, may well get a kingdom, but neuer honourable reputation.

And thus they contend concerning the meanes, whereby a state is continued in happie gouernment: whereof this much I dare say by the warrant of this historie, that he who falsifieth his words vpon aduantage, howsoeuer he regardeth his honour, had neede to paie them home in regard of his owne safetie: for if they once recouer the losse, and get any aduantage against those truth-breakers, they will finde as little fauour, as the Germans did with Cæsar.



## CHAP. V.

Cæsar marched directly to the campe of the  
Germans, and cut them all in pieces, and  
so ended that warre.



PON these considerations, Cæsar manifesting his resolution to the Legates, and Questor; there happened a very fortunate accident. For the next daie, very early in the morning, most of the Princes and chiefest of the Germans came vnto Cæsar into his campe, to excuse their fraudulent practise; and withall to continue their petition of truce. Whereof Cæsar was exceeding glad, and caused them to be kept in hold; and at the same instant, brought his Armie out of the campe, commanding his horsemen to follow the legions, because they had beene daunted with so late an ouerthrow: And making a triple battell, marched speedely eight miles, and so came vpon the Germans, before they had notice what had happened; and being terrified with our sudden arriual, and the departure of their owne leaders, knew not whether it were their best course, to bring forth their forces, or to defend their campe, or otherwise to seeke their safety by flight. Which tumult and feare was no sooner perceiued by the Roman souldier, but calling to mind their perfidious trecherie, they brake into the campe, and were at first a little resisted; in the meane time, the women and children fled euery one awaie: which Cæsar perceiuing, sent his horsemen to pursue them. The Germans hearing the clamour and schrichings behinde their backes, and seeing their friends pursued and slaine, did cast awaie their weapons, and fled out of the campe, and comming to the confluence of the Mase and the Rhene, such as had escaped cast themselues into the riuer; where, what through feare, and wearinesse, and the force of the water, were all drowned. In this conflict the Romans lost not a man: the number of the enemy was 430000 with women and children. To them, whom he had retained in his campe, he gaue leaue to depart; but they fearing the crueltie of the Galles, desired that they might continue with the Romans: which Cæsar agreed vnto.

Cæsar.

## OBSERVATIONS.

His relation affoordeth little matter of warre, but onely a seuerer reuenge of hatefull trecherie: notwithstanding I will hence take occasion, to discouer the offices of the Questor and the Legates; and shew what place they had in the Armie. And first concerning the Questor, we are to vnderstand, that he was elected by the common voice of the people, in the same court, which was called to creat the Generall. His office was, to take charge of the publike treasure, whether it came out of their Ærarium, for the paie of the Armie; or otherwise was taken from the enemy. Of

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him the souldiers receiued their stipend both in corne and money; and what other bootie was taken from the enemie, he either kept them, or sold them, for the vse of the common-weale.

The Legates were not chosen, by the people, but appointed by the Senat, as assistants & Coadiutors to the Emperor, for the publike seruice, and were altogether directed by the Generall, in whose absence they had the absolute command: and their number was for the most part vncertaine; but proportioned according to the number of legions in the Armie.

## CHAP. VI.

### Cæsar maketh a bridge vpon the Rhene, and carrieth his Armie ouer into • Germanie.

Cæsar.



HE German warre being thus ended: Cæsar thought it necessarie, to transport his Armie ouer the Rhene into the continent of Germanie, for manie causes: whereof this was not the least, that seeing the Germans were so easily perswaded, to bring their colonies and their vagrant multitudes into Gallia: he thought it good to make knowne vnto them, that the Roman people could, at their pleasure, carrie their forces ouer the Rhene into Germanie. Moreouer, those troupes of horse, which were absent at the late ouerthrow of the Germans, were fled into the confines of the Sicambri; to whom, when Cæsar sent messengers to demand them to be sent vnto him, they answered, that the Roman Empire was limited by the Rhene: and if the Germans were interdicted Gallia, why should Cæsar challenge any authority in their quarters? Lastly, the Vbi, who amongst all the rest of the Germans had only accepted of Cæsars friendship, and giuen pledges of their fidelitie, had made earnest suit vnto him, to send them aid against the Sueui; or at the least to transport his Armie ouer the Rhene: for the name and opinion of the Roman Armie was so great, and of such fame, what with Ariouistus ouerthrow, and this last seruice, that it sounded honourable amongst the furthest nations of Germany. For these reasons, Cæsar resolved to passe the Rhene: but to carrie his Armie ouer by boate, was neither safe, nor for the maiestie of the people of Rome. And albeit it seemed a matter of great difficultie, by reason of the breadth, swiftnes, and depth of the riuer, to make a bridge; yet he resolved to trie what he could doe, otherwise he determined not to passe ouer at all: and so he built a bridge after this maner.

At twofoote distance, he placed two trees of a foot and halfe square, sharpened at the lower end, and cut answerable to the depth of the riuer: these he let downe into the water with engines, and drone them in with commanders, not perpendicularly, after the fashion of a pile, but gable wise and bending with the course of the water: opposite vnto these he placed two other trees, ioyned together after the same fashion, being 40 foote distant from the former, by the dimension betweene their lower parts

in the bottome of the water, and reclining against the course of the riuer: these two paire of couples thus placed, he ioyned together with a beame of two foote square, equall to the distance betweene the said couples, and fastened them at each ende on either side of the couples, with braces and pins: whereby the strength of the worke, and nature of the frame was such, that the greater the violence of the streame was, and the faster it fell vpon the timber worke, the stronger the bridge was vnitied in the couplings and iointes. In like manner, he proceeded with couples, and beames, untill the worke was brought vnto the other side of the riuer: and then he laide straight planks from beame to beame, and covered them with hurdles; and so he made a floore to the bridge. Moreover, on the lower side of the bridge, he droue downe supporters, which being fastened to the timber worke, did strengthen the bridge against the force of the water; and on the upper side of the bridge, at a reasonable distance, he placed piles to hinder the force of trees or boates, or what els the enemy might cast downe to trouble the worke: within ten daies, that the timber began to be cut downe and carried, the worke was ended, and the Armie transported. Caesar, leauing a strong garrison at either end of the bridge, went into the confines of the Sicambri.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**I**T shall not be amisse, to enter a little into the consideration of this bridge; as wel in regard of the ingenious Architecture therof, as also that we may somewhat imitate Caesar, whom we may obserue to insit with as great plenty of wit & eloquence, in presenting vnto vs the subtilty of his inuentio in such maner of handy works, as vpon any other part of his actiōs; as this particular description of the bridge, may sufficiently witnes: besides the fortifications at Alesia, and the intrenchments in Britanie, for the safetie of his shipping, with many other workes, which he might well record, as the greatest designes of an heroick spirit, and the wonderfull effectes of magnanimous industrie; that succeeding ages might not boast either of Arte or prowes, which his vertue had not expressed; or otherwise might wonder at that worth, which they themselues could not attaine vnto: And to that purpose hee entertained Vitruuius, the father of architecture, and as worthilie to bee imitated in that facultie, as his maister Caesar is in seates of armes. By whose example a great commander may learne howe much it importeth the eternitie of his fame, to beautifie his greatest designes with arte, and to esteeme of such as are able to intreat the Mathematicall muses, to shew themselues vnder the shape of a sensible forme; which albeit through the rudenesse of the matter, fall farre short of the truth of their intellectuall nature, yet their beautie expresseth such a maiestie of Arte, that no time will suffer the memorie thereof to perish.

The workmanship of this bridge consisted chiefly in the oblique situation of the double postes, whereof the first order bending with the streame, and the lower ranke against the streame, when they came to be coupled together with ouerthwart beames, which were fastened in the couplings with braces, which he nameth *Fibulas*; the more violent the streame fell vpon the worke, the faster the

the iointes of the building were vnited, as may better appeare by a modell of that making, then can be exprest by any circumstance of wordes.

*Lib. de  
Machi.*

I might hence take occasion to speake of the diuersitie of bridges, and of the practises which antiquitie hath deuised to transport Armies ouer riuers: but inasmuch as it is a common subiect for all that vndertake this militarie taske, and hath beene handled by Lipsius, vpon the occasion of this bridge; I will refer the reader to that place; and only note the singular disposition of this action, in as much as Cæsar made the meanes correspondent to that end which he intended. For considering that the chiefe end of his passage was, to let the Germans vnderstand, that the power of the Roman Empire was not bouided with the Rhene; and that a riuier could not so separate their Territories, but that they were able to ioine both the continents together, and make a common roade waie, where it seemed most vnpassable: he thought it best to passe ouer his Army by a bridge, that so the Germans might know the power of his forces, and also conceit their Territories, as vnited vnto Gallia; or to be vnited at the pleasure of the Romans, with a firme Isthmus & plaine passage by foot, which in times past had alwaies been separated by a mightie riuier. Neither would a transportation by boat haue wrought that effect, for as much as the daily vse thereof was so familiar to the Germans, that it nothing altered their imagination, of an vnaccesible passage: but when they saw so strange a thing attempted, and so suddenly performed, they would easily vnderstand, that they were not so farre off, but that they might be ouertaken; and so direct their demeanour accordingly.

Let this suffice therefore to proue, that a passage ouer a riuier by a bridge, is more honourable, safe, and of greater terror to the enemy, then any other way that can be deuised; especially if the riuier carrie any depth, such as the Rhene is: otherwise, if it haue either shallowes or foordes, whereby men may wade ouer, without any great incombrance, it were but lost labour to stand about a bridge, but rather to thinke of it, as of a place incombred with such hindrances, as men often meete with in a march.

## CHAP. VII.

Cæsar taketh reuenge vpon the Sicambri: giueth libertie to the Ubij; and returneth againe into Gallia.

*Cæsar.*



HE Sicambri, vnderstanding that Cæsar was making a bridge ouer the Rhene, prepared themselues to flie; and at the perswasion of the Vsiptes, forsooke their country, and conuained selues and their possessions into woods, and solitarie desertes. Cæsar continuing a few daies in their quarters, hauing set on fire their villages and houses, and burned up their corne and prouision; he came to the Ubij, promising them aide against the Sueui: by whom he vnderstood, that as soone as the Sueui had intelligence, that he went



went about to make a bridge, calling a counsell according to their maner, they sent vnto all quarters of their state, that they should forsake their townes, and carie their wines and children, and all that they had, into the woods: and that all that were able to beare Armes, should make head in one place, which they appointed to bee the midst of their countrey, and there they attended the comming of the Romaines, and were resolu'd in that place to giue them battell. Which when Caesar vnderstood, hauing ended all those thinges, in regard whereof he came into Germanie, which was chiefly to terrifie the Germans, to be reuenged vpon the Sicambri, to set the Vbiij at libertie; hauing spent in all 18 daies beyond the Rhene, as well in regard of his owne honour, and the good of the common-weale: he returned into Gallia, and brake vp the bridge.

## CHAP. VIII.

Cæsar thinketh of a voiage into Britanie: he enquireth of marchants, concerning the nature of that people.



ALTHOUGH the sommer was almost spent, and that in those partes the winter hasteneth on a pace, inasmuch as all Gallia inclineth to the North; notwithstanding he resolu'd to go ouer into Britanie: forasmuch as he vnderstood, that in all the former wars of Gallia, the enemy had receiued most of their supply from thence. And although the time of the yeare would not suffer him to finish that warre; yet he thought it would be to good purpose, if he went only to view the Iland, to vnderstand the qualitie of the inhabitants, and to know their coast, their portes, and their landing places; whereof the Galls were altogether ignorant: for seldome any man, but marchants, did trauell vnto them. Neither was there any thing discouered but the sea-coast, and those regions which were opposite vnto Gallia: And therefore calling marchants together from all quarters, he neither could vnderstand of what quantitie the Iland was, what nations, or of what power they were that inhabited it; what vse or experience of warre they had; what lawes or customes they vsed; nor what hauens they had to receiue a nauie of great shipping.

Caesar.

## OBSERVATIONS.



AS the Germans had oftentimes stirred vp motions of rebellion amongst the Galls, by sending their superfluous multitudes into their kingdome; so the Britaines had vpheld most of their warres, by furnishing them with such supplies, as from time to time they stood in neede of. So that if Cæsar, or the Roman people, would rest secure of their quiet and peaceable gouernment in Gallia, as they had chastised the in-

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lencie of the Germans, & sent them backe againe, with greater losse then gaine; so was it necessarie to make the Britains know, that their assistance in the warre of Gallia would draw more busineses vpon them, then they were well able to manage. For as I haue noted in my former discourses, the causes of an vnpeaceable gouernment are as well externall and forraigne, as internall and bred in the bodie; which neede the helpe of a Phisition, to continue the bodie in a perfect state of health, and require as great a diligence to qualifie their malicious operations, as any internall sicknesse whatsoeuer.

In the second Commentarie, I briefly touched the commoditie of good discouerie; but because it is a matter of great consequence, in the fortunate carriage of a warre, I will once againe by this example of Cæsar, remember a Generall not to be negligent in this dutie. Suetonius in the life of our Cæsar reporteth, that he neuer vnderooke any expedition, but he first receiued true intelligence of the particular site, and nature of the country, as also of the maners and qualitie of the people; and that he would not vndertake the voiage into Britanie, vntill he had made perfect discouerie by himselfe, of the magnitude and situation of the Iland. Which Suetonius might vnderstand by this first voiage, which Cæsar would needes vndertake in the latter end of a sommer, although it were as he himselfe saith, but to discouer.

It is recorded by auncient writers, that those demigods that gouerned the world in their time, gaue great honor to the exercise of hunting, as the perfect image of warre in the resemblance of all parts, and namely in the discouerie and knowledge of a country; without which all enterprises, either of sport in hunting, or earnest in warres were friuolous and of no effect. And therefore Zenophon in the life of Cyrus, sheweth that his expedition against the king of Armenia, was nothing but a repetition of such sportes, as he had vsed in hunting. Howsoeuer, if the infinite examples registred in historie, how by the dexteritie of some leaders it hath gained great victories, & through the negligence of others, irreuerable ouerthrowes; are not sufficient motiues to perswade the to this duty: let their owne experience in matters of small moment, manifest the weakenesse of their proceedings, when they are ignorant of the chiefeest circumstances of the matter they haue in hand. But let this suffice in the second place, to proue the necessitie of good discouerie; and let vs learne of Cæsar, what is principally to be inquired after in the discouerie of an vnknowne country; as first the quantitie of the land: secondly, what nations inhabite it: thirdly, their vse of warre: fourthly, their ciuill gouernment: and lastly, what hauens they had to receiue a nauie of great shipping. All which circumstances are such principall Arteries in the bodie of a state, that the discouerie of any one of these demaundes would haue giuen great light, concerning the motion of the whole bodie.

## CHAP. IX.

Cæsar sendeth C. Volusenus, to discover the coast  
of Britanie; and prepareth himselfe for  
that voiage.



**C**ÆSAR sent out Caius Volusenus, with a gallie to discover what he could concerning these thinges; and to returne againe unto him very speedely: he himselfe marched in the meane time, with all his forces, unto the Morini; forasmuch as from thence laie the shortest cut into Britanie. Thither he commanded that shippes should be brought from all the maritime cities of that quarter, and namely that fleete, which he had built the yeare be-

Cæsar.  
Teroanne, or  
Monstrell.

fore for the warre at Vannes. In the meane time his resolution being knowne, and carried into Britanie by merchants and others, manie priuate states of that Iland sent ambassadours unto him, promising him hostages of their loialtie, and signifying their readinesse to submit themselves to the Roman Empire. To these he made liberall promises, exhorting them to continue in that obedience; and so sent them backe againe: And with them he sent Comius, whom he had made king of Arras, whose wisdom and vertue he held in good account, and knew it to be of great authoritie in those Regions: to him he gaue in charge to go to as many of the states as he could, and perswade them to accept of the friendship of the Roman Empire, and that Cæsar himselfe would presently follow after.

Volusenus, hauing taken what view of the country he could; for he durst not go on shore to commit himselfe to the barbarisme of the enemy; after fūe daies returned to Cæsar: and while he staid in those places for the furnishing of his fleete, the Morini sent messengers unto him, excusing their former faultes, and manifesting their readinesse to obey his mandates. Cæsar not willing to leaue any enemy behinde him, or to neglect his voiage into Britanie, for such small matters; hee willingly accepted of their submission, hauing first receiued manie hostages of them, and hauing made readie eightie shippes of burthen, which he thought sufficient to transport two legions, he deuised the Gallies to the Questor, the Legates and the commanders of the horse. There were also eigheteene shippes of burthen more, which laie windbound at a port eight miles off, and them he appointed for the horsemen: the rest of the Armie he committed to Q. Titurius Sabinus, and L. Arunculeius Cotta, commanding them to go to the confines of the Menapij: and appointed P. Sulp. Rufus, a Legate, to keepe the port, with a sufficient garrison.

## CHAP. X.

Cæsar faileth into Britanie, and landeth  
his men.

Cæsar.



THESE thinges being thus dispatched: hauing a good winde in the third watch, he put out to sea, commanding his horsmen to imbarke themselues at the further port, which was but slowlie performed: hee himselfe arriued vpon the coast about the fourth houre of the daie, where he found all the cliftes possessed with the forces of the enemye. The nature of the place was such, that the hils laie so steepe ouer the sea, that a weapon might easily be cast, from the higher ground vpon the lower shore: and therefore he thought it no fit landing place; notwithstanding he cast anker untill the rest of the nauie were come up vnto him. In the meane time calling a councell of the Legates and Tribunes, he declared vnto them what aduertisements he had receiued by Volusenus, and told them what he would haue done; and withall admonished them that the course of militarie affaires, and especially sea matters, that had so sudden and an vnconstant motion, required all thinges to be done at a becke, and in due time. The Councell being dismissed, hauing both wind and tide with him, he waighed anker, and sailed eight miles from that place, vnto a plaine and open shore. The Britaines perceiuing the Romans determination, sent their horse and chariots before, and the rest of their forces followed after, to the place where the Romans intended to land. Cæsar found it exceeding difficult to land his men, for these respectes: the ships were so great, that they could not be brought neere vnto the shore: the souldiers in strange and unknowne places, hauing their hands laden with great and heauie weapons, were at one instant to go out of the shippe, to withstand the force of the billow, and to fight with the enemye; whereas the Britaines either standing vpon the shore, or making short sallies into the water, did boldly cast their weapons in knowen and frequented places, and managed their horses as accustomed to such seruices.

The Romans being terrified with these thinges, and altogether unskilfull of this kinde of fight, did vse the same courage, as they were wont to doe in land seruices: which when Cæsar perceiued, he caused the Galleies, that were both strange to the Britaines, and readier for vse, to be remoued from the shippes of burthen, and to be rowed up and downe, and laide against the open side of the enemye; that from thence with slinges, engines & arrowes, the enemy might be beaten up from the water side, which stood the Romans in good steede: for the Britaines, being troubled with the strangeness of the Galleies, the motion of their Oares, and the vnusuall kinde of engines; were somewhat dismayed, and began to retire backe, and giue waie to the Romans: but the souldiers still lingering, and especially for feare of the depth of the sea, the Eagle-bearer of the tenth legion desiring the Gods, that it might fall out happely to the legion: If you will (saith he) forsake your Eagle, O ye souldiers, and betraie it to  
the



*the enemy, for mine owne part I will do my duty both to the common weale, and to my Imperator, and hauing spoken this, with a loud voice, hee cast himselfe into the sea, and caried the Eagle towarde the enemy; the Romaines exhorting one another, not to suffer such a dishonour to be committed, they all leaped out of the ship: which when others that were neere at hande perceiued, they followed them with as great alacritie, and pressed towards the enemy to incounter with them. The fight on both partes was very eager, the Romaines not being able to keepe any order of battell, nor to get any firme footing, nor to follow their ensignes, forasmuch as euery man kept with those ensignes, which he first met withal, were wonderfully troubled: But the enemy acquainted with the flats and shallowes, as they beheld them from the shore to come single out of their ships, putting spurs to their horse, would set upon them in-combreed and vnprepared, and many of them would ouerlay a few; others would get the aduantage of the open side, and cast their weapons amongst the thickest troupes of them: which when Cäsar perceiued, he caused the shipboates and smaller vessels to be manned with soldiours, and where he sawe neede of helpe, he sent them to rescue such as were ouercharged. As soone as the Romaines got footing on the firme land, they made head together and charged the enemy, and so put them to flight, but they were not able to follow them, nor take the Iland at that time, for want of horsemen, which thing was only wanting to Cäsars fortune.*

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



Pon this circumstance of landing, I may iustly take occasion to handle that controuerſie, which hath beene often debated by our English Captaines, which is, whether it be better in question of an inuasion, and in the absence of our shipping, to oppose an enemy at his landing vpon our coast; or quietly to suffer him to set his men on shore, and retire our forces into some inland place, and there attend to giue him battell? It seemeth that such as first set this question on foot, and were of an opinion, that we ought not by any meanes to encounter an enemy at his landing; for so wee might much endanger our selues and our countrey; did ground themselves vpon the authority of Monsieur de Langey, not obseruing the difference betweene an Iland and a continent. For where he setteth down that position, he plainly aimeth at such Princes, as border one vpon an other in the same continent: but where their territories are disioyned by so great a barre as the Ocean, and haue not such meanes to surprise one an other, it were meere folly to hold good that rule, as shall better appeare by the sequell of this discourse. Wherein I will first laie downe the reasons, that may be vrged to proue it vnſafe to oppose an enemy at his landing, not as beeing vrged by that party; for I neuer hearde any probable motiue from them which might induce any such opinion, but set down by such as haue looked into the controuerſies, both with experience and good iudgement.

And first, it may be obiected, that it is a hard matter to resist an enemy at his landing, as well in regard of the vncertaintie of place, as of time: for beeing ignorant in what place hee will attempt a landing, wee must either defende all

T iij.

places



places of accesse, or our intentions wil proue meere triuolous; and to performe that, it is requisite that our defensiuē forces be sufficient, according to the particular qualitie of euery place subiect to danger: which considering the large extension of our maritime parts, and the manie landing places on our coast, will require a greater number of men, then this Iland canne afford. And although it could furnish such a competent number, as might seeme in some sort sufficient; yet the vncertainty of the time of the enemies arriual, would require that they should be lodged, either vpon or neere the places of danger, manie daies at least, if not many weekes, before the instant of their attempt, which would exhaust a greater masse of treasure, then could bee well afforded by the state.

Secondly, it may be obiected, that all our landing places are of such disadvantage, for the defendantes; that it were no safetie at all to make heade against him at the landing: for in asmuch as such places are open and plaine, they yeelde no commodity to shelter the defendantes from the fury of the artillerie, wherewith the enemy will plentifully furnish their long boates and landing vessailes; which beating vpon the beach (for most of our landing places are of that quality) will so scatter them, that no man shall bee able to indure the inconuenience thereof.

The thirde obiection may arise from the disparitie both of numbers, and condition of the forces of either partie: for the first it must needes bee granted, that the defendantes being to garde so many places at once, cannot furnish such numbers to euery particular place for defence, as the assailants may for offence. Concerning the qualitie of the forces, it is without question, that a great and potent Prince, (for such a one it must bee, that vndertaketh to inuade the territories of so absolute and well obeyed a Princess as her Maiestie is) would drawe out the floure of his folderie wheresoeuer; besides the gallant troupes of voluntaries, which do commonly attend such seruices. Now these being thus qualified, and drawne into one head, and being to make as it were but one body: how can it be reasonably imagined (the time and place of their attempt being vncertaine) that the defendants should equal them with forces of like vertue and experience?

These are the reasons, which may be drawne from the disadvantage, which they haue that go about to oppose an enemy at his landing: the rest that haue beene urged, by such as maintaine this opinion, are either impertinent to the question, or taken altogether from false grounds. But before I proceede to the answer of these reasons, I will lay this downe for a principle. That it is impossible for any forraigne Prince how puissant soeuer, to make such a preparation as shall be fitting to inuade a state so populous, and respectiue of their soueraigne, (notwithstanding the pretenses deuised to dissemble the same) but it must of necessity be discovered, before it can bee made able to put any thing in execution: which I might enlarge by particularizing the infinite equipage, which is required for so great a fleet. But I will rest my selfe in the example of the yeere 88. which proueth the discovery of the pretended inuasion, before it could come to execution.

Concerning

Concerning therefore the first obiection: it cannot indeed bee denied, but the place of the enemies landing will be doubtfull; and therefore our care must generally extend it selfe to all places of access: but that our defensiuē forces are not sufficient in a competent maner to garde all such places, according as the necessitie of them shall require, that is the point in question. To prooue that our forces are sufficient: wee must necessarily enter into particularities; wherein I will take Kent for a president, as not altogether vnacquainted with the state thereof; which, if I deceiue not my selfe, is a shore of as large extension vpon the maritimate partes, as any other within this kingdom, for the breadth thereof enlarging it selfe from the point of Nesse by Lyd, which is the vtermoſt skirt vpon the coast of Suffex, vnto Margate vppon the coast of Essex; is by computation about twenty foure miles: but notwithstanding this large circuit, who knoweth not that the sixt part thereof is not subiect to the landing of such an enemy, as wee speake of, partly in regarde of the hugeness of the cliffes, which do inclose a great part of that skirt; and partly in regard that much of that quantitie, which may be landed vpon, hath such eminent and difficult places neere adioyning, as an armie that shoulde put it selfe there on shore, shoulde find it selfe being opposed but by a small force, so straitened, as they would not easily find a way out, without apparant ruine of their whole forces. Further it cannot be denied, but that generally along the coast of Kent, there are so many rocks, shelues, flats, and other impediments, that a nauie of great ships canne haue no commodity to anchor neere the shore: and for the most part the coast lieth so open to the weather, that the least gale of wind will put them from their Anchor: all which particularities duly considered, it wil appeare that this large skirt of Kent will affoord a far lesſer part fit for the landing of an army, then was thought of at the first. And were it that so publike a treatise as this is, would admit with good discretion such an exact relation, as falleth within my knowledge concerning this point, I would vndertake to make it so euident, by the particular description both of the number, quantity and qualitie of the places themselves; as no man of an indifferent iudgement would imagine our forces to be insufficient, to affoord euery of them such a safe and sure garde, as shall bee thought requisite for the same. But forasmuch as it is vnfitting to giue such particular satisfaction in this publike discourse, giue me leaue, submitting my selfe alwaies to better iudgements, to giue a generall taste of that meanes as would secure all places, with a competent number of men.

Hauiug shewed you before the circuit of the maritimat parts of Kent, I would obserue this order: first, to make a triple diuision of all such forces, as shall be appointed for this seruice; as for example, I wil suppose the number to be 12000 of which I would lodge 3000. about the point of Nesse, and 3000. about Margate, & 6000. about Foulkston, which I take to be as it were the center: for my greatest care should be so to dispose of them, as they might not only succor one another in the same shire, but as euery shire bordereth one vpon another; so they should mutually giue helpe one vnto another, as occasion should bee offered: as if the enemy shoulde attempt a landing about Nesse, not onely the 6000. lodged as before, shoulde march to their succours, but such also of the

Suffex

*Answer to  
the first ob-  
iection.*

Sufflex forces as were neere vnto that part; and so likewise of the rest: by which you may see how great a force would in few houres bee assembled, for the reinforcing of any of these out skirts; and the rather, forasmuch as the one halfe of the whole forces are thus lodged in the center of the shire, which is neerer to all parts then any other place whatsoeuer. There woulde also in the quartering of them, an especiall care bee had to the places of daunger, as might bee answerable to the importance thereof: for my meaning is not to lodge them close together, but to stretch them out along the coast by regiments and companies, as the country might afford best oportunitie, to entertaine them.

Now concerning the latter part of this obiection, which vrgeth the vncertainty of time, when the enemy shall make his approches: I holde it most requisite that our defensue forces should be drawne into a heade, before the enemy should be discouered neere our coast ready to put himselfe on shoare: for it were a grosse absurdity to imagine, that companies coulde vpon such a so-daine be assembled, without confusion; and make so long a march, with such expedition, as the necessity of the occasion would require. Nowe for that huf-banding respect of her Maiesties coffers, which is vrged to such extremity, as it would be vsupportable for this state to beare: as I doubt not but good intelligence would much qualifie that supposed immoderate expence; so I assure my selfe, that men of sound iudgement, will deeme it much out of season to dispute about vnecessary thrift, when the whole kingdome is brought in question of being made subiect to a stranger:

*Vt ingulgent homines surgunt de nocte latrones,  
Non expergesteris, vt te ipsum serues?*

the enemy (peradventure) hath kept 30000. men in paie 2. months before, to make hauocke of our countrey, and to bring vs into perpetuall thraldome; shal we thinke it much to maintaine sufficient forces vpon our coast, to assure our selues, that no such enemy shall enter into our countrey? the extremity of this charge woulde bee qualified by our good espiall, which would proportion our attendance, with the necessity which is imposed vpon vs to bee carefull in busi-nesses of this nature. Let this suffice therefore to proue, that our forces are sufficient to keepe the sea coast; and that the vncertainty of time, when the enemy will make his attempts, ought not to hinder vs from performing that dutie, which the care and respect of our Prince and countrey imposeth vpon euerie good subiect, which is the substance of the first reason, which I set downe in the beginning of this discourse.

*The answer  
to the second  
reason.*

Now concerning the second reason, which vrgeth the disadvantage of the place, in regarde of the fury of the enemies artillery. True it is, that such places as yelde the enemy commodity of landing, are for the most parte plaine and open, and afford naturally no couert at all. What then? shall a soldiour take euery place as hee findeth it, and vse no arte to qualifie the disadvantages thereof? or shall a man forgo the benefit of a place of aduantage rather, then hee will relieue with indultry the discommoditie of some particular circumstance? I make no question but an ingenious commander, being in seasonable time lodged with conuenient forces vpon any of those places, yea vpon the beach



beach it selfe; which is vnapt to make defensible; as anie place whatsoeuer; woulde vse such industrie as might giue sufficient securitie to his forces, and ouerwaie the enimie with aduantage of place; especially considering that this age hath afforded such plentifull examples of admirable inuentions in that behalfe: but this cannot be done; if our forces doe not make head before the instant of the enemies attempt, that our commanders may haue some time to make readie store of Gabions, handbaskets, with such moueable matter as shal be thought fit for that seruice.

Neither let this trouble anie man, for I dare auouch it, that if our forces are not drawne into a heade before the enimie bee discouered vpon the coast, although wee neuer meane to oppose their landing, but attende them in some inlande place, to giue them battaile; our Commanders will bee farre to seeke of manie important circumstances, which are requisite in a matter of that consequence. And therefore let vs haue but a reasonable time to bethinke our selues of these necessities, and we will easilie ouercome all these difficulties, and vse the benefit of the firme lande to repell an enimie, weakened with the sea, tossed with the billow, troubled with his weapons, with manie other hinderances and discouragements, which are presented vnto him both from the land and the sea. He that saw the landing of our forces in the Island of Fiall, in the yeere 97. can somewhat iudge of the difficulty of that matter: for what with the working of the sea, the steepnesse of the cliffes, the troublesomnes of their armes, the soldiors were so incombred, that had not the enimie beene more then a coward, he might wel with 200. men haue kept vs from entering any part of that Iland.

Concerning the thirde obiection, this briefelie shall bee sufficient, that wee are not so much to regarde that our forces doe equall them in number, as to see that they bee sufficient for the nature of the place, to make it good against the enemies landing: for wee knowe that in places of aduantage and difficult accessse, a small number is able to oppose a great; and wee doubt not but all circumstances duellie considered, wee shall proportionablie equall the enimie, both in number and qualitie of their forces: alwaies presupposed, that our state shall neuer bee destitute of sufficient forces trained, and exercised in a competent maner, to defende their Countrey from forraigne enemies. For the neglect thereof, were to drawe on such as of themselves are but too forward, to make a praie of vs; and to make vs vnapt, not onelie to oppose an enemies landing, but to defende our selues from beeing ouerrunne; as other nations liuing in security, without due regarde thereof, haue beene.

*The answere  
to the third  
reason.*

And this much concerning the answere to those three reasons, which seeme to prooue that an enimie is not to bee resisted at his landing. Nowe if we do but looke a little into the discommodities, which follow vpon the landing of an enemy, we shall easilie discouer the dangerousnesse of this opinion: as first, we giue him leaue to liue vpon the spoile of our countrey, which cannot be preuented by any waisting, spoiling, or retiring of our prouisions, in so plentiful a countrey as this is, especially considering that wee haue no strong townes



at all to repose our selues vpon. Whereof wee neede no further testimonie, then is deliuered vnto vs out of the seventh booke of these Commentaries, in that war, which Cæsar had with Vercingetorix.

Secondly obedience, which at other times is willingly giuen to Princes, is greatly weakened at such times; whereby all necessary meanes to maintaine a war is hardly drawn from the subiect. Thirdly, oportunitie is giuen to malecontents and ill disposed persons, either to make head themselves, or to flie to the enemy. Fourthly, the madnes to aduenture a kingdom vpon one stroke, hauing it in our disposition to do otherwise, with many other disadvantages, which the oportunitie of any such occasion would discouer.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Of the name  
Imperator.



He worde *imperator*, which the Eagle-bearer attributeth to Cæsar, was the greatest title that could be giuen to a Romaine leader: and as Zonaras in his second Tome saith, was neuer giuen but vpon some great exploite, and after a iust victorie obtained; and then in the place where the battaile was fought, and the enemy ouerthrowne, the Generall was saluted by the name of *Imperator*, with the triumphant shoute of the whole armie; by which acclamation, the soldiours gaue testimonie of his worth; and made it equiualent with the most fortunate Commanders.

3. *Annal.*

This ceremonie was of great antiquitie in the Romaine Empire, as appeareth by manie histories, and namelie by Tacitus, where hee saith, that Tyberius gaue that honour to Bleisus, that hee should be saluted Imperator by the legions; which hee sheweth to bee an ancient dignitie belonging to great Captaines, after they had foiled the enemy, with an eminent ouerthrowe. For euerie victorie was not sufficient, whereby they might challenge so great an honour, but there was required (as it seemeth) a certaine number of the enemies to be slaine. Apian in his second booke saith, that in olde time, the name of Imperator was neuer taken, but vpon great and admirable exploits: but in his time 10000 of the enemy being slaine in one battell, was a sufficient ground of that honour. Cicero saith, that 2000 slaine in the place, especiallie of Thracians, Spaniards or Galles, did worthely merit the name of Imperator. Howsoever it seemeth by the same author, that there was a certain number of the enemy required to be slaine, where he saith, *Se in ista victoria Imperatorem appellatum.*

Phil. 14.

Lib. 2. *epist.* 9

## CHAP. XI.

The Britains make peace with Cæsar, but breake it againe, upon the losse of the Romain shipping.



**T**HE Britaines being ouerthrowne in this battaliez, as soone as they had recovered their safety by flight, they presently dispatched messengers to Cæsar to intreate for peace, promising hostages and obedience, in whatsoeuer he commanded. And with these ambassadors returned Comius of Arras, whom Cæsar had sent before into Britanie. Cæsar complained, that, whereas they sent vnto him into Gallia to desire peace, notwithstanding at his comming they made warre against him, without any cause or reason at all; but excusing it by their ignorance, he commanded hostages to be deliuered vnto him: which they presently performed in parte; and the rest being to bee set further off, shoulde likewise be rendered within a short time; in the meane while, they commanded their people to returne to their possessions, and their Rulers and Princes came out of all quarters to commend themselves and their states to Cæsar. The peace being thus concluded; foure daies after that Cæsar came into Britanie, the eighteen shippes which were appointed for the horsemen, put out to sea with a gentle winde, and approaching so neere the coast of Britanie, that they were within viewe of the Romaine campe: there arose such a sodaine tempest, that none of them were able to holde their course, but some of them returned to the porte from whence they came; other some were cast vpon the lower part of the Ilande, which lieth to the West ward; and there casting anchor tooke in such seas, that they were forced to commit themselves againe to the sea, and direct their course to the coast of Gallia. The same night it happened, that the moone being in the full, the tides were verie high in those seas; whereof the Romaines being altogether ignorant, both the Gallies which were drawne vp vpon the shore were filled with the tide, and the shippes of burthen that laie at anchor, were shaken with the tempest; neither was there anie helpe to be giuen vnto them: so that many of them were rent, and split in peeces; and the rest lost both their anchors, Gables and other tackling: and by that meanes became altogether vserviceable. Whereat the whole armie was exceedingly troubled; for there was no other shipping to recarrie them bcke againe: Neither had they anie necessaries to newe furnish the olde: and euerie man knew that they must needs winter in Gallia; for as much as there was no prouision of corn in those places where they were. Which thing beeing knowne to the Princes of Britanie, that were assembled to confer of such thinges as Cæsar had commanded them to performe, when they understood that the Romaines wanted both their horsemen, shipping, and prouision of corne, and coniecturing of the paucitie of their forces, by the small circuit of their campe, and that which was more important then all the rest, that Cæsar had transported his soldiours without such necessarie cariages, as they vsed to take with them: they thought it their best course to rebell, and to keepe the Romaines from corne and conuoyes of prouision, and so prolong the matter, vntil winter came on. For they thought that if these were once ouerthrowne

Cæsar.

Vj.

and

*and cut off from returning into Gallia, neuer any man would afterward adventure, to bring an army into Britanie: therefore they conspired againe the second time, and conuased themselves by stealth out of the campe, and got their men priuily out of the fields, to make head in some conuenient place against the Romans.*

#### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**O**ncerning the ebbing and flowing of the sea, and the causes thereof; it hath already beene handled in the second booke, to which I will adde this much, as may serue to shew, how the Romaines became so ignorant of the spring tides, which happen in the full and new of the moone. It is obserued by experience, that the motion of this waterie element is altogether directed by the course of the moon, wherein she exerciseth her regency, according as shee findeth the matter qualified for her influence. And for asmuch as all mediterranean seas, and such gulfs as are inclosed in sinues and bosomes of the earth, are both abridged of the liberty of their course, and through the smallnes of their quantity, are not so capable of celestiall power; as the Ocean it selfe: it consequently followeth, that the Tuscan sea, wherewith the Romaines were chiefly acquainted, were not so answerable in effect to the operation of the moon, as the maine sea, whose bounds are ranged in a more spacious circuit; and through the plenteous abundance of his parts, better answereth the vertue of the moone. The Ocean therfore being thus obedient to the course of the celestial bodies, taking hir course of flowing from the North, falleth with such a current between the Orcades, and the maine of Noruegia; that she filleth our channel between England and France, with great swelling tides; and maketh her motion more eminent in these quarters, then in any other partes of the world. And hence it happeneth, that our riuer of Thames, lying with her mouth so ready to receiue the tyde as it cometh, and hauing withall a plaine leuelled belly, and a very smal fresh current, taketh the tide as far into the land, as any other known riuer of Europe. And for this cause the Romans were ignorant of the spring tides in the ful of the moone.

#### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**S**uch as either by their own experience, or otherwise by obseruation of that which history recordeth, are acquainted with the gouernment of common weales, are not ignorant with what difficulty a nation, that either hath long liued in liberty, or bin gouerned by commanders of their own choosing, is made subiect to the yoake of bondage, or reduced vnder the obediēce of a stranger. For as we are apt by a naturall inclination to ciuill societie; so by the same nature wee desire a free disposition of our selues and possessions, as the cheefest end of the saide societie: And therefore in the gouernment of a subdued state, what losse or disadvantage happeneth to the victor, or how indirectlie

foeuer



foeuer it concerneth the bond of their thraldome, the captiue people behold it as a part of their aduerfaries ouerthrow; and conceiue thereupon fuch fpirites, as anfwere the greatnes of their hope, and fort with the ftrength of their will, which alwaies maketh that feeme eafie to be effected which it defireth. And this was the reafon, that the Britaines altered their refolution of peace, vpon the loffe which the Romans had receiued in their fhipping.

## CHAP. XII.

*Cæfar new trimmeth his late shaken nauie: the Britaines fet vpon the Romans as they haruefted; but were put off by Cæfar.*



**C**ÆSAR although he had not difcovered their determination, yet coniecturing of the euent by the loffe of his fhipping, and by their delay of giuing vpp hostages; hee provided againft all chances: for he brought corne daily out of the fields into his camps, and tooke the huls of fuch fhips as were moft difmembered, and with the tymber and braffe thereof hee mended the reft that were beaten with the tempeft, caufing other neceffaries to bee brought out of Gallia. Which being handeled with the great induftrie and trauell of the fouldiers, he loft onely twelue fhippes, and made the other able to abide the fea.

While thefe thinges were in action, the feuenth legion being fent out by courfe, to fetch in corne, and little fufpecting any motion of warre; as part of the fouldiers continued in the field, and the reft went and came betweene them and the campe, the ftation that watched before the gate of the campe, gaue aduertifement to Cæfar, that the fame way which the legion went, there appeared a greater duft then was vfuall feene. Cæfar fufpecting that which in deede was true, that the Britaines were entered into fome new refolution, he tooke thofe two cohorts which were in ftation before the port, commanding other two to take their place, and the reft to arme themfelues, and prefently to follow him, and went that waie, where the duft was defcried. And when he had marched fome diftance from the campe, he faw his men ouercharged with the enemy, and fcarce able to fuftaine the affault, the legion thronged together on a heape, and weapons caft from all partes amongft them. For when they had haruefted all other quarters, there remained one piece of corne, whither the enemy fufpected the Romans would at laft come; and in the night time conuaid themfelues fecretly into the woods, where they continued, untill the Romans were come into the field, and as they faw them difarmed, difperfed and occupied in reaping; they fuddenly fet vpon them, and flaying fome few of them, rowted the reft and incompaſſed them about with their horfemen, and chariots. Their manner of fight with chariots, was firft to ride vp and downe and caft their weapons, as they faw aduantage; and with the terrour of their horfes & ratteling of their wheelles, to diforder the companies; and when they



they had wound themselves betweene anie troupes of horse, they forsooke their chariots and fought on foot: in the meane time the guiders of their chariots would driue a little aside, and so place themselves, that if their maisters needed anie helpe, they might haue an easie passage vnto them. And thus they performed in all their fightes, both the nimble motion of horsemen, and the firme stabilitie of footmen; and were so readie with daily practise, that they could staie in the declinitie of a steepe hill, and turne short or moderate their going, as it seemed best vnto them; and runne along the beame of the coach and rest vpon the yoke, or harnesse of their horses, and returne as speedely againe at their pleasure. The Romans being thus troubled, Cæsar came to rescue them in verie good time: for at his comming, the enemy stood still; and the souldiers gathered their spirits vnto them, and began to renew their courage that was almost spent. Cæsar, thinking it an unfit time, either to prouoke the enemy, or to giue him battell; he continued a while in the same place: And then returned with the legions into the campe. While these things were a doing, and the Romaines thus busied; the Britaines that were in the field, conuained themselves all awaie.

#### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**B**Y this wee plainly finde, that there were vsually two cohortes (which according to the rate of 120 in a maniple, amounted to the number of 720 men) which kept the daie watch before the gate of the campe, and were alwaies in readinesse vpon any seruice. The commoditie whereof appeareth by this accident, for considering that the aduertisement required haste and speedie recourse, it greatly furthered their rescue to haue so manie men readie to march forward at the first motion, that they might giue what helpe they could, vntill the rest of their fellowes came in.

#### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**T**Heir manner of fight with chariots, is very particularly described by Cæsar, and needeth not to bee stood vpon any longer: onely I obserue, that neither in Gallia, nor any other country of Europe, the vse of chariots is neuer mentioned: but they haue euer beene attributed, as a peculiar fight, vnto the easterne countries, as futable to the plaine and leuell situation of the place, whereof we finde often mention in the scripture: which may serue for an argument to Geffrey of Monmouth, to proue the Britaines descent from Troie in Asia, where we likewise finde mention of such chariots.

## THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

**A** Hirdly we may obserue, the discrete or moderate temper of his valour, and the meanes he vsed to make his souldiers confident in his directions: for notwithstanding the Britaines had exceedingly vrged him, to make hazard of a present reuenge; yet finding it an vnfit time, (inasmuch as his men had beene somewhat troubled, with the furie of the Britaines) hee thought it best to expect some other oportunitie. And againe, to auoid the inconueniences of a fearefull retreat, he continued a while in the same place, to imbolden his men with the sight of the enemy. And this manner of proceeding wrought a full perswasion in his souldiers, that his actions were directed with knowledge, and with a carefull respect of their safetie; which gaue him resolution when they were caried vpon seruice, being assured that what seruice soeuer they were imployed vpon, was most diligently to bee performed, as a matter much importing the fortunate issue of that warre: whereas if they had perceiued that headstrong furie, which carrieth men on with a desire of victorie, and neuer looketh into the meanes whereby it may be obtained, had directed the course of their proceedinges, they might with reason haue drawne backe from such imployments, and valewed their safetie about the issue of such an enterprise. And hence ariseth that confident opinion, which the souldiers haue of a good Generall; which is a matter of great importance in the course of a warre.

## CHAP. XIII.

The Britaines make head, with their forces, and  
are beaten by Cæsar: his returne in-  
to Gallia.

**A**FTER this; for manie daies together, there followed such tempests and foule weather, that both the Romans were constrained to keepe their campe, and the Britaines were kept from attempting any thing against them: But in the meane time, they sent messengers into all quarters, publishing the small number of the Roman forces, and amplifying the greatnesse of the bootie, and the easie means offered vnto them of perpetuall libertie, if they could take the Roman campe. Shortly vpon this, hauing gathered a great companie, both of horse and foote; they came to the place where the Romans were incamped. Cæsar (although he foresaw the euent by that which before had happened, that if the enemy were beaten backe, he would auoide the danger by flight) yet hauing some 30 horse, which Comius of Arras had carried with him, at his comming

Cæsar.

comming into Britanie; he imbattailed his legions before his campe; and so gaue them battell. The enimie not being able to beare the assault of the Roman souldiers, turned their backs and fled: the Romans followed them, as farre as they could by running on foote; and after a great slaughter, with the burning of their townes farre and neare, they returned to their campe. The same daie the Britaines sent messengers to Cæsar, to intreat for peace; whom he commanded to double their number of hostages, which he commanded to be carried into Gallia. And forasmuch as the Aequinoctium was at hand; he thought it not safe to put himselfe to the winter sea, with such weake shipping: and therefore hauing got a conuenient time, he hoised saile a little after midnight, and brought all his ships safe vnto the continent. Two of these ships of burthen, not being able to reach the same hauen, put in somewhat lower into the land: the soldiers that were in them being about 300, being set on shore, and marching towardes their campe: the Morini, with whom Cæsar at his going into Britany had made peace, in hope of a bootie, first with a few of their men stood about them, commanding them vpon paine of death to laie downe their weapons; and as the Romans, by casting themselves into an Orbe, began to make defence, at the noise and clamour amongst them, there were suddenly gathered together about 6000 of the enemy. Which thing being knowen, Cæsar sent out all the horsemen to relieue them: in the meane time the Romans sustained the force of the enimie, and fought valiantly the space of foure houres; and receiuing themselves some few woundes, they slew many of the enimie. After the Roman horsemen came in sight, the enimie cast awaie their weapons and fled, and a great number of them fell by the horsemen.

## OBSERVATIONS.



F al the figures which the *Tactici* haue chosen to make vse of in militarie affaires; the circle hath euer beene taken for the fittest, to be applied in the defensiu part, as inclosing with an equall circuit on all partes whatsoeuer is contained within the circumference of that Area: and therefore Geometrie tearmeth a circumference a simple line, for as much as if you alter the site of the parts, and transport one arch into the place of another; the figure notwithstanding will remaine the same, because of the equall bending of the line, throughout the whole circumference. Which property, as it proueth an vniformitie of strength in the whole circuit, so that it cannot be said that this is the beginning, or this is the end; this is front, or this is flanke. So doth that, which Euclide doth demonstrate in the 3 of his Elements, concerning the small affinitie betweene a right line, and a circle (which being drawn to touch the circumference, doth touch it but in a point only) shew the greatnes of this strength in regard of any other line, by which it may be broken. Which, howsoeuer they seeme, as speculatiue qualities, conceiued rather by intellectuall discourse, then manifested to sensible apprehension; yet forasmuch as experience hath proued the strength of this figure, in a defensiu part, aboue any other maner of imbattailing; let vs not neglect the knowledge of these naturall properties, which discouer the causes of this effect: neither let vs neglect  
this



this part of militarie knowledge, being so strong a meanes to maintaine valour, and the finew of all our abilitie: for order correspondent to circumstances, is the whole strength and power of an Armie. Neither ought there any action in a well ordered discipline, to be irregular, or voide of order: and therefore the Romans did neither eate nor sleepe, without the direction of the Consull, or chiefe commander; otherwise their valour might rather haue beene tearmed furie then vertue: but when their courage was ranged with order, and disposed according to the occurrences of the time; it neuer failed as long as the said order continued perfect.

It appeareth therefore, how important it is for a commander to looke into the diuersitie of orders for imbattailing, and to waigh the nature thereof; that hee may with knowledge apply them to the quality of any occasion. The Romans tearmed this figure *Orbis*, which signifieth a round body both with a concaue, and a conuex surface: in resemblance whereof, I vnderstand this Orbe of men imbattailed to be so named; which might peraduenture consist of fiue or more or fewer ranks, inclosing one another after the nature of so manie circles, described about one Center: so that either the middest thereof remained voide, or otherwise contained such cariages, and impediments, as they had with them in their march. This forme of imbattailing was neuer vsed, but in great extremitie: for as it was the safest of all other; so it gaue suspicion to the souldiers of exceeding danger, which abated much of their heat in battell, as wil herafter appeare by the testimonie of Caesar himselfe, in the fift Commentarie, vpon the occasion which happened vnto Sabinus and Cotta.

## CHAP. XIII.

**T**HE next daie, Caesar sent Titus Labienus a Legate, with those legions which he had brought out of Britanie, against the reuolted Morini; who hauing no place of refuge because their bogs & fens were dried up, where they had sheltered themselues the yeare before, they all fell under the power of his mercie. Q. Titurius, and A. Cotta the Legats, who had led the legions against the Menapij, after they had wasted their fieldes, cut up their corne, burned their houses, for the Menapij were all hid in thicke woods; they returned to Caesar: these thinges being thus ended, Caesar placed the wintering campes of all his legions amongst the Belgæ; to which place two only of all the cities in Britanie, sent hostages vnto him: the rest neglecting it. These wars being thus ended: vpon the relation of Caesars letters, the senate decreed a supplication for the space of 20 daies.

Caesar.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**I**N the ende of the second Commentarie, we reade of a supplication granted by the senate, for 15 daies; which was neuer granted to anie man before that time, since the first building of the citie: but forasmuch as in this fourth yeare of the warres in Gallia, it was augmented from 15

Xj.


vnto



Li. 15. fami.  
Cicero.

vnto 20 daies, I thought it fit to referre the handling thereof, vnto this place. We are therfore to vnderstand, that whensoever a Roman Generall had carried himselfe well in the warres, by gaining a victorie, or enlarging the boundes of their Empire; that then the senate did decree a supplication to the Gods, in the name of that captaine. And this dignitie was much sought after, not onely because it was a matter of great honour, that in their names the Temples of their Gods should be opened, and their victories acknowledged, with the concourse and gratulation of the Roman people: but also because a supplication was commonly the forerunner of a triumph, which was the greatest honour in the Roman gouernment: And therfore Cato nameth it the prerogatiue of a triumph. And Liniu in his 26 booke saith, that it was long disputed on in the senate, how they could denie one that was there present to triumph, whose absence they had honoured, with supplication, and thanksgiuing to the Gods, for things happily effected? The maner of the Ceremonie was; that after the Magistrate had publicly proclaimed it with this forme or stile, *quod bene & faciliter rempublicam administrasset*; the Roman people cloathed in white garmentes and crowned with garlands, went to all the temples of the Gods, and there offered sacrifices, to gratulate the victorie in the name of the Generall. In which time they were forbidden all other busineses, but that which pertained to this solemnity. It seemeth that this time of supplication, was at first included within one or two daies at the most, as appeareth by Liniu in his third booke, where he saith, that the victorie gained by two seuerall battels, was spitefully shut vp by the senat in one daies supplication: the people of their owne accord keeping the next daie holie and celebrating it with greater deuotion then the former.

Vpon the victorie which Camillus had against the Veij, there were granted foure daies of supplication; to which there was afterward a daie added, which was the vsuall time of supplication vnto the time that Pompei ended the warre, which they called Mithridaticum; when the vsuall time of fise daies was doubled, and made 10, and in the second of these Commentaries, made 15, and now brought to 20 daies. Which setteth forth the incitements and rewardes of wel doing, which the Romans propounded both at home and abroad, to such as in deuoured to enlarge their Empire, or manage a charge, to the benefit of their common-wealths. And thus endeth the fourth Commentarie.



# THE FIFT COMMENTARIE OF THE WAR, WHICH CÆSAR MADE IN GALLIA.

## THE ARGUMENT.

**C**æsar caused a great nauie to be built in Gallia: he caried 5 legions into Britany, where he made war with the Britains, on both sides the riuer Thames: at his returne into Gallia, most of the Galles reuolted; and first the Eburones vnder the conduction of Ambiorix, set vpon the campe of Q. Titurius the Legate, whom they circumuented by subtilty; and then besieged the campe of Cicero: but were put by, and their Armie ouerthrowen by Cæsar.

## CHAP. I.

Cæsar returneth into Gallia: findeth there great  
*store of shipping made by the souldiers, and commandeth them to be brought to the  
hauen Iccius.*



**L**VCIVS Domitius, and Appius Claudius, being Consuls; Cæsar at his going into Italie, gaue order to the Legats to build as manie ships that winter, as possibly they could; commanding them to be built of a lower pitch then those which are used in the mediterranean sea, for the speedier lading & unlading of the, and because the tides in these seas were verie great: and forasmuch as he was to transport great store of horse, he commanded them to be made flatter in the bottome then such as were vsuall in other places, and all of them to be made for the vse of Oares, to which purpose their low building serued verie conueniently. Other necessaries and furniture for rigging, he gaue order to haue it brought out of Spaine. Cæsar after the assembly of the states in Lombardie, and that he set free Illiricum from the incursions of the Pirusta, he returned into Gallia; where he found 600 ships built, by the extraordinarie industrie of the souldiers, notwithstanding the penurie and want of all necessarie matter, with 28 Gallies ready furnished, which in a few daies might be lanchèd: hauing commended the souldiers and ouerseers of the worke, he commanded them to be brought to the port called Iccius, from whence he knew the passage into Britanie, was not aboue thirtie mile ouer.

Cæsar.

X ij.

THE

## THE OBSERVATION.

**T**His Iccius Portus Floide thinketh to be Caleis; others take it to bee Saint Omer, partly in regard of the situation of the place, which being in it selfe verie lowe, hath notwithstanding very high bankes, which incompass the towne about; and in times past was a verie large hauen. To this maie be added the distance from this towne, to the next continent of the Iland of Britany; which Strabo maketh to containe 320 stadia, which agreeth to the French computation of 13 leagues. Cæsar maketh it thirtie mile: this is the hauen, which Pliny calleth *Britannicum portum Morinorum*.

## CHAP. II.

Cæsar saileth into Britanie: landeth his forces,  
and seeketh the enemye.

Cæsar.



**CÆSAR** hauing prepared all things in readinesse, he left Labienus in the continent with three legions, and 2000 horse, both to keepe the hauen and make prouision of corne; and also to obserue the motion of the Galles: and with fīue legions and the like number of horse, as he left in the continent, about sun-setting he put out to sea, with a soft south winde, which continued vntill midnight; and then ceasing, he was carried with the tide vntill the morning, when he perceived that the Iland laie on his left hand: and againe, as the tide changed, hee laboured by rowing to reach that part of the Iland, where he had found good landing the yeare before: wherein the souldiers deserved great commendation; for by strength and force of Oares, they made their great ships of burthen to keepe waie with the Galleies. About high noone, they arrived in Britanie, with all their ships: neither was there any enemye scene in that place; but as afterward Cæsar vnderstood by the captiues, the Britains were there with a great power; but being terrified with the infinite number of shipping, which they discovered from the shore (for there were in all about 800) they forsooke the shore, and hid themselues in the vpland countrie. Cæsar hauing landed his men, and chosen a conuenient place to incampe, as soone as he vnderstood by the captiues where the enemy laie, in the third watch of the night, he marched towards them; leauing ten cohortes and 300 horse, for a garizon to his shipping: which he the lesse feared, because it lay at anchor in a soft and open shore: he marched that night about 12 mile before he found the enemye: The Britaines sending out their horse, and chariots to a riuer that ran betweene them and the Romans, and hauing the aduantage of the vpper ground; began to hinder the Romans, and to giue them battell, but being beaten backe with our horsemen, they conuained themselues into a wood. The place was strongly fortified both by art and nature, and made for a defence (as it seemeth) in their ciuill wars: for all the entrances were

shut

*shut up with great trees, laid ouerthwart the passages. And the Britaines shewed themselues out of the wood but here and there, not suffering the Romans to enter the fortification: but the soldiours of the seauenth legion, with a Testudo which they made, and a mount which they raised, tooke the place and drove them all out of the woods, without any losse at all; sauing some fewe wounds which they receiued. But Caesar forbade his men to follow after them, with any long pursuit, because hee was both ignorant of the place, and a great part of that daie being spent, he would imploy the rest thereof in the fortification of his campe.*

## OBSERVATIONS.



Caesar, hauing taken what assurance of peace he could with the Galles, both by carrying the chiefeest of their Princes with him, and by leauing three legions in the continent, to keepe the vulgar people in obedience: he embarked al his men at one place, that they might be all partakers of the same casualties, and take the benefit of the same aduentures, which being neglected the yeare before, drew him into many inconueniences for want of horse, which being embarked at an other hauen met with other chances, and saw other fortunes; and neuer came to him into Britanie: The place of landing in this second voyage, was the same where he landed the yeere before: and by the circumstances of this history, may agree with that which tradition hath deliuered of Deale in Kent, where it is said that Caesar landed. In the first yeere we finde, that he neuer remoued his campe from the sea shore, where he first seated himselfe; although his men went out to bring in corne, as far as they might wel returne againe at night: but now hee entered further into the Iland, and within twelue miles march came vnto a riuer, which must needs be that of Canturbury, which falleth into the sea at Sandwich.

In that he saith that the garizon of his shipping consisted of ten cohortes, which I haue said to be a legion: we must vnderstande, that Caesar left not an entire legion in that garizon; but he tooke ten cohorts out of his whole forces, peraduenture two out of euerie legion, and appointed them to take the charge of his shipping.

## CHAP. III.

*Caesar returneth to his nauies to take order for  
such losses as had happened by tempest  
the night before.*



HE next daie earlie in the morning, hee deuided his forces into 3. companies, and sent them out to pursue the enemy: but before they had marched any farre distance, and came to haue the rereward of the enemy in vewe; there came newes from *L. Atrius*, with whom he left the ten cohorts,

*Caesar.*

*X iij.*

*cohortes,*



cohortes, and the charge of the shipping, that the night before there was such a tempest at sea, that the whole navy was either sore beaten or cast on shore, and that neither anchor nor Gable could hold them, nor yet the Sailers indure the force of the weather; and that there was great losse in the shipping, by running against one another, in the violence of the tempest. Vpon these newes, Cæsar caused the legions to be called backe againe, and to cease for that time, from following the enemy any further, he himselfe returned to the navy, where he found 40. ships lost, and the rest not to be repaired but with great industry and paines: first therefore he chose shipwriters and Carpenters out of the legions, and caused others to bee sent for out of Gallia; and writ to Labienus to make ready what shipping he could. And although it seemed a matter of great difficulty and much labour; yet he thought it best, to hale up all the ships on shore, and to inclose them within the fortification of his campe: in this businesse he spent ten daies, without intermission either of night or day, untill hee had drawn up the ships, and strongly fortified the campe leauing the same garrison which was there before to defend it.

#### THE OBSERVATION.



Herein we may behold the true image of vndanted valour, and the horrible industry (as Tully tearmeth it) which hee vsed to preuent fortune of her stroke in his busines, and comprehend casualties and future contingents, within the compas of order and the bounds of his owne power, being able in tenne daies space, to set almost eight hundred ships from the hazarde of winde and weather; and to make his campe the Roade for his nauie, that so he might rest secure of a meanes to returne at his pleasure.

#### CHAP. IIII.

The Britains make Cassiuellaunus generall in this warre: the Iland, and the maners of the people described.

Cæsar.



**C**ÆSAR returning to the place from whence hee came, founde far greater forces of the Britans there assembled, then he left whē he went to the nauie. And that by publike consent of the Britaines, the whole gouernment of that war was giuen to Cassiuellaunus, whose kingdome lay deuided from the maritime states, with the riuer Thames, beginning at the sea, & extending it selfe 80. mile into the Iland. This Cassiuellaunus, made continuall war with his neighbor states: but vpon the comming of the Romans, they all forgot their home-bred quarrels, and cast the whole gouernment vpon his sholders, as the fittest to direct that war.

The

The inner part of Britanie is inhabited, by such as memory recordeth to be borne in the Ilands; and the maritimate coast by such as came out of Belgia, either to make incursions or inuasions; and after the war was ended, they continued in the possessions they had gained, and were called by the name of the cities from whence they came: the country is very populous, and well inhabited with houses, much like vnto them in Gallia. They haue great store of castell, and vse brasse for money, or yron ringes waighed at a certaine rate. In the mediterranean partes there is found great quantity of Tyn, and in the maritimate parts yron: their brasse was brought in by other nations. They haue all sorts of trees that they haue in Gallia, excepting the figge and the Beech. Their religion will not suffer them to eate, either Haire, Hen, or Goose; notwithstanding they haue of all sorts, as well for novelty as variety. The country is more temperate, and not so colde as Gallia. The Ilande lieth triangle wise, whereof one side confronteth Gallia, of which side that angle, wherein Kent is pointed to the East; and the other angle to the South: this side containeth about 500. mile. An other side lieth toward Spaine and the West, that waie where Ireland lieth, being an Ilande halfe as big as England; and as farre distant from it as Gallia: in the mid way between England & Ireland, lieth an Iland called Mona, besides many other smaller Ilands, of which some write that in winter time for 30. daies together, they haue continuall night, whereof we learned nothing by inquirie, only we found by certaine measures of water, that the nights in England were shorter then in the Continent. The length of this side, according to the opinion of the inhabitants, containeth 700. mile. The thirde side lieth to the North and the open sea, sauing that this angle doth somewhat point towards Germanie; this side is thought to contain 800. miles: And so the whole Iland containeth in circuit 2000. miles. Of al the inhabitants, they of Kent are most curteous and ciuill; al their country bordering vpon the sea, and little differing from the fashion of Gallia. Most of the inlande people sow no corne, but liue with milke and flesh, clothed with skins, and hauing their faces painted with a blew colour, so the end they may seeme more terrible in fight: they haue the haire of their head long, hauing al other parts of their body shauen, sauing their upper lip. Their wines are common to ten or twelue, especially brethren with brethren, and parents with children; but the children that are borne, are put vnto them, vnto whom the mother was first giuen in marriage.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**I**N the descriptions of the ancient Britains, we may first obserue their pedigree, according to the Haraldry of that time: wherein we must vnderstand that in those ages, the Nations of the worlde thought it no small honor, to deriue their descent from a certaine beginning, and to make either some of their Gods, or some man of a famous memorie, the father of that progenie, and founder of their state; that so they might promise a fortunate continuance to their gouernment, being first laide and established by so powerfull a meanes. But if this failed, they then bragged of antiquitie, and cast all their glory vpon the fertility of their soile, being so strong and fruitful, that it yeelded of it selfe such a people, as they were: and so we read howe the Athenians, for as much as they were ignoraunt from whence they came, were

ware an Oaken leafe, in token that they were bred of the earth where they dwelled. And hereupon also grew the controuersie, betweene the Egyptians and the Scythians, concerning antiquity: wherein the Egyptians seemed to haue great aduantage, because of the fertility and heat of their countrey; whereas the Scythians inhabited a colde climate, vnfruitfull and an enemy to generation. Of this sort were the Britains, that inhabited the mediterranean part of the Ilande: who not knowing from whence they came, nor who first brought them thither, satisfied themselves with that common receiued opinion, that they were borne and bred of the earth. The sea coast was posselt by such as came out of the continent and retained the names of the cities from whence they came, as a memoriall of their progenitors.

The forme of the Iland is very well described, and measured out, according to the scale of our moderne Geographers. For concerning the difference of longitude between the Easterne angle of Kent, and the furthest point of Cornwall, they make it eight degrees; which in a maner iumpeth with Cæsars dimensionation: the other sides are somewhat longer; and therefore Tacitus in the life of Agricola, compareth it to a Carpenters Axe, making that side which bordereth vpon France to resemble the Edge; and the other two sides to incline by little and little, one towards an other; and so make the Ilande narrower at the top, according to the forme of that instrument. Hee setteth downe the whole compasse of the Iland, according to the manner of the ancient Geographers, who by the quantity of the circuit, did vsually iudge of the content, not considering that the *Area* of euery figure dependeth as well of the quantity of the angle, as the length of the side. Concerning the temperature of Britanie, in regard of the colde winters in France, we must vnderstand that Britanie hath euer beene found of a more temperate constitution; in regarde of sharpe and colde winters, then any other countrey lying vnder the same parallell: whether the cause thereof may bee imputed to the continuall motion of the sea about the Iland, which begetteth heat, as some haue imagined; or to the site thereof, in regard of other Continents from whence the winde alwaies riseth, and carieth with it the nature of the countrey by which it passeth; and so the Ilande hauing no other continent lying North to it, from whence the winde may rise, but all for the most part vpon the South, hath no such colde windes to distemper it, as other parts of Germany, which are vnder the same parallel; but the Southern wind, which is so frequent in Britany, tempereth the ayre, with a mild disposition, and so keepeth it warme; or whether it be some other vnknowne cause, our Philosophers rest vn-satisfied. But as touching Gallia, it may bee saide, that forasmuch as it beareth more to the South, then this Iland doth, the aire thereof by reason of the continuall heate, is of a farre purer disposition; and so pierceth more then this grosser aire of Britany, & carieth the cold further into the pores; and so seemeth sharper and of a far colder disposition.

This Iland, which Cæsar nameth *Mona*, is known at this time by the name of *Man*, and lieth betweene Cumberland and Ireland. Ptolemie calleth it *Monada*, Tacitus calleth Anglesey by the name of *Mona*, peraduenture from the nomination of the Britains, who calleth it *Tyr mon*, the land of Mon.

Concer-



Concerning those places, where the night continueth in the midst of winter for 30. dayes together, they must be sited 6. degrees beyond the circle Articke, and haue a day in summer of like continuance, according to the rules of Astronomy. In that he found the nights in Britanie shorter then in the continent, we must vnderstand it to be only in summer: for the more oblique the horizon is, the more vneuen are the portions of the diurnall circles which it cutteth; and the nearer it commeth to a right horizon, the nearer it commeth to an equality of day and night: and hence it happeneth, that in summer time, the nights in France are longer then here in England, and the winter shorter. The like we must vnderstand of all Southerne and Northerne countries.

To conclude, I may not omit the ciuility of the Kentish men, and their courteous disposition about the rest of the Britaines, which must be imputed to that ordinary course which brought ciuilitie vnto all other nations: of whom such as were first seated in their possessions, and entertained societie, were the first that brought in ciuill conuersation, and by little and little were purified, and so attained to the perfection of ciuill gouernement. So we find that first Assirians and Babilonians (as nearest to the mountaines of Armenia where the Arke rested, and people first inhabited) reduced their states into common weales of monarchies of exquisite gouernment, flourishing with all maner of learning and knowledge; when as yet other countries lay either wast, or ouerwhelmed with Barbarisme. From thence it flowed into Egypt, out of Egypt into Greece, out of Greece into Italy, out of Italy into Gallia, and from thence into England, where our Kentish men first entertained it, as bordering ypon France, and frequented with merchants of those countries.

## CHAP. V.

Diuers skirmishes betweene the Romaines  
and the Britaines.

**T**HE caualrie of the enemy and their chariots, gaue a sharpe conflict to the Romaine horsemen in their march: but so, that the Romaines got the better euery way, driving them with great slaughter to the woods and hills, and loosing also some of their owne men, being too venturous in the pursuit. The Britaines after some intermission of time, when the Romanes little thought of them, and were busied in fortifying their campe, came sodainly out of the woods, and charged vpon those that kept station before the campe. Caesar sent out two the chiefeest cohorts of two legions to second their fellows: these two cohorts standing with a small alley betweene them, the other that were first charged, being terrified with that straunge kind of fight, boldly brake through the thickest of the enemy, and so returned in safetie to their fellows. That day Quintus Laberius Dirus, a Tribune of the souldiers was slaine; the Britaines were repelled with moe cohorts, which Caesar sent to second the former.

Caesar.

Ti.

And



And forasmuch as the fight happened in the view of all the campe, it was plainly perceived, that the legionarie souldiers, being neither able for the waight of their armour, to follow the enemy as he retired, nor yet daring to go farre from his ensigne, was not a fit aduersary to contest this kind of enemy: and that the horsemen likewise fought with no lesse danger, inasmuch as the enemy would retire backe of purpose, and when they had drawne them a litle from the legions, they would then light from their chariots and encounter them, with that aduantage which is betwene a footman and a horseman. Furthermore, they neuer fought thicke and close together, but thin and in great distances, hauing stations of men to succour one another, to receiue the weary, and to send out fresh supplies.

## OBSERVATIONS.



Pon this occasion of their heavy armour, I will describe a legionary souldier in his compleat furniture, that we may better iudge of their maner of warfare, and vnderstand wherein their greatest strength consisted. And first we are to learne, that their legionary souldiers were called *Milites grauis armatura*, souldiers wearing heavy armor, to distinguish them from the Velites, the archers, slingers, and other light armed men. Their offensive armes were a couple of pikes, or as some wil, but one pike, and a Spanish sword, short and strong, to strike rather with the point then with the edge. Their defensive armes, were a helmet, a corslet, and bootes of brasce, with a large target, which in some sort was offensive, in regard of that *umbroneum* which stucke out in the middest thereof. The pike is described at large in the first booke, and the target in the second: the sword (as Polybius witnesseth) was short, two edged, very sharpe, and of a strong point: and therefore Liuius in his 22. Booke sayeth, that the Gaules vsed very long swordes without pointes; but the Romaines had short swordes, readier for vse; these they called Spanish swordes, because they borrowed that fashion from the Spaniard. The old Romaines were so girt with their swords, as appeareth by Polybius, and their monuments in marble, that from their left shoulder it hung vpon their right thigh, contrary to the vse of these times, which as I haue noted before, was in regard of their target, which they caried on their left arme: this sword was hung with a belt of leather, beset with studs, as Varro noteth, and these were their offensive weapons.

Lib. 4.

Pli. lib. 10.

Their helmet was of brasce, adorned with three Ostrich feathers of a cubite in length, by which the souldier appeared of a larger stature, and more terrible to the enemy, as Polybius saith in his sixth booke. Their breast-plate was either of brasce or yron, ioyned together after the manner of scales, or platted with little rings of yron: their bootes were made of barres of brasce, from the foote vp to the knee. And thus were the legionarie souldiers armed, to stand firme rather then to vse any nimble motion, and to combine themselues into a bodie of that strength which might not easily recoil at the opposition of any confrontment; for agilitie standeth indifferent to helpe either a retreat

or

or a pursuit, and nimblefooted soldiours are as readie to flie backe, as to march forward; but a waighty body keepeth a more regular motion, and is not hindered with a common counterbuffle: so that whensoever they came to firme buckeling, and felt the enemy stand stiffe before them, such was their practise, and exercise in continual workes, that they neuer fainted vnder any such taske; but the victorie went alwayes cleere on their side. But if the enemy gaue waie to their violence, and came not in but for aduantage, and then as speedilie retired, before the counterbuffle were well discharged; then did their nimblenesse much helpe their weakenesse, and frustrate the greatest parte of the Romaine discipline. This is also proued in the ouerthrowe of Sabinus and Corra, where Ambiorix finding the inconuenience of buckeling at handy blowes, commaunded his men to fight a far off; and if they were assaulted, to giue backe; and to come on againe as they saw occasion: which so wearied out the Romaines, that they all fell vnder the execution of the Galles. Let this suffice therefore to shew, how vnapt the Romans were to flie vpon any occasion, when their armour was such, that it kept them from al starting motions, and made the futable to the staied and well assured rules of their discipline, which were as certaine principles in the execution of a standing battaile; and therefore. not so fit either for a pursuit, or a flight.

Concerning the vnequall combat betweene a horseman and a footeman, it may be thought strange, that a footeman shoulde haue such an aduantage against a horseman, beeing ouermatched, at least with a Sextuple proportion both of strength and agilicie: but wee must vnderstande, that as the horse is much swifter in a long carriere; so in speedie and nimble turning at hand, wherein the substance of the combat consisteth, the footeman farre exceedeth the horseman in aduantage; hauing a larger marke to hit by the Horse, then the other hath. Besides, the horseman ingageth both his valour, and his fortune in the good speede of his horse, his woundes and his death doe consequentially pull the rider after, his feare or furie maketh his maister either desperate or slowe of performance, and what defect soeuer riseth from the horse, must bee answered out of the honour of the rider. And surely it seemeth reasonable, that what thing soeuer draweth vs into the societie of so great a hazard, should as much as is possible, be contained in the compasse of our owne power. The sword which we manage with our owne hand, affoordeth greater assurance then the harquebuse, wherein there are many partes belonging to the action, as the powder, the stone, the spring, and such like; whereof if the least faile, of his part, we likewise faile of our fortune: but howe probable soeuer this seemeth, this is certaine, that in the course of the Roman wars, the horse were euer defeated by the foot, as is manifestly proued in the first of these bookes.

## CHAP. VII.

Cæsar giueth the Britains two seuerall  
ouerthrowes.

Cæsar.



**T**HE next daie, the enimie made a stand vpon the hils a far off from the campe, and shewed themselves not so often; neither were they so busie with our horsemen, as they were the day before: but about noone, when Cæsar sent out three legions, and al his Cavalry to get forrage, vnder the conduction of the Caius Trebonius a legat, they made a sodaine assault vpon the forragers, and fell in close with the Ensignes, and the legions. The Romans charged very fiercely vpon them, and beate them backe; neither did they make an end of following them, untill the horsemen trusting to the succour of the legions which were behinde them, put them all to flight, with the slaughter of a great number of them; neither did they giue them respite either to make head, to make a stand, or to forsake their chariots. After this ouerthrow, all their Auxiliarie forces departed from them; neither did they afterward contend with the Romans with any great power. Cæsar vnderstanding their determination, caried his armie to the riuer Thames, and so to the confines of Cassinellaunus, which riuer was passable by foot but in one place only, and that very hardly; at his coming hee found a great power of the enemy to be imbattailed on the other side, and the bancke fortified with many sharpe stakes, and many other also were planted couertly vnder the water. These things being discovered to the Romans by the Captiues and fugitiues; Cæsar putting his horse before, caused the legions to followe sodainlie after, who notwithstanding they had but their heades cleere, aboue the water, went with that violence, that the enemy was not able to endure the charge, but left the bancke and betooke themselves to flight.

## THE OBSERVATION.



**T**His attempt of Cæsar seemeth so strange to Brancatio, that hee runneth into as strange conclusions, concerning this matter, as first that he that imitateth Cæsar, may doubt of his good fortunes: for his proceeding in this point, was not directed by any order of war; and that a great commander hath nothing common with other leaders: but especially, he crieth out at the baseness of the Britains, that would suffer themselves so cowardly to be beaten. But if wee looke into the circumstances of the action, we shal find both Art & good direction therein; for being assured by the fugitiues, that the riuer was passable in that place, & in that place onlie, he knew that he must either aduēture ouer there, or leaue Cassinellaunus for an other summer, which was a very strong inducement to vrge him to that enterprife. The  
difficultie



difficultie wherof was much relieued by good direction, which consisted of two pointes, first, by sending ouer the horsemen in the front of the legions, who might better indute the charge of the enemy, then the footmen could, that were vpp to the necke in water; and withall, to shelter the footmen from the furie of the enemy. Secondly, he sent them ouer with that speed, that they were on the other side of the water, before the enemy could tell what they attempted: for if he had lingered in the seruice, and giuen the enemy leaue to find the aduantage which he had by experience, his men had neuer bin able to haue indured the hazard of so dangerous a seruice. It is hard to coniecture at the place, where this seruice was performed; for since the building of London bridge, manie foordes haue beene scoured with the current, and fall of the water, which before that time carried not such a depth as now they doe.

## CHAP. VII.

The conclusion of the British warre: Cæsar  
returneth into Gallia.



*Cassiuellaunus hauing no courage to contend anie longer, dismissed his greatest forces, and retaining onely foure thousand chariots, obserued their iourneies, keeping the wood countries, and driving men and cattell out of the fields into the woods, for feare of the Romans; and as their horsemen strayed out either for forrage or bootie, hee sent his chariots out of the woods by unknowne waies, and put their horsemen to great perill: in regard whereof, the horsemen durst neuer aduenture further then the legions, neither was there anie more spoile done in the countrey, then that which the leginarie souldiers did of themselves. In the meane time, the Trinobantes, being almost the greatest state of all those contries (from whom Mandubratius had fled to Cæsar into Gallia, for that his father Imanuentius holding the kingdome, was slaine by Cassiuellaunus) sent Ambassadors to Cæsar, to offer their submission, and to intreat that Mandubratius might be defended from the oppression of Cassiuellaunus, and sent vnto them to take the kingdome. Cæsar hauing receiued from them fortie pledges, and corne for his Armie, sent Mandubratius vnto them. The Trinobantes, being thus kept from the violence of the souldiers, the Cenimagni, Seguntiaci, Anacalites, Bibrocassi, yeelded themselves to Cæsar. By these he vnderstood, that Cassiuellaunus his towne was not farre off, fortified with woods and bogges, and well stored with men and cattell. The Britaines call a towne a thicke wood, inclosed about with a ditch and a rampier, made for a place of retrait when they stood in feare of incursions from the borderers. Thither marched Cæsar with his Armie, and found it well fortified both by arte and nature: And as he assaulted it in two seuerall places, the enemy unable to keepe it, cast himselfe out of the towne by a backe waie, and so he tooke it. Where he found great store of cattell, and slew manie of the Britaines.*

Y ij.


While



While these things were a doing, Cassiellaunus sent messengers into Kent, where in there were foure severall kinges, Cingetorix, Carvilius, Taximagalus, and Segonax, them he commanded with all the power they could make, to set upon the campe where the navie was kept. These kinges comming to the place, were overthrowne by a sallie which the Romans made out upon them, manie of them being slaine, and Cingetorix taken prisoner. This battell concurring with the former losses, and especially moved thereunto with the revolt of the forenamed cities, Cassiellaunus intreated peace of Cæsar by Comius of Arras. Cæsar being determined to winter in the continent, for feare of sudden commotions in Gallia, and that the summer was now farre spent, and might easilie be lingered out, hee commanded pledges to be brought unto him, and set downe what yearly tribute the Britaines should paie to the Romans: the hostages being taken, he caried backe his Armie to the sea, imbarked his men and arrived safe with all his ships upon the coast of Gallia.

#### THE OBSERVATION.

**A**nd thus ended the warre in Britanie, which affoordeth little matter of discourse, being indeede but a scambling warre, as wel in regard of the Britaines themselves, who after they had felt the strength of the Roman legions, would neuer adventure to buckle with them in any standing battel, as also in regard that there were no such townes in Britany as are recorded to haue been in Gallia, which might haue giuen great honour to the warre, if there had been any such to haue been besieged, and taken in by Cæsar. And although Tacitus saith, that Britanie was rather viewed then subdued by Cæsar, being desirous to draw that honour to his father in law Agricola; yet we finde here, that the Trinobantes, which were more then either the skirt, or the heart of Britanie, (for our Historians doe vnderstand them to haue inhabited that part, which lieth as farre as Yorkeshire and Lancashire) were brought vnder the Roman Empire by Cæsar: who was the first that euer laide tribute vpon Britanie, in the behalfe of the people of Rome; or cast vpon them the heauie name of a subdued people.



## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



VT least I may seeme negligent in these occurrences of Britanie, as not deeming the alteration happening in this Island by the power of Rome, worthy due memorie: I will briefly set downe the state thereof from this Area during the liues of the twelue Emperours.

Iulius Cæsars next successors, first Augustus and then Tiberius, thought it policie to restraine the infinite desire of enlarging the Romaine Empire, and so left this entrance into Britanie vnseconded. Caius is said to haue had a meaning to inuade it, but did nothing. Claudius transported legions and aides, and first sent Aulus Plautius gouernour, and after him Ostorius, who ouerthrew king Cradocke in battell, and shewed him at Rome to Claudius, to Agrippina and the Lords of the Senate, who affirmed the sight to be no lesse honourable, then when P. Scipio shewed Siphaces, or L. Paulus Perses; him Didius Gallus succeeded, who being old and full of honour, thought it sufficient to keepe that which his predecessors had gotten. Next vnto Didius came Veranius, onely memorable in dying the first yeare of his Proprætorship: but Suetonius Paulinus following got a great name, first by inuading Anglesey, strong with inhabitants, and a receptacle for fugitiues; secondly by ouerthrowing Boadicea Queene of the Iceni, in a battell comparable to the victories of old times, wherein fourescore thousand Britaines were slaine, with the losse of foure hundred Romaine souldiers, but being thought to be ouer seuiere, he left his charge to Petronius Turpilianus, who composing former troubles with a milder carriage, was succeeded by Trebellius Maximus, whose easie course of gouernement taught the Britaines good manners, and made the souldiers first wanton with ease, and then mutinous, which by his gentle intreatie being ended without bloodshed, he left his place to Vectius Bolanus, of like loosenesse of discipline, but in stead of obedience got much good wil. The errors of these three soft Proprætors, were holpen by Petilius Cerealis a great commaunder, and worthy his place, he subdued the Brigantes, and lett the place to Iulius Frontinus, who with no lesse happinesse vanquished the Silures. The last was Agricola, fortunate in diuers battels against the Britaines, and as unhappie in his reward; for Domitian maligning his honour, first discharged him of his place, and then as it is thought poisoned him. And this was the state of Britanie vnder the twelue Emperours.

*Tacit. 12.  
Annal.*

## CHAP. VIII.

Cæsar disposeth his legions into their  
wintering camps.

Cæsar.  
\* Either Cambray, Amiens  
or S. Quintin



After he had put his ships in harbor, and held a councell of the Gaules at\* Samarobrina; forasmuch as that yeare by reason of the drought, there was some scarcitie of corne in Gallia, he was constrained to garrison his armie, and to disperse them into more cities then he had done the yeares before. And first he gave one legion to Caius Fabius, to be led among the Morini; another to Quintus Cicero, to be caried to the Neruij; another to L. Roscius, to be conducted to the Essui; a fourth he commaunded to winter amongst the men of Rhemes, in the marches of the Treuiri vnder T. Labienus; three he placed in Belgia, with whom he sent Marcus Crassus his Questor, L. Munatius Planus, and C. Trebonius Legates; he sent one legion, that which he had last inrolled, beyond the riuer Po in Italy, with five cohorts, vnto the Eburones, the greatest part of whose countrie lyeth betweene the Maze and the Rheine; with them he sent Q. Titurius Sabinus, and Lucius Arunculeius Cotta. By distributing his legions in this manner, he thought to remedie the scarcitie of corne; and yet the garrisons of all these legions, excepting that which Roscius caried into a quiet and peaceable part, were contained within the space of 100 mile: and vntill his legions were settled, and their wintering camps fortified, he determined to abide in Gallia.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



Haue heard it oftentimes contradicted by some, that vnderstand not the waight of a multitude, when it was said, that an armie keeping head continually in one part of a kingdome, was more burthen some to the common-wealth in regard of the expence of victuals, then when it was dispersed into particular cities and families, before the time of the muster and inrolement: for (say they) in the generall account of the publike weale, it differeth nothing, whether a multitude of 30000. men be maintained with necessary prouisions in one intire bodie together, or dispersed particularly throughout euery part of the countrey: forasmuch as euery man hath but a competent quantitie allotted vnto him, which he cannot want, in what sort or condition of life soeuer he be ranged; neither doth the charge of a multitude grow in regard they are vnited together, but in regard they amount to such a multitude where soeuer. But such as looke into the difference with iudgement, shall find a marvellous inequality, both in regard of the portion of victuals which is spent, and the meanes whereby it is provided: for first we must vnderstand,

stand, that an armie lying continually in one place, fallieth so heauie vpon that part, that it quickly consumeth both the fatte and the flesh (as they say) and leaueth nothing vnspent, which that part can afford them; and without further supply of prouisions, would in a small time come to vtter destruction. This want then must be relieved by taking from the plentie of other bordering quarters, to furnish the wants of so great a multitude: wherein there cannot be obserued that proportion of moderate taking, to vittaille the Armie with a sufficient competence, but the partiall respect which the purueiers, and vittailers will haue to their priuat commodity, wil quickly make an inconuenience either in the countrey, from whence it is taken; or in the Armie, for which it is provided; according as the error may best aduantage their particular, what discipline soeuer be established in that behalfe. Whereas on the contrarie part, when euerie particular man of that multitude shal be billeted in a seuerall family, throughout all parts of the kingdome, the charge will be so insensible, in regard of the expence of the said families, that the country will neuer feelee any inconuenience. And if euerie housholder that had receiued into his house one of the said army, should giue a true account of that which riseth aboue his ordinary expence; by the addition of one man, it would fall farre short of that treasure, which is necessarily required, to maintaine the saide number of men vnited together into one bodie. Neither doth the difference consist in the quantitie of vittailles, which euerie man hath for his portion, whether they be dispersed or vnited; but in the maner of prouision, and the meanes which is vsed to maintaine them: wherein euerie master or steward of a familie, endeouureth to make his prouisions at the best hand, & so to husband it, that it may serue for competence, and not for superfluitie; and by that means, the general plenty of the country is maintained, & the comon-wealth flourisheth by well directed moderation. But in the victualling of an army, there is no such respect had, which may any way aduantage the publike good; for there the gaine of the purueier riseth by experience & superfluous wastting, rather then by thrift and sauing frugalitie: and so the common-wealth is weakned by the il husbanding of that great portion of vittaille, which is allowed for so great a multitude. And if they should haue such varietie of viands in an Armie, as they haue when they are in seuerall families, it were vnpossible it should continue any time together. And therefore the Romans, notwithstanding the exactnesse of their discipline, could afford their armies no other prouision but corne, and larde, as well in regard of the commoditie which that kinde of diet afforded them in the course of their warres, as also for the good of that countrey, wherein they were resident. And if it so fell out, that the extremitie of the season, or any other cause, had brought a dearth into the lande, there was no readier waie to helpe that inconuenience, then by dispersing their Armies into diuers quarters; which Cæsar disposed with that care, that they might be as neere together as they could.



## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



Concerning the choice of their souldiers and their maner of inrolment, I had rather referre the reader to Polybius, then enter into the particular discourse of that action; which was carried with such grauitie and religious ceremonies, as might best serue to possesse their mindes of the waight and consequence of that businesse: but for as much as the largenesse of their Empire, and the necessitie of their occasions would not admit, that the enrolment should still be made at Rome amongst the citizens, as it appeareth by this legion which was inrolled beyond the riuer Po; it consequently followeth, that such Ceremonies, which were annexed to the place, were altogether omitted: and therefore I cannot speake of that which the olde Romans did in that part of their discipline, as a thing continued vnto Cæsars time. But he that desireth to see the maner of their choise, with such complements as might adde both a reuerent respect, and a Maiestie to the worke; let him reade Polybius of that argument.

## CHAP. IX.

**Ambiorix attempteth to surprise the campe of Sabinus and Cotta; and failing, practiseth to take them by guile.**

Caesar.



FIFTEENE daies after the legions were settled in their wintering campes, there began a sudden tumult and rebellion by the meanes of Ambiorix, and Catiunculus, who, hauing receiued Sabinus & Cotta into their confines, and brought them in corne to the place, where they laie; at the inducement of Induciomarus of Triers, they stirred up their people to rebellion: and suddenly surprising those that were gone abroad to get wood, came with a great power to assault the campe. But when our men had tooke Armes, and were got vppe upon the rampier, and had ouermatched them in a skirmish of horse, which made a sallie out of the campe vpon the Galles: Ambiorix despairing of good successe, withdrew his men from the assault; and then after their manner, they cried vnto vs, that some of our companie should come and speake with them: for they had somewhat to discouer touching the publike state, whereby they hoped all controuersies might be ended. Whereupon Caius Carpineius a Roman horseman, and one of Titurius his familiar friendes, and one Iunius a Spaniard, who diuers

diuers times before had beene sent by Caesar to Ambiorix; were sent out to treat with them. Ambiorix first acknowledged himselfe much indebted to Caesar; for manie curtesies, in that by his meanes hee was freed from a pension which hee paid to the Aduatici; and for that both his own sonne, and his brothers sonne, whom the Aduatici had held in prison vnder the name of hostages, were by Caesar released and sent home againe. And touching the assault of the campe, hee had done nothing of himselfe, but by the impulsion of the state, among whom such was his condition, that the people had as great authoritie ouer him, as he himselfe had in regard of the people: who were likewise inforced to this warre, because they could not withstand the sudden insurrection of the Galles, whereof his small meanes might be a sufficient argument. For his experience was not so little, to thinke himselfe able with so small a power to overthrow the people of Rome; but it was a generall appointment throughout all Gallia, vpon this daie to assault all Caesars garrisons, to the end that one legion might not giue reliefe vnto another: Galles could not easily denie the request of Galles, especially when it concerned their publike libertie. Nowe hauing satisfied that duetie which he owed to his countrey, hee had respect to Caesar and his benefites, in regard whereof, he admonished them, and praised Titurius for the hospitalitie that had beene betweene them, that he would looke to the safetie of himselfe, and his souldiers: There were a great number of Germaines that had alreadye passed the Rhene, and would be here within two daies: and therefore let them aduise themselves, whether they thought it good before the next borderers perceiued it, to depart with their soldiers out of their wintering places, either to Cicero or Labienus, of who the one was not past fiftie mile off, and the other a little further: for his owne part, he promised them this much, and confirmed it by oath, that they should haue safe passage through his territories; for so he should both doe a pleasure to his countrey, in disburdening it of garrisons, and shew himselfe thankfull to Caesar for his benefits. This speech being ended, Ambiorix departed, and Carpineius and Iunius made report thereof to the Legates.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**E**ander his counsell, to vse the foxes skin where the lyons faileth, doth shew, that the discourse of our reason is sooner corrupted with error, then the powers of our bodie are overcome with force. For oftentimes the minde is so disquieted, with the extremitie of perturbation, that neither the apprehension can take sound instructions, nor the iudgment determine of that which is most for our good: but according as any passion shall happen to raigne in our disposition; so are we caried headlong to the ruine of our fortune, without sense of errour, or mistrust of well-succeeding: where as the bodie continueth firme in his owne strength; and is subiect onelie to a greater waight of power, by which it maie bee subdued and ouerthrowen. It behooueth vs therefore to take good heed, that our surest holde bee not vnfastened by the subtiltie of the foxe, when it

hath continued firme against the force of the Lyon : and that the trecherie of the spirit doe not disaduantage those meanes, which either our owne power or oportunitie, hath gained in our actions. Wherein a commander cannot haue a better rule for his direction, then to beware, that violence of passion doe not hinder the course of sound deliberation : and withall, to bee iealous of whatsoeuer an enemie shall, either by speech or action, seeme to thrust vpon him, how colourable soeuer the reasons maie be, which are alleadged to induce him thereunto. For first, if the minde be not confirmed by the vertue of her better faculties, to resist the motion of fruitlesse apprehensions, it may easily bee seduced either by feare or vaine imagination, diffident conceptions or ouer easie credulitie, with manie other such disturbing powers, from that waie, which a good discretion and an vnderstanding, free from passion, would haue taken. First therefore I holde it necessarie, to haue the consistorie of our iudgment well settled, with a firme resolution, and with the presence of the minde, before wee enter into deliberation of such things, as are made happie vnto vs by good direction. And then this, amongst other circumstances, will giue some helpe to a good conclusion; when we consider how improbable it is, that an enemie, whose chiefest care is to weaken his aduersarie, and bring him to ruine, should aduise him of anie thing that maie concerne his good; vnlesse the profite, which he himselfe shall thereby gather, doe farre exceede that which the contrarie part may expect. I grant that in ciuill warres, where there are many friendes on either partie, and haue the aduerse cause as deere vnto them as their owne; there are oftentimes many aduertisements giuen, which proceede from a true and sincere affection, and maie aduantage the partie whom it concerneth, as well in preuenting any danger, as in the furtherance of their cause; and therefore are not altogether to be neglected, but to be waied by circumstances, and accordingly to be respected; whereof wee haue manie pregnant examples in the ciuill warres of France, and particularly in *Monsieur La Nou* his discourses: But where there are two Armies, different in nation, language and humor, contending for that which peculiarly belongeth vnto one of them; where care to keepe that which is dearest vnto them, possesseth the one, and hope of gaine stirreth vp the other; there is commonlie such an vniuersall hatred betweene them, that they are to looke for small aduantage, by aduertisements from the enemie: which if the Romans had well considered, this subtile Gall had not  
dispossest them of their strength,  
nor brought them to  
ruine.

## CHAP. X.

The Romans call a councell vpon this aduertisement, and resolute to depart, and ioyned themselves to some other of the legions.



THE Romans being troubled at the sodainnesse of the matter, albeit those things were spoken by an enemy, yet they thought them no way to be neglected; but especially it moued them, for that it was incredible that the Eburones, beeing base and of no reputation, durst of themselves make war against the people of Rome: and therefore they propounded the matter in a councell, wherein there grew a great controuersie among them: L. Arunculeius and most of the Tribunes, and Centurions of the first orders, thought it not good to conclude of any thing rashlie, nor to depart out of their wintering camps, without expresse commandement from Caesar; forasmuch as they were able to resist neuer so great a power, yea euen of their Germans, hauing the garizons well fortified: an argument whereof was, that they had valiantly withstood the first assault of the enemy, and giuen them many wounds. Neither wanted they anie victuals, and before that prouision which they had was spent, there would come succor from other garizons and from Caesar. And to conclude, what was more dishonorable, or sauored of greater inconstancy, then to consult of their weightiest affaires, by the aduertisement of an enemy? Titurius urged vehementlie to the contrarie, that it then would be too late for them to seeke a remedie, when a greater power of the enemy, accompanied with the Germans, were assembled against them; or when anie blow were giuen to anie of the next wintering camps hee: tooke Caesar to be gone into Italie, for otherwise the Eburones, would not haue come so proudly to the camp. Let them not respect the authour, but the thing it selfe; the Rhene was not far off, and hee knewe well that the ouerthrow of Ariouistus, and their former victories, were greuous to the Germans. The Gallies were vexed with the conuulsies they had receiued, being brought in subiection to the Romaine Empire, and hauing lost their former reputation in deedes of armes. And to conclude, who would imagine that Ambiorix should enterprise such a matter, without any ground, or certaintie thereof? but howsoeuer things stood, his counsell was sure, and could bring no harme: for if there were no worse thing intended, they should but goe safelie to the next garizons; or otherwise, if the Gallies conspired with the Germans, their onelie safetie consisted in celeritie. As for the counsell of Cotta, and such as were of the contrarie opinion, what expectation could be had thereof? wherein if there were not present danger; yet assuredly famine was to be feared by long siege. The disputation being thus continued on either part, and Cotta with the Centurions of the first orders, earnestly repugning it, doe as please you, since you will needes haue it so, saith Sabinus; and that he spake with a loud voice, that a great part of the soldiers might well heare him. For I am not he that most feareth death among you,

Caesar.

Z iij.

let



let these be wise: and if any mischance happen vnto them, they shall aske account thereof at thy hands, inasmuch as if thou wouldest let them, they might ioine themselves within 2 daies to the next garizons, & with them sustaine what chance soeuer their common destinie should allot them; and not perish with famine and sword, like a people cast off and abandoned from their fellowes. After these wordes, they began to rise out of the councell; but holde was laide vpon them both; entreatie was made that they would not obstinatelie bring all vnto a desperate hazard; the matter was all one whether they went or staied, so that they all agreed vpon one thing; whereas in disagreeing, there was no likelihood of well doing: the disputation was prolonged vntill midnight; at length Cotta yeelded, and the sentence of Sabinus tooke place. And thereupon it was proclaimed, that they should set forth by the breake of day: the rest of the night was spent in watching, euery soldior sought out what he had to carry with him, and what he should be constrained to leaue behind him of such necessaries, as he had prepared for winter: all things were disposed in such sort, to make the soldiors belecue, that they could not stay without danger.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**B**Y the resolution in this disputation, it appeareth how little a graue and wise deliberation auaileth, when it is inipugned with the violence of passion, according to the truth of my former obseruation; for the matter was well reasoned by Cotta, and his positions were grounded vpon thinges certaine, and well knowne to the whole councell: and yet the feare of Sabinus was such, that it caried the conclusion by such supposed assertions, as the qualitie of his passion had ratified for true principles; being grounded altogether vpon that which the enemy had suggested, and not vpon any certaine knowledge of the truth: neither is it often seene, when a Councell disputeth vpon matters of such consequence, that their deliberations are altogether cleere from such troublesome motions, but that it will somewhat incline to the partialitie of a strong affection; so powerfull is passion in the government of the soule, and so interessed in the other faculties. And this is one cause of the vncertainty of mans iudgement, from whence all contrarie and different opinions do arise. Neither is this so strange a matter, that a councell of warre should so much varie in case of deliberation, when as many especiall points of military discipline remaine yet vndecided; hauing the authoritie of the great Commaunders of all ages, to ratifie the truth on either parte; whereof I coulde alleage many examples. But concerning the issue and euent of our deliberations, what can bee more truelie saide then that of the Poet?

*Et male consultis pretium est prudentia fallax,  
Nec fortuna probat causas, sequiturque merentes;  
Sed vaga per cunctos nullo discrimine fertur:  
Scilicet est aliud quod nos cogatque regatque  
Mains, & in proprias ducat mortalia leges.*

Notwithstan-

Notwithstanding, forasmuch as our wisdom is not so subject to fortune, but that it may comprehend within it selfe, the good direction of most of the occurrences, which fall within the course of our businesse; or if we must needs miscarrie, yet it somewhat helpeth our ill fortune to thinke, that we went vpon best probabilities; it shall not be amisse to set down some rules for the better directing of a mature consultation. Wherein we are to vnderstand, that as all our knowledge ariseth from some of our senses, and our senses comprehend onely particularities, which being caried vnto the apprehension, are disposed into formes and degrees, according as they either concur or disagree in their feuerall properties: from whence there arise intellectual notions, and rules of Arte; wherein the science of the said particulars consisteth: so hee that intendeth to debate a matter, with sound deliberation, must descend from confused conceptions and a knowledge in generall, to the exact distinction of particular parts, which are the occurrences to be directed, and the material substance of euery action: he therefore that can giue best direction, either by experience, or iudicious discouerie, concerning such particularities as are incident to the matter propounded, can best aduise which is the safest way to auoid the opposition of contradicting natures. But to make this somewhat plainer, I will alleage 2. examples: the one moderne in case of consultation; the other ancient, and may seeme not so pertinent to this matter, in regard it is a meere Apology, yet forasmuch as it freely censureth the quality of particular circumstances, it may giue great light to that which we seeke after.

The moderne example is taken out of Guicherdin, from the warres which *Lewis* the French King had with the Pope and the Venetians, concerning the state of Ferrara and the Duchie of Milan: wherein there arose a controuersie among the French captaines, whether it were better to go directlie to seeke the enemy, who albeit were lodged in a strong and secure place, yet there was hope, that with the virtue of armes and importunitie of artillerie, they might bee dislodged and driuen to a retreite: or otherwise, to take the way either of Modena or Bologna, that so the enemy for feare of loosing either of those townes, might quit their holde, and by that meanes Ferrara should bee freed from the warre. Monsieur Chaumont the Generall of the French, inclined to the former aduise: But Triulce, a man of great authoritie and experience, hauing beene an executioner in 18. battailes, reasoned thus in particulars to the contrary. We debate (saith he) to go seeke the enemy to fight with him; and I haue alwaies heard great captaines holde this as a firme principle: Not to attempt the fortune of a battell, vnlesse there be either an offer of an especiall aduantage, or otherwise, compulsion by necessitie. The rules of warre giue it to the enemy that is the inuader, and hath vndertaken the conquest of Ferrara, to seeke to assaile and charge vs; but to vs, to whom it is sufficient to defende our selues, it cannot be but impertinent to vndertake an action, contrary to all direction and discipline of war. I am of opinion, which is confirmed by euident reason, that there is no possibility to execute that deuise, but to our harmes and disaduantage: for we cannot go to their campe but by the side of a hill, a streight and narrow way, where all our forces cannot be imployed; and yet they

Lib. 9.

they with small numbers will make resistance, hauing the oportunitie of the place fauourable to their vertues : wee must march by the rising of a hill, one horse after another ; neither haue we anie other waie to draw our Artillerie, our baggage, our cartes and bridges, but by the streight of the hill : and who doubteth not but in a waie so narrowe and combrous, euerie artillerie, euerie carre, or euery wheele that shall breake, will not stay the Armie a whole houre at the least ? By which impediments euerie contrarie accident may put vs to disorder. The enimie is lodged in couert, prouided of victuals and forrage ; and wee must incampe all bare and naked, not carying with vs that which should serue for our necessarie nouriture, but expect the things to come after ; which in reason ought to go with vs. To attempt newe enterprises, whereof the victorie is lesse certaine then the perill, is contrarie to the grauitie and reputation of a leader ; and in actions of the warre, those enterprises are put to aduenture, that are done by will and not by reason. Many difficulties may compell vs to make our aboade there, two or three daies ; yea the snowes and raines ioyned with the extremitie of the season, may suffice to detaine vs : how shall we then doe for victuals and forrages ? What shall we be able to doe in the warres, wanting the thinges that should giue vs strength and sustenance ? What is he that considereth not, how dangerous it is to go seeke the enimie in a strong campe, and to be driuen at one time to fight against them, and against the discommoditie of the place ? If we compell them not to abandon their campe, wee cannot but be inforced to retire ; a matter of great difficultie in a countrey so wholly against vs, and where euerie little disfaour will turne to our great disaduantage, &c.

And thus proceeded that graue discourse, in the discouerie of the particular occurrences, incident to that enterprise ; which being laied open to their confused iudgments, did manifestly point at the great disaduantages, which were to be vndergone, by that attempt.

*Anal, 6,*

The other example is of more antiquitie, taken out of Tacitus, and concerneth the arraignment of certaine senatours, for the friendship that had past betweene Seianus and them. Amongst whom M. Terentius thus answered for himselfe ; according as it hath of late been published by translation.

It would be peraduenture lesse behouefull for my estate to acknowledge, then to denie the crime I am charged with : but hadde what hadde maie, I will confesse that I haue beene Seianus friend, and that I desired so to bee, and that after I had obtained his friendship, I was glad of it. I had seene him ioint officer with my father, in the gouernment of the pretorian cohort ; and not long after in managing the cittie affaires, and matters of warre : his kinsmen and allies were aduanced to honour, as euerie man was inward with Seianus, so he was graced by Cæsar : and contrariwise, such as were not in his fauour, liued in feare, and distressed with pouertie. Neither doe I alleadge any man for an example of this ; all of vs who were not priuie to his last attempts, with the danger of my onely estate I will defend : not Seianus the Vulsiniensis, but a part of the Claudian and Iulian familie, which by alliance hee had entered into ; thy sonne in law Cæsar, thy companion in the Consulship, and him, who tooke vpon him thy charge of administering the common-wealth, wee did reuerence and



and honor. It is not our part to iudge of him, whom thou doest exalt aboute the rest, nor for what considerations: to thee the highest iudgement of thinges the gods haue giuen; and to vs the glory of obedience is left. We looke into those thinges which we see before our eies, whom thou doest enrich, whome thou doest aduance to honours, who haue greatest power of hurting or helping, which Seianus to haue had, no man will denie. The Princes hidden thoughts, or if he go about any secret drift, it is not lawfull to sound, and dangerous; neither shalt thou in the ende reach vnto them. Thinke not onely Lordes of the senate, of Seianus last daie; but of sixteene yeeres, in which wee did likewise fawne vpon and court Satrius, and Pomponius; and to be knowne vnto his freed men and partners, was reckoned for a high fauour. What then? shall this defence bee generall, and not distinguished, but a confusion made of times past, and his latter actions? no, but let it by iust boundes and tearmes be deuided: let the treasons against the common wealth, the intentions of murdering the Emperour bee punished; but as for the friendships, dueties, pleasures and good turnes, the same ende shall discharge and quit thee, O Caesar, and vs! The constancie of this Oration preuailed so much, that his Accusers were punished with exile. And thus wee see howe particularities decide the controuersie, and make the waie plaine to good direction.

## CHAP. XI.

The Romaines take their iourney towards  
the next legion; and are set vpon by  
the Galles.



As soone as the daye lyght appeared, they set forth of their Campe, like men perswaded that the counsell had bene giuen them not by anemie, but by Ambiorix an especiall friende, with a long tailed march, and as much baggage as they were able to carrie. The Galles vnderstanding of their iourney, by their noise and watching in the night; secretlie in the woodes some two miles off layed an Ambuscado, in two seuerall places of aduantage, and there attended the coming of the Romaines; and when the greatest part of the troupes were entered into a valley, sodainlie they shewed themselves on both sides the vale, pressing harde vpon the rerewarde, and hindering the foremost from going vpp the hill; and so beganne to charge vpon the Romaines in a place of as great disadvantage for them as coulede bee. Then at length Titurius, as one that had provided for nothing before hande, began to tremble, ran

Caesar.

A i.

vp



*up and down, and disposed his cohorts, but so fearefully and after such a fashion, as if all things had gone against him, as it happeneth for the most part to such, as are forced to consult in the instance of execution.*

THE OBSERVATION.



T nowe plainelie appeareth, by this negligent and ill ordered march, and the vnlooked for incounter which the Galles gaue thē, that feare had ratified in the iudgment of Sabinus the smooth suggestion of Ambiorix, with an approbation of a certaine truth; and laied that for a principle, which a discourse free from passion would haue discerned to be but weake, and of no probabilitie: which so much the more amazed Titurius, by howe much his apprehension had erred from the truth, and betraied good counsell to a course full of danger; which as Cæsar noteth, must needes fall vpon such, as are then to seeke for direction when the businesse requireth execution. I haue handled alreadye the inconueniences of disappointment; and therfore at this time wil but bring it only into remembrance, that wee may take the greater care to preuent an accident of that nature: wherein, as the best remedie for an euill is to foresee it, according to the saying, *prauisa percent mala*; so the greatest mischiefe in an euill, is when it commeth vnthought of, and besides our expectation; for then it falleth vpon vs with a supernaturall waight, and affrighteth the minde with a superstitious astonishment, as though the diuine powers had preuented our designements, with an irremediable calamitie, and cut off our appointment with a contrarie decree: although peraduenture the thing it selfe carie no such importance, but might be remedied, if wee were but prepared with an opinion, that such a thing might happen. It were no ill counsell therefore, what resolution soeuer bee taken, to make as full account of that which may fall out to crosse our intentions, as that which is likelie to happen from the direction of our chiefeest proiects; and so we shall be sure to haue a present mind in the middest of our occasions, and feele no further danger, then that which the nature of the thing inforceth.

## CHAP. XII.

The Romans cast themselues into an Orbe;  
and are much discouraged.



*But* Cotta, who had before thought that these things might happen by the waie, and for that cause would not bee the author of the iourney, was not wanting in anie thing that concerned their common safetie: for both in calling vppon the soldiours and encouraging them, hee executed the place of a Commaunder; and in fighting, the dutie of a soldiour. And when they found, that by reason of the length of their troupe, they were not able in their owne person to see all thinges doone, and to giue direction in euerie place; they caused it to bee proclaimed, that they should all forsake their baggage, and cast themselues into an Orbe: which direction, although in such a case bee not to be reprooued; yet it fell out ill fauoredlie: for it both abated the courage of the Romans, and gaue the enemy greater encouragement, inasmuch as it seemed that that course was not taken, but vppon a great feare and in extremitie of perill. Moreouer, it happened, as it coulde not otherwise chuse, that the soldiours went from their Ensignes, to take from the cariages such thinges as were most deere vnto them: and there was nothing heard amongst them but clamours and weepings. But the Barbarous Gallies were not to learne home to carrie themselues: for their Commaunders caused it to bee proclaimed, that no man shoulde sturre out of his place; for the praie was theirs, and all that the Romaines had laide aparte, was reserved for them: and therefore let them suppose that all things consisted in the victorie. The Romans were equal to the Gallies, both in number of men and valour; and albeit they were destitute of good Capitaines, and of good fortune, yet they reposed in their manhooe at the hope of their safetie: and as often as any cohort issued out, they failed not to make a great slaughter of the enemy on that part.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



*Haue* already handled the nature of an Orbe, with such properties as are incident to a circle; wherein I shewed the conueniencie of this figure, in regarde of safe and strong imbattailing: I will now add this much concerning the vse thereof, that as it is the best manner of imbattailing for a defensue strength, and therefore neuer vsed but in extremitie; so we must be very carefull, that the sodaine betaking of our selues to such a refuge, doe not more dismaie the soldiours, then the aduantage of that imbattailing canne benefit them.

A a ij

them. For vnlesse a leader be carefull to keepe his men in courage, that their hearts may bee free from despaire and amazement, what profit can there arise from any disposition or bodie. foeuer, when the particular members shall bee sencelesse of that duty, which belongeth vnto them? for order is nothing but an assistance to courage, giuing meanes to manage our valour with aduantage. In the warre of Africke wee reade, that Cæsars legions being incircled about with great multitudes of enemies, were forced to make an Orbe; but he quicklie turned it to a better vse, by aduancing the two Cornets two contrary waies, and so deuided the enemy into two partes; and then beate them backe to their great disaduantage.

#### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



Neede not stand vpon this order which the Galles heere tooke, concerning pillage, that no soldior should forsake his station, or disranke himselfe in hope of spoile; which is a thing that from the very infancie of warres hath often changed the fortune of the day, and solde the honor of a publike victorie, for priuate lucre and petty pilfering. Amongst other examples, let that which Guichardine reporteth of the battell of Taro, suffice to warne a well directed armie, as well by the good which Charles the eighth of that name, King of France, receiued at that time, as by the losse which the Italians felt by that disorder, not to seeke after pillage vntil the victory be obtained.

*Lib. 20*

#### THE THIRD OBSERVATION.




He insufficiency of these Commanders, whereof Cæsar now complaineth as the only want, which these Romans had to cleere themselves of this daunger; bringeth to our consideration that which former times haue made a question, which is, whether it were the vertue of the Roman leaders, or the valor of their soldiers, that enlarged their Empire to that greatnes, and made their people and senate Lords of the world? Polybius waighing the causes of a victorie, which the Carthagineans gained of the Romans, by the counsell and good direction of one Zantippus a Grecian, hauing before that time receiued diuers ouerthrowes, during the time of those warres in Africke; concluded, that it was more in the worthines of the Commanders, then in any extraordinary vertue of the soldiours, that the Romans achieued so many conquests. And besides the present example of Zantippus, he confirmed his opinion with the proceedings of Hanniball, who from the beginning of the second punicke warre, still gained of the Roman Empire, enlarging the territories of Carthage, and streightening the iurisdiction of mightie Rome, vntill it had got a leader matchable to that suble Carthaginian, and found a Scipio to confront their Hannibal. To this may be added that famous



# SABINVS AND COTTA







famous battell betweene the olde Romans, and the last Latines; wherein both parties were equally ballaunced, both in number and quality of their souldiers, hauing both the same Armes, the same vse of their weapons, and the same discipline, as if it had bene in a Ciuill warre: neither could fortune tell by the presence of their Armies, where to bestowe her fauour, or where to shewe her disdain; but that the worthinesse of the Roman leaders brought the oddes in the triall, and made Rome great with the ruine of the Latines. Whereby it appeareth, how much it importeth the whole fortune of an Armie, to haue a leader worthie of the place which he holdeth: forasmuch as nothing doth make a greater difference of inequalitye betweene two equall Armies, then the wisdom and experience of a graue commander, or the disability of an vnskillfull leader; which are so powerfull in their seuerall effectes, that there is greater hope of a heard of Hartes led by a Lyon, then of so many Lyons conducted by a Harte.

## CHAP. XIII.

Ambiorix directeth the Galles how they might  
best fight with aduantage, and frustrate  
the weapons of Romaine  
souldiers.

**T**HE which thing when Ambiorix perceined; he commanded his men to throwe their casting weapons a farre off, and keepe themselves from comming neare at hand, and where the Romans charged vpon them to giue waie; and againe, as they sawe them retire to their ensignes, then to pursue them. Which commandement was so diligently obserued by the Galles, that as oft as any cohort sallied out of the Orbe to giue an assault, the enemye gaue backe as fast as they could; and in the meane time there was no help, but that part must be left naked and open to the inconuenience of casting weapons; and againe, as they retired to their place, they were circumuented as well by them that had giuen place vnto them, as by such as stood next about them: And if they went about to keepe their ground, they could neither helpe themselves by their manhood; nor standing thicke together, auoide the dartes that such a multitude cast vpon them: and yet notwithstanding these inconueniences besides the woundes which they had receiued, they stood still at their defence, and hauing so spent the greatest part of the daie (for they had fought eight houres together) they counted nothing dishonourable or unworthie of themselves.

Caesar.

Aa ij.

THE

## THE OBSERVATION.

**H**auē spoken already of the manner of the Roman fight, consisting altogether in good disposition of imbattailing, and in firme standing, and buckling at handy-blowes: as may appeare by this circumstance, where Ambiorix forbiddeth his men to buckle with them, but to giue backe and follow on againe, as the lightnesse of their Armes gaue them oportunitie. In like manner in the first booke of the Ciuill warres, in the battell betweene Cæsar and Afranius, it appeareth, that Cæsar his souldiers were bound to keepe their arae, not to leaue their ensignes, nor without a waightie occasion to forsake their stations appointed them: whereas the Afranians fought thinnē, and scattered here and there; and if they were hard laied vnto, they thought it no dishonour to retire and giue backe, as they had learned of the Portugals, and other Barbarous nations.

## CHAP. XIII.

## The Romans are overthrowen.

**T**HEN T. Baluentius, who the yeare before had beene Primipile of that legion, a valiant man and of great authoritie, had both his thighes darted through with a lauelin: and Q. Lucanius, of the same order, valiantly fighting to succour his sonne, was slaine: and L. Cotta the Legate, as he busilie encouraged all the Cohortes and Centuries, was wounded in the mouth with a sling. Titurius moued with these thinges, as he beheld Ambiorix a farre off encouraging his men, sent C. Pompeius vnto him, to intreat him that he would spare him and his souldiers. Ambiorix answered, that if he were desirous to treat, he might: for he hoped to obtaine so much of the people, to saue the souldiers: but for himselfe he should haue no harme at all; for the assurance whereof, he gaue him his faith. Titurius imparted the matter to Cotta, who absolutely denied to go to an armed enemy, and continued resolute in that opinion. Titurius commanded such Tribunes and Centurions that were present, to follow him; and when he came neere to Ambiorix, being commanded to cast awaie his armes, hee obeyed, and willed those that were with him, doe the same. In the meane time while they treated of the conditions, and Ambiorix began a solemne protestation of purpose, Titurius was by little and little incompassed about and slaine. Then according to their custome, they cried victorie, and taking up a howling, charged the Romans with a fresh assault, and routed their troupes. There L. Cotta fighting valiantly was slaine, with the most part of the souldiers with him: The remnant retired into their campe, amongst whom L. Petrosidius the eagle-bearer, when he sawe himselfe overcharged with enemies, threw the Eagle within the rampier, and fighting with a great courage,

*rage, before the campe was slaine. The rest with much adoe indured the assault untill night, and in the night being in despaire of all succour slewe themselves euerie man: a few, that escaped from the battell, came by unknowne waies through the woods to Labienus, and certified him how all things had fallen out.*

## OBSERVATIONS.

**A**Nd thus haue we heard of the greatest losse, that euer fel at any one time vpon Cæsar his Armie, from the time that hee was first Proconsull in Gallia, vnto the end of his dictatorship. For in the two ouerthrowes at Dirrachium, he lost not aboute 1000 men, and in that at Gergouia not so manie: but here fifteene cohortes were cut in pieces, which amounted to the number of 7000 men, or thereabout. Which maketh cowardice, and ill direction the more hatefull, in regard that the great victorie, which his valour obtained in Pharsalia, cost him but the liues of two hundred men. The resolution of such as returned to the campe, witnesseth the exceeding valour of the Roman souldier, if a valiant leader had had the managing thereof; or if Cotta alone had bene absolute commander, there had bene great hope of better fortune in the successe: but here it happened as it commonly doth, that where there are many that are equall sharers in the chiefe authoritie, the direction for the most part followeth him that is more violent in opinion then the rest: which being a propertie rather of passion then of iudicious discourse, forceth a consent against the temperat opposition of a true discerning vnderstanding; and so consequently it falleth out, that one coward, hauing place and authoritie in the councel, doth either infect or annihilate the sound deliberations of the rest of the leaders: for his timerousnesse flieth alwaies to extremities, making him rash in consultation, peremptorie in opinion, and base in case of perill; all which are enemies to good direction, and the onely instruments of mischieuing fortune.

## CHAP. XV.

**Ambiorix** hasteth to besiege Cicero; and stirreth  
*up the Aduatici, the Neruij; and so*  
raisseth a great power.



**A**MBIORIX tooke such spirites vnto him vpon this victorie, that with his horsemen he went immediatly vnto the Aduatici, being the next borderers vpon his kingdome, without intermission of night, commanding his footmen to follow him: The Aduatici being stirred up to Commotion, the next daie after he came to the Neruij, exhorting



ting them not to let slippe this occasion of taking to themselves perpetuall libertie, and reuenging them of the Romans for the wrong they had receined. He tolde them that two Legates were already slaine, and a great part of the Armie ouerthrowne: it was now no great matter, suddenly to surprise the legion that wintered with Cicero; to the performance whereof, he offered himselfe to be their assistant. These remonstrances easilie perswaded the Neruij, and therefore they dispatched speedie messengers to the Centrones, Grudij and other people vnder their dominion, and raised verie great forces, and with them they hasted to the campe where Cicero wintered, before anie inkling of the death of Titurius was brought vnto him.

### THE OBSERVATION.



He ambitious and working spirit of Ambiorix, that could attempt to raise the basenesse of a small and ignoble state, to so high a point of resolution, that they durst aduenture vpon the Roman legions, being settled in the strength of their Empire, by the memorie of so manie victories in Gallia: wanted now no meanes to make an ouerture to a vniuerfall commotion, propounding libertie and reuenge to the Galles, two the sweetest conditions that can happen to a subdued people, if they would but stretch out their hands to take it, and follow that course which his example had proued sure and easie. Which maie serue to shewe, that he that will attempt vpon doubtfull and vn safe Principles, will take great aduantage from a probable entrance, and make a small beginning a sufficient meanes for his greatest designs.

### CHAP. XVI.

Cicero defendeth his campe from the surprise  
of the Neruij, and prepareth himselfe  
against a siege.



It happened to Cicero also (as it could not otherwise chuse) that manie of the souldiers, that were gone into the woods for timber and munition, were cut off by the sudden approach of the enemies horsemen. These being circumvented, the Eburones, Neruij, and Aduatici, with all their confederates and clientes, began to assault the campe. The Romans betooke them speedily to their weapons; and got vpon the rampier, with much adoe they helde out that daie: for the Galles trusted much vpon celeritie, hoping if they sped well in that action, to be victors euer after. Cicero dispatched letters

letters with all speede to Caesar, promising great rewardes to him that should carie them: but all the waies were so forelaid, that the messengers were taken. In one night there was built in the campe 120 towers, of such timber as was brought in for fortification, & whatsoever wanted of the rest of the worke, was perfected. The enimie the next daie with a farre greater power assaulted the campe, and filled up the ditch: the Romans made the like defence, as they had done the daie before; the like was continued. diuers daies after. The Romans made no intermission of their worke at anie part of the night, nor gaue anie rest either to the sicke or the wounded. Whatsoeuer was needfull for the next daies assault, was provided in a readinesse the night before; a great number of stakes hardened in the fire were prepared, and manie murall piles were made; the towers were floored in their flaries, Pinacles and Parapets were set up of hurdles: and Cicero himselfe being sicke, and of a weake constitution, tooke not so much leasure as to rest himselfe in the night time; so that the souldiers of their owne accord compeld him, by intreatie, to spare himselfe.

## THE OBSERVATION.



His Q. Cicero is said to bee the brother of Marcus Cicero the famous Oratour, & to him were the letters sent which are found in his Epistles, directed *Quinto fratri*. In this action his cariage deserved as great reputation, in the true censure of honor, as euer his brother did for his eloquence, *pro Rosfris*. And if it had been the others fortune to haue performed the like seruice, he would haue made it the greatest exploit that euer Roman had atchieued by armes: wherein particularly may be commended the diligence and industrie, which was vsed in raising so manie towers, in so small a time; for providing the night before, such things as were necessarie for the next daies defence; for making so manie stakes hardened at the ende with fire, for the defence of the rampier; and for the store of these murall piles, which resembled the forme of the ordinarie pile, but were farre greater and waightier in regard they were to be cast from the rampier; which gaue them such aduantage, by reason of the height, that being cast by a strong and well practised arme, they were verie effectuall and of great terrour.



## CHAP. XVII.

The Neruij propound the same things to Cicero  
*which Ambiorix had done to Sabinus;*  
 but are reiected.

**W**HEN the Princes and chiefe commanders of the Neruij, which had anie entrance of speech and cause of acquaintance with Cicero, signified their desire to speake with him: which being granted, they propounded the same things they had used to deceive Sabinus; all Gallia was in Armes; the Germans were come over the Rhene; Caesar and the rest were besieged in their wintering campes; Sabinus and his men were cut in pieces; notwithstanding they carried this minde to Cicero, that they refused nothing but their wintering among them, they might depart in safetie whither they would, without disturbance or feare of danger. Cicero onely made this answer: that it was not the custome of the people of Rome, to take anie article or condition from an armed enemy; but if they would laie their armes aside, let them use his furtherance in the matter, and send some to negotiat it with Caesar; there was great hope in regard of his iustice and equitie, that they should not returne unsatisfied.

## THE OBSERVATION.

**H**E first attempt, which Ambiorix made vpon the campe of Sabinus and Cotta, was but short; but here what with the pride of the former victorie, and the great multitude of the assailants, they continued it longer, in hope to carrie it by assault: for the first assault of a place, especially when it commeth by waie of surprise, is of greater hope to the assailant, and of greater danger to the defendant, then such as afterward are made in the sequell of the warre: for after the first brunt, the heate of the enemy is much abated, as well through the nature of a hot desire, which is most violent in the beginning, and afterward groweth colde and remisse, as also with the harmes and perill which they meete with in the incounter; and on the contrarie side, the defendants hauing withstood the first furie, wherein there is most terrour and distrust, grow more confident and better assured of their manhood, and in experience of their strength stand firme against anie charge whatsoeuer.

## CHAP. XVIII.

The Neruij besiege Cicero, with a ditch and a  
rampier, and worke meanes to set fire  
on their tents.

**T**HE Neruij disappointed of this hope, carried a ditch and a rampier round about the campe; the rampier was 11 foot high; and the ditch 15 foote deepe; which they had learned of the Romaines, partly by being conuersant among them certaine yeares before, and partly by the prisoners and captiues which they had taken; but they had no yron tooles fit for that purpose, but were driuen to cut vp turfe with their swords, and gather earth with their hands, and carrie it away with their mantles and gaberdines. Whereby may be gathered, what a multitude of men there were at the siege; for in lesse then three houres, they finished the fortification of fifteene miles in circuit. The daies following, the enemy built towers to the height of the rampier, prepared great hooks and strong penthouses, or sauegardes of boords and timber, according as the captiues had giuen them instruction. The seauenth daie of the siege being a very windie daie, they cast hoat bullets of claie out of slinges, and burning darts upon the cabines of the Romans, which after the manner of the Galles, were thatched with strawe: these cabines were quickly set on fire, which by the violence of the winde was carried ouer all the campe; the enemy pressing forward with a great clamour, as though the victorie were alreadie gotten, began to bring their Turrets and Testudines to the rampier, and to scale it with ladders. But such was the valour of the Roman souldiers, that albeit they were scorched on all sides with fire, and ouer-charged with multitude of weapons, and saw all their wealth burned before their face; yet no man forsooke the rampier, or scarce looked backe at that which had happened, but they all fought valiantly, and with an exceeding courage.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**T**His one example may serue to shew the excellencie of the Romaine discipline, and the wisdom of the first founders of that Arte: for they perceiuing that the fortune of warres consisted chieselie in the mastering of particular occurrences, trained their souldiers in that forme of discipline, as might struggle with inconueniences, and strong oppositions of contradicting accidents; and so ouerwage all difficulties and hinderances, with a constant perseueration and a courage inuincible. For the great attempting spirit of an ambitious commâder, that seeketh to ouertop the trophes of honour, with the memorie of his exploits, will quickly perish by his owne direction, if the instruments of execution be weaker, then the meanes which

B b ij.

lead



lead him to his designments. For where the waight is greater then the strength, the engine will sooner breake, then lift it vp. Let a discreet leader therefore so leuell his thoughts, that his resolution may not exceede the abilitie of his particular means; but first let him be well assured what his souldiers can doe, before he resolue what he will doe: or otherwise, let him so inable them by discipline and instructions, according to the example of the old Romans, that their worth maie answere the height of his desires and follow his aspiring minde, with a resolution grounded vpon knowledge and valour; and so making their ability the ground of his designes, he shall neuer faile of meanes to performe what he intendeth. The want of this consideration hath, within these late yeares, repaide our commanders in many partes of Christendome with losse and dishonour; when as they measured the humour of their poore needie and vndisciplined souldier, by the garbe of their ambitious thoughtes, and so laide such proiects of difficultie, as were verie vsutable in the particularitie of occurrences to that, which their souldiers were fit to execute.


## CHAP. XIX.

The æmulation betweene two Centurions, Pulpio,  
and Varenus, with their fortunes in  
the incounter.



HERE were in that legion two valiant men, Titus Pulpio, and L. Varenus Centurions, comming on a pace to the dignitie of the first orders: these two were at continuall debate which of them should be preferred one before another. & every yeare contended for place of preferment, with much strife and emulation. Pulpio at a time, that the fortification was very sharply assaulted, called to Varenus, and asked him why he now stood doubtfull? or what other place he did looke for to make triall of his manhood? this is the daie (saith hee) that shall decide our controuersies; and when he had spoken these wordes, he went out of the fortification, and where he saw the enemy thickest, he fiercely set upon the: then could not Varenus hold himselfe within the rampier, but followed after in a reasonable distance. Pulpio cast his pile at the enemy, and strooke one of the multitude through that came running out against him; he being slaine, all cast their weapons at him, giuing no respite or time of retrait: Pulpio had his target strooke through, and the dart stucke fast in his girdle: this chance turned aside his scabberd and hindered his right hand from pulling out his sword, in which disaduantage the enemy pressed hard upon him; Varenus came and rescued him: immediatly the whole multitude, thinking Pulpio to be slaine with the darte, turned to Varenus, who speedely betooke him to his sword, and came to handy-strokes, and hauing slaine one he put the rest somewhat backe. But as he followed ouerhastely upon them, he fell downe: him did Pulpio rescue, being

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*being circumvented and in danger, and so both of them hauing slaine manie of the enemye, retired to their campe in safety, to their great honour. Thus fortune caried as well the contention, as the incounter of them both, that being enemies, they neuerthelesse gaue helpe to saue each others life, in such sort, that it was not to bee iudged which of them deserued greatest honor.*

## OBSERVATIONS.



Ælar inserteth this accident of the two Centurions, as worthie to be related amongst the deeds of armes contained in these commentaries: wherein we are first to obserue the grounds of this quarrel, which was their continual strife for place of preferment, which they sought after by shewing their valour in time of danger, and approouing their worth by the greatnesse of their desert; a contention worthy the Roman discipline, and may serue for a paterne of true honour full of courage, accomplished with vertue. For these *Simultates*, which desire of honor had cast between them, brought forth emulation which is the spur of vertue, far from enmitie or hatefull contention: for the difference betweene these two qualities is, that enmitie hunteth after destruction, and onely reioiceth in that which bringeth to our aduersary vtter ruine, dishonour or ill atchieuement: but emulation contendeth only by well deseruing, to gaine the aduantage of an other mans fame, that vseth the same meanes to attaine to the like end; and is alwaies mixed with loue, in regard of the affinity of their affections, and the sympathie of their desires, not seeking the ouerthrow of their Competitor, but succouring him in time of danger, and defending him from foule and vnfortunate calamitie, that he may still continue to shew the greatnes of his worth by the opposition of inferior actions, which are as a lesser scantling of desert to measure the estimation of the others honour.

A vertue rare and vknownne in these daies, and would hardly find subiects to be resident in, if she should offer her helpe in the course of our affaires, or sue to be entertained by the crooked dispositiōs of our times: for we can no sooner conceiue the thoughts that breed emulation, but it turneth presently to hatred, which is followed to the vttermost of our malice, and resteth better satisfied with the miserable end of our opposed partner, then with thousand of Trophes deseruedly erected to our honor. Which maketh me wonder, when I looke into the difference of these and those ages, whether it were the discipline of that time, which brought forth such honest effectes of vertue, to their glory and our ignominy, hauing learned better rules then were known vnto them; or whether the world weakened with age, want strength in these times to bring forth her creatures in that perfection, as it did in those daies; or what other cause hath made our worst affections so violent, and our better faculties so remisse and negligent, that vertue hath no part in vs but wordes of praise, our whole practise being consecrated to actions of reproch. The iniuries, murtheres, scandalous cariages of one towards an other, which in these daies are so readily offered



red, and so impatientlie digested, will admit no satisfaction but priuate combate, which in the first monarchies was granted only against strangers, and foraine enemies, as the only obiects of armes and wrath, and capable of that iustice, which the priuate sworde shoulde execute: for they well perceiued that these single battels were, as sparkles of ciuill discorde, and intestine warres; although not so apparant in the generall view of their state, yet as odious in particular, and as dishonourable to good gouernment. And if there were a true recorde of such, as haue beene either slaine or wounded within these fortie yeeres, either in this kingdome, or in France, or in Germanie, by this licentious and brutish custome; I make no question, but they woulde amount to a number capable of that fearefull stile, which is attributed to ciuill warres.

Neither is there any lawe howe rigorous or harde soeuer, that can giue reliefe to this disorder, but the restraint will drawe on as great enormities, and as vntolerable in a good gouernment. Rotaris king of the Lumbardes forbade his subiectes this manner of combate; but shortlie after, hee was constrained to recall the edict, for the auoiding of greater euils; although hee protested the thing to bee both inhumane, and barbarous. The like edict was published in France by Philip the Faire, but was within two yeeres reuoked againe, at the instante request of his subiectes, in regarde of the murders and assassins committed in that kingdome. The onelie remedie, that I finde to take effect in this case, was that of late time, which the Prince of Melphe in Piemont, inuented to preuent this euill: for perceiuing howe ordinarie quarrels and bloudshed were in his campe, hee assigned a place betweene two bridges for the performance of the *Duellum*, with this charge; that hee that had the worst shoulde alwaies bee slaine, and cast from the bridge into the water; the daunger ioyned with dishonour (which by this decree attended such as vndertooke priuate combate) made the soldiours wiser in their cariage, and put an end to their sedition and ciuill discordes. But that which is yet worst of all, is that custome hath now made it so familiar, that euery trifle seemeth sufficient to call the matter to a priuate combate; a crosse looke calleth an others mans honour in question; but the word lye is of as great consequence, as any stabbe or villanie whatsoeuer. Whereat we may well wonder howe it happeneth, that wee feeke our selues so much exasperated at the reproch of that vice, which we so ordinarilie commit; for in the custome of these times to cast vpon vs the lie, is the greatest iniurie that wordes can doe vnto vs; and yet there is nothing more frequent in our mouth. It may be a propertie in our nature, to stand chiefly in the defence of that corruption vnto which wee are most subiect: I speake not this to qualifie the foulnesse of this vice; for I holde a lier to bee a monster in nature, one that contemneth God and feareth man, as an ancient father saith; but to shew the crookednesse of our disposition in disdaining to acknowledge that fault, which wee so commonlie commit. But I would faine learne when honor first came to be measured with words, for from the beginning it was not so. Cæsar was often called to his face theefe, and dronkard, without any further matter; and the liberty of inuectiues, which  
great

great personages vsed one against an other, as it began, so it ended with words. And so I thinke our lie might too, for I take him that returneth the lie, and so letteth it rest vntill further prooffe, to haue as great aduantage in the reputation of honor, as the former that first gaue the disgrace.

## CHAP. XX.

Cicero sendeth to Cæsar, at whose comming  
the siege was raised, and the Galles  
ouerthrowne.



*T* length Cicero found meanes, by a Gall to aduertise Cæsar of the danger wherein he was: who speedily hasted with two legions to giue him succour; the Neruij vnderstanding of Cæsars approach, forsooke the siege and went to meet him. Cæsar finding the enemy to be 60000. strong, and himselfe not to haue about 7000. men, incamped himselfe in a place of aduantage; and sought by counterfeiting feare, to draw the enemy to come and assault his campe, which he handled with that dexteritie, that the Galles came vp vnto him, with a full assurance of victory: but Cæsar sending out two sallies at two seuerall gates of the campe, ouerthrew the greatest part of them, and dispossessed the rest of their armes; and so ended that war.

FINIS.



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XX JAHO

Cicero sendeth to Cato, at whose coming  
the scene was raised, and the  
overlaid was.

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# THE SIXT BOOKE OF CÆSARS COMMENTARIES.

## THE ARGUMENT.

**H**IS Sommers Commentarie setteth forth the malice of an enemy, that refuseth open encounter: but keeping himselfe in the fastnesse of his holds, forceth the aduerse partie, either to leaue him vntouched, or to seeke him out vpon disaduantage: together with such casualties annexed to the matter, as the power of fortune doth commonly intermingle with such occurrences: as also the maners and fashions of life, then in vse amongst the Germanes and Gaules.

### CHAP. I.

*Cæsar fearing a greater commotion in Gallia,  
mustereth more forces.*

**C**ÆSAR for many reasons expecting greater troubles in Gallia, appointed M. Silanus, C. Antistius Reginus, and T. Sextius Legates in his armie, to make a new choise, and muster vp more souldiers; and withall he intreated Cneius Pompeius Proconsull, forasmuch as he continued at the city about publique busineses, that he would recall to their ensignes, and send vnto him such souldiers as were before discharged of the Consuls oath: for he thought it very materiall for the future time, to the opinion of the Gaules, when they should see Italy so mightie, that if they had receiued any losse by the casualties of warre, they could not onely in a short time make a supply thereof, but augment their armie with greater forces. Which when Pompey had granted, both for the good of the common wealth and Cæsar's friendship, the choice being speedily by his ministers performed: before the winter was ended, three legions were inrolled and brought vnto him, whereby the number of cohorts were doubled which were lost with Q. Titurius: and withall he made experience both by the speed and by the forces, what the wealth and discipline of the people of Rome could do.

*Cæsar.*



## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



Otwithstanding any former purpose, I will begin this Commentarie with the manner of the choise which the Romaines vsed when they mustered souldiers for an intended warre: and will lay it first downe, as the basis and groundfill of all militarie architecture, and caried by them with such a ceremonious and graue respect, as might best expresse the seriousnesse of the action, and make the souldiers vnderstand what consequence the sequell imported. *Polybius*, who onely remaineth of them that haue written of the auncient fashion of the Romaine warre; amongst other parts of their discipline, hath left vnto posteritie a compendious relation of their musters and inrolements, with the helpe of other histories may be thus vnderstood.

*Polyb. lib. 6.*

Vpon the choise of their Consuls in the beginning of euery yeare, their custome was to inrole foure Legions, two for either Consull. At which inrolement, they first chose foureteene Tribunes, out of the bodie of their Gentlemen, whom they called Equites: these foureteene were such as had serued five yeares in the warres, whereby they became eligible of that dignitie. And againe, they chose ten other Tribunes out of the communaltie, being such as had seene ten yeares seruice: grounding this custome vpon another law; which commaunded the Equites to serue ten, and the Pedites or Commons twentie whole yeares before they could be freed and discharged from the warres: and therefore according to the proportion of their stipendary time, as the Equites were admitted Tribunes at five yeares, so were the legionarie footmen at ten, as at halfe their complete time of seruing in the warres. The generall respect which the Romaines had in the choice of euery particular man, from the highest to the lowest, was included in the circumstances of their age, and of their wealth: the age which they deemed fit to endure the labors of war, was from seuentene to fixe and fortie, for so saith *Tabero*. Concerning the first limit of militarie abilitie, that *Seruius* did inrole souldiers from the age of seuentene yeares, adiudging such to be fit for the seruice of the common weale. And *Sensorinus* expresseth the second with an etymologie of the name, where he saith, that men were called *Iuvenes* vnto the age of 46 yeares, *Quod rempublicam in re militari possint iuuare*. In this abilitie of yeares, we are to vnderstand, that the law required euery man to perfect the complete number of twentie yeares stipend: if there were occasion of so many warres in that space of nine and twentie yeares, which is comprehended betweene seuentene and fortie six. The wealth which is the second circumstance that made men capable of military dignity, was necessarily required to amouit to the value of *Drachmas quadringentas*, as *Polybius* saith, which by the latin phrase was termed, *Quaterna millia æris*: such as were not worth so much, were neglected in this choise, and reserued for sea-seruice: neither was it lawfull for any man to attaine to any office or magistracie within the citie, vntill he had merited ten yeares stipend. Vpon a resolution to make an inrolement, which was almost euery yeare,

Thirteen  
pounds star-  
ling, or there-  
abouts.

the

The Consuls did proclaime a day when all men of militarie age were to present themselves : vpon which day the Romaine youth being assembled in the citie, and then in the Capitoll : the fouretence Tribunes elected out of the bodie of the Equites, diuided themselves according as they were chosen by the people into foure parts ; forasmuch as in former time the whole forces of their Empire consisted of foure legions or regiments, wherof I haue discoursed at large in the former booke. And the foure Tribunes first chosen were allotted to the first Legion, the 3 next to the second legion, the foure other to the third, and the three last to the fourth. In like maner the ten Tribunes which were taken out of the common bodie of the people, diuided themselves into foure parts : and the two first chosen were inrolled in the first legion, the three next in the second legion, the two following in the third legion, and the three last in the fourth. By which ingenious and discreet allotment it came to passe, that the communitie were intermingled in the gouernement of their armies with the gentlemen, in such an excellent mixture, that the Equites were either superiour or equall to the Plebei ; notwithstanding that euery legion had an equall number of Tribunes. The election being thus farre caried, the Tribunes of euery legion sate them downe by themselves : the people being deuided first into their Tribes, and then into their classes and centuries, casting lots which Tribe should be taken ; and out of that Tribe whereon the lot fell, they drew foure men as equall as they could both in age and habitude, who being brought forth, the Tribunes of the first legion made the first choise of one of those foure ; then the Tribunes of the second legion had their choise, they of the third legion tooke the next, and the fourth had the last man. And againe, out of the same Tribe were other foure chosen, and then the Tribunes of the second legion began first to make their choise, and so consequently the first legion had the last man. Againe foure other being chosen, the Tribunes of the third legion had the first election, and in that course the second legion had the last man. And by this alternate and successiue election it came to passe, that euery legion was equally compounded both in quality and in number. The inrolement proceeding in this maner vntill their numbers were full : the Tribunes of euery legion assembled their seuerall troopes together, and tooke one out of euery regiment, and gaue an oath vnto him that he should execute and obey according to his power, whatsoever was commanded him by his Generall: the rest being particularly called, were sworne to keepe the same oath which their foreman had taken: and thus we see, both who were the electors, who were eligible, and the maner of their choise. Wherein we may obserue what meanes they vsed to ingage euery particular man, with an interest in the generall cause : for they thought it not sufficient to force men out by publike authoritie, and to bind them simply to that seruice by the mandates of their Empire, considering the labours and difficulties of warre, which oftentimes are able to dull the edge of the greatest spirit, and to cause omissions of duty in the most honest and obedient minds ; but they tied them likewise with such particular respects, as did both concerne the possessions of their fortune, and the religion of their soule. For it is obserued concerning mans actions, that vnlesse the minde do faith-

fully affect the execution, it may be caried with such a perfunctorie seruice, as shall betray the true intent to no effect, and deceiue the end of that which was promised by designement: and therefore they refused to inrole any man, that had not a conuenient proportion of wealth, to maintaine a stedfast and well resolued courage, and to settle the motions of a staggering mind, when they bethought themselves, that the publike duties wherein they were ingaged, were the defensiuē powers of their Empire, and the meanes whereby the publike weale continued happie: and so by consequence their priuate fortunes were assured from violence, and preserved onely by an effectuall obseruance of their militarie discipline. I graunt that it is not altogether wealth that doth grace and formalize the actions of men: for in some cases penurie and want makes men more valorous, according to the answer which a souldier once made to *Lucullus*:

*Horace.*

*Ibit eo quò vis, qui Zonam perdidit, inquit.*

Notwithstanding forasmuch as the publike cause, is either misprised or well affected, according as it doth concerne euery man in particular, as who will doubt of the vttermost diligence of those Mariners, that haue their vessell fraught with their owne goods? or contrariwise, who will blame a mercenarie Pilot, for making peace with death, with the losse of other mens merchandize? For *Patria est ubicunque, bene est*, as one truly saith. And the estimation we haue of this life, is entertained onely by the benefites we hold by our life. And therefore it much importeth a State, to haue such Agents to negotiate the publike busineses, as are ingaged in the same by the interest of their owne particular. Neither was it sufficient in that gouernement to chuse men of abilitie both in their bodie and in their substance, but they found it necessarie to bind their conscience with a religious consecration, and to sweare a faithfull obedience to their Generall, which with the reuerence of the place being the Capitoll, and other ceremonies of maiestie attending the inrolement, doth manifestly shew, how much the Romaines imputed to this part of their discipline, being the foundation of the sequele of that action

#### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

*Renforcing of  
troupes de-  
cayed.*



Secondly, I obserue the benefite which an opulent and able State may make of any losse or misfortune receiued by an enemy: which consisteth chiefly in the reinforcing, or if it may be, in the redoubling of such troupes as the casualties of warre hath consumed: for it much abateth the spirit of a people, and turneth the pride of a victorie into discouragement and faintnesse of heart, when they see their best and most fortunate indeuours atchieue nothing, but a reiteration of their labours, and are driuen to begin againe that worke, which with much difficultie and hazard they had once overcome. For it is the end that maketh any labour to be vndertaken, being otherwise nothing but a paine of the bodie and a vexation of the spirit. And therefore when it shall be found either



either circular, or of many confrontments, before it can answer the designments of our mind, we chuse rather to forgo that contentment, which the accomplishment of our desires would afford vs, then to buy it with such a measure of trouble, as exceedeth that, which the proportion of our meanes seemeth able to effect. In regard whereof, the auncient sages of the world, made a taske of this qualitie to be one of *Hercules* labours, by faining the serpent Hydra to be of this nature, that when one head was smitten off, two other heads grew out presently from the same stumpe: and so his labour multiplied his trauell, and his valour increased the difficultie of his worke. It was *Cæsars* custome in other cases, to haue such a beginning of strength at his first entrance into a war, as by continuance might be augmented, and rather increase then decay, vpon the resistance of an enemy. So he began the warre in Gallia with sixe legions, continued it with eight, and ended it with tenne: he beganne the ciuill warre but with one legion: he arriued at Brundisium with sixe: he followed *Pompey* into Greece, with fiftene thousand foote, and fiue thousand horse, and ended that warre with two and twenty thousand foote, and a thousand horse. He began the warre at Alexandria with 3200. foote, and ended it with sixe legions. He began the warre in Affricke with sixe, and ended it with eight legions. And thus he imitated naturall motion, being stronger in the end then in the beginning, and made his armie as a plant like to grow great, and sprowt out into many branches, rather then to die or decay for want of strength, or fresh reinforcing.

## CHAP. II.

The Treuiri sollicite the Germanes and some of  
the States of Gallia. *Cæsar* carieth 4 legions  
into the territories of the Neruii.

**I**NDVCIOMARVS being slaine, as is related in the former booke, the *Treuiri* gaue the gouernment vnto his kinsfolke: they intermitted no time to sollicite their borderers with the Germanes, and to promise them money for the wars. When they could not preuaile with their neighbours, they tried those that were further off, and hauing found some that hearkened to their designs, they confirmed their league with a mutuall oath, giuing pledges for assurance of money, and withall they drew Ambiorix into their societie and confederation. Which things being knowne, *Cæsar* perceiuing the preparations which in euery part were made for warre: the *Neruii*, *Aduatici*, and the *Menapii*, with all the Germanes on the other side of the Rheine to be in armes; the Senones not to come being summoned, but to be in counsell with the *Carnutes* and their bordering States, the Germanes to be sollicited with often Embassages from the Treuiri, he held it best to thinke of warre soo-

*Cæsar.*  
\* Part of the  
Dioces of  
Cullen.

a Tourney.  
b Beaumont.  
c Guelders.

\* Chartres.



ner then heretofore he was accustomed: and therefore before the winter was ended, with foure legions that lay next together, he entred suddenly vpon the confines of the Neruii, and hauing taken a great number of men and castell, before they could either make head or flie away, he distributed the bootie to the souldiers, wasted the countrie, caused the people to come in, and to giue pledges vnto him: that businesse being speedily ended, he brought the legions backe againe into their wintering campos.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Exemplarie  
iustice.



HIS exemplarie course of proceeding in punishing some one for the offences of many, hath euer bene held the best meanes to repress rebellious and factious motions, as well amongst particular subjects which do conspire against the common Politic of a State, as also of such inferiour Cities and States, as shal entertaine a confederacie preiudiciall to the soueraigntie of an Empire: for in all such combinations the vndertakers are euer more confident in the assistance and mutuall encouragement of each others assent and forwardnesse, then in the strength of their owne particular meanes. For the mind propounding a course contrarie to a vertuous direction, is alwaies suspicious and mistrustfull of the issue: for as honest motions and conceptions of the heart are attended with assurance, so doth diffidencie wait vpon indirect and perfidious designements. And thence it happeneth, that when the inward thoughts can affoord no meanes of emboldening, they commonly relie vpon each others example, and do make the action to appeare honest vnto themselues, forasmuch as so many associates do approue it. For the preuention whereof in the continent of Gallia, Cæsar first layed a heauie hand vpon the Neruii, being well assured, that as rebellious motions are strengthened and drawne on by the mutuall example of conspiring members, so they may be weakened and extinguished by the exemplarie ruine and subuersion of some one or more of the said members, and is as forcible to dissuade as the other to encourage: futing right with the tenour of Iustice, which ought to be caried in such sort against offenders, that by the punishment of some few, the feare may touch all. According as the Poet describeth the nature and effect of thunder:

*Ipse Pater media nimborum in nocte corusca  
Fulmina molitur, dextra, quo maxima motu  
Terra tremit, fugere fera; & mortalia corda  
Per gentes humilis statuit pavor, ille flagranti  
Aut atro, aut Rhodopea, aut alta Ceraunia  
Deijcit.*

The whole earth trembled, but one hill onely smoaked for it.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



SECONDLY, I obserue the respect which *Cæsar* had to the extraordinarie labour of his souldiers : for whereas they were drawne out of their wintering campes before winter was ended, and were caried vnseasonably vpon a seruice, he rewarded them with the bootie and spoile of the enemie, contrarie to the ordinarie course of the Romaine warfare, which reserued either all or the most part thereof for the publike Treasure, and left the souldier to his stipendarie entertainment. Which is a point very obseruable in the cariage of a warre : wherein are required as well eminent and extraordinarie attempts, as common and vsuall duties, and in the iudgement of a wise Commaunder are thought worthie their answerable rewards. At the siege of *Gergonia*, as it followeth in the seuenth Commentarie, *L. Fabius* a Centurion told his companions, that the bootie and pillage which he had got at the taking of *Auaricum*, would not suffer any man to get vp vpon the wall before himselfe. And so for the most part it falleth out, that honorable attempts being honorably rewarded, do as seed sowne in good ground, multiplie the increase of like vertuous actions. And this was one principall meanes which he vsed to giue courage and valour to his souldiers, as when he went to get *Spain* from *Pompey* and that faction, he borrowed mony of the Tribunes and Centurions, and gaue it in largeis to the souldiers, whereby he gained (as he saith) two aduantages, *quod pignore animos Centurionum deuinxit, & largitione redemit militum voluntates*.

Upon extra-  
ordinarie ser-  
uice, the sould-  
ier extraor-  
dinarily re-  
warded.

Lib. 1. civili  
bell.

## CHAP. III.

*Cæsar* summoneth a generall Coun-  
cell, and carieth his armie against  
the Senones.



GENERALL Councell or meeting of all the States of Gallia being summoned, according to his first resolution in the beginning of the Spring, whereas all the rest sauing the Senones, Carnutes, and Treuiri made their appearance: he conceiued of it as the beginning of warre and defection, and thereupon setting all other things aside, he transferred the Councell to the citie of Paris in the confines of the Senones, which in the time of their fathers had vnitied their state vnto them, but were held cleare of this confederacie. This thing being published from the Tribunall, the same day he caried the Legions against the Senones, and by great iourneys came into their countrie, his comming being knowne, Acco the chieftest author of that rebellion,

*Cæsar.*

*commaunded the multitude to go into the cities and townes of defence: but as they endeouored, before it could be accomplished newes was brought that the Romaines were alreadie come, whereby they necessarily left off their purpose, and sent Ambassadors to Cæsar to intreat for fauour, they vsed the mediation of the Hedui, whose state had of old time bene in faith and league with the Romaines. Cæsar at the sute of the Hedui did willingly afford them pardon and accepted their excuse, forasmuch as he iudged the sommer time fitter to be spent in the warre which was comming on him, rather then in matter of question and iudgement: and hauing commaunded an hundred pledges, he deliuered them to be kept by the Hedui. The Carnutes likewise sent messengers and pledges, and by the intreatie of the men of Rhemes, whose clients they were, receined the same answers. Cæsar ended the councill, and commaunded horsemen to be sent him from all the States of Gallia.*

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

*The benefite  
& use of coun-  
cels and Par-  
liaments.*



I shall not seeme impertinent to the Reader, that I take occasion here to say somewhat touching the vse and benefit of this Parliament or Councell generall; wherein all the states of Gallia, or at the least such as did acknowledge the Romaine soueraigntie, presented their fealtie, and were mutuall witnesses of ech others allegiance. Concerning which we are to vnderstand, that as all naturall bodies haue a transitorie being, depending vpon motion & function of parts, so specially States and Common-weales: as sympathising with naturall causes haue no certain continuance in one and the same being, but are subiect to the alteration of time and fortune, and do passe the ages of a naturall life, from infancie growing to better strength vntill it come to the best perfection which yeares can afford it, and then decaying again by like degrees, euen to the period and death of that pollicie. For remedy whereof, and for the preuention of any weakning disease, which might infect either the whole powers of the bodie, or so possesse any part thereof, as it might thereby proue either daungerous or vnprofitable: amongst other helpes, these counsels and meetings haue bene thought necessary, wherein euery particular State and citie had some of their societie present, as wel to open their griuances if any were, and to seeke ease and releefe by way of treaty and dispute, as also to receiue such directions and mandates, as the wisdom of the Prince should thinke meete for their gouernement. For as this common council or generall assembly, may well be termed the pulse of a politicke bodie, whereby the true state and temperature thereof is discerned; so is it also as a treatie or parle, and a renewing of the conditions of peace betweene the head and the members; where soueraigntie and obedience being mutually propounded, do concur in the stablishing of true and perfect gouernement. And this is that which the politicians of latter time do in their writings call the reducing of a common-weale to the first beginning: for the noisome and superfluous humours being by this meanes purged and abated, the bodie of the publike weale is refined into such true and naturall elements, and settled in that disposition

disposition of health, as may giue great hope of long continuance. Besides this vse and benefit of these assemblies, there were many necessary businesse concluded, & many things agreed vnto seruing to the maintenance of war against parties and factions, as namely the leuies and supplies of horse and foot, granted by this Councel as a subsidy; and in the *Romaine* army receiued stipend and pay by the name of Auxiliary or associate forces, whereof we reade in many places of these Commentaries, and particularly in this booke: but the *Romaines* vsed specially the seruice of their horsemen, as the flower of their strength, and farre exceeding their foot companies in execution of armes and vse of war, wherein the *Gaules* haue euer chalenged a preheminence before other their neighbour-nations, and haue continued the same reputation euen vnto this time: whether it be in regard of the nimble and quicke motions of their spirits, which are better suted with the swift and speedie execution of horse, then with any readines which their own strength can afford them, or what other cause it hath I know not: but this I am sure of, that as the world taketh notice of their hot phantasies, so would the *French* be reckoned the best horsemen of any other nation. The last saying, which I obserue concerning this councell, is the time wherein it was summoned, which was the beginning of the Spring rather then any other part of the yeare, whereof there is this reason; that if any State neglected the summons, and refused to make their appearance according to custome, the sommer time comming on, gaue good meanes to the *Romaine* legion to punish the insolencie of such a contempt; as it happened in this place to the *Senones*, *Carnutes* and *Treuir*, whose absence from this meeting was a sufficient argument to *Caesar* of their rebellion, and deserued the reward of open reuolt.

The French  
are better  
horsemen  
then footmen.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



THE second thing which I will briefly obserue in this Chapter, is the pardon which *Caesar* willingly gaue the *Senones* at the mediation of the *Hedui*, not so much for the respect he bare vnto the *Hedui*, although they had of long time performed good seruice to the *Romaine* Empire, and were found more faithfull then all the States of *Gallia* (howbeit I doubt not but that he was glad of that occasion to gratifie the *Hedui*), but as a maister in that facultie, well knowing what best suted with the publicke profite in all times and seasons, he would not mispend the sommer in questions and dispute concerning former errors which might better be remembred vpon other occasions, but rather in prosecuting war against other speciall reuolters, as a matter more behouefull to the aduancement of the Empire, and best fitting the time of sommer. For in following a businesse, there is nothing more auailable to a fortunate issue, then to be able to distinguish of the validity of the parties, & to discerne which hath most interest in the bulke of the matter, that so we may not be mistaken in our designs, but follow that course as shall most aduantage our purpose. And here a Generall is to take speciall care, that no humerous respect do hinder that resolution which

Not to mis-  
spend the time  
in vnneccessary  
services.



true iudgement approueth : for oftentimes it falleth out, that either particular profit, delighting pleasures, desire of reuenge, or some other vnseasonable affection, doth so intangle them in their proceedings, as they neuer attaine to the maine drift of the action: and this is called stumbling by the way.

### CHAP. IIII.

#### *Cæsar intendeth the warre of the Treuiri.*

*Cæsar.*

**T**HIS part of Gallia being quieted, he bent his whole mind to make warre against the Treuiri and Ambiorix, commanding Canarinus with the caualrie of the Senones to go along with him, least any tumult should happen in his absence, either thorough his discontentment or the malice of the State: these things being thus determined, forasmuch as he well knew that Ambiorix would not come to blowes in open fight, he endeoured by what meanes he could to vnderstand his other purposes. The Menapij were neighbour-borderers vpon the confines of the Eburones, inclosed about with a defence of bogs and woods, onely they of all the States of Gallia had neuer sent to Cæsar touching any contract of peace: of them Ambiorix was receiued and had familiar entertainment. And further he vnderstood, that by the meanes of the Treuiri the Germanes were brought to a contract of friendship with him also. These helps he thought were fit to be taken from Ambiorix before he set vpon him with open warre; lest despairing of his safety, he should either hide himselfe amongst the Menapij, or be compelled to fly ouer the Rheine to the Germanes. In this resolution he sent the baggage of the whole armie with a conuoy of two Legions to Labienus, who was then in the territories of the Treuiri, and he himselfe with five expedite and unburthened Legions made towards the Menapij. They hauing made no head, but trusting to the strength of the place, fled into the woods and bogs, and caried all they had with them. Cæsar diuiding his forces to C. Fabius a legat and M. Crassus the treasurer, hauing made speedy prouision of bridges, did set vpon the in three parts, and burnt houses and villages, and tooke great numbers of men and cattell, whereby the Menapij were constrained to send to Cæsar for peace: he hauing taken pledges of them, assured them that he would esteeme them as enemies if they did either receiue Ambiorix into their countrey, or any messengers from him. The matter being thus compounded, he left among them Comes of Arras with certaine horse, as a garrison to that place, and he himselfe made towards the Treuiri.

THE

## OBSERVATIONS.



ENCE we may obserue, that as it falleth out in other things for the most part, so especially in matter of waire there is such a medley and interlacing of materiall circumstances, with the bodie of the action, that commonly one businesse begets another. *Casars* chiefe designe at this time was the warre against *Ambiorix* & the *Treuiri*: but considering the contract and league between the and the *Menapii*, he would not prosecute the warre of the *Treuiri*, vntill he had take away that assistance, & left the in the nakednes of their own strength. Wherein we may first obserue what opinion *Casars* held of allies and associates, or any other that gaue helpe or assistance to an enemy: for besides this particular, we may reade in the fourth Commentarie, that the chiefe cause that mooued him to take the voyage into *Brittaine*, was, for that the *Brittaines* had vnderhand giuen succour and assistance to the *Gaules*, a matter not to be neglected in his iudgement, whether it were in regard of any friendship or good respect which they bare vnto the *Gaules*, or otherwise to keepe the *Romaines* occupied there, that they in the meane time might liue quietly at home, which I neede not here dispute: but the matter proueth it selfe plainly by *Casars* owne confession, that the continuall supplies sent from *Brittaine*, were a sufficient cause to moue him to that warre. And as it followeth in this Commentarie, concerning the selfe same matter, the onely cause that drew him to passe the *Rheine* the second time into *Germanie*, was the succours which the *Germanes* had formerly sent to the *Treuiri*; according to reason in cases of other natures, that he that will extinguish a lampe, must not suffer an addition of oyle, nor admit the influence of lesser streames, when he goeth about to drie vp the greater riuer. But that which was the occasion of this businesse, and might haue challenged the first place in this discourse, was: for that *Casars* was most assured that *Ambiorix* would not be brought to a triall of battell; and therefore he laboured to vnderstand his other proiects. From whence a Commaunder may receiue direction, what course to hold in a refusall of open encounter: for as the art and sleight of warre is to subdue an enemy, so are there more waies and meanes to effect that purpose, then by waging battell; as I haue discoursed at large in the third Commentarie: whereunto I may adde thus much, which is generally obserued in the cariage of great and eminent Commaunders, that such as failed in matter of negotiation, and wanted dexteritie in managing the course of their businesse, (notwithstanding any fortune or singularity in striking a battell,) did neuer attaine to firme and permanent honour. If any man be desirous to descend into particulars, let him looke into the liues of king *Pirrhus*, *Demetrius*, *Anniball*, and *Caius Marius*, whose latter ends, or shutting vp of their liues, were not answerable to their excellencie in deedes of armes, for want of that iudiciall disposition of their businesse, which *Casars* might boast of, of whom it may be truly said, that (notwithstanding the many battels which he fought, yet he did *plura consilio, quam vi gerere*.

*Casars opinion of allies & associates.*

*Chap. 10.*

## CHAP. V.

Labienus ouerthroweth the Treuiri  
by a guile.

Cæsar.



*WHILE* Cæsar was about these things, the Treuiri hauing raised great forces both of horse and foote, had a purpose to assault Labienus, wintering in their confines with one legion. And as they were within two dayes iourney of him, they had intelligence of two legions more which Cæsar had sent vnto him; wherupon they encamped themselues some fiftene miles distant frō him, and resolued there to attend the Germanes forces: Labienus being aduertised of their resolution, hoping through their rashnesse to find some good oportunitie of encounter, he left fīue cohorts for the safetie of the cariages, and with fīue and twenty other cohorts, besides great forces of horse he marched towards the enemy and encamped himselfe within a mile of them. Betweene Labienus and the enemy there ranne a riuer, the passage whereof by reason of the broken bankes was very hard and difficult: this riuer he did not purpose to passe himselfe, and doubted the enemy would not be drawne to do it. In the meetings and counsels of warre he gaue out, that forasmuch as the Germanes were said to be at hand, he would neither hazard himselfe nor the fortunes of the army, but he would rather remoue his campe the next day very early in the morning. This was quickly caried to the enemy, as amongst many of the Gaules that were with him, some of them did naturally fauour the proceedings of their owne nation. Labienus hauing in the night time called vnto him the Tribunes of the souldiers, and the Centurions of the first Orders, acquainted them with his purpose, and to the end he might giue greater suspicion of feare to the enemy, he caused the campe to be dislodged with more noise and tumult then the Romaine discipline had vsually obserued; and thereby made the retreat not vnlike a flight or escape: which before day light (the two camps being so neare one to the other) was by the discoverers brought to the enemy. The last tronpes of the Romaines were scarce gone out of the campe, but the Gaules encouraging one another not to lose so hopesfull a prey, thinking it long (specially the Romaines being thus affrighted, to expect the Germane forces, and that it stood not with their dignitie, being so able, and so many in number, not to aduventure vpon a handfull of men, flying from them, and troubled besides with baggage and burden, and therefore they doubted not to passe the riuer, and to giue them battell in a place of disadvantage. Labienus suspecting that which now had happened, to the end he might draw them all ouer the riuer, he made as though he would go on forward: at length sending the cariages a litle before, and placing them vpon a hill: Ye haue now (said he) fellow souldiers that oportunitie which ye desired, the enemy in a cumbersome and vnequall place, onely affoord me your Leader at this time that valour, which oftentimes heretofore you haue shewed to your Generall, imagine him



to be present, and to see this seruice with his owne eyes : and withall he commaunded the Ensignes to be caried towards the enemy, and the armie to be imbastelled, and leauing a few troupes of horse with the cariages, he disposed the rest in the wings of the armie. The Romaines taking up a crie and a shout, did speedily cast their pikes at the enemy, who when they saw the Romaines readie to assault them whom they had thought had fled from them for feare, they were so discouraged, that euen in the first close they betooke themselues to flight towards the next woods. Labienus pursuing them with his horsemen, killed many of them and tooke more prisoners, and within a few dayes tooke in the whole state of the Treuiri: for the Germanes which came to their succour vnderstanding of their ouerthrow, returned home againe; and with them went also the kinsmen of Induciomarus the authors of that defection. The so-ueraigntie and gouernement was giuen to Cingetorix, who from the beginning had euer bene true and loyall to the Romaines.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**H**AUE already handled this practise of a pretended feare, which the Historie doth so often recommend to our consideration, and haue shewed the inconuenience of ouer light credulitie, leading such easie weeners to a disappointment of their hopes, and consequently to the hazard of their fortune. I will now proceed to that which is further implied in this relation, and respecteth the chiefeſt dutie of a chiefe commander: and that is, what specially is required of a Generall, in the cariage and direction of a battell. Concerning which point, as there is nothing more materiall to the effecting of any businesse, then oportunitie of time, conueniencie of place, and an orderly disposition of the meanes according to time and place. So in question of encounter or waging battell, the dutie of a Leader may be included in these three circumstances, concerning the qualitie of the place, as the chiefeſt and first respected in the choice of a iudiciall director, the whole scope of the Romaine discipline from the time of their first Kings, euen to the last of their Emperours, did alwayes aime at the aduantage of place, as a necessarie helpe for the obtaining of victorie. Which I haue already noted in the *Heluetian* action: yet for as much as the wisdom and experience of those times did deeme it a circumstance of such importance, giue me leaue once againe to inforce the vse thereof by these examples. *Habetis milites* (saith Labienus in this place) *quam petistis facultatem, hostem iniquo atque impedito loco tenetis, praeſtate eandem nobis ducibus virtutem, quam ſapenumero Imperatori praestitistis.* Whereby he cleareth himselfe of all imputation of ill direction, as hauing perſourmed the vttermoſt dutie of a Commaunder, and giuen ſuch helps by the aduantage of the place as are requisite to an easie victorie, leauing the rest to the execution of the ſouldiers. *Caſar* at the losse he receiued at *Dyrrachium* cleared himselfe to his ſouldiers in this sort: *Quod eſſet acceptum detrimenti cuius, potius quam ſuae culpa debere tribui, locum ſecurum ad dimicandum dedisti, &c.* And as it followeth in the ſeuenth Commentarie, being imbastelled vpon

Com. 3. cap. 8.

The dutie of a  
Generall in  
euerie battell.

Lib. 1. cap. 6.



Battell of  
Newport.

the side of a hill right ouer against the armie of the *Gaules*, which stood likewise in a readinesse to entertaine the *Romaine* valour, would not suffer his men to hazard themselues in the passage of a bogge of fiftie foote in breadth lying betwene both the armies, but rather perswaded his souldiers, disdainig the confrontment of the enemie, to indure their contumelie, rather then to buy a victorie with the danger of so many worthie men, and patiently to attend some further oportunitie. Which passage of *Caesar* euen in the said tearmes, as it is there related, was vrged to good purpose by Sir *Frauncis Vere* in the yeare 1600 at a consultation before the battell of *Newport*. For the armie of the *Netherlanders* being posselt of the *Downes*, which are small swelling hils rising vneuenly along the sea shore vpon the coast of *Flaunders*, and the enemie making a stand vpon the sands at the foote of those hils, and so cutting off the passage to *Ostend*, it was disputed by the Commaunders, whether they should leaue the *Downes*, and go charge the enemie where he stood imbattelled vpon the sands, or attend him in the fastnesse of the *Downes* whereof they were posselt. The whole Councell of warre were earnestly bent to forsake the *Downes*, and to hazard the fight on equall tearmes, as impatient that their passage and reueit to *Ostend* should be cut off. But Sir *Frauncis Vere* well knowing how much it imported the businesse of that day to hold a place of such gaine and aduantage, perswaded Count *Maurice* by many reasons, and specially by this of *Caesar* which I last alleadged, not to forgo the helpe of the *Downes*, but to expect the enemie in that place, and so make vse of that benefite vpon the first encounter, rather then to aduenture the successe of the battell in worse tearmes, in hope of clearing the passage: and shewing also many probable coniectures, that the enemie would not continue long in that gaze. Wherein as his opinion then preuailed, so all that were present were eye-witnesse both of the truth of his coniecture, and the soundnesse of his iudgement. For the enemie within a while after comming on to charge the troupes of the States, was receiued with such a counterbuffe from the hils, and were violently beaten backe in such rude manner, as our men had the execution of them for the space of a quarter of a mile or more, which was no small aduantage to the fortune of that day. Touching the oportunitie of time, which *Pindarus* calleth the Mother of worthie exploits, and oftentimes dependeth vpon the circumstance of place, a Generall ought carefully to aduise that he neither precipitate nor foreflow the occasion, which is well expressed in this particular seruice of *Labienus*. For where his purpose was to draw the enemie ouer a riuer that had steepe and vneasie banks, and thereby of a hard and difficult passage, he would not shew his resolution, vntill he had drawne them all ouer the riuer: for he was well assured, that the *Romaine* legions would so charge the enemie vpon their first encounter, with the vnresistable waight of their piles, that in their giuing backe they could not escape the daunger of the riuer. And therefore to make the victorie more absolute and complete, he suffered them all to come ouer the water, that all might be endaungered in their passage backe againe. And this is the benefite which oportunitie bringeth, which is the rather to be attended with all carefulnesse, forasmuch as *Non sapè, ac diu, eadem occasio est.*

Concerning

Concerning the last circumstance of the apt and fit disposition of the forces according to time and place, which is necessarily required in the dutie of a General; it is referred to this end only, that they may be ranged in such manner, that as one man is assistant to another in their severall files and ranks, so one troope may be in subsidijes to another, to the end that no part may stand naked, or fall in the singlenes of it owne strength, but that one may second another from the first to the last. *C. Sempronius* a Romaine Consull hauing fought vnaduisedly, and receiued an ouerthrow, *Iulius* the Tribune of the people, caused *Tempanius* a horseman that was present at the battell to be called, and as *Liui* reporteth it, *Coram eis, sexte Tempani, inquit, arbitreris ne C. Sempronium Consulem, aut in tempore pugnam iniisse, aut firmasse subsidij aciem?* for *Liui* saith, he hath fought incaute inconsultèq, non subsidij firmata acie non equite apud locato. And of these three circumstances, consisteth the dutie and office of a Generall, touching the direction of a battell: wherein whosoever faileth, doth hazard the prerogative of his commaund ouer that armie which he leadeth, according to that of *Cesar* in the first of his Commentaries, *Se scire quibuscunque exercitus dicto audiens non fuerit, aut male re gesta fortunam defuisse, aut aliquo facinore comperto, aduenitur esse conuictum*: which *Cesar* himselfe needed not to feare, if we may beleeue *Plutarke*, who writeth that he was indowed by nature with an excellent promptitude and aptnesse, to take oportunitie in any businesse.

In the life of  
*Cesar*.

#### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



May not omit to insist a litle vpon this noise or shout, which the souldiers tooke vp in the instant of the charge, and is related in this place as a materiall point in their cariage at this seruice. A matter auncient and vsuall in the Romaine armies, as well in the time of their first Kings, as their first Consuls. *Fusi primo impetu & clamore hostes*, saith *Liui* concerning *Romulus*. And not long after, *Consul nec promouit aciem, nec clamorem reddi passus*. *Cesar* in the censure which he gaue concerning *Pompey* his direction for the battell at *Pharsalia*, doeth expresse a double vse of this clamour or shouting: first the terrour of the enemy, and secondly the encouragement or assurance of themselves: *Est quedam animi incitatio* (sayth he) *atque alacritas, naturaliter innata omnibus, que studio pugne incenditur, hanc non reprimere sed augere imperatores debent: neque frustra antiquitus institutum est ut signa undique concinerent, clamorem vniuersi tollerent, quibus rebus & hostes terreri & suos incitari existimauerunt*. Two contrarie effects, proceeding from a cause, which to common sense carieth no shew of any such efficacy: *Vox est prater ea nihil*, as one said of the Nightingale in another sense. But such as do seriously looke into the reasons thereof, shall find the saying true which is ascribed to the elder and wiser *Cato*: *Verba plus quam gladium, & voces quam manum hostes territare & in fugam vertere*. The eare as I haue already noted wil sooner betray the soule to the distresse of feare, then any other of the fiue senses: which *Iosephus* well vnderstood, although peraduenture he applied

The vse and  
benefite of a  
shout took vp  
in a charge or  
assault.  
Lib. 1.  
Lib. 2.  
Lib. 3. Civil.

Lib. 1.

Lib. 3. cap. 18

In Marius  
life.

not so fit a remedie, when he commaunded his men to stop their cares at the acclamations of the *Romaine* legions, lest they might be daunted and amazed thereat. The reason may be, for that our discourse (diligently attending vpon a matter of that consequence which calleth the liues of both parties in question, and valewing euery circumstance at the vtmost) doth alwayes presuppose a cause answerable to such an effect of ioy and assurance: for these shouts and acclamations are properly the consequents of ioy, & are so auailable that they deceiue both parties; for such as take vp the shout by way of anticipation, do seem to conclude of that which is yet in questiō; and the enemy thereupō apprehendeth danger when there is none at all, whereby it hapneth, *Hofes terreri, & suos incitari*, as *Cæsar* noteth. Besides these examples, I might alleage the authority of holy writ, but that it might seeme both vsauorie and vnseasonable to make a commixture of such diuersities: I will therefore content my selfe with a practise of our time at the battell of *Newport*, where after diuers retreits and pursuits, either side chafing the other, as it were by turne and mutuall appointment, and as it often falleth out in such confrontments: at last commandement was giuen to the *English* to make head again, and after some pause to charge the enemy with a shout; which being accordingly performed, a man might haue seen the enemy startle before they came to the stroke: and being charged home were so routed, that they made not head againe that day. For the preuention of such a disadvantage, there can be no better president, then that which *Plutarke* noteth, touching the battell betweene the *Romaines* and the *Ambrons*, a part of that deluge of people which came downe into Italy with the *Cimbri* and *Tewtons*; for these *Ambrons* coming out to giue battell, to the end they might strike feare into the *Romaines*, they made an often repetition of their owne name with a lowd sounding voice, *Ambrons, Ambrons, Ambrons*. The *Italians* on the other side that first came downe to fight, were the *Ligurians*, inhabiting the coast of *Genoa*, who hearing this noise, and plainly vnderstanding them, made answer with the like crie, founding out their owne name, *Ligurij, Ligurij, Ligurij*. Whereupon the Captaines of both sides made their souldiers crie out altogether, contending for enuie one against another who should crie it loudest; and so both sides were encouraged, and neither of them disadvantaged, *Clamore utramque sublato*.

### THE THIRD OBSERVATION.



HIS *Labienus* was a great souldier, and well acquainted with *Cæsars* maner in leading an armie, and made many good fights while he continued vnder his commaund: but after he tooke himselfe to *Pompeys* part, and ioyned with a faction against his first maister, he neuer achieued any thing but losse and dishonour.

Dux fortis in armis  
*Cæsareis Labienus erat, nunc transfuga vilis.*

And



And vpon that occasion he is often mentioned as a memoriall of his disloyaltie, to proue that good successe in matter of warre doth follow the Generall rather then any inferiour Captaine: for it is obserued of diuers, whose fortune hath bene great vnder the conduction of some commaunders, and as vn lucky vnder other leaders: like plants or trees that thriue well in some grounds, and beare store of fruite; but being transplanted, do either die or become barren. And doubtlesse, there may be obserued the like sympathy or contrariety in the particular courses of mans life, wherein they are caried vpon the streame of their fortunes, according to the course of their first imbarcking. And therefore such as happen in a way that leadeth to successfull ends, shall much wrong themselves either to turne backe againe, or to seeke by-paths, whose ends are both vnknowne and vncertaine: and herein the French saying may serue to some purpose: *Si vous estes bien tenez vous là.*

## CHAP. VI.

Cæsar carieth his armie ouer the Rheine  
into Germanie.

**C**ÆSAR being come from the Menapij to the Treuiri, did resolute to passe the Rheine for two causes: the one was, for that the Germaines had sent succours and supplies to the Treuiri; the other that Ambiorix might haue no reception or entertainment among them. Vpon this resolution, a litle aboue that place where he caried his armie ouer before, he commaunded a bridge to be made after the knowne and appointed fashion, which by the great industrie of the souldiers was ended in a few dayes: and leauing a sufficient strength at the bridge, lest anie sudden motion should rise amongst the Treuiri, he caried ouer the rest of his forces both horse and foote. The Vbij which before time had giuen hostages and were taken into obedience, sent Ambassadors vnto him to cleare themselves from imputation of disloyaltie, and that the Treuiri had receiued no supplies from their state: they pray and desire him to spare them, lest the generall distast of the Germaines should cause him to punish the innocent for the guilty: and if he would aske more hostages, they would willingly giue them. Cæsar vpon examination of the matter, found that the supplies were sent by the Swevi: and thereupon he accepted the satisfaction of the Vbij, and inquired the way and the passages to the Swevi. Some few dayes after he vnderstood by the Vbij, that the Swevi had brought al their forces to one place, and had commaunded such nations as were vnder their dominion that they should send them forces of horse and foote. Vpon this intelligence he made prouision of corne, and chose a fit place to incamp in: he commaunded the Vbij to take their cattell and all their other goods from abroad out of the fields into their townes, hoping that the barbarous and vnskilfull men might through want of victuall be drawne to fight vpon hard conditions: he gaue order also that they should euery day

Cæsar.



send out discoverers to the Swevi to vnderstand what they did. The Vbij did as they were commaunded, and after a few dayes brought word that all the Swevi hauing receiued certaine newes of the approach of the Romaine armie, had retired themselves and all their forces to their vtmost confines, where there was a wood of an infinite greatnesse called Bacenis, and serued as a natue wall or defence to keepe the Chirufci from the incursions of the Swevi, and the Swevi from the iniurie and spoile of the Chirufci.

## OBSERVATIONS.

Bridges.



Brancatio F.

Whether mens  
wits be sharper  
and readier then in  
former time.

WILL hold my former purpose, not to deliuer any thing concerning bridges, whereof there are so many treatises already extant: neither will I go about to describe the substantiall building or ingenious workmanship of this bridge here mentioned, which might wel besecme *Cæsar* & his armie: for as he only could, or at the least did, put in practise the making thereof, so will I leaue the description to himselfe, as best suting with his eloquence. But forasmuch as *Brancatio* an Italian writer, taketh occasion from hence to runne into ignorance and errour, giue me leaue to set a marke vpon this place, lest others not knowing the auncient course, should run their barke vpon the same shallowes. Amongst other aduertisements (being but fourteene in all, which he hath giue vpon *Cæsars* Commentaries) he noteth and commendeth the vse of bridges made of boates, which are commonly caried in an armie royall to that purpose before this or any other inuention of former times, specially in regard of the easinesse and expedition which may be vsed both in making such a bridge, and taking it vp againe: for the boates being prepared readie, as vsually they are in campe royals, such a bridge may be made in a day, which *Cæsar* could not do in tenne, but with great wonderment and admiration. And therein I hold well with *Brancatio*, that for the speedie transportation of an armie ouer a riuer, there is no readier meanes then a bridge of boates, presupposing the boates to be fust in a readinesse. But that which he concludeth, is, that mens wits in these times are much sharper and readier, then those of former ages, forasmuch as they haue found out an easie and expedite course, which former times could neuer reach vnto. Wherein I will not go about to derogate any thing from the condition of the time in which we liue and breath, but do desire to find them better accomplished, then any other foregoing ages, howsoeuer I may suspect a greater weakenesse of wit in these dayes, wherein the temperature of the body is worse conditioned then it was in the time of our forefathers, as may appeare by many arguments, and serueth not so fitly to the working powers of the mind, as it did before this multiplicite of mixture, when the state of mens bodies were compounded of those perfect elements which were in our first parents. But for this reason which *Brancatio* alledgeth, the Reader may be pleased to vnderstand, that the vse of boate bridges was both knowne and in practise, as well before the *Romaine* Empire, as in the time of their gouernment.

Hero-

*Herodotus* relating the passage of *Zerxes* armie into *Greece*, describeth this bridge of boates, (which *Brancatio* would attribute to the inuention of our times) in the selfe same manner, or rather more artificially then hath bene accustomed in these later ages: for finding that no timber worke would serue the turne, to make a sufficient bridge ouer the streights of *Hellespont*, being seuen furlongs in breadth, he caused Biremes and Triremes to be placed in equall distance one from another, and fastened with anchors before and behind, and to be ioyned together with planks and boords, and then couered with sand and grauell, raising a hedge or blind on each side therof, to the end the horse and cattell might not be affraid at the working of the billow, and so made a bridge for the passage of his armie. And in the time of the *Romaine* Empire, *Tacitus* describeth the like bridge to be made ouer the riuer *Po*, by *Valens* and *Cecina* with as great skill as can be shewed at these times: for saith he, they placed boates a crosse the riuer, in equall distance one from another, and ioyned them together with strong planks, and fastened them with anchors: but in such sort, as *Anchorarum funes non extenti fluitabant, ut augescente flumine inoffensus ordo nauium attolleretur*. Whereby it appeareth how much *Brancatio* was deceiued in ascribing that to these latter times, which was the inuention of former ages, and may serue as a caueat to our out-languist humōrists, that can indure no reading but that which soundeth with a straunge idiome: not to trust too much vpon their authors, lest whilst they stifle their memorie with straunge words, in the meane time they starue their vnderstanding.

*Polimnia*  
*Herodoti.*

*Hist. 3.*

## CHAP. VII.

### The Factions in Gallia in Cæsars time.

**B***UT* here it shall not be amisse to deliuer somewhat touching the manner and fashion of life both of the *Gaules*, and of the *Germanes*, and wherein those two nations do differ. In *Gallia* not onely in euery citie, village, & precinct, but almost in euery particular house, there are parties and factions, the heads whereof are such as they thinke to be of greatest authoritie, according to whose opinion and commaund the maine course of their actions is directed. And this seemeth a custome instituted of old time, to the end that none of the common people how meane soeuer, might at any time want meanes to make their partie good against a greater man: for if they should suffer their parties and followers to be either oppressed or circumuented, they should neuer beare any rule or authoritie amongst them. And this is the course throughout all *Gallia*, for all their States are deuided into two factions. When *Cæsar* came into *Gallia*, the *Hedui* were chieffering-leaders of the one partie, and the *Sequani* of the other: these finding themselves to be the weaker side, (forasmuch as the principalitie and chieftest

*Cæsar.*

power was aunciently seated in the Hedui, hauing many and great adherents and clients; drew the Germaines and Ariouistus by many great promises on their party: and after many great victories al the Nobilitie of the Hedui being slaine, they went so far beyond them in power and authoritie, that they drew the greatest part of clients frō the Hedui to themselves, and took the children of their Princes for pledges, and caused them to take a publike oath not to vndertake any thing against the Sequani: besides a great part of their countrey which they tooke from them by force, and so they obtained the principalitie of Gallia. And thereupon Diuitiacus went vnto Rome to seeke ayde of the Senate, but returned without effecting any thing. Cæsars comming into Gallia brought an alteration of these things, for the pledges were restored backe againe to the Hedui, and their old followers and clients did likewise retorne to their protection: besides other new followers which by Cæsars meanes did cleaue vnto them. Whereby their noblenesse and dignity was so amplified and enlarged, that the Sequani lost their authority, whom the men of Rhemes succeeded. And forasmuch as the world took notice that they were no lesse fauoured of Cæsar then the Hedui, such as by reason of former enmities could not endure to ioyne with the Hedui, put themselves into the clientele of the men of Rhemes, & found respectiue protection from that State, which caused a new and sodaine raised authority of the men of Rhemes: so that at that time the Hedui went far beyond all the other States of Gallia in power and authority, and next vnto them were the men of Rhemes.

## OBSERVATIONS.

Factions and parties.



**F** ACTIONS are generally the rent of a State, and a disioyn-  
 ting of those parts which common vnitie hath knit together for  
 the preferuation of good gouernement: but the *Gauls* main-  
 tained sides and parties throughout the whole bodie of their  
 continent, and found it necessary for the vpholding of their pol-  
 licie at home: and as it fell out in the course of these warres, rather a helpe then  
 otherwise in their generall defence against a forraine enemy. The reason of the  
 former benefite was grounded vpon two causes, as *Cæsar* noteth; the one pro-  
 ceeding from the oppression vsed by the rich and mightie men towards the  
 poorer and meaner people; and the other from the impatiencie of those of in-  
 ferioir condition, refusing to acknowledge any authoritie or preheminiencie at  
 all, rather then to endure the wrongs and contumelies of the mighty. And ther-  
 fore to preuent the licentious might of the great ones, and to giue countenance  
 and respect to the lower sort, these factions and sides were deuised: wherein  
 the foote had alwayes a head sensible of the wrongs which were done vnto it.  
 Things of greater condition are alwayes iniurious to lesser natures, and cannot  
 endure any competencie; not so much as in comparison, or by way of relation.  
 In things without life, the prerogatiue of the mountaines doth swallow vp the  
 lesser rising of the downes, and the swelling of the downes, the vneuenesse of  
 the

the mole-hills: the Stars are dimmed at the rising of the Moone, and the Moone loseth both her light and her beautie in the presence of the Sunne. So amongst brute beasts and fishes, the greater do alwayes deuour the lesse, and take them as their due by the appointment of nature: and men more iniurious in this point, then either mountaines or brute beasts, inasmuch as they do alwayes ouervalew themselves beyond their owne greatnesse, haue in all ages verified the old prouerbe, *Homo homini lupus*. And on the other side, as nature maketh nothing in vaine, but hath giuen a being to the least of her creatures: so do they endeouour not to be adnulled, but to keepe themselves in being and continuance, *Habet & musca splenem*, saith the Poet: and the Pismires and Bees haue their common weales, though not equall to a Monarke. And therefore that the mightie and great men of *Gallia*, might not deuoure the lowest of the people, but that euery man might stand in his owne condition, and by the helpe of a *Rowland* liue by an *Oliuer*. And againe, that the poorer sort might giue as a tribute for their protection, that respect and obedience to their superiours, as belongeth to such high callings, these factions and bandies were obtained: whereby the Nobles were restrained from oppressing the poore, and the poore compelled to obey the Nobilitie, which is the best end that may be made of any faction.

Concerning the aduantage which the *Gaules* receiued by these factions against forraigne enemies, it was rather in regard of the multiplicite of States and Common-weales which were in the continent of *Gallia* then otherwise; for it manifestly appeareth, that their factions and contentions for soueraigne authoritie, caused one partie to bring in *Arionistus* and the *Germaines*; and the other partie, the *Romaines* to make good their bandy. But forasmuch as *Gallia* had many diuisions, and contained many seuerall States, relying chiefly vpon their owne strength, and esteeming the subuersion of their neighbour citie, as a calamitie befalling their neighbour, from which the rest stood as yet free, it was not so easily conquered as if it had bene all but one kingdome. The battell which *Cesar* had with the *Neruij*, which was fought so hard, that of threescore thousand men there were left but fiew hundred; nor of sixe hundred Senators, but three; nor againe, the selling of three and fiftie thousand *Gaules* for bond-slaues at one time, did not so much aduantage the conquest of *Gallia*, as the battell of *Edward* the third, or that of *Henric* the fift, our two English *Cesars*: in the former whereof were slaine at *Cressie* thirtie thousand of the *French*, and in the latter at *Agincourt* but ten thousand. The reason was, for that the former losses though farre greater concerned but particular States, whereas these latter ouerthrowes extended to the members and branches of the whole kingdome.

Lib. 2.

Lib. 3.



## CHAP. VIII.

## Two sortes of men in Gallia, Druides and Equites.

Cæsar.

Potestas vita  
& viris.

England.

**T**Hroughout all Gallia there are but two sorts of men that are of any reckoning or account; for the common people are in the nature of seruants, and of no worth of themselves, nor admitted to any Parliament: being kept vnder either by debts or by great tributes, or by the oppression of the mightie: do put themselves in the seruice of the Nobilitie, and are subiect to the authoritie which the master hath ouer his bondslauie: of these two sorts, the one are Druides, and the other Equites or gentlemen. The Druides which are alwayes present at their holy duties, do giue order for their publike and priuate sacrifices, and expound their Religion. To the Druides great numbers of the youth do resort for learnings sake, and haue them in great honour and reputation; for they do determine almost of all controuersies both publicke and priuate: for if any offence be committed, as murther or manslaughter, or any controuersie arise touching their lands or inheritance, they sentence it; rewarding the vertuous, and punishing the wicked. If any priuat mā or State do not obey their decree, they interdict him from holy duty, which is the greatest punishment that is amongst them: such as are thus interdicted, are reputed in the number of impious and wicked men, euery man leaues their companie, and doth auoyd to meete them, or speake with them, lest they should receiue any hurt by their contagion: neither haue they law or iustice when they require it, nor any respect or honour that doth belong vnto them. Ouer all the Druides there is one Primat that hath authoritie of the rest: at his decease if any one do excel the rest in dignitie he succeedeth: if many equals are found they go to election, and sometimes they contend about the primacy with force and armes. They meet at a certaine time of the yeare in the confines of the Carnutes, which is the middle part of all Gallia, and there they sit in a sacred place: thither they resort frō al parts that haue cōtrouersies, & do obey their orders & iudgemēts. The art & learning of the Druides was first found out in Britany, and from thence is thought to be brought into Gallia: and at this time, such as will attaine to the perfect knowledge of that discipline, do for the most part trauell thither to learne it. The Druides are exempt from warfare and payments, and haue an immunitie from all other duties: whereby it falleth out, that many do betake themselves to that profession of their owne free will, and diuers others are sent to that schoole by their parents and friends: they are said to learne many verses, and that some do study therein twenty yeares. Neither is it lawful for them to commit any thing to writing, beside that in other publicke and priuat busineses they onely vse the Greeke tongue: & that as I take it for two causes, first for that their learning may not become common and vulgar; secondly, that schollers might not trust so much to their writings as to their memorie, as it happeneth for the most part to such as rely vpon the trust of bookes and papers, & in the meane time omit the benefit of good remembrance.

They

*They inducours chiefly to teach men that their soules do not die, but that they do fleete from one bodie to another, and this they thinke to be very important to stirre men up to vertue neglecting the feare of death: they dispute further, and giue many traditions to the youth, touching the starres and their motion, the magnitude of the earth and the world, and the might and power of the Gods.*

## OBSERVATIONS.



HE qualitie and condition of the *Druides* is in this place very particularly described by *Cæsar*, and may be reduced to these heads. First, their office extending both to things diuine and things temporall, whereby they executed the place both of Priests and of Iudges. And for that purpose there was one knowne place appointed where they sat in iudgement: and as I vnderstand it, there was but one Terme in the yeare, which both began and ended their suites in law. The second thing is their authoritie, hauing power to reward vertue, and to punish vice. Thirdly, their Priuiledges and immunities, being free from contribution, from warfare and all other burthens of the state. Fourthly, their doctrine and learning which was partly Theologicall, concerning the might and power of the gods, the immortalitie of the Soule: and partly philosophicall, touching the starres and their motion, the earth and the magnitude thereof: and lastly, their manner of learning, which was altogether Pythagoricall, refusing the help of letters and bookes, and committing their doctrine to the tradition of their elders: but that which is specially to be obserued, is, that this learning was not onely found out here in *Brittanie*, but such as would perfectly attaine to the knowledge thereof, came into *England* to studie the same, contrarie to the experience which heretofore hath bene obserued of the Northerne and Southerne parts of the world: for as the South giueth a temper to the bodie fit for the science and contemplation of Arts, whereby the mind being enlarged and purified in her faculties, doth diue into the secret depth of all learning, and censure the hidden mysteries thereof: so the Northerne climats do bind in the powers of the soule, and restraints all her vertues to the vse of the bodie, whereby they are said to haue *animam in digitis*, not affoording her that delight and contentment which is vsually receiued by speculation. And thence it hapneth that all speculative arts and sciences, and what else soeuer concerneth the inward contemplation of the mind, was found out and perfected by such as border vpon the South, and from them it was brought by litle and litle into the Northerne regions. And such as would be maisters in the Arts they professed, went alwaies southward for the attaining therof: but here the South was beholding to the North, as well for their principles of Diuinitie, as for their Philosophie, and morall learning, being as pure, as that which any heathen people euer dranke of. Which proueth an auncient singularitie in the inhabitants of this Iland, touching the studie of Arts & matter of learning, and may with like euidence be proued from age to age euen to this time. In witnesse whereof I

*Druides.*

*England.*

*By reason of  
the curious  
and artificiall  
workes.*

appeale to the two Vniuersities of this land, as a demonstration of the loue which our nation hath euer borne to learning, being two such Magazines of arts and sciences, so beautified with curious buildings, and supplied with indowments for the liberall maintenance of the Muses, enriched with Libraries of learned Workes, adorned with pleasant places for the refreshing of wearied spirits, gardens, groues, walkes, riuers, and arborets, as the like such *Athens* are not to be found in any part of the world.

## CHAP. IX.

The second sort of men in Gallia, called  
*the Equites in Cæsar time.*

Cæsar.



THE other sort of people are Equites or Gentlemen, these whē there is occasion, or when any warre happeneth (as before Cæsar his comming was vsuall euery yeare, that either they did offer iniuries, or resist iniuries) are alwaies parties therein, and as euery man excelleth other in birth or wealth, so is he attended with clients and followers, and this they take to be the onely note of Nobilitie and greatnesse. The whole nation of the Gaules are much addicted to religions, and for that cause such as are either grievously diseased or conuersant continually in the daungers of warre, do either sacrifice men for an oblation, or vow the oblation of themselues, vsing in such sacrifices the ministerie of the Druides, forasmuch as they are perswaded that immortall Deitie cannot be pleased, but by giuing the life of one man for the life of another. And to that purpose they haue publike sacrifices appointed, others haue Images of monstrous magnitude, whose limmes and parts being made of osiers, are filled with lining men, and being set on fire the men are burned to death: the execution of such as are taken in theft or robbetrie or any other crime, they thinke to be best pleasing to the gods, but wanting such they spare not the innocent. They worship chiefly the god Mercurie, and haue many of his images amongst them, him they adore as the inuentor of all arts, the conductor and guide in all voyages and iourneys, & they thinke him to haue great power in all merchandize and gaine of moneys. Next vnto him they preferre Apollo, Mars, Ioue and Minertua, and of these they carie the same opinion as other nations do: Apollo to be powerfull in healing diseases, Minertua in finding out artificiall workes, Ioue ruling the celestiaall Empire, and Mars for warre. When they are to encounter with an enimie, they vow all the spoile vnto him, and such beasts as are taken they sacrifice, other things they lay up in some one place: and many such heapes of things so taken, are to be scene in the holy places of diuerse of their cities. Neither doth it often happen that any man neglecting his religion in that point, dare either keepe backe any thing so taken, or take away ought laid up in their Repositories. The Gaules do all boast themselues in the stocke from whence they are descended, vnderstanding by the Druides, that they come of the god Dis. And therefore

therefore they end the space of all their times by the number of nights rather then by the number of dayes, obseruing the dayes of their natiuitie, the beginnings of their moneths, and their yeares, in such sort, as the day doth alwayes follow the night. And herein they differ from other nations, that they suffer not their children to come openly vnto them, but when they are growne fit for warre: thinking it shameful and dishonest, that a sonne in his childhood should in publike places stand in the sight of his father. To the portions which they haue with their wiues, they adde as much more of their owne goods, and the vse of this money thus added together, is kept apart, and the longer liuer hath both the principall and the interest for all the former time. The men haue power of life and death, both ouer their wiues and their children: and when a man of great place and parentage shal happen to decease, his kinsfolks assemble themselves together to enquire of his death, if there be any occasion of suspition, they put his wife to torture after the maner of a seruant, and if it be found, she dies tormented with fire and all other tortures as may be imagined. Their funerals (according to the rest of their life) are magnificall and sumptuous, burying with the dead corpes all that he tooke delight in while he liued, not sparing liuing creatures: and not long out of memorie, the custome was to burie with the bodie such clients and seruants as were fauoured by him in his life time. Such States as are careful in the gouernment of their common weales, do prohibite by a speciall law, that no man shall communicate a rumour or report touching the State to any man sauing a Magistrate, forasmuch as it had bene often found, that rash and vnskilful men were so terrified with false reports, and moued to such desperate attempts, that they entred into resolutions touching the maine points of State. The Magistrates do keepe secret such things as they thinke fit, and that which they thinke expedient they publish: but it is not lawfull to speake of matter of State, but in assemblies of State.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



CONCERNING the beginning of dayes and times, which *Caesar* noteth in this place to be obserued by the *Gaules* after Sun setting: whereby it happened that in the naturall day of foure and twentie houres, the night alwaies preceded the day time, contrarie to the vse of *Italy*, where the day began at Sun rising, and the night followed the artificiall day as the second part of the day natural: we are to vnderstand, that as all time, and the distinction of the parts thereof, dependeth vpon the two motions of the Sunne: the one as it moueth in it own orbe from West to East, begetting the reuolution of yeares, and the seasons of Sommer and Winter, the Spring and the Autumne, with the measure of moneths as it passeth through the signes of the Zodiacke: and the other, as it is carried from East to West by the first mouing spheare, making the distinction of nights and dayes, houres and minutes: so the beginnings of these times and seasons are diuersly taken amongst diuerse people and nations of the earth. The *Jewes* had the same computatio touching the beginning of the day as the *Gaules* had, but vpon other grounds and reasons then could be alleadged for this cu-

*The beginning of the day diuersly obserued.*



some in *Gallia*: for they began their day in the euening at Sunne setting, as appeareth by many places of the Scripture: and *Moses* in the repetition of the first seuen dayes worke, vpon the accomplishment of a day, saith, The euening and the morning were one day, giuing the euening precedencie before the morning, as though the day had begun in the euening. The *Bohemians* in like manner do obserue the beginning of their day in the euening, and do herein follow the vse of the *Iewes*. Other nations do begin at Sunne rising, and take the computation of their day naturall from the first appearing of the Sunne in the East. The *Greekes* begin and end their day at midnight, obseruing the certaintie of that time, and the correspondence betweene the equall and planetarie houres in the meridian Circle: whereas otherwise by reason of the inequalitye of the dayes and the nights, out of a right sphaere there is alwaies some difference betweene the said houres: and this vse also is obserued by vs in *England*.

This god *Ditis* whom he nameth for the father of that nation, is the same whome the heathen called *Pluto*, the god of hell and darkenesse, and for that cause they put darkenesse before light, touching the beginning of their naturall day.

But forasmuch as this circumstance giueth occasion to speake of dayes and times, giue me leaue to insert the reformation of the yeare, which *Cæsar* so happily established, that succeeding times haue had no cause to alter the same.

And although it neither concerneth the art of warre, nor happened within the cōpasse of these seuen fontmiers: yet forasmuch as it was done by *Cæsar*, & deserueth as often memorie as any other of his noble acts, it shall not seeme impertinent to the reader to take this much by the way concerning that matter. There is no nation of any ciuill gouernement, but obserueth a course or reuolution differenced with times and seasons, in such manner, as may be answerable to the motion of the Sunne, in the circuit which it maketh through the signes and degrees of the Zodiacke. But forasmuch as the gouernment of a ciuill yeare doth not well admit any other composition of parts, to make it absolute and complete then by naturall dayes; and on the other side the Sunne requireth odde houres and minutes to finish his race, and returne againe to the goale from whence it came, there hath alwaies bene found a difference betweene the ciuill and the Solar yeare. Before *Cæsars* time, the *Romaines* vsing the auncient computation of the yeare, had not onely such vncertaintie and alteration in moneths and times, that the sacrifices & yearly feasts, came by litle and litle to seasons contrary for the purpose they were ordained: but also in the reuolution of the Sun or Solare yeare, no other nation agreed with them in account; and of the *Romaines* themselues onely the Priests vnderstood it: and therefore when they pleased (no man being able to controule them) they would vpon the sodaine thrust in a moneth aboue the ordinary number, which as *Plutarch* noteth, was in old time time called *Mercedonius*, or *Mensis intercalaris*. To remedie this inconuenience, *Cæsar* calling together the best and most expert Astronomers of that time, made a Kalender more exactly calculated then any other that was before: and yet such a one as by long continuance of time hath

*Plutarke  
Cæsar.*

hath bred a difference, for the matter standeth thus.

It is found by certaine obseruation of Mathematicians of all ages, that the Sunne being caried from the West to the East by the motion of his owne Spheare, finisheth his yearely course in the space of 365. dayes, fiue houres, nine and fortie minutes, and some odde seconds: whereupon it was then concluded that their ciuill yeare must necessarily containe three hundred threescore and fiue dayes, which maketh two and fiftie weekes and one day: and forasmuch as those fiue odde houres, nine and fortie minutes, and some seconds, did in foure yeares space amount vnto a naturall day (wanting two and fortie minutes, and fixe and fiftie seconds, which was thought nothing in comparifon) they deuised euery fourth yeare to adde a day more then ordinarie, to answer that time which is vsually added to February: whereby it happeneth that in euery fourth yeare February hath nine and twentie dayes; and so they made an order to reforme their yeare without any sensible error for a long time. But since that time, being one thousand fixe hundred yeares and more, those two and fortie minutes, and six and fiftie seconds, which as I said do want of the naturall day of foure and twentie houres which is incerted in euery fourth yeare, haue bred a manifest and an apparant error: for whereas the ciuill yeare is by that meanes made greater then the solar yeares, the Sunne ending his taske before we can end our times, it happeneth that such feasts as haue relation to seasonable times, do as it were foreslow the oportunitie, and fall out further in the yeare, as though they had a motion towards the sommers solstice. And as these go forward, so doth the Equinoctiall returne backwards towards the beginning of the moneth. For *Cesar* by the helpe of the Astronomers obserued the Equinoctium the fiue and twentieth of March. *Ptolomy* in his time obserued the Equinoctium the two and twentieth of March. And it was obserued the one and twentieth of March in the yeare from the incarnation 322. what time was holden the first generall Councell at *Nice* a citie of *Ponthus*, in respect whereof the Pascall tables and other rules were established for the celebration of Easter. But since that time there are passed 1281. yeares, and the Equinoctium cometh before the one and twentieth of March ten dayes.

As this error is reformed among other nations, and reduced to that state as it was at the *Nicene* Councell: so there might many reasons be alleaged to proue the reformation conuenient of a greater number of dayes then ten. For if the Kalender were so ordered, that euery moneth might begin when the Sun entred into that Signe which is for the moneth, and end when the Sunne goeth out of that signe, it would auoide much confusion, and be very easie to all sorts of people as haue occasion to obserue the same: which doubleffe was the purport of the first institution of moneths; and was obserued (as it seemeth) by the old *Romains*, who began the yeare at the winter solstice, as *Ouid* noteth:

*Bruma noni prima est, veterisq; nouissima solis,*

*Principium capiunt Phœbus & annus idem.*

And therefore they called that moneth Ianuarie of *Ianus* that had two faces, and saw both the old and the new yeare: such therefore as would go about to reforme the yeare to this course, must not cut off ten dayes onely, but one and

twentie; and for one yeare make December to continue but tenne dayes, and then Ianuarie to begin, and so successiuelly to the rest of the moneths. But it may be said, that although we helpe our selues, and put off the inconuenience which is fallen vpon vs, yet in tract of time the like error will fall againe vpon succeeding ages, and put their yearely Feasts besides the dayes appointed for them. For remedie whereof it may be answered: That whereas this error hath happened by adding euery fourth yeare a naturall day, which in true calculation wanted two and fortie minutes and fixe and fiftie seconds of foure and twentie houres, and in euery 136. yeares hath accrued within one minute to a day more then needed: the onely way is euery 136. yeares, to omit the addition of that day, and to make that yeare to containe but 365. dayes, which by the order of *Cæsars* Kalender, is a leape yeare, and hath one day more, which hath brought this error. And so there would not happen the error of a day in the space of 111086. yeares, if the world should continue so long.

But lest we should seeme more curious in reforming the course of our ciuill yeare, then the manners of our ciuill life, I will proceede to that which followeth.

#### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

*Their respect  
to matter  
of State.*



THE second thing which I obserue in their manner of life, is the respect they had to matter of State, and the care which they took that no man shold dispute of the Commonweale, but in assemblies appointed for the seruice of the Commonweale. Whereby they gained two speciall points for the maintenance of good gouernement. The first, that no man might speake of points of state, but the gouernours of State: for such I vnderstand to be admitted to their Councils and Parliaments. Secondly, that such matters of consequence as touched the so nearely, might not be handled, but at such places and at such times as might best aduantage the State. Concerning the former, we are to note, that Gouernment is defined, to be an establishing of order best fitting the maintenance of a people, in a peaceable and happie life. Order requireth degrees and distinctions inuesting seuerall parts in seuerall functions and duties: to these duties there belongeth a due obseruancie according to the motion and place, which euery part holdeth in the generall order. Of these degrees and distinctions, Soueraigntie and Obedience are two maine relatues, the one inuested in the Prince or Magistrate, the other in the people and subiect, incommunicable in regard of their tearmes and subiects, and yet concurring in the maine drift of gouernment, intending the benefite of a happie life. And therefore the *Gauls* did carefully provide, that no man shold exceed the limits of his owne rancke, but that such as fate at the helme might shape the course: & for the rest whose lot it was to be directed, they would haue them take notice of their mandates by obedience, and not by dispute.

*Tibi summan  
rerum diydere,  
nobis obsequi  
gloria relata est:  
Tacitus.*

Touching the second point, we are to consider the danger which may happen

pen



pen to a State, by common and ordinarie discourse of the Principles of that Gouernment, or of such circumstances as are incident to the same, (without respect of time or place, or any other due regard) which the wisdom of a well ordered pollicie, doth hold requisite thereunto: for whatsoeuer is deliuered by speech, without such helpfull attendance, is both vnseasonable and vnprofitable, and the Cōmonweale is alwaies a sufferer, when it falleth into such rash considerations: for our most serious cogitations assisted with the best circumstances, can but speake to purpose. And as the execution falleth short of the purport intended by discourse, so is our speech and discourse lame and wanting to our inward conceipt. And therefore as religious actions stand in neede of *hoc age*, so may politicke consultations vse the helpe of the same remembrancer.

## CHAP. X.

## The maner and life of the Germanes.

**T**HE Germanes do much differ from the Gaules in their course of life, for they haue neither Priests nor sacrifices: they worship no Gods but such as are subiect to sense, and from whom they dayly receiue profits and helpe, as the Sunne, the fire, and the Moon. for the rest they haue not so much as heard of: their life is onely spent in hunting, or in vse and practise of war: they inure themselues to labor and hardnesse euen to their childhood; and such as continue beardedlesse are most commended amongst them: for this some thinke to be very auailable to their stature, others to their strength and sinewes: they hold it a most dishonest part for one to touch a woman before he be twentie yeares of age, neither can any such matter be hid or dissembled; forasmuch as they bathe themselues together in riuers, and vse skinnes and other small conerings on the reines of their backs, the rest of their bodie being all naked. They vse no tillage, the greatest part of their foode is milke, or cheese, or flesh: neither hath any man any certaine quantitie of land to his owne vse; but their Magistrates and Princes do euery yeare allot a certaine portion of land to kindreds and tribes that inhabite together, and in such places as they think fit, whereof they giue many reasons, lest they should be led away by continuall custome from the practise of war to the vse of husbandrie, or lest they should endeuour to get themselues great possessions, and so the weaker should be thrust out and dispossessed of their linings by the mightie, or lest they should build too delicately for the auoyding of cold or heate, or lest they should waxe couetous and thirst after money, which is the beginning of all factions and dissensions; and lastly that they might keepe the Commons in good contentment, considering the parity betweene their reuenues and the possessions of the great ones. It is the greatest honor to their States to haue their confines lie wast and desolate far and neare about them: for that they take to be an argument of valour, when their borderers are drinen to forsake their country,

Caesar.



and dare not abide neare them; and withall they thinke themselves by that meanes much safer from any sodaine incursion. When a State wakesh war, either by way of attempt or defence, they chose Magistrates to commaund that war, hauing power of life and death, but in time of peace they haue no common Magistrate, but the chiefe men in the country and the villages, do interpret the law and determine of controuersies. The best committed out of the confines of their State is not infamous or dishonest, but commended as an exercise of the youth and a keeping them from slouth: when any one of their Princes and chiefe men shall in an assembly or counsell publish himselfe for a leader vpon some exploit, and desire to know who will follow him vpon the same, they that haue a good opinion of the man and the matter, and do promise him their helpe and assistance, are commended by the multitude: the rest that refuse to accompany him are held in the number of traitors, and neuer haue any credit afterwards. They hold it not lawfull to hurt a stranger that shall come vnto them vpon any occasion, but do protect him from iniuries: to such euery mans house is open & his table common. The time was when the Gauls excelled the Germanes in prowesse and valor, and made war vpon them of their own accord, and by reason of the multitude of their people and want of ground for habitatio, they sent many colonies ouer the Rheine into Germany. And therefore those fertile places of Germany, which are neer vnto the wood Hercinia which Erathostenes & other Grecians tooke notice of by the name of Orcinia were possessed by the Volga and Tectosages, who dwelt there at this time, and keepe their ancient opinion of iustice and warlike praise. Now the Germanes stil continue in the same poertie, want, and patience, as in former time: do vse the same diet and apparell for their bodies, but the neighborhood and knowledge of other nations hath made the Gauls liue in a more plentiful maner, and by litle & litle haue bin weakned & overthrowen in diuers battels, so that now they stand not in coparison with the Germanes. The breadth of the wood Hercinia is 9 dayes iourney ouer, for they haue no other differences of space but by meanes of dayes iourneys: it beginneth at the confines of the Helvetij, Numeti, and runs along the riuer Danubius to the territories of the Daci, thence it declineth to the left side from the said riuer, and by reason of the large extension thereof, it bordereth the confines of many other countries. Neither is there any Germane that can say, that either he durst aduenture, or did go, or had heard of the beginning of the same, although he had trauelled therein threescore dayes iourney. In this wood are many sorts of wild beasts, which are not to be seene in any other place: amongst the rest there is an Oxe like vnto a Hart, that in the middest of his forehead betweene his eares carieth a horne longer then vsuall, diuided at the end into many large branches; the female is in all respects like vnto the male, and beareth a horne of the same magnitude and fashion. There is likewise another sort of beasts called Alces, not vnlike vnto a Goate, but somewhat bigger and without hornes, their legs are without ioynts, that when they take their rest they neither sit nor lie vpon the ground, and if they chance to fall they cannot rise againe. When they take their rest in the night, they leane against trees: the hunters hauing found out their footsteps and their haunt, do either undermine the roote of such trees, or so cut them asunder that a small matter will ouerthrow them, so that when they come according vnto their vse to rest themselves against those trees, they ouerthrow them with their waight, and fall with themselves and so are taken. The third kind of beast are those which are called Vri, some-  
what

what lesser then an Elephant, and in colour, kind and shape, not unlike unto a Bull, they are both strong and swift, and spare neither man nor beast that commeth in their sight: these they catch with greater labour and diligence in pits and ditches, and so kill them. The youth do inure and exercise themselves in this kind of hunting, and such as kill many of these beasts, and shew most hornes, are highly commended: but to make them tame or any their litle ones, was neuer yet seene. The largenesse of their hornes, as also the fashion and kind thereof, doth much differ from the hornes of the Oxen, and are much sought after for cups to be used in their greatest banquets, being first bound about the brim and trimmed with siluer.

## OBSERVATIONS.



**C**ESAR in this Chapter describeth the course of life which the *Germanes* in his time held throughout the whole pollicie of their gouernement, the scope whereof was to make them warlike: to which he saith, that in times past the *Gaules* were as valiant and as warlike people as the *Germanes*: but the neighbourhood and knowledge of other nations, had taught them a more plentifull manner of life, which by litle and litle had weakened their strength, and made them far inferiour to the *Germanes*. Which bringeth to our consideration that which is often attributed to a ciuill life, that such as tast of the sweetnesse of ease, and are qualified with the complements of ciuilitie, haue alwayes an indisposition to warlike practises. The reason is grounded vpon vse and custome; for discontinuance doth alwayes cause a strangenesse and alienation, benumbing the appetest parts with vnreadie and painefull gestures: and is so powerfull, that it doth not onely steale away naturall affection, and make parents forget to loue their children; but like a tyrant it is able to force vs to those things which naturally we are vnfit for, as though the decrees of nature were subiect to the controlement of custome. Much more then, the things got by vse and practise, are as easily forgot by discontinuance, as they were obtained by studious exercise. On the other side, there is nothing so horrible or dreadfull, but vse maketh easie. The first time the Fox saw the Lion, he swounded for feare; the next time he trembled, but the third time he was so farre from feare, that he was ready to put a trick of craft vpon him: whereby it appeareth, that the *Germanes* had no further interest in deedes of armes about the *Gaules*, then what the vse of war had gained them: for as vsage continueth the property of a tenure, so non-usage implieth a forfeiture. *Cato* was wont to say, that the *Romaines* would loose their Empire, when they suffered the Greeke tongue to be taught amongst them: for by that meanes they would easily be drawne from the studie and practise of warre, to the bewitching delight of speculatiue thoughts. And *Marcellus* was blamed for being the first that corrupted *Rome* with the delicate and curious workes of *Greece*: for before that he brought from the sacking of *Syracusa* the wel wrought tables of pictures and imagery, *Rome* neuer knew any such delicacie, but stood full fraught with armor & weapons of barbarous people, of the


Whether a ciuill life do weaken a warlike disposition.

bloudy spoyle and monuments of victories and triumphs; which were rather fearefull shewes to inure their eyes to the horror of warre, then pleasant fights to allure their minds to affections of peace. Whereby it appeareth, that such as suffer themselues to be guided by the easie raigne of ciuill gouernement, or take a disposition to that course of life, can hardly indure the yoke of war, or vndergo the tediousnesse of martiall labours.

## CHAP. XI.

Basilus his surprise vpon  
*Ambiorix.*

Caesar.



**C**ÆSAR finding by the discoverers which the Vbij sent out, that the Sweui had all betaken themselves to the woods, and doubting want of corne, forasmuch as the Germaines of all other nations do least care for tillage, he determined to go no further. But that his returne might not altogether free the barbarous people from feare, nor hinder the helpes and succors which they were wont to send into Gallia, hauing brought backe his armie, he cut off so much of the furthest part of the bridge next vnto the Vbij, as came in measure to two hundred foote, and in the end of that which remained, he built a towre of foure stories, making other workes for the strengthening of that place, wherein he left a garrison of twelue cohorts vnder the command of young C. Volcatius Tullus: he himselfe as corne waxed ripe, went forward to the warre of Ambiorix by the way of the wood of Ardena, which is the greatest in all Gallia, and extendeth it selfe from the bankes of Rheine and the confines of the Treuiri, to the seate of the Neruij, carying a breadth of fise hundred miles. He sent L. M. Basilus before with all the horse, to see if he could effect any thing either by preuention and speedie arriuall, or by oportunitie, commaunding him not to suffer any fires to be made in his campe, lest his comming might be discovered. Basilus followeth his directions, and comming vpon them contrarie to their expectation, tooke many of the enemy abroad in the fields, and by their conduction made towards Ambiorix, where he remained in a place with a few horsemen. As fortune is very powerfull in all things, so she challengeth a speciall interest in matter of warre: for as it happened by great lucke, that he should light vpon him vnawares and unprouided, and that his comming should sooner be seene then heard of: so was it great hap, that all the armes which he had about him, should be surpris'd, his horses and his charrets taken, and that he himselfe should escape death. But this happened by reason of the wood that was about his house, according to the manner of the Gauls, who for auoyding of heate, do commonly build neare vnto woods and riuers: his followers and friends sustaining a while the charge of the horsemen in a narrow place, while he himselfe escaped in the meane time on horsebacke, and in flying was protected and sheltered by the woods, whereby Fortune seemed very powerfull both in drawing on a danger, and in auoyding it.

OBSER.



## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



THE prerogative which Fortune hath alwayes challenged in the accidents of warre, and the speciall interest, which she hath in that course of life more then in other mens actions, hath made the best soldiers oftentimes to sing a song of complaint, the burthen whereof yet remaineth, and serueth as a reason of all such misadventures, *Fortune de la guerre*. Such as haue obserued the course of things, and haue found one and the same man continuing the same meanes, this day happie, and the next day vnfortunate: and againe, two other men, the one aduised and respectiue, and the other violent and rash, and yet both attaine the like good fortune by two contrarie courses, or otherwise as oftentimes it falleth out, the more heedlesse, the more happie; haue bene perswaded that all things are so gouerned by fortune, that the wisdom of man can neither alter nor amend them: and therefore to spend much time or tedious labour, either in carefull circumspection, or heedfull preuention of that which is vnchaungeable, they hold as vaine as the washing of an *Aethiopian* to make him white. Of this opinion *Sylla* seemed to be, professing himselfe better borne to fortune then to the warres, and acknowledging his happiest victories to haue proceeded from his most heedlesse and vnaduised resolutions. And the great *Alexander* so caried himselfe, as though he had bene of the same opinion, of whome *Curtius* saith: *Quoties illum fortuna, à morte renoucauit? quoties temerè in pericula uetèrū perpetua felicitate protexit?* And *Plutarch* saith, that he had power of time and place.

*Fortune.*

*Plutarke in  
the life of  
Sylla*

*In the life of  
Alexander.*

Others are not willing to ascribe so much to Fortune, as to make themselves the tennis ball to her racket: and yet they are content to allow her halfe of euery thing they go about, reseruing the other moitie to their owne directions. And so like partners in an aduenture, they labour to improue their share for their best aduantage.

Some other there are that will allow Fortune no part at all in their actions, but do confront her with a goddesse of greater power, and make Industrie the meanes to adnull her deitie. Of this opinion was *Timotheus* the *Athenian*, who hauing achieved many notable victories, would not allow of the conceipt of the painter, that had made a table wherein Fortune was taking in those cities, (which he had won) with a net, whilst he himselfe slept: but protested against her in that behalfe, and would not giue her any part in that businesse.

*Plutarke in  
the life of  
Sylla.*

And thus the heathen world varied as much in their opinions touching Fortune, as Fortune herselfe did in her euents to themward: which were so diuers and chaungeable, as were able to ensnare the deepest wits, and confound the wisdom of the greatest iudgements: whereby the word Fortune vsurped a deitie, and got an opinion of extraordinarie power in the regiment of humane actions. But our Christian times haue a readier lesson, wherein is taught a soueraine Prouidence, guiding and directing the thoughts of mens hearts, with the faculties and powers of the Soule, together with their externall actions, to



such ends as shall seeme best to that omnipotent wisdom, to whom all our abilities serue as instruments and meanes to effect his purposes, notwithstanding our particular intendments, or what the heart of man may otherwise determine. And therefore such as will make their wayes prosperous vnto themselves, and receiue that contentment which their hope expecteth, or their labours would deserue, must vse those helpes which the rules of Christianitie do teach in that behalfe, and may better be learned from a Diuine, then from him that writeth Treatises of warre.

THE SECONDE OBSERVATION.

*Celeritie and  
expedition.*



*VINTVS* Curtius speaking of Alexander saith: *Nullam virtutem Regis istius magis quam celeritatem laudauerim*: whereof this might be a ground, that he followed *Darius* with such speed after the second battell he gaue him, that in eleuen dayes he marched with his armie fixe hundred miles, which was a chafe well fitting *Alexander* the Great, and might rest vnexampled: notwithstanding *Suetonius* giueth this generall report of *Cæsar*, that in matter militarie, *aut equanitas præstantissimorum gloriam aut excessit*: and for this particular he saith, *quod per sepe nuntius de se præuenit*. And to speake truly, he seemeth to challenge to himselfe expedition and speede as his peculiar commendation, grounding himselfe vpon the daunger which lingring and foreflowing of time, doth vsually bring to well aduised resolutions: according to that of *Lucan* the Poet,

*Nocuit semper differre paratis.*

For by this speedie execution of well digested directions, he gained two maine aduantages: first the preuention of such helpes and meanes as the enemy wold otherwise haue had, to make the warre daungerous and the euent doubtfull. And secondly, the confusion and feare, which doth consequently follow such maine disappointments, being the most daungerous accidents that can happen to any partie, and the chiefe points to be endeoured to be cast vpon an enemy by him that would make an easie conquest.

*Plutarke in  
the life of  
Pompey.*

For prooffe whereof amongst many other examples, I will onely alledge his expedition to *Rome*, when he first came against *Pompey*, according to *Plutarke's* relation. In the meane time (saith he) newes came to *Rome*, that *Cæsar* had won *Ariminum*, a great citie in *Italie*, and that he came directly to *Rome* with a great power, which was not true: for he came but with 3000. horse and 5000. foote, and would not tarie for the rest of his armie, being on the other side of the Alpes in *Gallia*, but made hast rather to surprise his enemies vpon the sudden, being afraid and in garboile, not looking for him so soone, then to giue them time to be prouided, and so to fight with them in the best of their strength, which fell out accordingly: for this sudden and v unexpected approach of his, put all *Italy* and *Rome* it selfe into such a tumult and confusion, that no man knew what way to take for his safetie: for such as were out of *Rome* came flying thither from all partes, and those on the other side that were in *Rome*, went out

as fast, and forsooke the citie. And the amazement was such, that *Pompey* and the Senate fled into *Greece*, whereby it hapned that *Cæsar* in threescore dayes, was Lord of all *Italie* without any bloudshed.

Besides this manner of preuention by sudden surprize, we may see the like expedition in the very cariage and forme of his warres: for if the enemy had taken the field, he laboured by all meanes to bring him to fight: or otherwise if he refused to take the field, he then endeouored with the like speede to besiege him or blocke him vp in some hold, to the end he might bring the matter to a speedy vpsshot, as he did with *Vercingetorix* at *Alesia*. But that which is most memorable touching this point, at the first taking in of *Spaine* in the garboile of the ciuill warres, he defeated two armies, ouerthrew two Generals, and tooke in two Prouinces in the space of fortie dayes. Neither did he make vse of expedition onely in his cariage of a war, but also in the action and execution of battell: for he neuer forsooke an enemy ouerthrowne and discomfited, vntill he had taken their campe, and defeated them of their chiefe helpes, which *Pompey* felt to his vtter ouerthrow: for the same day he routed him at *Pharsalia*, he took his campe, and inclosed a hill with a ditch and a rampier, where 25000. *Romaines*, were fled for their safetie, and brought them to yeeld themselues vnto him: and so making vse (as he saith) of the benefite of fortune, and the terror and amazement of the enemy, he performed three notable seruices in one day.

And this he vsed with such dexteritie and depth of wisdome, that commonly the first victorie ended the warre, as by this at *Pharsalia* he made himselfe Commaunder of the East, and by that at *Tapsò* he made himselfe Lord of *Africke*, and by the battell at *Monda* he got all *Spaine*.

To conclude this point, I may not forget the like speed and expedition in his workes: in fiftene dayes he cast a ditch and a rampier of fiftene foote in height, betweene the lake at *Geneua* and *S. Claudes* hill, containing nineteene miles. He made his bridge ouer the *Rheine* in ten daies. At the siege of *Marseilles* he made twelue gallies, and furnished them out to sea within thirtie daies after the timber was cut downe. And the rest of his workes with the like expedition.

Veni,  
Vidi,  
Vici.

Lib. 2. bell.  
ciuili.

Lib. 1. bell.  
ciuili.

## CHAP. XII.

Catiuulcus poisoneth himselfe: *Cæsar*  
deuideth his armie into three parts.



OW whether *Ambiorix* did not make head & assëble his forces of purpose, for that he determined not to fight, or whether he were hindered by the shortnesse of the time, and the sudden comming of the horsemen, thinking the rest of the armie had followed after, it remaineth doubtfull: but certaine it is, that he sent priue messengers about the countrie, commaunding euery man to shift for himselfe, of whome some fled into the Forrest *Arduenna*, others into fennes and bogges, and such as

*Cæsar.*

were neare the Ocean, did hide themselves in such Islands as the tides do commonly make: and many forsooke their country, and committed themselves to their fortunes, to meere straungers and unknowne people. Catiuulcus the king of the one halfe of the Eburones, who was a partie with Ambiorix in this matter, being now growne old and unable to vndergo the labours either of warre or of flying, detesting Ambiorix with all manner of execrations, as the auhor of that matter, dranke the iuice of Tew (whereof there is great store in Gallia and Germanie) and so died. The Segni and Conderusi of the nation and number of the Germaines that dwell betweene the Eburones and the Treuiri, sent messengers to Cæsar to intreat him not to take them in the number of the enemy. And that he would not adiudge all the Germaines dwelling on this side of the Rheine, to haue one and the same cause: for their part, they neuer so much as thought of warre, nor gaue any aide to Ambiorix. Cæsar hauing examined the matter by the torture of the captiues, commaunded them, that if any of the Eburones should flie vnto them to bring them vnto him, and in so doing he wold spare their cuntry: then deuiding his forces into three parts, he left the baggage of the whole armie at Vatuca a castle in the middest of the Eburones, where Titurius and Armuculeius were lodged. The winter before he made choice of this place, the rather for that the fortifications made the yeare before continued perfect and good, to the end he might ease the souldier of some labour, and there left the fourteenth legion for a guard to the cariages, being one of the three which he had last enrolled in Italy, making Q. Tullius Cicero their Commaunder, and with him he left two thousand horse.

The armie being deuided, he commaunded Titus Labienus to carrie three Legions towards that part of the sea coast which bordereth vpon Henapii, and sent Trebonius with the like number of Legions to wast and harrie that countrey which confineth the Aduatici: he himselfe with the other three determined to go to the riuer Scaldis, which runneth into the Mase, and to the furthest parts of the wood Ardenna: for that he vnderstood that Ambiorix with a few horsemen was fled to those parts. At his departure he assured them that he would returne after the seuenth dayes absence: for at that day he knew that corne was to be giuen to that legion which he had there left in garrison. He counselled Labienus and Trebonius to returne likewise by that day if they conueniently could, to the end that after communication of their discoueries and intelligence of the proiects of the enemy, they might thinke vpon a new beginning of warre.

## OBSERVATIONS.



HIS sudden surprise vpon Ambiorix and the Treuiri, preuented (as I haue already noted) their making head together, and put the enemy to such shifts for their safety, as occasion or opportunity would afford them in particular. And albeit the Treuiri were by this means dispersed, yet they were not ouerthrowne, nor utterly vanquished, but continued still in the nature and qualitie of an enemy, although

though they were by this occasion defeated of their chiefeft meanes. And therefore the better to prosecute them in their particular flights, and to keepe the disioyned, he diuided his armie into 3 parts, and made three seuerall inroads vpon their countrey, hoping thereby to meet with some new occasion, which might giue an ouerture of a more absolute conquest: for diuersitie of motions do breed diuersitie of occasions, whereof some may happily be such as being well managed may bring a man to the end of his desires. But herein let vs not forget to obserue the maner he vsed in this seruice; for first he left a *Rédez vous* where all the cariages of the armie were bestowed, with a competent garrison for the safe keeping thereof; to the end the soldiers might be assured of a retreat, what difficulty soeuer might befall them in that action, according to that of *Sertorius*, that a good captain should rather looke behind him then before him: and appointed withall a certaine day when all the troopes should meete there againe: *Vt rursus (as he sayth) communicato consilio, exploratisq; hostium rationibus, aliud initium belli capere possint.*

*Plutarke in  
the life of  
Sertorius.*

## CHAP. XIII.

*Cæsar sendeth messengers to the bordering  
States, to come out and sacke  
the Eburones.*

**H**ERE was (as I haue already declared) no certaine band or troope of the enimie, no garrison or towne to stand out in armes; but the multitude was dispersed into all parts, and euerie man lay hid either in some secret and unknowne valley, or in some rough and wooddie place, or in some bog, or in such other places as gaue them hope of shelter or safetie: which places were well knowne to the States of that countrey, and the matter required great diligence and circumspection, not so much in regard of the generall safetie of the armie (for there could no danger happen vnto them, the enimie being all terrified and fled) but in preserving euery particular souldier; which notwithstanding did in part concerne the safetie of the whole armie: for hope of booty did draw many farre off out of their rankes, and the woods through vncertaine and unknowne passages would not suffer the souldiers to go in troopes. If he would haue the businesse take an end, and the very race of those wicked people rooted out, the armie must be diuided, and many small bands must be made for that purpose: but to keepe the Maniples at their ensignes, according to the custome and vse of the Romaine armie, the place it selfe was a sufficient guard for the barbarous people, who did not want courage in particular, both to lie in waite for them, and circumuent them as they were seuered from their companies: as in extremities of that nature what diligence could attaine vnto was provided, but in such maner, that somewhat was omitted in

*Cæsar.*



*the offensive part, rather then it should be done with any detriment or losse to the souldier. Cæsar sent messengers to the next bordering States, calling them out to sacke the Eburones in hope of bootie and pillage, to the end the Gaules should rather hazard their liues in the wood then the legionarie souldiers, as also that there might be many spoylers and destroyers, to the end that both the name and race of that State might be taken away. These things were acted in all parts and quarters of the Eburones, and the seuenth day drew neare which he had appointed for his returne to the cariages.*

## OBSERVATIONS.

*The benefit of  
open encounter.*



**T** is a commoditie which a Generall hath, when the enemy doth not refuse open encounter, for so he may be sure that the weight of the businesse will rest vpon militarie vertue and prowess of armes, as ready way makes to a speedy victory: but when it shal happen that the country doth affoord couert & protection to him that is more malicious then valorous; and through the fastnesse of the place refuseth to shew himselfe vnlesse it be vpon aduantage, the warre doubtlesse is like to prooue tedious, and the victory lesse honorable. In such cases there is no other way, then so to harry and wast a countrey, that the enemy may be famished out of his holds, and brought to subiection by scarcity and necessity: which is a meanes so powerfull, as well to supplant the greatest strength, as to meete with subterfuge and delay, that of it selfe it subdueth all opposition, and needeth no other help for atchieuing of victory, as may appear by the sequel of this sommers action. And herein let vs further obserue the particular care which Cæsar had of his soldiers, adiudging the whole army to be interested in euery priuat mans safetie; a matter strange in these times, and of small consequence in the iudgement of our commanders, to who particular fortunes are esteemed non-entities, and men in feuerall of no valew: forasmuch as conquests are made with multitudes, concerning which point, I grant it to be as true, as it is often spoken in places besieged; that the losse of one man is not the losse of a towne; nor the defeating of twentie, the ouerthrow of a thousand: and yet it cannot be denied but the lesser is paid for the lawrell wreath, the more precious is the victorie: and it sitteth then at a hard rate, when it maketh the buyer bankrupt, or inforceth him to confesse, that such another victorie would ouerthrow him. And therefore he that will buy much honour with litle blood, must endeavour by diligent and carefull labour to prouide for the particular safetie of his souldiers. Wherein albeit he cannot valew an vnity at an equal rate with a number; yet he must consider, that without a vnity there can be no multitude: and not so only, but the life and strength of a multitude consisteth in vnities; for otherwise, neither had Nero needed to haue wished the people of Rome to haue had but one head, that he might haue cut it off at a stroke; nor Sertorius deuide had caried any grace, making a lustie fellow faile in plucking off the thinne taile of an old leane jade;

*Plutarke in  
the life of  
Sertorius.*

jude; and a litle wearish man leaue the stumpe bare of a great tayld horse, and that in a short time, by plucking haire by haire.

## CHAP. XIII.

The *Sicambri* sent out two thousand horse against the *Eburones*, and by fortune they fall vpon Cicero at *Vatuca*.

**H**ERE you shall perceine the power that fortune hath, and what chaunces happen in the cariage of a war. There was (as I haue already said) the enimie being scattered and terrified, no troop or band which might giue the least cause of feare: the report came to the *Germanes* on the other side of the *Rheine*, that the *Eburones* were to be sacked, and that all men had libertie to make spoyle of them. The *Sicambri* dwelling next to the *Rheine*, set out two thousand horse, and sent them ouer the river some thirtie miles below that place where *Cæsar* had left the halfe bridge with a garrison: these horse made directly towards the confines of the *Eubrones*, tooke many prisoners and much cattell, neither bog nor wood hindered their passage, being bred and borne in warre and theft. They inquire of the prisoners in what part *Cæsar* was, and found him to be gone farre off, and that all the armie was departed from thence: and one of the prisoners speaking to them, said, Why do yee seeke after so poore and so slender a bootie, when otherwise you may make your selues most fortunate? in 3 houres space you may go to *Vatuca*, where the *Romaine* armie hath left all their fortunes; the garrison in that place is no greater then can hardly furnish the walles about, neither dare any man go out of the trenches. The *Germanes* in this hope did hide the pilage which they had already taken, and went directly to *Vatuca*, taking him for their guide that gaue them first notice thereof. Cæsar.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**I**T were as great a madnesse to beleeue that a man were able to giue directions to meete with all chaunces, as to thinke no foresight can preuent any casualtie: for as the soule of man is endued with a power of discourse, whereby it concludeth either according to the certaintie of reason, or the learning of experience, bringing thide directions as faultie and inconuenient, and approouing others as safe and to be followed: so we are to vnderstand, that this power of discourse is limited to a certaine measure or proportion of strength, and inscribed in a


circle of lesser capacitie, then the compasse of possibilitie, or the large extension of what may happen; for otherwise the course of destinie were subiect to our controlement, and our knowledge were equall to vniuersall entitie, whereas the infinitie of accidents do farre exceede the reach of our shallow senses, and our greatest apprehension, is a small and vnperfect experience. And therefore as such as through the occasion of publike employment, are driuen to forsake the shore of minute and particular courses, and to flote in the Ocean of casualties and aduentures, may doubtlesse receiue strong directions, both from the loadstone of reason, and tramontane of experience to shape an easie and successfull course: so notwithstanding they shall find themselves subiect to the contrarietie of winds and extremitie of tempests, besides many other lets and impediments beyond the compasse of their direction, to interrupt their course and diuert them from their hauen, which made the *Carthaginian* that was more happie in conquering then in keeping to crie out: *Nusquam minus quam in bello euentus rerum respondent*, as it happened in this accident.

*Hanniball.*

## CHAP. XV.

The Sicambri come to Vatuca, and offer  
to take the campe.

*Cæsar.*



**C**ICERO hauing all the dayes before obserued Cæsar's direction with great diligence, and kept the souldiers within the camp, not suffering so much as a boy to go out of the trenches: the seuenth day distrusting of Cæsar's retorne according to his promise, for that he vnderstood he was gone further into the countrey and heard nothing of his retorne: and withall being moued with the speeches of the souldiers, who termed their patient abiding within their trenches, a siege, forasmuch as no man was suffered to go out of them, and expecting no such chaunce within the compasse of three miles, which was the furthest, he purposed to send them for corne, especially considering that nine legions were abroad, besides great forces of horse, the enemy being alreadie dispersed and almost extinguished; he sent fine cohorts to gather corne in the next fields which were separated from the garrison onely with a litle hill lying betweene the camp and the corne. There were many left in the camp of the other legions that were sicke, of whom such as were recovered to the number of three hundred, were sent with them all vnder one ensigne: besides a great companie of souldiers boyes, and great store of cattell which they had in the campe. In the meane time came these Germaine Rutters, and with the same gallop as they came thither, they sought to enter in at the Decumane gate; neither were they discovered by reason of a wood which kept them out of sight untill they were almost at the trenches, insomuch as such trades men and merchants as kept their booths and shops vnder the rampier, had no time

time

time to be receiued into the campe, and the cohort that kept watch did hardly sustaine the first assault. The enimie was quickly spread about the workes, to see if they could finde entrance in any other part: our men did hardly keepe the gates: the rest was defended by the fortification and the place it selfe: the whole campe was in a great feare, and one inquired of another the reason of the tumult, neither could they tell which way to carie their ensignes, or how any man should dispose of himselfe: one gaue out, that the campe was taken, and another that the armie and General was ouerthrowne, and that the Barbarous people came thither as conquerours: many tooke occasion from the place to imagine new and superstitious Religions, recalling to mind the fatall calamitie of Cotta and Titurius that died in that place. Through this feare and confusion that had possesst the whole campe, the Germaines were confirmed in their opinion which they had receiued from the prisoner, that there was no garrison at all in the workes. They endeuored to breake in, and incouraged one another not to suffer so great a fortune to escape them. Publius Sextius Baculus that had bene Primipilus vnder Cæsar (of whom mention hath bene made in the former battels) was there left sicke, and had taken no sustenance of siue dayes before: he hearing the danger they were in, went vnarmed out of his cabbin, and seeing the enimie readie to force the gates, and the matter to be in great hazard, taking armes from one that stood next him, he went and stood in the port; the Centurions of the cohort that kept watch followed him, and they for a while ingaged the enimie. Sextius hauing receiued many great wounds fainted at length, and was hardly saued by those that stood next him. Vpon this respite the rest did so far assure themselves, that they durst stand vpon the workes, and make a shew of defence.

## OBSERVATIONS.



N the former obseruation I disputed the interest which the whole armie hath in one particular man, which out of Cæsars opinion I concluded to be such as was not to be neglected: but if we suppose a partie extraordinarie, and tye him to such singular worth as was in *Sextius*, I then doubt by this example, whether I may not equall him to the multitude, or put him alone in the ballance to counterpoise the rest of his fellowes. For doubtlesse if his valour had not exceeded any height of courage, elswhere then to be found within those wals, the whole garrison had bene vtterly slaughtered, and the place had bene made fatall to the *Romaines* by two disastrous calamities. In consideration whereof, I will referre my selfe to the iudgement of the wise, how much it importeth a great Commaunder, not onely in honour as a rewarder of vertue, but in wisdom and good discretion, to make much of so gallant a spirite, and to giue that respect vnto him, as may both witnesse his valiant cariage, and the thankfull acceptation thereof on the behalfe of the Commonweale, wherein we need not doubt of Cæsars requitall to this *Sextius*, hauing by diuerse honorable relations in these warres, touching his valiantnesse and prowesse in armes, made



him partaker of his owne glorie, and recommended him to posteritie, for an example of true valour.

## CHAP. XVI.

## The Sicambri continue their purpose in taking the campe.

Caesar.



N the meane time the souldiers, hauing made an end of reaping and gathering corne, heard the crie: the horsemen hasted before, and found in what daunger the matter stood; there was in that place no fortifications to receiue the affrighted souldiers: such as were lately inrolled and had no experience in matter of warre set their faces towards the Tribunes of the souldiers, and to the Centurions, and expected directions from them.

Cicero.

There was none so assured or valiant, but were troubled thereat. The barbarous people hauing spied the ensignes a farre off, left off their assault, and first they thought it had bene the legions that had returned: afterward contemning the smalnesse of their number, they set vpon them on all sides: the souldiers boyes be-tooke themselves vnto the next hill, and being quickly put from thence, they cast themselves headlong amongst the Maniples and ensignes, and so put the souldiers in a worse feare then they were before. Some were of opinion to put themselves into the forme of battell which resembleth a wedge, and so (forasmuch as the campe was at hand) to breake speedily through the enemy. In which course if any part should be circum-vented and cut a peeces, yet they hoped the rest might saue themselves: others thought it better to make good the hill, and all of them to attend one and the same fortune. This aduise the old souldiers did not like of, who (as I said before) went out with the others that were sent a haruesting all vnder one ensigne by themselves: and therefore encouraging one another, Caius Trebonius a Romaine horseman being their cap-taine, and commaunding them at that time, brake through the thickest of the enemy, and came all safe into the campe. The boyes and horsemen following hard after them were likewise saued by the valour of the souldiers: but those that tooke the hill, ha-uing neuer had any vse of seruice, had neither the courage to continue in that resolu-tion which they had before chosen, nor to imitate that force and speed which they had seene to haue helped their fellows: but indenouring to be receiued into the campe, fell into places of disadvantage: wherein diuers of their Centurions, who had lately bene taken from the lowest companies of other legions, and for their valours sake preferred to the highest and chiefe companies of this legion, least they should lose the honour which they had before gotten, fighting valiantly died in the place. Part of the soul-diers by the promesse of these men that had remoued the enemy, beyond all hope, got safe into the campe, the rest were defeated and slaine by the Germanes.

THE

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



HIS circumstance doth afford vs two observable points : the one, how much an old experienced souldier, that hath the vse and knowledge of seruice, exceedeth the nouicie of such as are newly enrolled . The second, which dependeth vpon the former, that valour and militarie vertue, is a consequent of vse and practise, rather then any inherent gift of nature . *Camillus* being sent with an armie against the *Thuscanes*, the *Romaine* souldier was much affrighted at the greatnesse of the host which the enemy had put on foote, which *Camillus* perceiuing, he vse no other motiues of perswasion to strengthen their weakened minds, and to assure them of a happie day, but this : *Quod quisque didicit aut consuevit, faciat*, as well knowing where to rouze their valour, and in what part their greatest strength rested. For as men cannot preuaile in that wherein they are vnexperienced, but will be wanting in the supplies of their owne particular, and miscarie euen vnder the directions of another *Anniball*: so a known and beaten tracke is quickly taken, and the difficulties of a businesse are made easie by acquaintance. Vse maketh maisteries, saith our English Prouerbe, and practise and art do farre exceed nature . Which continuall exercise and vse of armes amongst the *Romaines*, attained to such perfection, as made *militum sine rectore stabile virtutē*, as *Linie* witnesseth. And as *Antiochus* confessed to *Scipio*: *Quod si vincuntur, non minuantur animis tamen*. *Cesar* in all his battels, had a speciall respect to the inexperience of the new inrolled bands, placing them either behind the armie for a guard to their cariages, as he did in the *Heluetian* action, or leauing them as a defence to the campe, or shewing them aloofe off, signifying thereby, as *Linie* saith of the *Sicilians*: *Quod magis nomen quàm vires ad presidium adferebant* . Whereby it consequently followeth, that militarie vertue proceedeth not so much from nature, or any originall habite, as it doth from exercise and practise of armes. I graunt there is a disposition in nature, and a particular inclination to this or that art: according to that of the Poet,

*Fortes creantur fortibus & bonis.*

But this disposition must be perfected by vse, and falleth short of valour or militarie vertue, which consisteth of two parts . The first, in knowledge of the discipline of warre, and the rules of seruice : wherby they may vnderstand the course of things, and be able to iudge of particular resolutions. The second, is the faithfull indeuour in executing such proiects, as the rules of warre do propound for their safetie : both which parts are gotten onely by vse. For as the knowledge of militarie discipline, is best learned by practise, so the often repetition therof, begetteth assurance in action, which is nothing else but that which we call Valour . In which two parts, these new enrolled bands had small vnderstanding, for they were as ignorant what course to take in that extremitie, as they were vnassured in their worser resolutions.

Lib. 7.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

*A Cimms  
described.*




**T**HIS *Cimms*, or troupe of souldiers disposed into a Triangle, was the best and safest way to breake through an enemie, for an Angle hath a renting and deviding propertie, and is so sharpe in the meeting of the two side lines, that the point thereof resembleth indiuisibilitie, and therefore is apt and proper to deuide a-sunder, and to make a separation of any quantitie. Which forme Nature hath also obserued in the fashion of such creatures that haue a piercing and deviding motion, as in fishes, that haue all heads for the most part sharpe, and thence Angewise are enlarged into the grossenesse of their bodie. And birds likewise, the better to deuide the ayre, haue sharpe billes & litle heads, with a body annexed of a larger proportion. The manner of the *Romaines* was (as I haue already shewed) to strengthen the piercing Angle with thicke compacted targets, and then enlarging the sides as occasion serued, either to the quantitie of an acute, or a right, or an obtuse Angle: they gaue the charge in such sort, *ut quacunq̃ parte percutere impetu suo, sustineri nequeant*, as *Linus* saith.

## CHAP. XVII.

The Sicambri giue ouer their  
purpose and depart.

*Caesar.*



**T**HE *Germanes* being out of hope of taking the campe, forasmuch as they saw our men to stand vpon the workes, they returned ouer the *Rheine* with the bootie which they had in the woods. And such was the feare of the *Romaine* souldier, euen after the enemie was gone, that *Caius Valenus* being sent that night to the campe with the horsemen, they would not beleue that *Caesar* and the armie were returned in safetie: feare had so possessed their minds, that they did not let to say, that all the legions were overthrowne and the horse had escaped by flight, and desired there to be receiued: for they could not be perswaded the armie being safe, that the *Germanes* would haue attempted to surprize their campe: of which feare they were deliuered by *Cæsars* arriual. He being returned not ignorant of the euents of warre, complained of one thing onely, that the cohorts that kept the watch were sent from their Stations, forasmuch as no place ought to be giuen to the least casualtie. And there he saw how much fortune was able to do by the sudden comming of the enemie, and how much more in that he was put off from the rampier and the gates which he had so nearely taken: but of all the rest, this seemed the straungest, that the *Germanes* comming ouer the *Rheine*, to depopulate and spoile *Ambiorix* and his countrey, had like to haue taken the *Romaine*

maine campe, which would haue bene as acceptable to Ambiorix as any thing that could happen.

## OBSERVATIONS.




It is an old saying, auouched by Plutarke: *Fortuna id unum hominibus non aufert quod bene fuerit consultum*, which Tiberius the Romaine Emperour well vnderstood: of whom Swetonius reporteth, *Quod minimum fortuna, casibusque permittebat*: and is the same which Caesar counselleth in this place, *Ne minimo quidem casui locum relinqui debuisse*. It were a hard condition to expose a naked partie to the malice of an enemy, or to disadvantage him with the losse of his sight: an armie without a guard at any time is meerly naked, and more subiect to slaughter, then those that neuer tooke armes: and the rather where the watch is wanting, for there sudden chaunces can hardly be preuented: and if they happen to auoid any such vnexpected casualtie, they haue greater cause to thanke fortune for her fauour, then to be angrie with her for her malice: for preuention at such times is out of the way, and they are wholly at her mercy; as Caesar hath rightly deliuered touching this accident. And therefore, whether an armie march forward or continue in a place, sleepe or wake, play or worke, go in hazard, or rest secure, let not so great a bodie be at any time without a competent strength, to answer the spite of such misaduentures.

Nothing ought to be left to the hazard of fortune.

## CHAP. XVIII.

Caesar returneth to spoile the enemy:  
punisheth Acco.



ÆSAR returning againe to trouble and vex the enemy, hauing called a great number of people from the bordering cities, he sent them out into all parts; all the villages and houses which were any where to be seene, were burned to the ground, pillage and bootie was taken in euery place, the corne was not onely consumed by so great a multitude of men and cattell, but beaten downe also by the vnseasonableness of the yeare and continuall raine: insomuch that albeit diuers did hide themselves for the present, yet the armie being withdrawne, they must necessarily perish through want and scarcitie. And oftentimes they happened of the place (the horsemen being deuided into many quarters,) where they did not onely see Ambiorix, but kept him for the most part in sight: and in hoping still to take him, some that thought to demerit Caesars highest fauour, tooke such infinite paines, as were almost beyond the power of nature. And euer there seemed but a litle betweene them and the thing they most desired, but he conveyed himselfe away through dens and woods,

Caesar.



and dales, and in the night tyme sought other countreys and quarters, with no greater a guard of horse then foure, so whomonely he durst commit the safetie of his life. The country being in this manner haried and depopulated, Cæsar with the losse of two cohorts brought backe his armie to Durocortum in the state of the men of Rhemes, where a Parliament being summoned, he determined to call in question the conspiracie of the Senones and Carnutes, and especially Acco the principall author of that Councell, who being condemned was put to death *more maiorum*. Some other fearing the like iudgement, saued themselves by flight: these he interdicted fire and water, and leauing two legions to winter in the confines of the Treuiri, and two other amongst the Lingones, and the other sixe at Augendicum in the borders of the Senones, hauing made prouision of corne for the armie, he went into Italy, ad *conventus agendos*.

## OBSERVATIONS.



HE conclusion of this Sommers worke, was shut vp with the sacke and depopulation of the *Eburones*, as the extremitie of hostile furie, when the enemie lyeth in the fastnesse of the country, and refuseth to make open warre. That being done, Cæsar proceeded in a course of ciuill iudgement with such principal offenders as were of the conspiracie: and namely, with Acco, whom he punished in such manner as the old *Romaines* were accustomed to do with such offenders as had forfeited their loyaltie to their countrie, a kind of death which Nero knew not, although he had bene Emperour of Rome thirtene yeares, and put to death many thousand people. The partie condemned was to haue his necke locked in a forke, and to be whipped naked to death: and he that was put to death after that maner, was punished *more maiorum*. Such others as feared to vndergo the iudgement, and fled before they came to triall, were banished out of the country, and made vncapable of the benefit of fire and water in that Empire. And thus endeth the sixt Commentarie.



THE

THE SEVENTH AND LAST  
COMMENTARIE, VVRITTEN BY CÆSAR  
OF THE WARRE HE MADE  
IN GALLIA.

THE ARGUMENT.

**T**HIS last Commentarie containeth the specialities of the warre which Cæsar made against all the States of Gallia vnited into one confederacie, for the expelling of the Romaine gouernement out of that continent, whom Cæsar ouerthrew in the end, *Horribili vigilantia, & proditiosis operibus.*

CHAP. I.

The Gaules enter into new deliberations of reuolt.

**G**ALLIA being in quiet, Cæsar according to his determination went into Italy to keep Courts and Sessions: there he vnderstood that P. Clodius was slaine, and of a decree which the Senate had made, touching the assembly of all the youth of Italy, and thereupon he purposed to inrole new bands throughout the whole Prouince. These newes were quickly caried ouer the Alpes into Gallia, and the Gaules themselves added such rumors to it, as the matter seemed well to beare; that Cæsar was now detained by the troubles at Rome, and in such dissensions could not returne to his army. Being stirred up by this occasion, such as before were inwardly grieved, that they were subiect to the Empire of the people of Rome, did now more freely and boldly enter into the consideration of warre. The Princes and chiefeſt men of Gallia hauing appointed counsels and meetings in remote and wooddie places, complained of the death of Acco, and shewed it to be a fortune which might concerne themselves: they pity the common misery of Gallia, and do propound all maner of promises and rewards to such as will begin the warre, and with the danger of their liues redeeme the libertie of their country: wherein they are to be very carefull not to forslow any time, to the end that Cæsar may be stopped from comming to his armie before their secret conferences be discovered: which might easily be done, forasmuch as neither the Legions

Cæsar.

durst go out of their wintering camps in the absence of their Generall, nor the Generall come to the Legions without a conuoy. To conclude, they held it better to die in fight, then to loose their auncient honour in matter of warre, and the libertie left them by their predecessors.

## OBSERVATIONS.



HIS Chapter discovereth such sparkles of reuolt, rising from the discontentment of the conquered *Gaules*, as were like to breake out into an vniuersall burning; and within a while proued such a fire, as the like hath not bin seene in the continent of *Gallia*: for this sommers worke verified the saying of the *Samnites*, *Quòd pax seruientibus grauior quàm liberis bellum esset*, and was caried on either part with such a resolution, as in respect of this seruice, neither the *Gaules* did before that time ingage themselues seriously in their countries cause, nor did the *Romaines* know the difficultie of their taske. But as *Epaminondas* called the fields of *Beotia*, *Mars* his scaffold where he kept his games; or as *Zenophon* nameth the city of *Ephesus* the *Armors shop*: so might *Gallia* for this yeare be called the Theater of war. The chiefeft encouragement of the *Gaules* at this time, was the trouble and dissention at *Rome* about the death of *Clodius*, and the accusation of *Milo* for killing *Clodius*.

This *Clodius* (as *Plutarke* reporteth) was a yong man of a noble house, but wild and insolent, and much condemned for profaning a secret sacrifice, which the Ladies of *Rome* did celebrate in *Cæsars* house, by comming amongst them disguised in the habite of a young singing wench, which he did for the loue of *Pompeia*, *Cæsars* wife: whereof being openly accused, was quitted by secret meanes which he made to the Iudges: and afterwards obtained the Tribuneship of the people, and caused *Cicero* to be banished, and did many outrages and insolencies in his Tribuneship: which caused *Milo* to kill him, for which he was also accused. And the Senate fearing that this accusation of *Milo*, being a bold spirited man and of good quality, would moue some vproare or sedition in the citie, they gaue commission to *Pompey* to see iustice executed; as well in this cause as for other offences, that the city might be quiet and the commonwealth suffer no detriment: whereupon *Pompey* posselt the market place, where the cause was to be heard with bands of souldiers and troopes of armed men. And these were the troubles in *Rome* vpon the death of *Clodius*, which the *Gaules* did take as an occasion of reuolt, hoping thereby that *Cæsar* (being in *Gallia Cisalpina*, which prouince was allotted to his gouernement, as well as that *Gallia Northward the Alpes*) would haue bene detained from his armie.

*Livie, lib. 3.*

*Plutarke in  
the life of  
Marcellus.*

*Plutarke in  
the life of  
Cicero.*

*Ne quid resp.  
detrimenti  
capiat.*

*Gallia Cisal-  
pina & Trā-  
alpina.*

## CHAP. II.

The men of Chartres take vpon them the beginning of a reuolt, vnder the cōduction of Cotuatus and Conetodunus.

**T**H E S E things being thus disputed, the men of Chartres did *Cæsar.* make themselves the chiefe of that warre, refusing no daunger for the common safetie of their countrey: and forasmuch as at that present they could not giue caution by hostage, lest the matter should be discovered; they desire to haue their couenants strengthened by oath, and by mutual collation of their military ensignes, which was the most religious ceremony they could vse to bind the rest not to forsake them, hauing made an entrance and beginning to that warre. The men of Chartres being commended by the rest, and the oathes of all them that were present being taken, and a time appointed to begin, they brake vp the assembly. When the day came, they of Chartres vnder the conduction of Cotuatus and Conetodunus, two desperat fellows, vpon a watchword giuen, ranne speedily to \* Genabum; and such Romaine citizens as were there vpon businesse, namely *\* Orleans.* C. Fufius Cotta a knight of Rome, whom Cæsar had left ouerseer of the prouision of corne, they slue, and tooke their goods. The report thereof was quickly spread ouer all the States of Gallia: for when any such great or extraordinary matter happeneth, they signifie it through the country by an out-cry and shout, which is taken by others, and deliuered to the next, and so goeth from hand to hand, as it happened at this time: for that which was done at Genabum at Sunne rising, was before the first watch of the night was ended, heard in the confines of the Aruerni, which is aboue a hundred and threescore miles distant.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**T**H I S manner of out-cry here mentioned to be vsuall in Gallia, *The Welch Hoboub.* was the same which remaineth in vse at this present in Wales, although not so frequent as in former times. For the custome is there, as often as any robberie happeneth to be committed, or any man to be slaine, or what other outrage or riot is done, the next at hand do go to some eminent place where they may be best heard, and there they make an outcrie or howling, which they call a *Hoboub*, signifying the fact to the next inhabitants, who take it as passionatly, and deliuer it further, and so from hand to hand it quickly spreadeth ouer all the countrey. It is a very readie way to put the countrey in armes, and was first deuised (as it seemeth) for the stay and apprehension of robbers and outlawes, who kept in




strong holds, and liued vpon the spoile of the bordering inhabitants, but otherwise it fauoureth of Barbarisme, rather then of any ciuill gouernment.

### CHAP. III.

#### Vercingetorix stirreth vp the Aruerni to the like commotion and reuolt.

*Cæsar.*



*N*like manner Vercingetorix the sonne of Celtillus of the nation of the Aruerni, a young man of great power and authoritie, whose father was the Commaunder of all Gallia, and because he sought a kingdome, was slaine by those of his owne State, calling together his followers and clients, did easily incense them to rebellion; his purpose being knowne, euery man tooke armes, and so he was driuen out of the towne of Gergonia by Gabonitio his vnkle and other Princes, who thought it not safe to make triall of that fortune. And yet he desisted not, but enroled needie and desperate people, and with such troupes, whomsoever he met withall of the State, he did easily draw them to his partie: perswading them to take armes for the defence of common libertie: and hauing at length got great forces together, he expelled his aduersaries out of the towne: by whom he was himselfe before thrust out. He was called of his men by the title of King, and sent Embassages into all parts, adiuuring them to continue constant and faithfull. The Senones, the Parisij, the Pictones, the Carduci, the Turones, the Auleri, the Lemouices, the Andes, and all the rest that border vpon the Ocean were quickly made on his partie: and by all their consents the chiefe commaund was conferred vpon him. Which authoritie being offered him, he commaunded hostages, to be brought in vnto him from all those states, and a certaine number of souldiers to be sent him with all speed: he rated euery citie what proportion of armes they should haue readie, and specially he laboured to raise great store of horse: to extraordinarie diligence he added extraordinarie seueritie, compelling such as stood doubtful by hard and seuerer punishment: for such as had committed a great offence, he put to death by fire and torture: lesser faults he punished with the losse of their nose or their eies, and so sent them home, that by their example others might be terrified. By these practises & seuerity, hauing speedily raised a great army, he sent Lucferius Carducus, a man of great spirit and boldnes, with part of the forces towards the Rutheni, & he himselfe made towards the Bituriges. Vpon his coming the Bituriges sent to the Hedui, in whose protection they were to require aide against Vercingetorix. The Hedui by the aduice of the Legats which Cæsar had left with the army, sent forces of horse and foote to the aid of the Bituriges, who comming to the riuer Loyer, which diuideth the Bituriges from the Hedui, after a few dayes stay, not daring to passe ouer the riuer, returned home againe, bringing word to our Legats that they durst not commit themselues to the Bituriges, and so returned: for if they had

had passed ouer the riuer, the Bituriges had inclosed them in on the one side, and the Aruernii on the other. But whether they did returne vpon that occasion, or through perfidious trecherie, it remaineth doubtfull. The Bituriges vpon departure, did presently ioyne themselves with the Aruernij.

## OBSERVATIONS.



Tis obserued by such as are acquainted with matter of Gouvernement, that there ought to be alwaies a proportion of qualitie betweene him that commaundeth, and them that obey: for if a man of *Sardanapalus* condition should take vpon him the charge of *Marius* armie, it were like to take no better effect, then if *Manlius* had the leading of lasciuious *Cinades*. And as we may obserue in oeconomicall pollicie, a dissolute maister may as soone commaund haire to grow on the palme of his hand, as to make a vertuous seruant: but the respect of dutie betweene such relatiues doth likewise inferre the like respect of qualitie: so in all sorts and conditions of command, there must be sympathising means to vnite the diuersitie of the parts, in the happie end of perfect Gouvernement. In this new Empire which befell *Vercingetorix*, we may obserue a double proportion betweene him and his people. The first, of strength and abilitie: and the other of qualitie and resemblance of affection: vpon the assurance of which proportion he grounded the austeritie of his commaund. For it appeareth that his first beginning was by perswasion and intreatie, and would indure no direction, but that which was guided by a loose and easie raine, holding it neither safe nor seemely, but rather a straine of extreame madnesse, first to punish or threaten, and then to want power to make good his iudgements: but being strengthened by authoritie from themselves, and backed with an armie, able to controule their disobedience, he then added punishment as the ensigne of magistracie, and confirmed his power by rigorous commaunds; which is as necessarie a demonstration of a well settled gouernment, as any circumstance belonging thereunto.

Touching the resemblance and proportion of their qualities, it is manifestly shewed by the sequelle of this historie, that euery man desired to redeeme the common libertie of their countrey, in that measure of indeuour as was fitting so great a cause. Amongst whom *Vercingetorix* being their chiefe Commander, *summa diligentia* (as the storie saith) added *summam seueritatem*, as well assured, that the greater part would approue his iustice, and condemne the vncertaintie of doubtfull resolutions, desiring no further seruice at their hands, then that wherein himselfe would be the foremost. In imitation of *Valerius Corvinus*: *Facta mea non dicta, vos milites sequi volo, nec disciplinam modo sed exemplum etiam à me petere*. And therefore the partie was like to be well vpheld, forasmuch as both the Prince and the people were so farre engaged in the matter intended, as by the resemblance of an earnest desire might answer the measure of due proportion.

There ought to be a proportion of quality betweene a Commander and his soldiers.

Muli Mariani.

Such a maister, such a seruant.

Linie.

## CHAP. III.

Cæsar commeth into Gallia, and by a  
deuice getteth to his armie.

Cæsar.



**T**H E S E things being told Cæsar in Italie, as soone as he vnderstood that the matters in the citie were by the wisdom of Pompey brought into better state, he tooke his iourney into Gallia, and being come thither he was much troubled how to get to his armie: for if he should send for the Legions into the Prouince, he vnderstood that they should be certainly fought withall by the way in his absence. If he himselfe should go vnto them, he doubted how he might safely commit his person to any, although they were such as were yet in peace. In the meane time Lucterius Cadurcus being sent against the Rutheni, doth easily vnite that State to the Aruerni: and proceeding further against the Nitiobriges and the Gabales, he receiued hostages of both of them, and hauing raised a great power he laboured to breake into the Prouince, and to make towards Narbo. Which being knowne, Cæsar resolved by all meanes to put him by that purpose, and went himselfe to Narbo: at his comming he encouraged such as stood doubtfull or timorous, and placed garrisons amongst the Rutheni, the Volsci, and about Narbo, which were frontier places and neare vnto the enemy, and commaunded part of the forces which were in the Prouince, together with those supplies which he had brought out of Italy, to go against the Heluij which are adioyning vpon the Aruerni. Things being thus ordered, Lucterius being now suppressed and removed, holding it to be dangerous to enter among the garrisons, he himselfe went towards the Heluij. And albeit the hill Gebenna which denideth the Aruernij from the Heluij, by reason of the hard time of winter and the depth of the snow, did hinder their passage, yet by the industrie of the souldier making way through snow of sixe foote deepe, they came into the confines of the Aruerni, who being suddenly and vnawares suppressed, little mistrusting an inuasion ouer the hill Gebenna, which incloseth them in as a wall, and at that time of the yeare doth not affoord a path to a single man alone, he commaunded the horsemen to scatter themselves farre and neare to make the enemy the more afraid. These things being speedily caried to Vercingetorix, all the Aruerni full of feare and amazement, flocked about him, beseeching him to haue a care of their State, and not to suffer themselves to be sacked by the enemy, especially now at this time, when as all the warre was transferred vpon them. Vpon their instant intreatie he removed his campe out of the territories of the Bituriges, and marched towards the country of the Aruerni. But Cæsar hauing continued two dayes in those places, forasmuch as he vnderstood both by vse and opinion, what course Vercingetorix was like to take, he left the armie, pretending some supplies of horse, which he went to raise, and appointed young Brutus to commaund those forces, admonishing him to send out the horsemen into all quarters, and that he himselfe would not be absent from the campe about three dayes. These things being thus settled, none of his followers

followers knowing his determination, by great iourneys he came to Vienna, where taking fresh horse which he had layd there many dayes before, he ceased neither night nor day, untill he came through the confines of the Hedui to the Lingones, where two legions wintered, to the end if the Hedui should undertake any thing against him he might with speed preuent it: being there, he sent to the rest of the Legions, and brought them all to one place, before the Aruernij could possibly haue notice of it.

## OBSERVATIONS.



**C**ÆSAR vpon his first entrance into Gallia, was perplexed how to get to his armie: and the matter stood in such tearmes, as brought either the legions or his owne person into hazard. For (as he saith) if he should send for the legions to come vnto him, they should doubtlesse be fought withall by the way, which he was loath to aduenture, vnlesse himselfe had bene present: or otherwise if he himselfe had gone vnto them, he doubted of the entertainemr of the reuolting *Gauls*, and might haue ouerthrowne his armie, by the losse of his owne person. In this extremitie of choice, he resolued vpon his owne passage to the armie, as lesse daungerous and more honorable, rather then to call the legions out of their wintering campes, where they stood as a checke to bridle the insolencie of the mutinous *Gauls*, and so to bring them to the hazard of battell in fetching their Generall into the field: whereby he might haue lost the victorie before he had begun the warres. And for his better safetie in this passage, he v-sed this cunning. Hauing assured the *Romaine* Prouince by strong and frequent garrisons on the frontiers, and remoued *Luciferius* from those parts, gathering together such supplies as he had brought with him out of *Italy*, with other forces which he found in the Prouince, he went speedily into the territories of the \* *Aruerni*, making a way ouer the hill \* *Gebenna*, at such a time of the yeare as made it vnpassable for any forces, had they not bene led by *Cesar*, only for this purpose, to haue it noised abroad, that whereas *Vercingetorix* and the *Aruerni* had principally vndertooke the quarrell against the *Romaines*, and made the beginning of a new warre, *Cesar* would first deale with them, and lay the weight thereof vpon their shoulders by calling their fortunes first in question, to the end he might possesse the world with an opinion of his presence in that country, and draw *Vercingetorix* back againe to defend his state, whilest he in the meane time did slip to his armie without suspition or feare of perill: for staying there no longer then might serue to giue a sufficient colour to that pretence, and leauing those forces to execute the rest, and to make good the secret of the proiect, he conueyed himselfe to his armie with such speed and celeritie, as doth verifie the saying of *Suetonius*: quod persapè nuncios de se prauenuit.

These blinds and false intendments, are of speciall vse in matter of warre and serue as well to get aduantages vpon an enemy, as to cleare a difficultie by cleanly euasion: neither is a Commaunder the lesse valued for fine conuey-

To abuse an enemy by way of stratageme commendable in a Commaunder.

\* *Auergne.*  
*La montagne de Genes.*

*Vita Cesaris.*



ance in militarie proiects, but deserueth rather greater honour for adding art vnto valour, and supplanting the strength of opposition, with the sleight of wit. *Dolus an virtus quis in hoste requirit?* hath alwayes bene held a principle amongst men of warre. And *Lisander* his counsell is the same in effect, that where the Lions skin wil not serue the turne, there take the foxes. *Carbo* spake it to the commendation of *Silla*, that he had to do both with a Lion and a Fox, but he feared more his Foxes pate then his Lions skin. It is reported that *Aniball* excelled all other of his time for abusing the enemy in matter of stratageme, for he neuer made fight but with an addition of assistants, supporting force with art, and the furie of armes with the subtiltie of wit.


Of late time amongst other practises of this nature, the treatie at *Ostend* is most memorablen, entertained onely to gaine time, that while speech of parle was continued, and pledges deliuered to the Archduke *Albertus*, for the safetie of such as were sent into the towne to capitulate with the Generall, there might be time gained for the sending in of such supplies of men and munition as were wanting, to make good the defence thereof: which were no sooner taken in, but the treatie proued a stratageme of warre.

In these foyles and trickes of wit, which at all times and in all ages haue bene highly esteemed in men of warre, as speciall vertues becomming the condition of a great Commaunder, if it be demaunded how farre a Generall may proceede in abusing an enemy by deedes or wordes? I cannot speake distinctly to the question, but sure I am, that *Surena* Lieutenant generall of the *Parthian* armie did his maister good seruice in abusing *Crassus* the *Romaine* Generall by faire promises; or as *Plutarch* saith by foule periurie, till in the end he brought his head to be an actor in a Tragedie: albeit *Surena* neuer deserued well of good report since that time. Howsoeuer men of ciuill societie ought not to draw this into vse from the example of souldiers, for as much as it is a part of the profession of cutting of throates, and hath no prescription but in extremities of warre.

## CHAP. V.

Vercingetorix besiegeth Gergouia: Cæsar  
taketh in Vellaunodunum and  
Genabum.

Cæsar.



HIS being knowne, Vercingetorix brought back his army againe into the country of the Bituriges, and thence marched to besiege Gergouia a towne held by the Boij, whom Cæsar had left there after the Heluetian warre, and given the iurisdiction of the towne to the Hedui, which brought Cæsar into great perplexitie, whether he should keepe the Legions in one place for that time of winter which remained, and so suffer the stipenda-

stipendaries of the Hedui to be taken and spoiled, whereby all Gallia might take occasion to reuolt: forasmuch as the Romaines should seeme to afford no protection or countenance to their friends, or otherwise draw his army out of their wintering camps sooner then was vsuall, and thereby become subiect to the difficulties of prouision and cariage of corne. Notwithstanding it seemed better, and so he resolved rather to vndergo all difficulties, then by taking such a score to loose the good wils of all his followers. And therefore perswading the Hedui diligently to make supply of necessarie prouisions, he sent to the Boij to aduertise them of his comming, to encourage them to continue loyall, and nobly to resist the assaults of the enemy: and leauing two Legions with the cariages of the whole armie at Agendicum, he marched towards the Boij. The next day comming to a Towne of the Senones called Vellaunodunum, he determined to take it in, to the end he might leaue no enemy behind him, which might hinder a speedie supply of victuals: and in two dayes he inclosed it about with a ditch and a rampier: the third day some being sent out touching the giuing vp of the towne, he commanded all their armes and their cattell to be brought out, and six hundred pledges to be deliuered. Leauing C. Tribonius a Legate to see it performed, he himselfe made all speed towards Genabum in the territories of the men of Chartres, who as soone as they heard of the taking in of Vellaunodunum, perswading them selues the matter would not rest so, they resolved to put a strong garrison into Genabum. Thither came Cæsar within two dayes, and incamping himselfe before the Towne, the euening drawing on, he put off the assault vnto the next day, commanding the souldiers to prepare in a readinesse such things as should be necessary for that seruice. And forasmuch as the towne of Genabum had a bridge leading ouer the riuer Loier, he feared lest they of the towne would steale away in the night: for preuention whereof, he commanded two Legions to watch all night in armes. The townsmen a litle before midnight went out quietly and began to passe ouer the riuer, which being discouered by the skouts, Cæsar with the Legions which he had ready in armes burnt the gates, and entring the Towne tooke it. The greatest number of the enemy being taken, and a very few escaping by reason of the narrownesse of the bridge, and the way which shut in the multitude, the towne being sacked and burned, and giuen for a bootie to the souldiers, he caried his armie ouer the riuer Loier into the territories of the Bituriges.

Ligeris.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



It is a knowne and an approued saying, *E malis minimum est eligendum*, but in a presentment of euils to be able to discern the difference and to chuse the least, *Hic labor, hoc opus*. Vercingetorix besieging Gergonia. (a stipendarie towne belonging to the Hedui, that of long time had serued the Romaine Empire) at such a time of the yeare as would not afford prouision of victuall for the maintenance of an armie, but with great difficultie and inconuenience of cariage and conuoy, Cæsar was much perplexed, whether he should forbear to succour the towne and raise the siege, or vndergo the hazard of long and tedious conuoyes.

Clairmont en Auvergne.

A matter often falling into dispute, although it be in other termes, whether honestie or honourable respect ought to be preferred before priuate ease and particular commoditie? *Cæsar* hath declared himselfe touching this point, preferring the honour of the people of *Rome*, as the maiestie of their Empire, and the reputation which they desired to hold, touching assistance and protection of their friends, before any inconuenience which might happen to their armie. And not without good reasons, which may be drawne aswell from the worthinesse of the cause, as from the daunger of the effect: for duties of vertue and respects of honestie, as the noblest parts of the mind, do not onely challenge the seruice of the inferiour faculties of the soule, but do also commaund the bodie and the casualties thereof, in such sort as is fitting the excellencie of their prerogatiue, for otherwise vertue would find but bare attendance, and might leaue her scepter for want of lawfull authoritie. And therefore *Cæsar* chose rather to aduenture the armie vpon the casualties of hard prouision, then to blemish the *Romaine* name with the infamie of disloyaltie. Which was lesse daungerous also in regard of the effect: for where the bond is of valew, there the forfeiture is great: and if that tie had bene broken, and their opinion deceiued touching the expectation of assistance and help, all *Gallia* might haue had iust cause of reuolt, and disclaimed the *Romaine* gouernement for non protection. To conclude then, let no man deceiue himselfe in the present benefit, which priuate respect may bring vpon the refusall of honest regard, for the end will be a witness of the errour, and proue honestie to be best policie.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

*Cæsar went  
always provided  
of foure  
things.*



It is obserued by some writers, that *Cæsar* neuer vndertooke any action, or at the least brought it not to triall, but he first assured himselfe of these foure things: the first was prouision of victuals, as the very foundation of warlike expeditions, whereof I haue alreadie treated in the first Commentarie: the difficultie whereof, made him so doubtfull to vndertake the releefe of *Gergonia*. And doubtlesse whoeuer goeth about any enterprise of warre, without certaine meanes of victuall and prouision, must either carie an armie of Camelions that may liue by the aire, or intend nothing but to build castles in the aire, or otherwise shall be sure to find his enimie either in his bosome, or as the prouerb is in *Plutarke*, to leape on his belly with both his feet.

*Plutarke in  
the life of  
Lucullus.*

*Comment. 3.*

The second thing was prouision of all necessaries, which might be of vse in that seruice: wherewith he alwayes so abounded, that there might rather want occasion to vse them, then he be wanting to answer occasion. And these were the instruments whereby he made such admirable workes, such bridges, such mounts, such trenches, such huge armades, as appeareth by the sea fight with the maritime cities of *Gallia*: according to which his former custome, forasmuch as the day was farre spent before he came to *Genabum*, he commaunded such

such things to be fitted and had in a readinesse, as might serue for the siege the next day.

The third thing was an armie for the most part of old souldiers, whom the *Romaines* called *Veterani*, whereof he was likewise at this time provided; for the two legions which were fresh and lately inroled, he left at *Agendicum* with the cariages, taking onely the old souldiers for this seruice, as knowing that in *Pugna usum amplius prodesse quàm vires.*

The fourth thing was the triall and experience of the enemies forces, which the former victories assured him to be inferiour to the *Romaines*, being alwayes a rule in the *Romaine* discipline (as I haue already noted) by light and easie skirmishes, to acquaint the souldiers with the maner of the enemies fight: *Ne eos nouum bellum, nouus hostis terreret*, as *Liuy* saith.

Comment. I.

## CHAP. VI.

Cæsar taketh in Nouiodunum, and beateth  
the enemy comming to rescue  
the Towne.



**V**ERCINGETORIX vnderstanding of Cæsars coming, left the siege and went to meete him. Cæsar resolved to take a towne lying in his way in the territories of the *Bituriges*, called *Nouiodunum*: which they of the towne perceiuing, sent out vnto him to beseech him to spare them, and to giue order for their safetie: and to the end he might speed that businesse with as much celeritie as he had accomplished former seruices, he commanded them to bring out their armes, their horse, and to deliuer pledges. Part of the hostages being giuen, while the rest were in deliivering over, diuers Centurions and a few souldiers being admitted into the towne to seeke out their weapons and their horses, the horsemen of the enemy which marched before *Vercingetorix* armie were discovered a farre off; which the townsmen had no sooner perceiued, and thereby conceiued some hope of releefe, but they presently took vp a shout and betooke themselves to their armes, shut the gates, and began to make good the wals. The Centurions that were in the towne perceiuing some new resolution of the Gauls with their swords drawne, possesst themselves of the gates, and saued both themselves and their men that were in the towne. Cæsar commanded the horsemen to be drawne out of the campe, and to begin the charge; and as they began to giue ground, he sent foure hundred *Germane* horsemen to second them, whom he had resolved to keepe with him from the first, who charged the enemy with such furie, that the Gauls could no way endure the assault, but were presently put to flight; many of them being slaine, the rest retired backe to the armie. Vpon their ouerthrow, the townsmen were worse affrighted then they were before; and hauing apprehended such as were thought

Cæsar.



to haue stirred up the people, they brought them to Cæsar and yeelded themselves vnto him: which being ended, Cæsar marched towards the towne of Auaricum, which was the greatest and best fortified of all the townes in the territories of the Bituriges; for that being taken in, he doubted not to bring the whole State of the Bituriges easily into his subiection.

## OBSERVATIONS.

The meanes  
which the Ro-  
maines used  
to weaken an  
emie.



Erasmuch as nothing is more changeable then the minde of man, which (notwithstanding the low degree of basenes wherein it often sitteth) will as occasion giueth way to reuenge, readily amount to the height of tyrannie, and spare no labour to crie quittance with an enimie: it hath bin thought expedient in the wisdome of foregoing ages, to plucke the wings of so mounting a bird, and to deprive an enimie of such meanes, as may giue hope of libertie by mutinie and reuolt.

The practise of the *Romaines* in taking in any towne, was to leaue them forcelesse, that howsoeuer they might stand affected, their nailes should be surely pared for scratching, and their power confined to the circuit of their mind: for as it appeareth by this and many other places of *Cæsar*, no rendrie of any towne was accepted, vntill they had deliuered all their armes, both offensiue and defensiue, with such engines and instruments of warre, as might any way make for the defence of the same. Neither that onely, but such beasts also, whether horse or Elephant or any other whatsoeuer, as might any way aduantage the vse of those weapons: which as it was a great dismay and weakning to the enimie, so was it short of the third condition, commaunding the deliuey of so many hostages or pledges as were thought conuenient, being the prime of their youth, & the flower of their manhood, and were as the marrow to their bones, and the sinewes to that bodie. Whereby it came to passe, that the remnant was much disabled in strength, concerning their number of fighting men; and such as were left had neither armes nor meanes to make resistance.

The Turke obserueth the same course with the Christians, but in a more cruell and barbarous maner; for he commeth duely at a certaine time, not regarding any former demeanour, and leadeth away the flower of their youth, to be inuested in impietie and infidelitie, and to be made vassalles of heathenish impuritie.

Oftentimes we reade, that a conquered people were not onely interdicted armes, but the matter also and the art whereby such armes were made and wrought; for where the people are great, and mettall and matter plentie, it is a chaunce if artificers be wanting to repaire their losse, and to refurnish their armourie. At the siege of *Carthage* the *Romaines* hauing taken away their armes, they notwithstanding finding store of mettall within the towne, caused workemen to make euery day a hundred targets and three hundred swords, besides

besides arrowes and casting slings, vsing womens haire for want of hempe, and pulling downe their houses for timber to build shipping. Whereby we may perceiue, that a General cannot be too carefull to depriue an enemy of all such helps as may any way strengthen his hand, or make way to resistance.

## CHAP. VII.

Vercingetorix perswadeth the Gaules  
to a new course of warre.



VERCINGETORIX hauing receiued so many losses one in the necke of another, \*Vellaunodunum, \*Genabum & \*Nouiudunum being taken, he calleth his men to counsel and telleth them that the war must be caried in another course then it hath bin heretofore, for they must endeuer by all means to keepe the Romaines from forrage and conuoy of victuall: which would easily be brought to passe, forasmuch as they themselves did abound in horsmen: & for that the time of the yeare did not yet serue to get forrage in the field, the enemy must necessarily seek it in houses and barnes, whereby the forragers would dayly be cut off by their horsmen. Moreover, for their safety and defence they were to neglect their priuate commoditie: their houses and their villages were to be burnt vp round about as far as Boia, that the Romaines might fetch their forrage thence. For themselves they thought it reason that they should make supply of victuall and prouision, in whose possessions they were, and for whom they fought. By this meanes the Romaines would neuer be able to endure that want as would befall them, or at the least be constrained to fetch their prouisions farre off, with great daunger and perill to themselves, neither did it make any matter whether they killed them or put them besides their cariages, for without necessary supplies they were neuer able to hold war. And to conclude, such towns were likewise to be set on fire, as by the strength of their situation were not safe from daunger, lest they should proue receptacles to linger and detract the war, and serue the Romaines for booty and supplies of prouision. And albeit these things might seem heauy and bitter, yet they ought to esteem it more grievous to haue their wiues and their children led away into seruitude, and themselves to be slaine by the sword of the enemy, which doth necessarily fall vpon a conquered people. This opinion was generally approued by the consent of all men, and more then twenty cities of the Bituriges were burnt in one day; the like was done in other States, great fires were to be scene in all parts: and although all men tooke it very grievously, yet they propounded this comfort vnto themselves, that the enemy being by this meanes defeated, they should quickly reconer their losses. Touching Auaricum they disputed it in common counsel, whether it should be burnt or defended: the Bituriges do prostrate themselves at the feete of all the Gaules, that they might not be forced to set on fire with their owne hands, the

Caesar.

\*Ville neuue  
en la franch  
conte.

\*Orleans.

\*Noyon.

fairest citie in all Gallia, being both an ornament and a strength to their state; they would easily defend it by the site of the place, being incircled round about with a river and a bogge, and being accessable by one narrow passage. At length leaue being graunted them to keepe it, Vercingetorix at first dissuading them from it, and afterwards yeelding vnto it, moued by the intreatie of the Gaules, and the commiseration of the common multitude; and so a fit garrison was chosen to defend the towne.

## OBSERVATIONS.

It is a hard matter in following a businesse, to hit that course which may most aduantage it.



HAVE seene an Imprese with a circle, and a hand with a sharpe stile pointing towards the center with this motto: *Hic labor, hoc opus*, signifying thereby, that albeit the Area thereof were plainly and distinctly bounded, and the Diameter of no great length, yet it was not an easie matter to find the Center, which is the heart and chiefeest part of that figure. In like manner there is no businesse or other course so easie or plaine, but the center may be mistaken, and the difficultie commonly resteth in hitting that point, which giueth the circumference an equall and regular motion.

The Gaules were resolu'd to vndertake the defence of their country, and to redeeme their libertie with the hazard of their liues: but it seemeth they were mistaken in the meanes, and ran a course farre short of the center. For Vercingetorix perceiuing the Romaines daily to get vpon the Gaules, first by taking in one towne, secondly another, and lastly of a third, he aduised them to set on fire all the country houses, villages and townes for a great circuit round about, and so force the Romaines to fetch their forrage and prouisions farre off, and vndergo the difficulties of long conuoyes, whereby the Gauls might make vse of their multitude of horse, and keepe the Romaines without supplies of necessarie prouisions: and so they doubted not but to giue a speedie end to that warre. And this he tooke to be the center of that businesse, and the true vse of their aduantage.

Lib. 4.

Polybius writeth, that *M. Regulus* hauing diuerse times ouerthrowne the Carthaginians in battell, one *Santippus* a Lacedæmonian clearly perceiuing the cause of their often routs, began openly to say, that the Carthaginians were not ouerthrowne by the valour of the Romaines, but by their owne ignorance: for they exceeding the Romaines in horse and Elephants, had neglected to fight in the champion, where their caualrie might shew it selfe, but in hills and woodie places where the foote troupes were of more force, and so the Romaines had the aduantage. Whereby the manner of the warre being changed, and by the counsell of the pregnant Greeke, brought from the hills into the leuell of the plaine, the Carthaginians recouered all their former losses by one absolute victorie. In like manner *Anniball* finding himselfe to exceede the Romaines in strength of caualrie, did alwaies indeuour to affront them in open and champion countries, and as often as the Romaines durst meete him, he put them to the worfe: but *Fabius* perceiuing the disaduantage, kept himselfe alwaies vpon the

Plutarke in the life of Fabius.

the

the hills, and in couert and vneuen places, and so made the aduantage of the place equall the multitude of the enemies horsemen.

There is no greater scorne can touch a man of reputation and place, then to be thought not to vnderstand his owne businesse. For as wisdom is the excellencie of humane nature, so doth want of iudgement deiect men to the condition of such as *Aristotle* calleth Seruants by nature: whose wit being too weake to support any waight, do recompence that want with the seruice of their bodie, and are wholly employed in a Porters occupation. Which *Homer* layeth vpon *Diomedes* shoulders, with as fine conueyance as he doth the rest of his inuentions: for *Vlisses* and he going out on a partie to do some exploit vpon the *Troians*, they caried themselues so gallantly, that they fell to share king *Rhesus* charret and horses: *Vlisses* presently seized vpon the horses, being of a delicate *Thracian* breed, and *Diomedes* seemed well contented with the charret: but being to carie it away, *Pallas* aduised him to let it alone, lest he might proue his strength to be greater then his wit, and yet not find so much neither as would carie it away.

*Seruus à natura. Polit. I.*

*Illiad, 10.*

But for these directions which *Vercingetorix* gaue vnto the *Gaules*, I referre the reader to the sequelle of the Historie, wherein he shall find how they preuailed.

### CHAP. VIII.

Cæsar besiegeth Auaricum, and is distressed for want of corne.



**V**ERCINGETORIX followeth Cæsar by small and easie iourneys, and chose a place to incampe in, fortified about with bogges and woods, fiftene miles distant from Auaricum, there he vnderstood what was done at Auaricum euery houre of the day, and commanded likewise what he would haue done. He obserued all our forraging and haruesting, and did set vpon such as went farre off vpon any such occasion, and incumbered them with great inconueniences: albeit they tooke what course they could to meete with it, as to go out at vncertaine times, and by vnknowne and vnusuall waies. Cæsar incamping himselfe before that part of the towne which was not shut in with the riuer nor the bogge, and afforded but a narrow and streight passage, began to make a mount, to driue vines, and to raise two towers: for the nature of the place wold not suffer him to inclose it round about with a ditch and a rampier: and neuer rested to admonish the *Hedui* and the *Boij* to bring in supplies of corne: of whome the one by reason of the small care and paines they tooke, did liue helpe him, the other being of no great abilitie, being a small and a weake state, did quickly consume all that they had. The armie was distressed for want of corne, by reason of the powertie of the *Boij*, and the indiligence of the *Hedui*, together with

*Cæsar.*



the burnings of the houses in the countrey, in such manner as they wanted corne for many dayes together, and sustained their liues with beasts and cattell which they had fetched a great way off: and yet no one voice at all was heard to come from them, unworthie the maiestie of the Romaine Empire, and their former victories. And albeit Cæsar did speake vnto the legions severally as they were in the works, that if their wants were beaueie and bitter vnto them, he would leaue off the siege. But all of them with one voyce desired him not to do so: for they had so serued many yeares vnder his commaund, as they neuer had receiued any dishonour, neither had they at any time departed and left the businesse vndone: it would be imputed vnto them as an ignominie and disgrace to leaue the siege, they had rather vndergo all difficulties, then not to reuenge the death of the citizens of Rome that by trechery were slaine at Genabum. The same speeches they deliuered to the Centurions and Tribunes, to be told Cæsar.

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Patience in a  
souldier ex-  
celleth valor.



HE worth of a Souldier consisteth in a disposition of mind and bodie, which maketh him apt to suffer and to vndergo the difficulties of warre: for let his resolution otherwise be neuer so great, and his courage inuincible in the day of battell, yet if he faint vnder the burthen of such tediousnesse as visually attendeth vpon warlike designements, he is no way fit for any great enterprise. *Pindarus* saith, that he vnderstandeth not the warre, that knoweth not that the atchieuing of one peece of seruice, is alwaies accompanied with the sufferance of another difficultie as great as that which was first intended: *Et facere, & pati fortia, Romanum est.* It was the peculiar commendation of the Romaine people, patiently to indure the extremities of warfare: which made the *Volsi* to crie out, That either they must forswear armes, and forget to make warre, and receiue the yoke of thraldome and bondage, *aut ijs quibuscum de imperio certetur, nec virtute, nec patientia, nec disciplina rei militaris cedendum.* *Appian* forgetteth not to say, that the Romaine Empire was raised to such greatnesse, not by fortune or good lucke, but by meere valour, and patient induring of hardnesse and want. Which is the selfe same which *Craffus* in his sorrow vttered to his soldiers, who neither did nor spake many things well: for as *Plutarke* rightly censureth him out of the Comickall Poet, he was

*A good man, any way else but in warres.*

The Empire of Rome (saith he) came not to that greatnesse which it now possesseth, by good fortune onely, but by patient and constant suffering of trouble and aduersitie; neuer yeelding or giuing place to any daunger.

Some Italian writers are of an opinion, that the two chiefeest parts of a souldier, Valour and Sufferance, are in these times deuided vnto two nations, the French and the Spaniard: the Spaniard making warre rather by sufferance then by violence of assaults; and the French impatient of delay, and furious in assaults: so that according to his opinion, a Spaniard and a French man, will make

one

Lin. lib. 6.

Plut. Craffus.

Boterius de  
Principe.

one good souldier. Touching the *Spaniard*, I cannot deny, but that he hath the name of one of the best souldiers in Christendome, and I do gladly allow all that vertue can challenge, for truth will preuaile against all affection: yet I may say thus much on the behalfe of our owne people, that we haue seldome lost honour in confronting any nation. Concerning the sufferance, and patient induring of hardnesse, which is said to be in the *Spaniard*, being able to liue long with a litle, it may peraduenture not vnfitly be attributed to the property of their countrey, and the nature of their climate, which will not beare nor digest such plentie of foode, as is required in colder countries: and thereupon being borne to so weake a digestion, they are as well satisfied with a roote or a faller, as others with better plentie of foode: and therein they go beyond other nations. Of the *French* I say nothing, but leaue them to make good the opinion of the *Italian* Writer.

*Suetonius* witnesseth of *Caesar*, that he himselfe was *laboris ultra fidem patiens*, whereby he might the better moue his armie to indure with patience the difficulties of the siege: and yet so artificially, as he seemed rather willing to leaue it vneffected, then to impose any burthen vpon them, which they themselves should be vnwilling to beare, the rather to draw the legions to ingage themselves therein, by denying to forsake it, then to cast that vpon them, which their vnwillingnesse might easily haue put off.

#### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



WE may further obserue, the meanes the souldiers vsed to acquaint *Caesar* with their desires, which was by the Tribunes and Centurions: for as these were mediate officers betweene the Generall and them, and deliuered the mandates and directions of the Emperour to the souldier: so did the souldiers vse their helpe to make knowne vnto him their requests: as besides this place may appeare in the first Commentarie, where they desired to giue him satisfaction touching the feare they had conceiued of *Arionistus* and the *Germanes*, which they likewise did by the Centurions and Tribunes.



## CHAP. IX.

Cæsar leaueth the siege, and goeth to take the  
*enemie vpon aduantage, but returneth againe*  
 without fighting.

*Cæsar.*



**W**HEN the towers began to approach neare vnto the walles, Cæsar vnderstood by the captiues, that Vercingetorix hauing consumed all his prouision of forage, had remoued his campe nearer to Auaricum, and that he himselfe was gone with the caualrie, and such readie footemen as were accustomed to fight among the horsemen to lye in ambush in that place where he thought our men would come a forraging the next day: which being knowne, setting forward about midnight in silence, in the morning he came to the enemies campe. They hauing speedie aduertisement by their skoutes of Cæsars comming, did hide their cariages in the woods, and imbattelled all their forces in an eminent and open place. Which being told Cæsar, he commanded the baggage to be speedily laid together, and their arms to be made readie. There was a hill of a gentle rising from the bottome to the toppe, incompassed round about with a difficult & troublesome bog of fiftie foot in breadth, vpon this hill the bridge being broken, the Gaules kept themselves trusting to the strength of the place, and were distributed into companies according to their seuerall states, with this resolution, that if the Romaines did passe over the bog, they might easily from the higher ground keepe them vnder, as they stucke in the mire, who little reckoning of so small a distance, would deeme the fight to be vpon equall tearmes, whereas they themselves well knowing the inequality of the condition, did make but a vaine and idle ostentation. The souldiers disdaining that the enemie could indure their presence so neare at hand, and requiring the signe of battell, Cæsar acquainted them with what detriment and losse of many valiant men, the victorie must at that time be bought, who being so resolute that they refused no daunger to purchase him honour, he might well be condemned of great ingratitude and villanie, if their lines were not dearer vnto him, then his owne safetic: and so comforting the souldiers he brought them backe againe the same day into the campe, and gaue order for such things as were requisite for the siege of the towne.

## OBSERVATIONS.



**T**HIS Chapter hath diuers special particulars worthy obseruatiō. The first is, the oportunitie which Cæsar tooke to visite the army of the Gaules, when Vercingetorix was absent and gone to lie in ambush for the Romaine forragers, which was a caucat to Vercingetorix, not to be too busie with the Romain conuoyes, lest his absence

abſence might draw on ſuch an inconuenience, as might make him repent for going a birding.

The ſecond is, the inequality which the aduantage of the place giueth to a partie: which I haue alreadie ſo often ſpoken of, as I am almoſt wearie to repeat it; and the rather, for that I haue produced this paſſage in the former booke, to ſignifie the benefite of ſuch an aduantage: yet forasmuch as it is ſo pregnant to that effect, as may well deſerue a double conſideration, and was alſo produced by *Cæſar* himſelfe vpon occaſion at *Gergonia*, giue me leaue to note how much it ſwayeth to counterpoise the want of the aduerſe partie. Wherein as it cannot be denied, but that it may giue ſuch help as may make a ſmall number equall a farre greater proportion of men, ſo in *Cæſar*'s iudgement it counteruaileth the abſence of the Generall, and maketh the bodie perfect without the head. Neither were they weakened onely with the abſence of their Generall: but their caualrie wherein they ſo much truſted was abſent likewiſe: and yet more then that too, by how much the *Romaine* legions excelled the *Gauls* in valour and prowefſe of armes, which being all put together is no ſmall aduantage. For doubtleſſe if the matter had ſtood vpon equall tearmes touching the place, neither the preſence of *Vercingetorix*, nor the addition of their caualrie to aſſiſt them, had hindered the battell, or turned the *Romaines* backe to their campe.

*The aduan-  
tage of the  
place doth  
counteruaile  
the abſence of  
the Generall.*

The third thing is the moderation which he ſhewed, forbearing to fight, the *Gauls* inſolently vaunting, and the *Romaine* ſouldiers fretting and diſdaining the enemies pride: whereby he ſetled ſuch a confidence of his directions in the minds of his men, by ſhunning the perill of apparant daunger which might fall vpon them in particular, as afterwards they would make no queſtion of his commands, but take them as the onely meanes of their ſafetie, being neuer better aſſured then in performing what he commaunded. The praetiſe of latter times, hath not ſo well deſerued of that vertue, but hath often ſhewed it ſelfe more prodigall of blood, as though men were made onely to fill vp ditches, and to be the wofull executioners of other mens raſhneſſe.

The laſt thing is the making readie of their weapons, *arma expediri iuſſit*. Concerning which point, we muſt vnderſtand that the *Romaines* alwaies carried their targets in caſes, and did hang their helmets at their backs, and fitted their piles as might be moſt conuenient with the reſt of their cariages. And therefore whenſoeuer they were to giue battell, they were firſt to put on their helmets, to vncaſe their targets, to fit their piles, and to make them readie for the charge: and this was called *Arma expediri*.



## CHAP. X.

Vercingetorix excuseth himselfe to the  
Gaules for his absence.

Cæsar.



VERCINGETORIX returning backe to the armie was accused of treason; first in that he had remoued his campe neare vnto the Romaines, and further that he had gene away from it, and tooke all the caualry with him: that he had left so great an armie without any one to command it: that vpon his departure the Romaines should come so oportunely and so speedily: for all these things could not fall out by chance without counsel and directions: it seemed he had rather haue the kingdome of Gallia by a graunt from Cæsar, then by their meanes and gift. Being thus charged; he answereth, that he remoued the campe for want of forrage, they themselves desiring it. He came neare vnto the Romaines being led thereunto by the oportunitie of the place, which was such as might defend it selfe by it owne strength; the caualry was of no vse in a boggie place, but might do good seruice there where it went. He left no man to command the army of purpose, left by the perswasion of the multitude he should be forced to fight, which he knew they all desired, as not able long to indure any labour: if the Romaines came by chance, they were to thanke fortune; if by any mans direction, they were beholding vnto him that had brought them where they might from the higher ground both see how small a number they were, and contemne their valour, who not daring to fight did thankfully returne into their campe: he desired to receiue no imperial dignitie by trechery from Cæsar, which he might otherwise haue by lawfull victory, which was now most certaine and sure, both to himselfe and the rest of the Gaules. And for that authoritie which he had receiued from them, he was ready to giue it vp into their hands againe, if they thought the honour which they gaue him to be greater then help and safetie which they receiued from him. And to the end you may vnderstand these things to be truly deliuered by me (saith he) heare the Romaine souldiers, and therewithal he brought forth seruants which were taken forraging a few daies before, miserably tormented with famine and irons: they being taught before hand what to answer, said they were legionary souldiers, and had stole out of the camp to see if they could meet with any corne or cattel in the fields: the whole army suffered the like penury, and mens strength began to faile them, insomuch that they were not able to vndergo any labour: and therefore their Generall had resolued, that if he preuailed not against the Towne, he would withdraw his army within three daies. These benefits (saith Vercingetorix) you haue of me, whom you accuse of treason for by my means without shedding of your bloud, you see so great a conquering army almost consumed with hunger, and by me it is provided, that when they flie from hence, no State shall receiue them into their territories. The whole multitude applauded his speech, by shaking and striking their hands together, as their maner is in such cases, commending Vercingetorix for a great souldier, whose loyalty as it was

not

not to be distrusted, so the war could not haue bin caried with better directions. They agreed further to send 10000. choise men out of all their forces into the towne, as not thinking it fit to commit the common safety of Gallia onely to the Bituriges, for they were perswaded that the summe of all the victory consisted in making good that town against the Romaines.

## OBSERVATIONS.



Multitude is *Bellua multorum capitum* (as one saith) an vnreasonable beast of many heads, apt to receiue froward and peruerse incitements, and hard to be drawne to better vnderstanding, iealous, impatient, trecherous, vnconstant, an instrument for a wicked spirit, and sooner moued to mischief by *Thersites*, then reclaimed to vertue by the authoritie of *Agamemnon*, or the eloquence of *Vlisses*, or the wisdom of *Nestor*, more turbulent then the raging either of the sea or of a deuouring fire. And therefore they may well go together to make a triplicity of euils, according to the saying, *Ignis, mare, populus, tria mala*.

*Vercingetorix* had both his hands full in this seruice, for his care was no lesse to keepe the *Gaules* from being distasted, then to make his partie good against *Cesar*. It is disputed touching the gouernement of a multitude, whether it be fitter to be seuer or obsequious? *Tacitus* saith peremptorily, that *In multitudine regenda, plus poena quam obsequium valet*. But he vnderstandeth such a multitude as are subiect to their commaunder, either by auncient seruice or the interest of regall authoritie, whereby they are tied to obedience by hereditarie dutie, and cannot refuse that which custome prescribeth. For otherwise where the people stand free frō such bonds, & haue submitted themselues to gouernment for some speciall seruice, there, clemencie or obsequious smoothing preuaileth more then the seueritie of commaund: according to the saying, *Homines duci volunt, non cogi*. Vpon a dissention which happened at *Rome* betweene the people and the Senate, the people were presently sent into the field vnder the leading of two Senators, *Quintius* and *Appius Claudius*: *Appius* by reason of his crueltie and seueritie, was not obeyed by his souldiers, but forsooke his prouince and returned *non proficiens*: *Quintius* being curteous and benigne, had an obedient armie, and came home a conqueror. In the like termes did *Vercingetorix* stand with the *Gaules*, who not long before were all of equal authoritie, and for the defence of the common cause had submitted themselues to order and gouernement: and therefore he caried himselfe accordingly, but with some cunning too, for he made no scruple to abuse the beast, & to present them with a lesson of deceit, taught to seruants and *Romaine* slaues, as the confession of legionarie souldiers, which is a libertie that hath euer bin allowed to such as had the managing of an vnruely multitude, who haue made as much vse of the false raine, as the bit, or the spur, or any other helpe belonging to that art.

*Horace.*

*Whether severity or clemency do more avail in governing a multitude.*

## CHAP. XI.

Cæsar continueth the siege at Auaricum, and  
describeth the walles of the Townes  
in Gallia.

Cæsar.



*Y* the singular valor of our soldiers all the counsels and deuises of the Gaules were made void and of none effect: for they are a nation of great dexterity, apt to imitate and make any thing which they see other men do before them, for they turned aside the hookes with ropes, and drew them into the towne with engines: they withdrew the earth from the mount with mines with their great skill, by reason of their iron mines wherein they are much practised: they set vp towers vpon euery part of the wal, and conered them with raw hides: they sallied out of the towne night and day, and either set fire to the mount, or assaulted the soldiers as they were at worke: they did euery day make their towers equal to that height of our towers, which the daily increase of the mount had added to their height. They hindred the open trenches, and kept them from approaching the wals with sharp burned stakes, cast into them with hot pitch and with great stones. All their walles are almost of this fashion, long straite beames are placed vpon the ground, with an equall distance of two foote one from another, and bound together on the inside of the wall, and fastened with great store of earth, the distances betweene the beames are filled and fitted with great stones in the front of the wal: these being thus placed and fastened with mortar, another such a course is laid vpon that, keeping alwayes the same distance, so as one beame be not laid vpon another, but in the second ranke placing them vpon the distances filled vp with stones, and so forward untill the wall be raised to the due height. This fashion as it is a worke not deformed either in shew or variety, obseruing alternate courses of beames & stones which keepe their order by euen lines, so is it profitable also and very much aduantageing the defence of the towne: for as the stone keepees it from burning, so doth the wood from the violence of the ramme, forasmuch as the beames are for the most part sortie foote long, and can neither be broken nor puld out.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

*The vse and  
practise of  
ancient time  
in besieging  
& defending  
townes.*



*T*HIS Chapter doth in some part expresse the maner of their siege in auncient time, and the meanes which the defendant had to frustrate the assaults and approches of the enemye. Besides the Ramme which the Romaines vsed to shake and ouerthrow the wall (whereof I haue already spoken) they had commonly great hookes of iron to catch hold

hold of a turret, and to pull it ouer the wall, or to pull downe the parapet, or to disturbe any worke which was to be made vpon the wall. These hookes were vsed by the legionario souldiers, being couered with vines in the same maner as they handled the Ram: and were auerted and put off by the ingenious practises of the *Gaules*, with ropes cast and insnared about them, and then by force of engines drawne into the towne. In like maner the open trenches, by which the *Romaines* made their approaches to the wall, were answered from the towne with stakes or piles, hardened at the end with fire, and then cast into them to hinder such as were at worke, together with seething pitch and great stones. Furthermore as the *Romaines* raised their mount, and brought matter vnto it to enlarge it in breadth and height, so did the *Gaules* vndermine it, and drew the earth away, or set it on fire to burne it: for as I haue already noted in the description of a mount, it was made aswell with wood and timber, as with earth and stones. They strengthened their walles with turrets and towers, and couered them with raw hides to keepe them from burning; and as the *Romaines* mounted in height with their turrets and engines, so the *Gaules* raised their towers answerable vnto them, that in the defence of the towne they might fight with equall aduantage. And thus they proceeded both in the offensive and defensive part, as farre as either valour or wit could improue those meanes which were then in vse in besieging a towne.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



It was the vse of all nations, to fortifie their strong townes with such wals as might make best defence against the practise of those times wherein they liued, touching the taking and besieging of townes: so the *Gaules* as it appeareth by *Cæsar* raised their walles of wood and stone, laid in mutual courses one with another, that the wood might make voide the violence of the Ram, and the stone keepe it from burning with fire, which in those dayes were the meanes to assault and overthrow a wall. In these times the walles of strong and fortified townes, are onely made and raised of earth, as the best defence against the furie of the artillerie. But forasmuch as the old maner of fortification is here in part deliuered by *Cæsar*, giue me leaue to haue a word or two touching the fortifications of these times.

And first touching the art it selfe, in respect of the matter and the maner, it is a member of architecture, but the end is militarie: for to fortifie is nothing els but to make a building answerable to necessitie and the occurrences of war. Neither is it the end of fortification to make a place inexpugnable, or vnpossible to be taken, for so it were *Ars artium*, but to reduce it to a good and reasonable defence.

Wherefocuer then any such defence is required, the mysterie of fortification is to raise such a fort, and to apply such a figure, answering the qualitie and

The maner of  
fortification  
in vse in  
these dayes.

Fortification  
defined.



Circular forts

sitie of that place, as may giue greatest strength thereunto: for as all places are not capable in the dispositiō of their best strength of all sorts of figures, so there is a difference of strength betweene this and that figure. And as the place wanteth the aduantage of motion and agilitie for it owne defence, so is it requisite it should be furnished with the best meanes and commodities both to annoy the enemy, and to defend it owne people. And in that respect all circular formes as compounded of parts of one and the same nature, are vnfit for fortification: for where a fort ought so to be disposed, that it may haue as many hands to strike as *Briareus*, and as a *Hydra* neuer to want a head, it is necessary that the figure thereof be of different and vnlike parts, as apt to worke diuers effects. For vnlesse it be able to discouer a far off, to commaund the countrey about as farre as the artillerie will play, to stop the passages, to hinder approches and assaults, to damnifie the enemy at hand and farre off, sometimes with the artillerie, sometimes with small shot, sometimes with fire-workes, and other times by sallies, it hath not that perfection as is requisite.

Triangular forts.

Admitting therefore composition of parts, next vnto the circle the triangular fortresse is most vnperfect, first in regard it is a figure of lesse capacitie then any other of equall bounds, which is a great inconuenience in a hold, when the souldiers shal be pind vp for want of roome, and through the straightnes of the place, not to be able to auoid confusion. Secondly the bulworkes of all such triangular fortresses, haue alwayes such sharpe cantons as are easily subiect to breaking, which giueth the enemy meanes to approach them without disturbance from the fort.

Quadrangle forts.

The quadrangle fortresse hath almost the same imperfection of angles as the triangle hath, but is more spacious within, and of greater capacitie.

Five sided and fixe sided fortresses.

And therefore Pentagons or Hexagons or any other that hath more angles, is fittest for fortification (vnderstanding the place to be capable of them) as being of a greater content, and hauing their angles more obtuse, and by consequence more solide and strong.

Forts in a plaine leuell. Aduantages.

A plaine champiō leuel doth admit all sorts of figures, and may take the best, hauing these aduantages, it easily hindereth an enemy from approaching neere vnto it, or incamping before it, and is not subiect to mines by reason of the water rising in such leuels. But on the other side, a small troope will besiege it, and batterie may be laid to diuers places of it: it is alwayes subiect to mounts of earth, and needeth many bulworkes, ditches, and much cost to keepe it.

Disaduantages.

Forts vpon a hill. Aduantages. Disaduantages.

A fortresse vpon a hill hath these aduantages, an enemy can hardly lodge neere vnto it, or lay batterie against it, it requireth more men to besiege it, and is not subiect to mounts. The disaduantages, are that it is not in our choice to make it in the best form of strength, but must giue it such a figure as may best fit the place, being sometimes too large and spacious, and sometime too strait. The enemies artillerie hath greater force against it playing vpward, and the artillerie of the fort playeth not so sure downward.

The hands of all forts.

The hands of all forts are the bulworkes from whence the artillerie playeth, the supplements to the bulworkes are the raelins, the platformes, the casmates, and the caualeros. The walles are made in scarpe canting inwards, the better to beare

beare the weight of the earth, with this proportion, that to euery fūe foote  $\frac{1}{2}$  or sixe foote in height, there be one foote allowed in scarpe. The counterscarpe is another wall outward to the first, and slopeth inward in the same maner as the former.

And thus much touching the general view of fortification, which is as much as may wel be comprehended in these short obseruations, referuing the further consideration thereof to a particular treatise by it selfe.

## CHAP. XII.

## The siege of Aquaricum continued.



*THE* siege being hindred by so many disturbances, and the soldiers afflicted all the time with cold and continuall rainie, yet they ouercame all these lets with continuall labour, and in five and twentie dayes they raised a mount of three hundred and thirtie foot in breadth, and fourescore in height. When it came almost to touch the wall, Cæsar himselfe attending the worke as his custome was, and encouraging the souldiers to omit no time from the same: a litle before the third watch of the night, the mount was seene to smoke, the enemye hauing set it on fire with a mine. And at the same instant of time, a shout being taken up by them that stood upon the wall, they made a sally out at two gates on both sides the towers: some cast firebrands and drie matter from the wall vnto the mount, pouring pitch and other things to nourish the fire, that no man knew whither to run first, or where to giue helpe. Notwithstanding forasmuch as Cæsar had appointed two legions by turne to watch before the campe, and two other to follow the workes, it happened, and that quickly, that some were readie to confront the sallies, and others to draw backe the towers from the front of the mount, and to cut the mount asunder, the whole multitude comming out of the campe to quench the fire. The rest of the night being now spent, the fight continued euery where, and euer the enemye tooke new spirits, and had hope of victorie, the rather because they saw the sheddies or houels belonging to the towers burnt; and that the souldiers could not come neare the said towers to manage them, as was fitting without shelter and couert, and that they euer sent fresh men to take the roomes of such as were wearie and ouer laboured: supposing the safetie of all Gallia to consist in that instant of time. There happened my selfe beholding it, an accident worthie memorie, which I thinke not fit to omit. A certaine Gaule before the gate of the towne, casting with his hands balles of tallow and pitch to increase the fire, right ouer against the tower was shot through the right side with a cros-bow, and fell downe dead: one that stood next him stepped ouer him and began to do the like seruice: he likewise was slaine with a shot out of a cros-bow: him a third man succeeded, and the third, a fourth: neither was the place forsaken untill the mount was quenched, the enemye remoued, and the fight ceased.

Cæsar.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

*Whether  
there need  
not as many  
men to defend  
a towne, as to  
besiege it.*

*The defence  
of a towne co-  
sisteth in foure  
points.*



**I**T were a matter worthie obseruation to consider, whether there neede not as many men to defend a towne, as to besiege it: Which at the first sight may peradventure seeme friuolous: forasmuch as the defendants are but to make good the place which they hold, and to stand onely vpon their defensiuē guard, hauing the aduantage of the place, the shelter of the wals, the strength of the ditch, and many other like helps for their defence and safetie: whereas the assailant is to striue against all these aduantages, and to oppose himselfe to the daunger of so many difficulties. But if we looke a litle nearer into the matter, and consider the seruice to be performed on either part, we shall find, that to say, as many men are necessarie to defend a towne as to besiege it, is no Paradoxe.

For the better vnderstanding thereof, we are to know, that the defence of a towne touching matter of fight, consisteth chiefly in these foure points. First, in manning and making good all parts of the wall: for if the defendant be not able to strengthen all parts with a competent force, then he hath not men enough to defend the town, forasmuch as all parts are subiect to assault, & what part fouer is not made good, that lyeth open to an enemy: or otherwise if the assault be onely to be made at a breach, the rest of the wall being strong enough to defend it selfe, there is required a competent strength within the towne to defend that breach. In this point there is litle difference touching a competent number of men betweene the assailant and the defendant: for if he that layeth siege to a towne hath men enough to assault all parts at one instant, the enemy must haue an answerable proportion to defend all, or if he haue no vse of more men then may serue to giue an assault at a breach, the defendant must haue the like proportion for the defence of the breach.

The second point is, in releeuing wearied men, either fighting or working, with fresh supplies to continue that businesse, as oftentimes it falleth out in the siege of a towne. Wherein likewise there is small or no difference touching an equalitie betweene both parties: for if the defendant be not as well able to releue his wearied souldiers with fresh supplies, as the enemy is to continue the assault, the towne may quickly haue a new maister.

The third point, is in defeating and making voide such workes as the enemy shall make against the towne, as mounts, mines, approches, and such like inconueniences, which being suffered to go on without opposition and preuention, the towne cannot hold out long. In this point the defendant hath the disaduantage, hauing need of more men to ouerthrow and preuent the workes, then the assailant hath to make them good: for there he that besiegeth the place fighteth with the aduantage, and hath the same helps as the defendant hath in the fastnesse of his hold: which caused this extraordinarie accident which *Cæsar* noteth touching the successiue slaughter of so many *Gaules*, who labouring  
to

to burne the *Romaine* workes with balles of tallow and pitch, were all flaine with the blow of one mans bow.

The last point is in sallies, which is as necessarie for the defence of a towne as any thing else whatsoeuer: for if the defendant be not able to sallie out, the enemy will quickly coope him vp, and tread vpon his belly. And herein the defendant needeth more men then the assailant: for he that is in the field, lyeth in the strength of his trenches, whereas the other cometh out naked vpon him.

And thus much touching this question in particular. Concerning the generall, if it be demanded whether there haue bene more men lost in the defence of *Ostend*, then in besieging it? I answer, that neither side can much vaunt of a small losse.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.




IN the second place there are two obseruable points: the one, *Caesars* continuall attendance vpon the workes, being present night and day without any long intermission, which did much aduantage their proceeding at that time, and was as important to a fortunate issue, as any other thing whatsoeuer: for where an enemy is extraordinary, either in valour or diligence, there must needs be extraordinary meanes to counteruaile the height of so great a resolution, which *Caesar* ouertopt with monstrous and huge workes, and speeded those works with his continuall attendance.

*The eye of the  
maister see-  
deth the horse*

The second point is the successiue taske of the *Romaine* armie, being eight legions present at that siege (for the other two were left at *Agendicum* with the cariages of the armie) in such sort, as halfe the armie was alwaies at rest, and the other halfe employed: two legions at worke, and two legions in the watch: and thus they eased each other, and still continued the worke: for otherwise they had not bene able to haue vndergone the burthen, as the saying is: *Quod caret alterna requie durabile non est.*

### CHAP. XIII.

#### Cæsar by an assault taketh Auaricum.



THE *Gauls* hauing tried all meanes, and none taking effect, the next day they consulted touching their leauing of the towne, *Vercingetorix* both commanding and perswading them vnto it, which they hoped they might do in the night time without any great losse vnto themselves, forasmuch as *Vercingetorix* was not farre off with his campe, and all the way thither was a continuall bogge, which would hinder the

*Caesar.*



Romaines from following after them. And for that purpose they prepared themselves against the next night: which the women perceiuing, did run suddenly out into the streetes and other publike places, and cast themselves at the feete of their husbands; and by all meanes intreated them, not to leaue them and their children to the cruelty of the enemy, whom nature and infirmitie of body would not suffer to flie away, but finding them to continue resolute in their purpose, forasmuch as in extreame perill, feare for the most part hath no commiseration, they cried out and signified their flights vnto the Romaines, wherewith the Gaules being scared, they desisted from the course lest the wayes should be forestalled and laid by the Romaine horsemen. The next day Cæsar hauing aduanced forward the tower, and persited those workes which he had determined to make, there hapned to fall a great rain, which he thought to be a fit occasion for his purpose: and forasmuch as he saw the guard vpon the wall to be somewhat negligently disposed, he commanded his men to work faire and softly, and shewed them what he would haue done, and encouraging the Legions which were hid in a readines vnder the vines, at length to inioy the sweetnesse of victory for their manifold labours: he provided a reward for such as were scene first vpon the walles, and gaue them the signe to begin; the souldiers flying suddenly out of all parts, did quickly possesse themselves of the walles. The enemy being frighted with so sudden an accident, and put from the towers and the walles, imbatelled themselves angle wise in the market place, and in other spacious streets of the citie, with this resolution, that if they were assaulted in any part, they would resist in forme of battell: but when they saw no man to descend on euery ground, but to inclose them round about vpon the wall, fearing least there would be no way to escape, they cast their armes away and fled all to the furthest part of the towne: part of them sticking in a throng at the gate, were there slaine by the souldiers, and part being got out of the gate were slaine by the horsemen: neither was there any mā that looked after pillage, but being moued to anger with the slaughter of our men at Genabum, and with the trauell and labour of those great workes, they neither spared old men, women nor children. In the end, of all that number which was about fortie thousand, scarce eight hundred (that vpon the first noise forsooke the Towne) came safe to Vercingetorix. These he receiued with great silence, being now farre in the night, lest any sedition should haue growne in the camp, through the pitie and commiseration of the vulgar people, and sent out his familiar friends and chiefe men of each State to meet such as had escaped away, and to bring them to their owne people as they lay quartered in the campe.

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THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

The Gaules in the beginning are more the men, & in the end lesse the women.



E may see here the saying verified touching the disposition of the Gaules for matter of valour, which in the begining seemed so great, that it needed no further straine to counteruaile the worth of Cæsars armie, and was exprest with such industrie and resolution, both in spoyling and disappointing the Romaine workes, as also by ingenious fortifying and making good their owne labors, that a man would

would haue deemed them *virtute pares*. But being a litle spent in the action, like a pot that hath a mouth as bigge as the belly, and powreth out all the liquor at an instant, they fell at length to that basenesse, as shewed lesse spirit then the women did, who chose rather to betray their husbands purposes to the enemy, then to hazard their liues by escaping to *Vercingetorix*. And this is that which is so often noted by Historiographers: *Quod multa bella impetu valida per tadia & moras euanescere*. The first thing that I obserue, is that which *Cæsar* himselfe noteth: *Quod plerumque in summo periculo, timor misericordiam non recipit*. Which was true on either side: for the *Gaules* were so set vpon flying to *Vercingetorix*, that they regarded not the wofull laments of the women and children, whom they were well content to hazard, whilst they themselves might escape in safetie. And on the other side, the women did forget to be pitifull to their husbands, whom they would not suffer to escape, and leaue them in their weakenesse behind as a prey to appease the wrath of the bloudie souldier, which would consequently follow in that escape. Which sheweth, that there is no tye comparable to the bond of nature, specially when it concerneth the preferuation of life. For as in other things, respect and affection may easily worke a communication of good things vnto others, as also a participation of their euils for their reliefe: so herein we are altogether sencelesse, and the loue we owe to our liues is so great, that it admitteth no respect. *Agessilaus* to his friend was without respect a friend, and yet notwithstanding being driuen one day to remoue vpon the sudden, and to leaue one sicke behind him whom he loued dearly: the sicke man calling him by his name as he was going away, besought him that he would not forsake him: *Agessilaus* turning backe againe, answered: O how hard it is both to loue and to be wise: according to the saying; *Sapere & amare vix Deo conceditur*.

Feare hath  
no pity.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



It is a principle amongst men of warre, not to put necessitie vpon an enemy, nor make him valiant whether he will or no, (as I haue already noted in the former Commentaries) which the *Romains* well obserued in this particular seruice at *Anaricum*: for being possessed of the walles, they did not suddenly assault them in the market place, where they had made head for their defence, but gaue them a breathing time, the better to vnderstand what they did; and respire, to bethinke themselves of a starting hole for the safetie of their liues. Which as it was quickly apprehended by the *Gaules*, so it made an easie execution to the *Romaine* souldier.

And as it seemeth it was the more carefully handled in respect of the condition of the enemy being reuolters: for such Prouinces as haue rebelled, are harder to be recovered after their reuolt, then they were at first to be subdued. For at the first, they haue no occasion to feare any hard condition, but yeelding

A Generall  
must not put  
necessitie vpon  
an enemy.


*Reuolters  
are in the  
conditio both  
of an enemy  
and of an of-  
fendor.*

to subiection do looke for fauor : wheras rebels and reuolters, besides the condition of an enemy, are in the nature of offenders, and stand in feare of the extremities of warre, which maketh them more obstinate then otherwise they would be. And therefore it behoueth a Generall not to impose any further necessitie vpon an enemy, then the qualitie of the warre doth lay vpon them: which oftentimes is more then can be well auoided.

### CHAP. XIII.

#### Vercingetorix doth comfort the Gaules for the losse of Auaricum.

*Cæsar.*



**T**H E next day calling a Councell, he comforted the Gaules, and exhorted them not to be utterly dismayed with that losse: for the Romaines had not ouerthrowne them with valour, nor in a set battell, but with a kind of art, and skill in besieging a towne, whereof they themselves were ignorant; he erred much that looked for all the euents of warre to fall out prosperously: it was neuer his opinion, that Auaricum should be kept, whereof they themselves were witnesses. But it fell out by the imprudencie of the Bituriges & ouer great indulgence of the rest that this losse happened vnto them, which notwithstanding he would speedily heale with greater helpes: for by his diligence he would vnite such States vnto them as were not yet of the confederacie, and make one purpose of all Gallia, which the whole world was not able to resist: and that he had almost effected it alreadie. In the meane time he thought it fit that they should yeeld vnto one thing for their safeties sake, which was to fortifie their campe; to the end they might better sustaine the sudden assaults of the enemy. This speech was not vnpleasing to the Gaules: and the rather that he himselfe was not dejected in spirit vpon so great a losse, nor did hide himselfe, or flie the presence of the multitude: being the more esteemed, forasmuch as when the matter was in questiō, he first thought it fit that Auaricum should be burned, and afterwards he perswaded them to forsake it; wherein as misfortune and aduersitie do impair the authoritie of other commanders: so contrariwise his honour daily increased by the losse which he receiued. And withall they were in great hope vpon his affirmation, to winne the rest of the States vnto them. And that was the first time that the Gaules began to fortifie their campe, being so appalled in spirit, that where they euer were vnaccustomed to labour, yet they thought it their part to suffer and vndergoe all that was commanded them.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



EXT to the knowledge and experience of warre, there is nothing more requisite in a great Commander, then greatnesse of spirit: for where his employment consisteth in managing the great businesse of the world, such as are the slaughter of many thousands in an houre, the sacking of cities, the fighting of battels, the alteration of Commonweales, victories, triumphes, and the conquest of kingdomes, which like the constellations in the eighth sphere, are left to succeeding ages in such characters as cannot be defaced, and make an impression of the greatest measure of ioy, or the greatest heape of sorrow; it is necessarie that his courage be answerable to such a fortune, neither to be crushed with the waight of aduersitie, nor puffed vp with the pride of victorie; but in all times to shew the same constancie of mind, and to temper extremities with a settled resolution.

Of this mettall and temper, is the Philosophers *homo quadratus* made of, such as *Camillus* was in *Rome*: for neuer speech did better besecme a great personage then that of his, hauing knowne both the fauour and the disgrace of fortune: *nec mihi dictatura animos fecit, nec exilium ademit*, saith he. Whereas weake spirits do either vanish away in the smoke of folly, being drunke with the ioyes of pleasing fortune, or otherwise vpon a chaunge of good times, do become more base and abiect, then the theefe that is taken in the fact: such as *Perseus* the last *Macedonian* king was, who besides his ill fortune for loosing his kingdome in the space of one houre, hath euer since stood attainted of a base and abiect mind, vnworthie the throne of *Alexander* the Great.

The wise *Romaines* vsed al meanes to giue courage and spirit to their leaders, and to free their minds from such externall respects, which losse or dishonour might cast vpon them. And therefore when *Varro* had fought so rashly at *Cannes*, that he had like to haue lost the *Romaine* Empire to *Anniball*, vpon his returne to *Rome* the whole Senate went out to meete him, and although they could not thanke him for the battell, yet they gaue him thanks that he was returned home againe, whereby he seemed not to despaire of the state of *Rome*.

In like maner did the *Gaules* congratulate *Vercingetorix*, that notwithstanding so great a losse, he was neither dejected in spirit, nor did hide himself from the multitude, but as a commander of high resolution, had found out means to heale those harmes, and to recompence the losse of *Anaricum*, with the vniting of all the States of *Gallia* into one confederacie.

A great Commander, must haue a great courage.

*Homo quadratus.*

*Plutark. Paulus & Emilius.*

*Plutark.*



## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

*It is dangerous  
to be the au-  
thor of a coun-  
sell in a state.*



Econdly we may obserue, how dangerous it is to be the author of a counsel touching any important or graue deliberation, or to lay downe any proiect for the seruice of a State; for all men are blind in this point, that they iudge of good or ill counsell by the successe, and looke no further then the end which it taketh, which prouing disastrous or vnfortunate, doth either bring the author to destruction, or into danger both of life and state.

*Holinshed.*

In the occurrences of this kingdome, it appeareth that *Henry* the fift being solicited by the commons touching the Abbies in *England*, and moued by petition exhibited in Parliament, to that which was afterwards accomplished by *Henry* the eight, was diuerted from those thoughts by an eloquent oratio made in Parliament by *Henry Chechley* Archbishop of *Canterburie* a graue and learned Prelate, perswading the King by many concluding reasons, to carie a great power into *France*, and there to make his claime for that kingdome, according to the right deriued vnto him from his noble progenitors. Whereupon the King was perswaded to vndertake that war, which albeit fel out most happily, yet the Bishop to satisfie both the king and the people for his former counsel, whereby many men were lost, built a colledge in *Oxford* dedicated to Allsoules, wherein he placed fortie scholers, to make supplications for all soules, and specially for such as had mischieued in *France* in the time of that warre.

*Vi felicitas re-  
rū gestarū ex-  
ercitus beneno-  
lentia impera-  
toribus: ita res  
adverse odia  
concliant.  
Lib. 3. bel. cin.*

*Vercingetorix* was happie in this point, for he perswaded the *Gaules* not to keepe *Auaricum*, but to suffer it to be burned as an enemie to their safetie: and thereupon he did not let to put them in mind of his opinion, as free from the daunger which hapned to a great man neare vnto *Perseus* whom I last spake of, who after his ouerthrow by *Paulus Emilins*, being told by that partie of many errours which he had committed in the cariage of that warre, turned himself suddenly, saying, Traitor hast thou referued thy counsell vntill now, when there is no remedie: and therewithall (as some report) slue him with his owne hand. And this was it that gaue *Vercingetorix* that happinesse: *Vi reliquorum imperatorum res aduersæ, auctoritatem minuunt: sic huius ex contrario, dignitas incommodo accepto indies augebatur.*



*Vercingetorix*

## CHAP. XV.

Vercingetorix laboureth to vnite all Gallia  
into one league for the vpholding of  
their warre.

**N**EITHER did Vercingetorix omit any indenuour for the accomplishment of his promise, to draw the rest of the States vnto him: and to that purpose he dealt with their chiefeſt men both by rewards and promiſes, and choſe out ſit men, that either by ſubtile ſpeeches, or friendſhip, or ſome other meanes, might win the vnto him. He took order that ſuch as had eſcaped from Auaricum ſhould be both cloied and armed: and withall, that he might reenforce his troopes which were weakened, he commaunded euery State to furniſh out certaine ſupplies, and to be brought by a day to the campe: he commaunded likewiſe all the archers, of whom there is great ſtore in Gallia, to be fought out and ſent vnto him, and by this meanes he ſpeedily repaired his loſſes at Auaricum. In the meane time Teutomatus the ſonne of Olloucio King of the Nitiobriges, whoſe father had the title of a friend from our Senate, came to him with a great number of horſemen, which he had brought out of Aquitaine.

Caſar.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**I**T ſeemeth by this place, that *France* in thoſe dayes did fauour archerie: for (as the ſtorie ſaith) they had great ſtore of archers amongſt them, but of what value they were is not here deliuered: the uſe they made of them followeth after in this Commentarie, which was to intermingle them amongſt the horſe, and ſo they fought as light armed men.

Archery.

In the times that our *English* nation caried a ſcourging hand in *France*, the matter betweene vs and them touching archerie, ſtood in ſuch tearmes as gaue *England* great aduantage: for I haue not heard of any bowmen at all amongſt them: whereas our nation hath heretofore excelled all other, as well in number of bowmen, as in excellent good ſhooting, and hath made ſo good prooffe thereof againſt the *French*, as it needeth not any long diſpute.

\*Concerning Archerie I find theſe things conſiderable: firſt that euery man be ſo fitted with bow and arrowes, as he may be apt for ſtrong and quick ſhooting; wherein I cannot ſo much commend theſe liuerie bowes, being for the moſt part heauy ſlugs, and of greater weight then ſtrength, and of more ſhew then ſeruice.

Secondly, that in a day of ſeruice the bow-men endeuour ſo to deliuer their

\*Things conſiderable touching archery  
In the time of Henry the ſiſt the *English* bow-men did comonly ſhoot an arrow of a yard long beſides the head

quiuers, that the whole band or flecue of shot may let go all at one instant of time: for so the shower of arrowes will be more fierce and terrible, and more available against an enemy.

Thirdly, the fittest forme of imbattelling for bow-men, which must not at any hand be deepe in flanke, for so such as are in the hindmost rankes, will either shoote short or to no purpose. And therefore the fittest forme of imbattelling for archerie, hath cuer bin accounted a long sided square, resembling a hearse, broad in front and narrow in flanke.

Fourthly, their defence in a day of battell, which must either be a couert wooddie place, where the horse of the enemy cannot come at them, or a trench cast before them, or the place must be fortified with galthrops & stakes, such as were deuised by *Henrie* the fift at *Agincourt* field, or some other meanes to auoid the caualrie. The last thing is the effect which the bow-men worke, which are two: first the galling of the enemy, and secondly disorder. Touching the galling of the enemy, there cannot be a better description then that which *Plutarke* maketh of the ouerthrow of the *Romaines* by the *Parthian* arrowes. The *Romaine* souldiers hands (saith he) were nailed to their targets, and their feete to the ground, or otherwise were fore wounded in their bodies, and died of a cruell lingring death, crying out for anguish and paine they felt, and turning and tormenting themselves vpon the ground, they brake the arrowes sticking in them. Againe, struing by force to plucke out the barbed heads, that had pierced farre into their bodies through their veines and sinewes, they opened the wounds wider, and so cast themselves away.

The disorder or rowting of an enemy which is caused by the bow-men, cometh from the fearefull spectacle of a drift of arrowes: for a shower of arrowes well deliuered and well seconded, for a while is so terrible to the eye, and so dreadfull in the successe, that it is almost vnpossible to keepe the enemy from rowting.

The two great victories which our nation had in *France* at *Cressie* and *Agincourt*, next to the valour of the English, are attributed to our archery: and the effect of our archerie at those times, was first disorder, and consequently slaughter. In the battell of *Cressie* the King of *Bohemia* fighting for the *French*, caused his horsemen to tie the bridles of their horses together in ranke, that they might keepe order notwithstanding the galling which he feared from our *English* archerie: but it fell out as ill as if he had tied their heads and their tailes together in file, for the drift of arrowes fell so terribly amongst them, that they ranne together on heapes with such confusion, as made the slaughter great, and their particular destinies most miserably fortun'd. At *Agincourt* the number of prisoners which euery souldier had, was admirable to speake of; for some report that many of our English had ten prisoners apeece, which happened chiefly from the disorder which fel amongst the *French*, and that disorder came by our archery. And doubtlesse if euer we should haue occasion to go against an enemy that so aboundeth in horse as the *French* do, there could be no better meanes against such horse, then our *English* bowmen. I know it hath bene said, that now the times are altered, and the argebuse and musket are so generally receiued,

*It is not so profitable to intermingle bowmen with other sorts of weapons, as to put them all into one body.*

*At the battell of Cressie the blacke Prince leading the vanguard, had the archers standing in the manner of a hearse.*

*Holmeshead. The archerie worketh two effects.*

*1. Galling the enemy.*

*Plut. Crassius. 2. Disorder.*

*The battell of Cressie.*

*The battell of Agincourt.*

*Argibuse and musket.*

receiued, and of such reputation in the course of our moderne warres, that in comparison of them, bow-men are not worth the naming. Wherein I will not go about to extenuate the vse of either of these weapons, as knowing them to be both very seruiceable vpon fit and conuenient occasions, nor take vpon me to determine which of them is most effectuell in a day of seruice, but onely deliuer my conceit touching their effects, and leaue it to the consideration of wise and discreete Commaunders.

And first touching shot. A wing of muskaters is auailable against anemie, onely in such bullets as do hit; for such as do not hit, passe away insensibly without any further feare, and the cracke is but as the lose of the bow. Of such bullets as do hit, the greatest part do not strike to death, but are oftentimes carried vntill the skirmish be ended before the party do feele himselfe hurt: so that anemie receiueh no further hurt by a charge of shot, then happeneth to such particular men as shall chaunce to be slaine out-right or fore hurt.

*How farre a wing of shot preuaileth.*

A fleecue of archers is auailable against anemie, aswell in such arrowes as do not hit, as in such as do hit: for whereas the cloud of arrowes is subiect to our sight, and euery arrow is both suspected and able to bring death sitting on the head, anemie is as much troubled at such arrowes as come faire vpon him and do not hit, as at those that do hit, for no man is willing to expose his flesh to an open and eminent daunger when it lieth in his power to auoide it. And therefore whilest euery man seeketh to auoide hurt, they fall into such confusion, as besides the losse of particular men, theemie doth hardly escape disorder, which is the greatest disaduantage that can befall him. Moreouer, the arrowes hauing barbed heads, although they make but a light hurt, yet they are not easily pulled out, which maketh the souldiers not to intend the fight vntill they be deliuered of them: and the horse so to sting and chafe, that it is impossible they should either keepe their rancke, or be otherwise managed for any seruice.

*How farre a fleecue of archers is auailable against anemie.*

And this much touching bow-men and archerie, which is a weapon as ancient as the first and truest historie, and is of the number of such weapons as men vse to fight with a farre off. The vse whereof is too much neglected by the English at these times, considering the honour they haue atchieued by it in former ages.

*Genesi. 27. 3.*





## CHAP. XVI.

A controuersie fell out in the state of the Hedui  
touching the choise of their chiefe  
Magistrate.

Cæsar.



CÆSAR staid many dayes at Auaricum: for finding there great store of corne and of other prouisions, he refreshed his armie of their former labour and wants. The winter now being almost ended, and the time of the year being fit for warre, he determined to follow the enemy, to see whether he could draw him out of the woods and bogs, or besiege him in some place. Being thus resolved, diuers of the principall men of the Hedui came vnto him, beseeching him that he would stand to them, and assist their state in a time of great neede, the matter being in extreame daunger, forasmuch as their aunient vsage was for one to be created their annuall Magistrate, hauing regall authoritie for that yeare: whereas now two had taken vpon them the said office, both of them affirming themselves to be lawfully created; the one was Conuictolitanis, a famous and flourishing young man, the other Cotus borne of an aunient family, and he himselfe of great power and kinred, whose brother Vedeliacus had borne the said office the yeare before. All their State was in armes, their Senate and their people diuided, together with their clients and followers: if the controuersie continued for any time, it would come to a battell; the preuention whereof consisted in his diligence and authoritie. Cæsar, though he knew it would be disadvantageous vnto him to leaue the warre and to forsake the enemy; yet knowing what inconueniences do usually arise of such discords and dissensions, least so great a State, and so neare to the people of Rome, which he himselfe had alwayes fauoured, and by all meanes honoured, should fall to warre amongst themselves: and that faction which distrusted their owne strength, should seeke helpe of Vercingetorix, he thought it most necessary to be preuented. And forasmuch as such as were created chiefe Magistrates amongst the Hedui, were by their lawes forbidden to go out of their confines: to the end he might not seeme to derogate any thing from their lawes, he himselfe determined to go vnto them. At his comming he called before him all the Senate, and those also that were in controuersie for the office: and finding in an assembly almost of the whole State, that one of them was chosen by a few priuily called together, in another place, and at another time then was accustomed, the brother pronouncing the brother: whereas their lawes did not onely forbid two of one family both being alive to be created Magistrate, but also to be of the Senate together: he compelled Cotus to giue ouer his interest in the magistracie, and confirmed Conuictolitanis being created by their Priests, and according to the custome of their State. This decree being ratified, he adhorted the Hedui to forget their priuate controuersies and dissensions, and to giue their best helpe to the warre in hand, wherein they might challenge and expect (the Gaules being subdued) such rewardes as they deserved,

command-

commanding all their horse and ten thousand foote to be speedily sent vnto him, which he meant to dispose into garrisons for the better prouision of corne. And then diuiding his armie into two parts, he sent foure Legions towards the Senones and the Parisians vnder the leading of Labienus; the other foure he led himselfe against the Aruerni, to the Towne of Gergonia, along the riuer Eleuar sending part of the horse with him, and keeping part with himselfe.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**N**O loose the least jot of that which a man hath in possession, is more dishonourable, then to faile of getting what he hath not. And therefore *Cæsar* chose rather to forgo the aduantages which a speedie pursuite of the enemy might haue afforded him to the ending of that warre, then to hazard the losse of so great a State, and so well affected to the people of *Rome* as were the *Hedui*, wherein he caried so equall and indifferent a hand, that he would do nothing but what the lawes of that State directed him vnto, as most assured that such directions were without exception.

*No minor est  
virtus, quam  
quære partem  
tueri.*

## CHAP. XVII.

*Cæsar* passeth his armie ouer the riuer Eleuar, and incampeth himselfe before Gergonia.



**W**HICH thing being knowne, *Vercingetorix* hauing broken downe all the bridges of that riuer, tooke his journey on the other side of Eleuar, either armie being in view each of other, and incamping almost ouer against one another: discoverers being sent out to watch, lest the *Romains* should make a bridge in any place, and carie ouer their forces. *Cæsar* was much troubled, lest he should be hindred by the riuer the greatest part of that Sommer, forasmuch as Eleuar is not passable at any foord vntill towards the Autumne. And therefore to preuent that, he encamped himself in a wooddie place right ouer against one of those bridges which *Vercingetorix* had commanded to be broken. The next day he kept himselfe there secretly with two legions, and sent forward the rest of the forces, with all the cariages as were accustomed, taking away the fourth part of each cohort, that the number of legions might appeare to be the same, commanding them to go on as farre as they could, and making coniecture by the time of the day, that they were come to their camping place, upon the same piles, (the lower part whereof remained there whole) he began to reedifie the bridge, and hauing speedily ended the worke, and caried ouer the Legions, and

*Cæsar.*

*Deemptis  
quartis qui-  
busque cohorti-  
bus.*

chosen a fit place to encampe in, he called backe the rest of his forces. Vercingetorix hauing notice thereof, lest he should be forced to fight against his will, went before by great iourneys; Cæsar with five incampings went from that place to Gergonia, and after a light skirmish betweene the horse the same day he came, hauing taken a view of the situation of the towne which was built vpon a very high hill, & had very hard and difficult approaches on all sides, he dispaired of taking it by assault, neither would he determine to besiege it vntill he had made prouision of corne. But Vercingetorix hauing set his campe on a hill before the towne, had placed the seuerall forces of the States by themselves, in small distances round about him, and hauing possesst himselfe of all the toppes of that hill, made a very terrible shew into all parts where he might be seene: he commaunded likewise the chiefe men of the States, whom he had chosen out to be of the Councell of warre, to meete alwaies together with him at the dawning of the day, to know if any thing were to be communicated vnto them, or what else was to be done. Neither did he omit any day to skirmish with his horsemen, with archers intermingled amongst them: to the end he might trie what courage and valor was in his people. Right ouer against the towne at the foote of the hill, there was a knowle exceedingly fortified, and hard to be come vnto on all sides, which if our men could get, they were in hope to hinder the enemye, both of a great part of their water, and also from free forraging: but the place was kept with a strong garrison. Notwithstanding Cæsar went out of his campe in the silence of the night, and before any helpe could come out of the towne, he put by the garrison, and possessed himselfe of the place, and left two legions there to defend it, and drew a double trench of twelue foote in breadth from the greater campe to the lesse, that single men might go safe too and fro from any sudden incursion of the enemye.

## OBSERVATIONS.

The meanes  
which Cæsar  
vsed to passe  
ouer the riuer  
Elauar.

Decembris  
quartis qui-  
busque cohor-  
tibus.



IRST we may obserue his manner of passing ouer the riuer *Elauar*, without any impediment from the enemye, notwithstanding the care which Vercingetorix had to hinder his passage, which was plotted with as great dexteritie as could be deuised in such a matter: and to shadow his purpose the better, that the number of legions marching vp the riuer might appeare to be the same, he tooke the fourth part of euery cohort, which in the whole amounted to two legions. For as I haue already deliuered in my former Obseruations, a legion consisted of ten cohorts, and euery cohort contained three maniples, and euery maniple had two companies which they called Orders: so that euery cohort hauing sixe companies, the fourth part of a cohort was a companie and a halfe, and in a legion came to fiftene companies, and in eight legions to one hundred and twentie companies; which being reduced make threecore maniples, which were equall to two legions: and proueth that which I haue already noted, the fit and conuenient disposition of their troupes, to take out at al times competent forces for any seruice without seeming to lessen any part. Secondly, I obserue the phraze which he vseth in this place, *Quinctis castris Gergoniam per-*

*peruenit*, which implyeth their infallible custome of encamping euery night within a ditch and a rampier: for as we vsually say, that to such a place is so many dayes iourney, because an ordinarie traoueller maketh so many iourneys before he come thither: so the *Romaines* reckened their iourneys with their army by their incampings, which were as duly kept as their iourneys, and were the most signall part of their dayes iourney.

## CHAP. XVIII.

Conuictolitanis moueth the Hedui  
to a reuolt.

*W*HILEST these things were a doing at Gergonia, Conuictolitanis the Heduan to whom the magistracie was adiudged by Cæsar, being wrought by the Aruerni with money, brake the matter to certaine young men, amongst whom Litauicus was chiefe, and his brethren being youths of a great house: with them he treated at first, and wished them to remember that they were not onely borne free men, but also to empire and gouernement. The Hedui were the onely State which kept

Cæsar.

Gallia from a most assured victorie: for by their authoritie and example, the rest would be concluded, which being set ouer, there would be no place in Gallia for the Romaines to abide in. Touching himselfe, he had receiued a good turne from Cæsar, but in such sort, as he had but his right: but he owed more to the common libertie: for why should the Hedui rather dispute of their customes and lawes before Cæsar, then the Romaines come before the Hedui? These young men were quickly perswaded as well by the speech of the Magistrate, as by rewards; insomuch as they offered themselves to be the authours of that Councell: but now the meanes was to be thought on, forasmuch as they were perswaded that the State would not easily be drawne to undertake that warre. They determined at last, that Litauicus should haue the leading of those tenne thousand men that were to be sent to Cæsar, and that his brethren should be sent before to Cæsar, and concluded likewise in what sort they would haue other things caried.

Litauicus hauing receiued the armie when he was about thirtie miles from Gergonia, calling the souldiers suddenly together, and weeping: Whither do we go (saith he) fellow souldiers? all our horsemen and our Nobilitie are slaine, the Princes of our State, Eporedorix and Viridomarus, being falsly accused of treason, are put to death by the Romaines without calling them to their answer: vnderstand these things from them that are escaped from the slaughter: for I my selfe (my brethren and kinsmen being slaine) am hindred with griefe from telling you what hath happened. Presently those were brought soorth, whom he had taught beforehand what he would haue said: who verified to the multitude those things which Litauicus had spoken: that all the horsmen of the Hedui were slain, forasmuch as they were said to haue had speech with



the Aruerni: for themselves they were hid amongst the multitude of souldiers, and were escaped out of the midst of the slaughter. The Hedui cry out all together, and do beseech Litauicus to looke to himselfe, and to them also: As though (saith he) the matter needeth any aduice or counsell, and that it were not necessarie for vs to go directly to Gergonia, and to ioyne our selues with the Aruerni. For do we doubt, but that the Romains, hauing begun so wickedly, will run presently vpon vs to take away our liues? And therefore if there be any courage at all in vs, let vs persecute their death that haue perished so vnderuedly, and let vs kill these theenes. He shewed them diuerse Romaine citizens that were in the troupes for safetie of conuoy: and forthwith he seized vpon a great quantitie of corne and other prouisions, and tortured the cruelly to death: he sent out messengers throughout all the state of the Hedui, continuing the same false suggestion touching the slaughter of the horsemen, and the Princes perswading them to reuenge their iniuries in like manner as he had done

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

*Gratia oneri  
vltio in qua  
est habetur.*



**T**HIS trecherous practise of *Conuictolitanis*, who a litle before (as we may remember) had receiued so great a benefit from *Caesar*, proueth true the saying of *C. Tacitus*, That men are readier to reuenge an iniurie then to requite a good turne, forasmuch as *Gratia oneri vltio in qua est habetur*: a good turne is as a burthen and a debt to a man, whereas reuenge is reckoned a gaine. The debt of loyalty and good affection, wherein *Conuictolitanis* stood engaged to *Caesar*, for confirming that right vnto him which ciuill diffention had made doubtfull, together with the respect of the generall cause, made him so willing to reuolt from the *Romains*, and in lieu of thankfull acknowledgement to requite him with hostilitie. A part so odious and detestable, that vertue grieueth to thinke that a man should be capable of any such wickednesse, or be stained with the infamy of so horrible a crime. Other vices are faults in speciall, and are branded with the seuerall markes of ignominie: but ingratitude is equal to the bodie of euill, and doth counteruaile the whole nature of hatefull affections: according to that of the Philosopher: *Ingratum si dixeris omnia dixeris*. Ingratitude is culpable of all sorts of wickednesse, and deserueth the greatest measure of reuenge. And therather for that it taketh away the vse of vertue, and maketh men forget to do good: for whereas the nature of goodnesse is specially seene in communicating it selfe to the reliefe of other mens wants, we ought to giue all diligence not to hinder this enlargement, nor by a froward and crooked example to preiudice others that stand in neede of the like fauour.

*Seneca.*

I haue often heard it spoken, but I know not how true it is, and am loath to beleue it, that in the exchange of a good turne, the partie that receiue it, hath more assurance of his benefactor, touching a faithfull and friendly disposition for the future time, then he that shewed the kindnesse can haue of the receiuer: for men are loath to loose both the fruite and the seede, and will rather bestow

more

more cost and more labour, then forgo the hope of their first indeauours, expecting both in reason and nature, fruite answerable to their seed: whereas the badnesse of our nature is such of it selfe:

*Vt gratia oneri vltio in questu habetur.*

THE SEECOND OBSERVATION.



HERE is no meanes so readie to abuse a multitude as false suggestions, which like a lying spirit seduceth the minds of men from the truth conceiued, and fashioneth their hearts to such purposes, as seemeth best to the abuser: and the rather when it is deliuered by a man of place and authoritie, & such a one as pretendeth carefullnesse for the safetie of a people: for then it fljeth as fast as the lightning in the ayre, and deludeth the wisest and best experienced of the multitude. A mischief that can hardly be preuented, as long as there is a tounge to speake or an eare to heare. But as *Socrates* said of paine and ease, that they are alwaies tyed together: so men must endeuour to redeeme the hurts of such an euill, by the benefite which thereby is consequently implied: for it were hard if wise men could not make the like vse of a multitude to good purposes, as these deceiuers do for their owne aduantage.

*Numa Pompilius* (to whom the *Romaine* Empire did owe as much for lawes and ciuill gouernment, as to *Romulus* for their martiall discipline) the better to establish such ordinances and decrees, as he made in his kingdome, fained familiar acquaintance with a goddessse of that time called *Egeria*, and by her he said he was assured, that the statutes which he made, were both equall and iust, and good for the *Romaines* to obserue, and the people found no hurt in beleeuing it.

In like manner *Lycurgus* hauing giuen many lawes to the *Spartans*, repaired to the citie of *Delphos*, and there he got a pleasing oracle, which he sent to *Sparta*, assuring them that his lawes were very good, and that citie keeping them, should be the most renowned of the world.

And *Sertorius* for want of other meanes vsed the seruice of a white hind, as a gift sent him from *Diana*, to make the *Lusitanians* beleeue whatsoeuer might best aduantage his businesse. And thus a multitude lyeth open to good and ill purposes, and is either happie or vnfortunate in the counsell of their Leader.

*A multitude is easily abused by false suggestions.*

*Phaedo Platonis.*

## CHAP. XIX.

Cæsar hindereth the reuolt of  
the Hedui.

Cæsar.



**E**POREDORIX the Heduan, a young man of great parentage, and of great power in his country, together with Viridomarus of like age and authoritie, but not so nobly borne, who being preferred to Cæsar by Diuitiacus, was by him advanced from meane estate to great dignitie, came both to Cæsar with the Heduan horsemen, being called out by name to that warre by him: betweene these two there was alwayes contention who should be the chiefeſt, and in that controuerſie for magiſtracie, the one ſtood for Conuictolitanis, and the other for Cotus: of these two Eporedorix vnderſtanding the reſolution of Litaucius, opened the matter to Cæſar almoſt about midnight: he prayed him not to ſuffer their State to fall away from the friendſhip of the people of Rome by the wicked counſell of young men, which would neceſſarily fall out if he ſuffered ſo many thouſand men to ioyne themſelues to the enemy, whoſe ſafetie as neither their kinsfolks would neglect, ſo the State could not lightly eſteeme of. Cæſar being much perplexed at this meſſage, forasmuch as he had alwayes cheriſhed the State of the Hedui, without any further doubt or diſpute, he tooke foure expedite and vnburthened Legions and all the horſe out of the campe, neither was there ſpace at ſuch a time to make the campe leſſer, forasmuch as the matter ſeemed to conſiſt in expedition, he left behind him C. Fabius a Legate with two legions for a gariſon to the campe. And hauing giuen order for the apprehending of Litaucius brethren, he found that a litle before they were ſled to the enemy: thereupon adhorting the ſouldiers not to thinke much of their labour in ſo neceſſarie a time, euery man being moſt willing, he went ſixe and twentie miles, and then met with the forces of the Hedui. The horſemen being ſent to ſtay their march, he commaunded not to kill any one of them, and gaue order that Eporedorix and Viridomarus (whom they thought to be ſlaine) to ride vp and downe amongſt the horſemen, and to call to their countrimen. They being once knowne, and the fraude of Litaucius diſcouered, the Hedui ſtretched out their hands, making ſignes of ſubmiſſion, and caſting away their weapons deſired to be ſpared from death. Litaucius with his clients and followers, who by the cuſtome of Gallia muſt not forſake their patrons in the extreameſt danger, ſled to Gergonia. Cæſar hauing diſpatched meſſengers to the State of the Hedui to acquaint them that he had ſaued their people, which by the lawe of armes he might haue ſlaine, gaue the armie three houres reſt that night, and then returned towards Gergonia. In the midde way certaine horſemen ſent by Fabius made knowne vnto Cæſar in what danger the matter ſtood: the campe was aſſaulted with all the enemies forces, and forasmuch as ſuch as were wearied, were ſtill releued with freſh men, it came to paſſe that our men fainted with continuall labours: for the campe was ſo great  
that

that they were alwaies to stand upon the rampier to make it good, and that many were wounded with the multitude of arrowes and other sorts of weapons; wherein their engines had serued them to good purpose for their defence. Fabius when these messengers came away, had shut up two gates, and left other two open, and had made sheddies and houels for the better defence of the wall, and prepared himselfe for the like fortune the next day. These things being knowne by the exceeding trauell of the souldiers, Cæsar came into the campe before Sun rising.

## OBSERVATIONS.



As often as the people of Rome had occasion to make warre, besides the bodie of the armie inrolled for that seruice, in such sort and with such ceremonies as I haue formerly deliuered; the Consull or Generall had authoritie to call out such others either of the communalty or the Equites, as for their long seruice were freed by the lawes from giuing in their names at a muster: and these they called *Euocati*, as a man would say, called out, being all men of speciall note and seruice, and such as were able to giue sound aduice for matter of warre. These *Euocati* went all for the most part vnder an ensigne, and were lodged together in the campe behind the pauilion of the Generall, neare vnto the gate which they called *Porta Pratoria*, and were alwayes free from ordinarie duties, as watching, incamping and fighting, vnlesse it came to such a passe, that euery man would put too his helping hand: but in all seruices they had their place appointed them according to their former experience and worth. And thus the *Romaines* strengthened their armie with the wisdom and experience of such as for many yeares together, had bene acquainted with the difficulties and casualties of warre, and oftentimes were able to affoord such helpees both by example & otherwise by good directions, as the wisdom of the Generall did gladly embrace. Concerning these two young nobles *Eporedorix* and *Viridomarus*, whom he nameth in this place *Euocati*, we are to vnderstand that they were called out to that warre vnder the same title, but to another end: for being men of great place and authoritie, he feared least in his absence they might be so wrought to fauour *Vercingetorix*, as neither himselfe nor the *Hedui* should haue any cause to commend them, according as it happened to *Litanicus*.

*Euocati, who they were.*



## CHAP. XX.

## The Hedui robbe and kill diuers Romaine Citizens.

Cæsar:



*W*HILE these things were a doing at Gergonia, the Hedui hauing receiued the first messages from Litaucicus, gaue themselves no time to vnderstand the truth, some being led on by couetousnesse, others by anger and rashnesse, as it is naturally ingrafted in that nation to take a light heare-say for a certaine truth, spoiled the Romaine citizens of their goods, and slue them besides, or drew them into bondage; Conuictolitanis stirring up the common people to madnesse, that when they had done some wicked fact they might be ashamed to be good againe. They drew Marcus Aristius a Tribune of the souldiers as he went to the Legion, out of the town Cauillonium, notwithstanding their faith and promise before giuen, causing the rest to do the like, which were there for matter of trade; these they set vpon continually as they travelled, robbed them of their cariages, and besieged such as made resistance day and night, many were slaine on both sides, & a greater number were stirred up to take armes. In the meane time newes being come that all their souldiers were vnder Cæsar's power, they runne speedily to Aristius, they tell him that nothing was done by publique authority, they called such as robbed the Romaines of their goods to answer the matter, they confiscate the goods of Litaucicus and his brethren, they sent Ambassadors vnto Cæsar to cleare themselves of these disorders: and this they do for the better recovery of their people that were now with Cæsar. But being contaminated with a wicked fact, and taken with the shame of robbing the Romaine citizens, many of them being touched in the fact, and much perplexed for feare of punishment, they priuily entred into consultations of warre, and solicited other States to that purpose by their Ambassadors: which although Cæsar vnderstood, yet he entertained them as curteously as he could, telling them that for the ignorance and lenitie of the common people he would not thinke hardly of the State, nor abate any thing of his good will and fauour to the Hedui.

## OBSERVATIONS.

One ill act be-  
getteth ano-  
ther.



Wicked act is not onely hurtful in it selfe and of it owne condition, but is like that boxe of euill, which the Poets faine to haue bene giuen to Pandora to be kept alwaies shut: for when the way is once made, and the gappe opened, one mischiefe draweth on another, and the tayle that followeth is more viperous then the head. There was neuer any one that stained himselfe with any detestable crime, but was moued to commit a second euill that had relatiō to the first:

for

for wicked deedes are iustified by themselves, and one crime is vpheld by another. When the hand is dipt in blood, it seemeth no great matter to imbrue the arme: and the loyaltie of a people being once shaken by the indirect practises of a few, it is no straunge matter if the whole bodie of that state do immediatly enter into treasonable consultations: as it happened in this place with the *Hedui*, who from that time which disclosed the trecherie of their heart, caried no faithfull regard to the *Romaine* gouernment, vntill the bitternesse of that warre which happened shortly after, had made them know their error.

It shall be necessarie therefore, as much as lyeth in the possibilitie of our meanes, to keepe the bodie of vertue safe from wounding: for albeit the wound be neuer so litle, yet it is alwaies wide enough to let out both the blood and the spirits, euen to the euacuation of the vitall breath of morall honestie.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



*On uictolitanis plebem ad furorem impellit* (saith the storie) as the fittest instruments to trouble the state, and to leauen the rest of the people with the furie of madnesse. For the poorer and meaner people, that haue no interest in the Commonweale but the vse of breath, nor any other substance but a flie in the commons, are alwaies dangerous to the peace of that kingdome: for hauing nothing to loose, they willingly imbrace all meanes of innouation, in hope of gaining something by other mens ruine, beleeuing altogether in the Prouerbe, which auerreteth the fishing to be good which is in troubled waters.

*Catilina* conspiring against the *Romaine* Empire, made choice of such to accompanie him whose fortune was desperate. And thereupon *Salust* saith: *Homini potentiam quarenti, egentissimus quisque opportunissimus, cui neque sua chara, quippe quæ nulla sunt, & omnia cum prætio honesta videntur.*

*Linie* writeth, that vpon the rumor in *Greece* of warre betweene *Perseus* and the *Romains*, the poorer sort did put themselves in pay vnder *Perseus*, with this resolution, that if there hapned no alteration vpon this occasiõ, they wold then cleaue to the *Romains*, and assist them to put the state of *Greece* into a garboile: *Semper in ciuitate* (saith *Salust*) *quibus opes nulla sunt, bonis inuidet, malos extolunt; vetera odere noua exoptant, odio suarum rerum mutari omnia student.*

There are these two meanes left for a state to ease it selfe of this sort of people, either to employ them abroad in warres, or to inrerresse them in the quiet of the Commonweale, by learning them such trades and occupations as may giue them a tast of the sweetnesse of peace, and the benefite of a ciuill life.

The poorer sort of people do imbrace all meanes of innouation.

*Salust* in the conspiracie of *Catilina*.

## CHAP. XXI.

Cæsar spieth an occasion to aduance the  
service at Gergonia.

Cæsar.



**C**ÆSAR suspecting a greater reuolt of the Gaules, lest he might be hemmed in with the strength of all the States of Gallia, he entred into deliberation how he might leaue Gergonia and get all his armie together againe, that his departure might not seeme to rise from the feare of their reuolt, and thereby be thought to flie away: and as he thought vpon these things, he seemed to spie an occasion of doing somewhat to purpose: for comming into the lesser campe to view the workes, he obserued a knoll which was kept by the enemye to be bare of men, which the day before could scarce be discerned by reason of the multitude of people: and wondering at it, he enquired the cause of the runawaies which came daily in great numbers vnto him: they all agreed of that which Cæsar had before vnderstood by the discouersers, that the backe of that hill was almost leuell, but narrow and woody where it gaue passage to the other part of the towne. The Gaules did much feare that place, for the Romanes hauing tooke one knoll if they should possesse themselves of another, the Gaules were almost blockt in round about and cut off from forraging, or any other issuing out of the towne: and therefore Vercingetorix had called them all to fortifie that place. This being knowne, Cæsar sent many troupes of horse to that place about midnight, commaunding them to ride vp and downe all thereabout somewhat tumultuously: and early in the morning he caused many horses and mules for cariage to be taken out of the campe with horsekeepers vpon them, hauing caskes vpon their heads the better to resemble horsemen, and to be caried round about the hilles, and to them he added a few horsemen, to the end they might spurre out the more freely, and so make a better shew, commaunding them all to go to the same place by a long circuit about. These things were done in view of the towne: for Gergonia stood, that they might from thence see into the campe, but yet in so great a distance they could not certainly perceine what was done. He sent likewise one Legion to the same hill, and appointed them to go a litle way, and then to make a stand in a dale, and to hide themselves in the woods. The Gaules began more to suspect that place, and all their forces were drawne thither, for the strengthening of it. Cæsar perceiuing the enemies campes to be void of men, hiding his ensignes and colours, he drew the souldiers by litle and litle out of the greater into the lesser campe, and acquainted the legates to whom he had giuen the seuerall legions in charge what he would haue done, warning them especially to keepe in the souldiers, lest they should be caried out either with a desire of fighting, or in hope of bottie: he propounded vnto them the incommodities of the disadvantage of place, which must onely be auoyded by expedition, the matter consisting rather in occasion and oportunitie then in fighting.

THE

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



T is an easy matter to begin a busines, & to make work for many hands; but to put it off againe, and to quit it without preiudice of other important respects, is no small labour. *Caesar* being ingaged in the siege of *Gergonia*, & fearing a generall reuolt throughout all *Gallia*, was not a litle troubled how he might cleare himselfe of that busines, without suspition of feare or flight, and gather all his forces into one bodie againe, which he had before deuided into two armies: for as *Marcellus* said to *Fabius* touching the siege of *Cassellum*, *Multa magnis ductibus sicut non aggredienda, ita semel aggressis non dimittenda esse, quia magna fama momenta in utramque partem sunt*. An enemy wil conceiue greater hopes from such a retreat, then from a greater aduantage. And therefore a Generall ought to haue as speciall a regard to the opinion which he desireth to be held of his proceedings, as of any part belonging to his charge; for fame is the spirit of great actions, and maketh them memorable or vnworthy by report, *ceteris mortalibus in eo stare consilia quid sibi conducere putent, Principum* (saith *Tacitus*) *diuersam esse sortem, quibus praecipua rerum ad famam dirigenda*: wherein there cannot be a better rule for the auoiding of that inconuenience, then that which *Lucretius* obserued, of whom *Linie* saith, *Id prudenter ut in temere suscepta re Romanus fecit, quod circumspexit difficultatibus, ne frustra tempus terreret celeriter abisset incepto*: for the speedie leauing of any such enterprise, doth excuse the rashnesse which might be imputed to the beginning, and men are not so much blamed for making triall of an ill disgested proiect, as they are for obstinate continuing in the same.

*It is an easier matter to begin a worke, then to quit it againe with credit.*

*Linie.*

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



SOME seruices (saith *Caesar*) are *Res occasionis non praelij*, whereof I haue already disputed. Notwithstanding giue me leaue to adde the mistake, which often falleth out in matter of oportunitie: for in viewing the occurrences of the warres of these latter times, we may find that some hot-spurre commaunders, hauing tasted of the good succeſſe which occasion affoordeth, haue thought of nothing but of seruices assisted with oportunitie, in such maner as at length they forgot that occasion came but seldome, and caried their men vpon such desperate attempts, as prooued the businesse to be a matter scarce affoording meanes to fight for their liues, but were often swallowed vp with deuouring daunger: wherein they did mistake the condition of the seruice, and fell short of *Caesars* example: for albeit he sent out his men to struggle with the height of the hill, and the disaduantage of well fortified camps, yet he knew they should find litle resistance by the enemy, being drawne away vpon other occasions, if they made that expedition as was requisite in this seruice, whereby he left them not

*Some seruices are Res occasionis non praelij.*




without meanes to ouerway those difficulties, and so made it *Rem occasiois non praliij*

## CHAP. XXII.

The Romaines make an assault  
vpon Gergonia.

Cæsar.



THESE things being deliuered, he gaue the soldiers the signe to begin, and at the same time he sent out the Hedui by another asscent on the right side. The wal of the towne was distant by a right line from the plaine and the foote of the hill (if it lay euen without any dale or valley) a thousand and two hundred paces: whatsoeuer more was added in fetching circuits about to clime the steepe of the hil, was ouer and besides that distance: from the midst of the hill in length as the nature of the place would beare it, the Gauls had with great stones raised a wall of sixe foote in height, to hinder the assault of our men, and all the lower part being left void and empty, they filled the upper part of the hill euen to the wall of the towne with thicke and frequent camps. The souldiers vpon the signe giuen were quickly come to the workes, and passing ouer them they posselt themselues of three camps with such speed and expedition, that Teutomatus the King of the Nitiobriges being surprised in his tent as he rested about noone time, the upper part of his bodie being naked and his horse wounded, did hardly escape the hands of souldiers occupied in bootie. Cæsar hauing got that which he propounded to himselfe, commaunded a retreat to be sounded, and the Ensignes of the tenth Legion stayd but the souldiers of the other Legions not hearing the sound of the trumpet, forasmuch as a great valley was betweene them, and it was staid notwithstanding by the Tribunes of the souldiers, and the Legates according as Cæsar had giuen in charge; but being caried away aswell with a hope of a speedy victory, as by the slight of the enemy and the fortunate battels of former times, they thought nothing so difficult but they could ouercome it by their valour, insomuch as they desisted not from following untill they came to the wal and the gates of the towne. Then a great outcry being took up in all parts of the towne, such as were further off being terrified with the suddenness of the tumult, thinking the enemy had bene within the gates, did cast themselues out of the towne, and the women cast down their apparel & their siluer frō the wals; & holding out their naked breasts & their hands spread abroad, aduired the Romaines to saue them, & that they wold not (as they had done at Auaricū) destroy both women and children: and some women slipt downe by their hands frō the wal, and gaue themselues freely to the souldiers. L. Fabius a centurion of the eight legion, who was heard to say that day, that the bootie which he had got at Auaricum so stirred him up, that he would suffer no man to get up vpon the wal before himselfe: hauing got three of his manipular souldiers, with their helpe he climed up to the top of the wall, and then he himselfe did helpe up his fellowes. In the meane time such as were on the other side of  
the

the towne, busied in fortifying that place (as we haue already deliuered) first the noise being heard, and then stirred vp by often messengers, that the Romaines had tooke the towne, sending their horsemen before they hasted thither in great numbers, and still as they came they stood vnder the wall, and increased the number of such as they found fighting: a great multitude being at length come together, the womē that a litle before had reached out their hands from the wall to the Romaines, began now to adiuire their owne people, and as the manner of the Gaules is, to shew their haire loose about their eares, and to bring out their children.

## OBSERVATIONS.



It is both safe and honourable for Souldiers and inferiour Commanders to keepe their directions: for whensoever they go about to enlarge their businesse according to their owne fantasie, howsoever occasiō may seeme to further their desires, they inuert the whole course of discipline, and do arrogate more to themselves, then they do attribute to their Generall.

The Romaines were strict in this point, as may appeare by that of *Manlius*, who put his owne sonne to death for making a happie fight against the enemy contrary to his directions: for although it fortun'd to fall out well at that time, yet the example was so dangerous in a wel ordered war, that he chose rather to bring a mischief vpon his own son, then an incōuenience to their military gouernement. *In iussu tuo* (saith one in *Liue* to the Consull) *nunquam pugnabo, non si certam victoriam videam*, making profession of true obedience, and ranging himselfe in the order of such parts as haue no other office but obseruance: for an armie is as a bodie, and the souldies are as particular parts, euery man according to his place: the Generall is as the life and soule, and giueth motion to euery part according to reason: and as in a naturall bodie no part can moue without directions from the life; so in the bodie of an armie, when any part moueth without the consent of the head, the motion is either monstrous or exorbitant, and sureth with such an effect as condemneth the instruments of vnaduised rashnesse.

*Polybius* saith, that men haue two wayes to come by wisdom, either by their owne harmes, or by other mens misadualties: such wisdom as is got through correction happening by their own errors, is dearely bought; but sitting neare them, is not easily forgotten: that which is obtained by other mens misfortunes, is well come by, and at an easie rate, but for the most part it is soone forgotten: but such as can retaine it to a good vse, are most happie men. This precept to souldiers touching obedience, and the precise keeping of their directions, hath by other mens harmes so often bin vrged, as a man would thinke that latter ages should beware of this disorder. And yet it falleth out almost in euery final seruice, for the greatest losse which the English receiued at any one time at *Ostend*, was in a sally, wherein captaine *Woodward* hauing possesst himselfe of some of the enemies workes, when by his directions he should haue stayed,

It is honorable for soldiers to keepe their directions.

thinking to improve his reputation by some further service : deeming it easie peradventure to go forward, he went on beyond the compasse of his command, whereby it hapned, that both the enemy had greater scope to reuenge their former dishonour, and the rest of our English troopes that had their part in that proiect by way of second helpes, could not proceede according to their directions, and so they all returned with losse.


*Institution  
of Cyrus.*

That which *Zenophon* reporteth touching one *Chrysantas*, is notable to this purpose, who being in the heat of a conflict, & having his sword lift vp to strike one of the aduerse partie, he chanced to heare a retreat sounded, whereupon he presently withdrew his hand, and did forbear to smite him: which howsoeuer to some may seeme ridiculous, and vnfitting the temper of a souldier in time of battell, yet let them know that *Zenophon* a great Commander, and an excellent hystorian, did alledge that example to the eternall memorie of the forenamed partie, for the knowledge and instruction of *Cyrus*, whom he propoundeth to the world as an absolute paterne both of militarie and ciuill vertue.

### CHAP. XXIII.

The Romaines continue the assault, and  
*were beaten off with losse.*

*Cæsar:*



**T**HE contention was not indifferent to the Romaines, neither in place nor in number of combattants, being wearied withall, both with the long race which they had run, and with the continuance of their fight, whereby they did not so easily beare the enemy being whole & fresh. Cæsar seeing the fight to be in an vnequal place, & the enemy stil to increase their forces, fearing his people he sent to T. Sextius the legat, who he had left to command the lesser camp, to bring out the cohorts speedily, & to place the same at the foot of the hil on the right side of the enemy, to the end that if our men were forced to forsake their place, yet the enemy might be terrified from following them ouer freely, he himself removing a litle out of that place where he stood with the legio, attended the event of the battell: and as they fought at hand very fiercely, the enemy trusting in the place and in the multitude, and our men in their valour, the *Hedui* sodainly appeared on the open side of our men, whom Cæsar had sent up by another assent on the right hand, and although they saw their right armes shewed or put forth, which was a signe of peace, yet they doubted lest the enemy had vsed that pollicy to deceiue them. At the same instant L. Fabius the Centurion, and those that climed up vpon the wall with him being slaine, were cast downe from the wal againe, and M. Petreius a Centurion of the same legion, as he was about to cut downe the gates, being oppressed with the multitude and despairing of his owne life, hauing receiued many wounds: Forasmuch (saith he to his souldiers that followed him) as I cannot saue my selfe and you too, I will certainly provide for your safetie, whom I haue brought into danger whilst I thirsted after honor:

*you*

You while you may, shift for your selues, and withall he brake through the thickest of the enemy, and with the slaughter of a couple he remoued be rest from the gate. And as his souldiers went about to helpe him, In vaine (saith he) do you indenor to saue my life, which bloud and strength haue already forsaken: and therefore get you hence while you haue meanes, and betake your selues to the legion, and so fighting fell downe dead, but saued his men. Our men being ouercharged on all sides with the losse of sixe and fortie Centurions, were beaten downe from the place, but the tenth legion which stood for a rescue in a more equall place, hindered the Gaules from following ouer eagerly. And againe, the cohorts which Fabius had brought out of the campe seconded that legion, hauing got the aduantage of the vpper ground. The legions as soone as they came into the plaine stood still and turned head to the enemy: Vercingetorix drew backe his men from the foote of the hill, and brought them into their camps. That day few lesse then seuen hundred souldiers were wanting.

## OBSERVATIONS.



AND this is the end of presumptuous rashnesse, when men are become so pregnant, as to take vpon them more then is required. But as they say of faire weather, that it is pitie it should do hurt: so is it great pitie that valour and resolution should proue disaduantageous. For this ouerdoing of a seruice, is but the spirit of valiant cariage, and the very motion of prowesse and courage, memorable in the offenders themselues: as we may see by this particular report of *Fabius* and *Petereius*; and much to be pitied, that vertue should at any time be ouerquelled with a greater strength.


At this seruice the *Romaines* stood in these tearmes, they were ouermatched in number, they had spent their strength in speedie running to the place which in it selfe was not fauourable vnto them, but almost as great an enemy as the *Gaules*, onely they trusted in their valour, and thought by vertue to cleare all difficulties. The *Gaules* had the fauour of the place, a farre greater number of fighting men, they came fresh to the battell, and were alwaies seconded with fresh supplies. *Caesar* seeing the two armies ingaged one with another, could neither part them nor recall his souldiers, but let such forces as were free in such conuenient places, as might rescue his people in the retreit, and keepe the *Gauls* from following the chase, or making any great slaughter of the *Romaine* souldier. Whereby it happened, that in so great an inequality, where there were so many swords drawne to make way to death, there were not seuen hundred men lost of the *Romaine* armie. And yet it happened to be the greatest losse that euer he receiued in those warres in his owne presence, when the issue of the conflict gaue the enemy the better of the day.



## CHAP. XXIIII.

Cæsar rebuketh the rashnesse of his souldiers, and maketh light but successfull skirmishes vpon the enemy.

Cæsar:



**C**ÆSAR the next day calling the armie before him, rebuked the temeritie and cupiditie of the souldiers, forasmuch as they had tooke vpon them to iudge how farre they were to go, or what they were to do: neither would they stay vpon the sounding of a retreit, nor hearken to the Tribunes nor the Legats that would haue kept them backe: he laid open vnto them how auailable the inequalitye of the place was, and what he himselfe thought of it, when at Auaticum he tooke the enemy without a Generall and without caualrie, and did forgo a most assured victorie, lest in the buckling he might haue receiued a small losse through the inequittie of the place. How admirable was the greatnesse of their spirit? whom neither the fortifications of the campes, the height of the hill, nor the wall of the towne, could stop or binder? Wherein he blamed their licentious arrogancie the more, forasmuch as they had tooke vpon them to iudge better of the victorie and the successe of that seruice, then the Generall himselfe: neither did he so much desire to find courage and vertue in his souldiers, as modestie and sobrietie. This speech being deliuered, and in the end confirming their minds that they might not be discouraged at the matter, nor attribute that to the worth of the enemy, which indeed was in the nature of the place, keeping his former purpose of departure, he brought the legions out of the campe, imbruted them in a conuenient place, and finding that Vercingetorix would not be drawne into an indifferent place, after a light skirmish of horse wherein the Romaines had the better, he caried his armie backe againe into the campe, and doing the like the next day, thinking it sufficient to abate the pride of the Gaules, and to strengthen the courage of his souldiers, he remoued his campe into the State of the Heduï, the enemy refusing to make after him.

## OBSERVATIONS.

Reparation  
of honour,  
what it is.



**R**Eparation of honour is a chiefe point in the cariage of an army: for he that leaueth an enemy vpon a losse receiued, when his souldiers are either awed or well beaten, must looke to find the same spirit and courage in them, when they shall come againe to confront the enemy, as they had when they last left him with a disadvantage: which is nothing else but an vnskilfull continuance of his own losse, and a preparation to a second ouerthrow. In the warre the Romaines had with


with *Anniball*, in all the fights they made, they continued their first losse vnto the battell at *Nola*, at what time by *Marcellus* good directions, they gaue him an ouerthrow, which was the first time that euer *Annibals* souldiers began to giue place to the *Romaines*, and repaired the *Romaines* valour againe, after so many battels as they lost: for then they were perswaded that they fought not with an enimie altogether inuincible, but that he was subiect to losse and ouerthrow. And in respect of this so happie a fortune, restoring the *Romaine* souldiers to their auncient valour and good fortune, it is that *Linie* saith: *Ingens eo die res, ac nescio an maxima illo bello gesta sit.* *Cæsar* did well vnderstand this Philosophie: and therefore he laboured to reaire the breach which the enemy had made in the valour of his souldiers, by light and small skirmishes, before he would aduenture to hazard the maine drift of the businesse in any set conflict. And the rather for that he had a purpose to leaue the enimie for a time, whereby he seemed to end the former seruices, wherein he had a speciall care not to depart with the last blow, hauing alwaies before that time had the better: for the condition of the end doth challenge much of the former proceedings, and doth draw the opinion of men to deeme of al as the conclusion importeth. According as *Claudius Nero* told his souldiers: *Semper quòd postremo adiectum sit, id rem totam videri traxisse.*

*Plutarche in the life of Marcellus.*

*Lib. 3. bel. civil. post pugnam Dyrrachianam. Cæsar neque satis militibus perterritus confidebat, specuumq; interponendum ad recreandos animos putabat.*

## CHAP. XXV.

## The Hedui reuolt: Cæsar passeth his armie ouer the riuer Loier.



*HE* third day he reedified the bridge at the riuer of Eleuar, and caried ouer his armie: there he vnderstood by *Viridomarus* and *Eporedorix*, that *Litauicus* was gone with all the enemies horse to sollicite the State of the Hedui, and therefore it was requisite that *Cæsar* should send them before to confirme the State, and keepe them in loyalty. And although *Cæsar* did mistrust the State of the Hedui for many causes, and did thinke that the departure of these two Nobles would hasten their reuolt, yet he did not thinke it fit to detain them, lest he should either seeme to do them wrong, or to giue any suspicion of distrust. At their departure he propounded vnto them briefly, how well he had deserved of their State, how low and weak they were when he receined them, confined within their townes, their lands extended, all their forces taken from them, a tribute laid vpon them, pledges extorted from them with great contumelie: and into what fortune and greatnesse he had brought them againe, that not onely they had recovered their former state, but did exceed the dignitie and fauour of all former times: and with these mandates he let them go. *Noiodunum* was a towne of the Hedui situate in a conuenient place, vpon the banke of the riuer Loier, thither had *Cæsar* sent all the hostages of Gallia, the corne, the publike treasure, and the greatest part of the baggage of the armie, and thither he had

*Cæsar.*

likewise sent great store of horse, which he had bought in Spaine and Italy for the service of this warre. Eporedorix and Virdomarus comming thither, and understanding touching the affaires of their State, that Litauicus was receiued into Bibract by the Hedui, which is the Metropolitane citie of their State, and that Conuictolitanis their chiefe Magistrate, and a great part of the Senate were come vnto him, and that publike messengers were sent to Vercingetorix touching a league of peace and amitie, they did not thinke it fit to omit so great an oportunitie. And thereupon hauing shaine the Guard at Nouiodunum, with such others as were there either by way of trade or trauell, they deuided the money and the horses betweene them, and tooke order that the hostages of the other States should safely be conueyed to Bibract. For the towne, forasmuch as they thought they were not able to keepe it, lest the Romaines might make any vse of it, they burned it: such corne as they could carie on the sudden, they conueyed away in boats, the rest they either burned or cast it into the riuer. They began to raise forces in the countrie next adioyning: to dispose of watches and garisons, on the banke of the riuer Loier: to shew their Cavalrie in all places, to the end they might exclude the Romaines from prouision of corne, or driue them through necessitie of want to forsake the Prouince. Whereof they were the rather assured, forasmuch as the Loier was much swelled by a fall of snow, whereby it was unpassable at any soord. These things being knowne, Cæsar thought it necessarie for him to make hast, to the end he might giue them battell before they had gathered a greater head: for touching his purpose for returning into the Prouince, he did not thinke it fit by any meanes, both in respect of the shame and infamie thereof, as also forasmuch as the opposition of the hill Gebenna, and the difficultie of the passage did hinder him, but especially for that he did exceedingly desire to ioyne himselfe with Labienus and the Legions that were with him. And therefore making great iourneys both by day and night beyond all mens expectation, he came to the riuer Loier, where the horsemen hauing found a conuenient soord for the necessitie of the time, that the souldiers might passe ouer with their armes and shoulders aboue the water, to hold up their weapons, disposing the horse in the riuer to breake the force of the streame, and the enemy being affrighted vpon their first shew, he caried ouer his armie in safetie. And hauing satisfied his souldiers with corne which he found in the fields, and good store of cattel, he determined to march towards the Senones.

## OBSERVATIONS.

The change  
which the re-  
uolt of the  
Hedui made  
in Gallia.



THE greatest difficultie that euer Cæsar found in the course of these warres, was at this instant vpon the reuolt of the Hedui: for whereas that state after Cæsars coming into Gallia, was euer reputed the fauorite of the Romaine Empire, hauing receiued such speciall priuiledges and prerogatiues aboue the rest, as might tye them with an inuiolable bond of amitie to the people of Rome: it was not to be expected that they should forsake so great a stay, or fauour any thing that might tend to the weakening of that authoritie, which preferred them in dignitie before all other states of that continent: and was as a Remora to diuers other nati-

ons

ons of *Gallia*, from shewing that defection by plaine and open reuolt, which they had so long before conceiued in their minds.

But when it appeared (notwithstanding any precedent benefite, or the merit of imperiall fauours) that the *Hedui* did affect the common cause of their countries libertie, and were content to ingage themselves therein, as farre as their liues or fortunes could any way be valued: it was not to be doubted, but that such other Commonweales, as before that time had remained newtrall, and had lesse cause then the *Hedui* to keepe backe their hands from a worke of that pietie, would apprehend the matter, as a businesse importing the safetie of their countrie, whereunto *Cæsar* and the Legions were common enemies. The consideration whereof, made *Cæsar* to thinke of returning backe into the Prouince, had not the dishonour of such a retreat, and the desire he had to ioyne with *Labienus*, hindred that purpose.

## CHAP. XXVI.

Labienus commeth to Lutetia with  
four Legions.



WHILE these things were done by *Cæsar*, *Labienus* hauing left those supplies which came last out of *Italie*, at *Agendicū* for the safetie of the cariages, went himselfe with foure legions to *Lutetia* a towne of the *Parisians*, built in an Island in the riuer *Sequana*. The enemy vnderstanding of his coming, great forces were speedily brought together out of the countries neare about: the chiefeſt command was giuen to *Camulogenus* of the nation of the *Auleri*, who notwithstanding his great age was called to that honour for his singular knowledge in matter of warre. He finding it to be a continued bog that ran into *Sequana*, and much hindered all that place, did stay there with his armie, and purposed to hinder the passage of the *Romaines*. *Labienus* did first indenuour to driue the vines, to fill vp the bog with hurdles and earth, and so to make the passage firme: but after that he perceiued it to be very hard to effect, in the third watch of the night he went out of the campe with silence, and the same way that he came, he went to *Melodunum* a towne of the *Senones*, situate in an Island of *Sequana*, as *Lutetia* is: and hauing surpris'd some fiftie shippes and boates, and manned them with souldiers, the townsmen being affrighted with the noueltie of the matter, of whom a great part were called out to that warre, he possesst himselfe of the town without any resistance: the bridge being reedified which the enemy had cut downe a few dayes before, he transported over the armie, and went downe along the riuer towards *Lutetia*. The enemy hauing notice thereof by such as escaped from *Melodunum*, commanded *Lutetia* to be burned, and the bridges of the towne to be broken: they themselves forsaking the bog, sate downe vpon the bankes of *Sequana* right ouer against the campe of *Labienus*. By this time *Cæsars* departure from *Gergonia* was knowne abroad, with the reuolt of the *Hedui*: and rumors were brought of a second

*Cæsar.*



rising and motion in Gallia: it was certainly confirmed, that the Gaules were in consultation, that Cæsar was kept backe both by the difficulties of the passage, and the river Loier, and for want of corne was constrained to returne into the Prouince. The Bellouaci also vnderstanding of the reuolt of the Hedui, whereas they were before trecherous and disloyall of themselves, did now begin to raise forces and prepare for open warre: Labienus vpon so great a chaunge of things, vnderstood that it was necessarie for him to take another manner of course then was before intended. For now he thought not of making any conquest, or vrging the enemy to battell, but to bring the armie backe in safetie to Agendicum. For on the one side, the Bellouaci stood ready to charge him, being a people that had the name for deedes of armes of all the nations in Gallia: the other side was kept by Canulogenus with an armie readie in the field: and last of al, the legions were kept from their garrison and their cariages with a great river that ranne betweene them and it.

## OBSERVATIONS.

He that will  
do things wel,  
must vary  
with the time.



THE great alteration which the reuolt of the Hedui made in Gallia, caused Labienus to let fall his former resolutions, and to shape such a course as might best answer the extremity of the tempest, for he that will attaine the end of his desires, or make peace with the affections of his mind, must not thinke at all times to carie away contentment with the strength of his meanes, or subdue resistance with force of armes, but must be well pleased to be driuen with the streame, vntill he meet with a tide of better oportunitie: for oftentimes it falleth out, that the opposition of resisting power is more available then ten legions commaunded by Cæsar, or what the Romaine Empire could adde besides to so great an armie: for there is no quantity so great, but there may be found a greater; nor none so litle but there may be a lesse, which may teach a man neither to conceit himselfe in a matchlesse singulartie, nor to despaire of a weake condition. And this is that which is so often recommended to the consideration of discreete Governours, whether they be Magistrates in peace, or Commanders in warre, to put them in mind of the condition of times, and to cary themselves answerable thereunto: forasmuch as fortunate and happie successe, riseth for the most part from such meanes as haue respect to the occurrences of the time, not running alwayes vpon one bias, nor sailing at all times with a fore-wind, but sometimes to presse forward, and sometimes to giue backe, according as the circumstances of the time shall make way to good fortune.

Plutarke in  
the life of Fabius.

Fabius the great Romaine, thought it no scorne to be called coward, or to vndergo the displeasure of the people of Rome, while he gaue place to the furie of the Carthaginian, and refused to receiue a third ouerthrow. And thus he altered the course of the Romaine warfare according to the time, and ouerthrew that enemy by shunning to encounter him, which in a battell would haue hazarded the conquest of Rome. In like maner Cn. Sulpitius the Dictator did imitate this wisdom of Fabius against the Gaules, by lingring out the warre: *Nolens se fortuna.*

*tuna committere aduersus hostem* (as *Liuy* saith) *quem tempus deteriorum indies & locus alienus faceret.* And to conclude this point, *Caesar* vpon the losse which he receiued at *Dyrrhachium*, *Omni sibi commutandam belli rationem existimauit*, as the storie saith: which was nothing else but varying with the time, and helping a bad fortune with new directions.

Cini. 3.

## CHAP. XXVII.

Labienus passeth the riuer of Sequana,  
and fighteth with the Gaules.



OR the auoiding of these great difficulties which came so suddenly vpon him, he knew there was no help to be had, but that which the vertue of his mind would afford him: and therefore calling a counsell a litle before the euening, he adhorted them to execute such things as he commanded both with diligence and industry; and so taking the ships which he had brought from *Melodunum*, he diuided them amongst the Romaine horsemen, and after the first watch he commanded them to go foure miles downe the riuer in silence, and there to attend him: he left five cohorts which he thought to be too weake for any fight as a garrison to the campe, and sent the other five cohorts of the same legion about midnight with al the cariages vp the riuer, commanding them to make a great noise and tumult as they went: he sought out all barges and boates, and sent them vp the riuer with much noise and beating of oares: and a litle while after he himselfe went quietly with three legions to the place where he had commanded the ships to abide him. At his comming thither, the enemies discoverers which were disposed on al parts of the riuer, were sodainly and vnawares surprised by our men, by reason of a sodain tempest that did rise in the meane time: & the army and the horse were by the diligence of the Romaine Knights (to whom he had committed that businesse) caried ouer. At the same time a litle before day-light, the enemy had intelligence that there was an extraordinary noise and tumult in the Romaine campe, and a great troope went vp the riuer, and the beating of oares was heard that way, and a litle below the souldiers were caried ouer. Which being knowne, forasmuch as they iudged that the legions were caried ouer in three places, and that they were so perplexed at the reuolt of the *Hedui*, that they fled away: they diuided their forces also into three parts, for a garrison being left right ouer against the Romaine campe, and a small band sent towards *Glossendium*, which was to go so farre as the boates went, they caried the rest of their army to meet *Labienus*. By the dawning of the day all our men were caried ouer, and the enemy was discovered ranged in battell. *Labienus* adhorting the souldiers to bethinke themselves of their ancient vertue, and to recall the memory of their fortunate battells, and to suppose that *Caesar* himselfe was present, vnder whose leading they had oftentimes ouerthrowne the enemy, he gaue the signe of battell. Vpon the first affront on the right wing where the se-

Caesar.

uenth legion stood, the enemy was beaten backe and put to flight; in the left corner where the twelfth legion was, the former rankes of the enemy being pierced through and beaten dead downe with the pikes, the rest notwithstanding did secretly resist; neither did any man giue suspicion of flying. Camulogenus the Generall was present with his men, and encouraged them to fight, the victory being uncertaine. When the Tribunes of the seventh legion vnderstood what was done in the left wing, they shewed the legion behind on the backe of the enemy, and there began to charge them, and yet none of them forooke his place, but were all inclosed and slaine, Camulogenus ending his dayes by the same fortune. Such of the enemy as were left ouer against the Romaine campes, vnderstanding that the battell was begun, came to second their fellows, and tooke a hil, but were not able to abide our conquering souldiers, but ioyning themselues to the rest that fled, were neither protected by the woods nor the mountaines, but were all slaine by the horsemen. This businesse being ended, Labienus returned to Agendicum, where the cariages of the whole army were left, and from thence came to Cæsar with all the forces.

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



Abienus being to passe the riuer of Seine, which was strongly guarded by the Gaules, was forced to seeke a meanes out of the vertue of his mind (as Cæsar saith) and to lay such a proiect as might amuse the enemy, and keep him in suspence what way to take to preuent his passage, vntill he had effected that which he desired: which bringeth to our consideration the saying of Epaminondas the Theban, that there is nothing more necessarie or behouefull for a Generall, then to vnderstand the purposes of the enemy. A point so much the more commendable, by how much it is in it selfe difficult, and hard to be discouered; for it were hard to vnderstand their secret deliberations, which for the most part are onely knowne to the Generall, or to such chiefe Commaunders as are neare about him, when their very actions which euery man knoweth, and such things as are done in the open view of the world, are oftentimes doubtfull to an enemy.

Necessary for  
a Generall to  
vnderstand the  
purposes of the  
enemy.

Liuy hath a notable storie to this purpose. Sempronius the Romaine Consull giuing battell to the Equi, the fight continued vntill the night parted them, not without alteration of fortune, sometimes the Romaines preuailing, and sometimes the Equi: the night coming on, both sides being wearie and halfe routed, they forooke their campes, and for their better safetie tooke each of them a hil. The Romaine armie diuided it selfe into two parts, the one part followed the Consull, and the other a Centurion, named Tempanius, a fellow of great spirit, and had shewed much worth in the battell. The next morning the Consull without further inquirie, made towards Rome; and so did the Equi withdraw their armie backe into their countrey, either of them deeming themselues ouerthrowne, and casting victorie vpon ech others shoulders. It happened that Tempanius with that part of the armie that kept with him, inquiring after the enemy,

enemie, found him to be ouerthrowne and fled : whereupon he first went to the *Romaine* campe and made that good, and then marched to the campe of the *Equi*, which he tooke and rifled, and so returned victor to Rome.

The morning following the battell of *Agincourt*, *Montjoy* the French Herald comming to inquire for prisoners, King *Henry* asked him who had wonne the field : to which he answered, that the *French* had lost it : which was vnknowne to that worthy Conquerour. *Plutarke* writeth, that *Cassius* killed himselfe vpon the like error, not knowing the fortune of the right wing of his armie. And therefore it must needes be a commendable matter, to vnderstand the deliberations of an enemie, when the issue of a battell is oftentimes so vncertaine.

*Holinshed.*  
*Henry the 5.*

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



*Amulogenus* hath the report in this place of singular knowledge and experience in matter of warre, and being of a great age he fought as resolutely as the youngest gallant of them all : which may bring to our consideration the fittest age of life to be wished in a Generall, for the atchieuing of noble and worthy exploits : wherein we are to consider, that the youth and former yeares of a mans age, are plentifully stored with hot bloud and nimble spirits, which quickly apprehend the conceptions of the mind, and carie them with such violence to execution, that they bereaue the iudgement of her prerogative, and giue it no respite to sensure them; whereby it commeth to passe, that young men are for the most part heedlesse, inconsiderate, rash and resolute, putting more vpon hazard then vpon good aduice.

*The fittest  
age of life for  
a Generall.*

On the other side, old age is cold in bloud, and not so quicke of spirit, but being beaten with the rod of long experience, it learneth to be slow and lingering, full of doubts and consideration, inclining rather to a feminine feare, then to a forward resolution.

Neither of these attributes are simply in themselves the best attendants of noble enterprises : for a hot-spurre gallant may runne apace, but not go sure; and what young man soeuer be aduanced to commaund, had neede of an old mans wit to discharge it. And if authoritie did at any time fall into the hands of youth in the *Romaine* gouernement, which was very seldome, it was *Premium virtutis, non aetatis*. *Pompey* was extraordinarie happie in that behalfe, for he attained the surname of Great, because he had deferred the honour of triumph before his beard was growne. And yet *Sertorius* tooke such aduantage at *Pompeys* youth, comming against him in *Spaine*, that he said he would haue whipped the yong boy to Rome againe with rods, had not that old woman (meaning *Metellus*) come to helpe him.

*Plutarke in  
the life of  
Sertorius.*

Again, where old age heapeth doubt vpon doubt, and falleth into the danger of vnprofitable lingering, *Nec ausus est satis nec prouidit*, it wanteth boldnesse

*Hist. 3.*



Plutarke in  
the life of  
Marius.

to steale the enterprife, and falleth also short of good prouidence, as *Tacitus* speaketh of *F. Valens*. *Augustus Caesar* purposing to commend *Tiberius* his successor with an extraordinarie praile, said he was a man that neuer put one thing to be twise consulted of. And it is said of *Marius*, that being come to the age of threescore and fife yeares or thereabouts, he shewed himselfe very cold and slow in all his enterprises, forasmuch as age had mortified his actiue heate, and killed that readie disposition of bodie that was wont to be in him. The *Romaines* finding *Fabius Maximus* to be full of doubts and delay, good to defend, but not to offend, and *Marcellus* of a stirring spirit, neither quiet with good nor ill fortune, (as *Anniball* truly said of him) they thought to ioine *Marcellus* youthfull courage with *Fabius* feare and wisdom, and so make a temperature fit for a Generall; whereupon they called *Marcellus* the sword, and *Fabius* the buckler: wherein *Caesar* of himselfe was excellent, of whom *Suetonius* reporteth, *Dubium cautior, an audentior*.

The best state of yeares then for this businesse, is that which tempereth the heate of youth with the coldnesse of age, and quickneth the slow and dull proceedings of double aduice, with the rashnesse of youthfull resolution: and falleth out betwene the yeares of fife and thirtie, and fife and fiftie. *Scipio African* commaunded the Romaine armie in *Spain* at foure and twentie yeares of age, and died at foure and fiftie. *Anniball* was chosen Generall to *Asdruball* at fixe and twentie yeares, and poysoned himselfe at threescore and ten. *Pompey* was slaine at nine and fiftie, and *Caesar* at fixe and fiftie: *Marcellus* kept his youthfull resolution to his old dayes, for being threescore yeares of age, he neuer longed for any thing more then to fight with *Anniball* hand to hand.

## CHAP. XXVIII.

### The Gaules consult of the cariage of that warre.

Caesar.

**T**HE reuolt of the Hedui being knowne, the warre waxed greater, Ambassadors were sent out into all parts, and they laboured to draw the rest of the States to their party, as farre as either fauour, authoritie, or money could preuaile: hauing got the pledges into their hands which *Caesar* had left with them, they terrified such as stood doubtfull, by threatening to kill them. The Hedui do desire *Vercingetorix* to come vnto them, and to acquaint them with the course of that warre: which being yeilded vnto, they labour to haue the chiefe commaund transferred vpon them: the matter growing vnto a controuersie, a generall Councell of all Gallia was summoned at *Bibract*: thither they repaired in great multitudes: and the matter being put to voices, they all

all with one consent made allowance of Vercingetorix for their Generall. The men of Rhemes with the Lingones and Treuiri were absent from this Council, the two first continuing their affection to the Romaine partie: the Treuiri were farre off, and were annoyed by the Germanes; in which respect they were absent from that warre, and remained neutrall. The Hedui were much grieved that they were put by the principalitie, they complaine of the change of their fortune, and wished for Cæsars former indulgence, neither durst they disioyne themselves againe from the rest, the warre being already undertaken: but Eporedorix and Viridomarus, two young men of great hope, were constrained, though unwilling, to obey Vercingetorix; he commaunded pledges to be deliuered by the rest of the States, and appointed a day for that businesse: he commaunded fiftene thousand horse to be speedily brought together: touching foote forces, he would content himselfe with those which he had; for his purpose was not to wage battell but where as he was very strong in horse. He made no doubt to keepe the Romaines from corne and forrage, onely they must patiently endure to haue their corne spoiled and their houses burnt; which particular losse would quickly be recompenced with libertie and perpetuall soveraigntie. These things being ordered, he commaunded ten thousand foote to be raised by the Hedui and Segutiani bordering upon the Prouince, and to them he added eight hundred horse, and sent them under the command of Eporedorix his brother, to make warre against the Allobroges. And on the other side, he caused the Gaballi and the nearest villages of the Aruerni to set upon the Heluij, the Rutheni, and the Cardurci, and to depopulate their countrey. Notwithstanding by secret messages he dealt with the Allobroges, whose minds he thought to be scarce settled from the former warre: he promised money to their chiefe men, and to giue the gouernement of all the Romaines Prouince to their State. To answer all these chaunces, there were provided but two and twenty cohorts, which being raised out of the Prouince, were disposed by L. Cæsar a Legate to preuent these mischiefs. The Hedui of their owne accord giuing battell to their borderers, were beaten out of the field, and were driuen into their townes with the slaughter of C. Valerius Denotaurus, the sonne of Caburus the chiefe man of their State, and of many other. The Allobroges hauing set many watches and garrisons upon the riuer Rheine, did with great care and diligence defend their borders. Cæsar vnderstanding the enemy to be stronger in horse then he himselfe was, and the passages being shut that he could not send either into the Prouince or into Italie for any supplies, he sent ouer the Rheine into Germanie, and got horse from such States as he had quieted the yeare before, with such light armed footemen as were accustomed to fight amongst the horse: at their arrivall, forasmuch as they were not well fitted with horse, he tooke the horses from the Tribunes and the Romaine Knights, and distributed them amongst the Germanes.

## OBSERVATIONS.

Three chiefe  
meanes to win  
men to fauor  
a matter.

1. Fauour or  
friendship.
2. Authoritie.
3. Money.



HERE are three principall meanes to draw a state into a partie which of it selfe standeth newtrall, or to win the minds of men, when they carie equall or indifferent affections. The first is, by fauour or friendship. The second, by authoritie: and the third by money.

Friendship relyeth vpon former respects, and the exchange of precedent courtesies. Authoritie concludeth from future daungers, and the inconueniences which may follow the refusall. Money doth gouerne the present occasiō, and is more generall then either fauour or authoritie. The *Gaules* were not wanting to make their partie good in any of these three perswading motiues: but as *Cæsar* saith: *Quantum gratia, autoritate, pecunia valent, ad sollicitandas ciuitates nituntur.*

Wherin as they went about to lay the stocke vpon it, so they left themselues but one triall for the right of their cause, and ioyned issue for all vpon the fortune of that action: for when they should see their best possibilities too weake, and their vttermost indeauours profite nothing against a mightie preuailing enemy, the greater their hopes were which they had in the meanes, the greater would be their despaire when such meanes were spent: for it is a shrewd thing for men to be out of meanes, and not to driue a hope before them.

It is vsuall vpon such maine occasions to imploy the chiefeest man in a State, in whome the souldiers may haue most assurance, and to accompanie him with such meanes as the strength of the Commonweale may afford him: but if their greatest hopes die in his ill successe, or waxe faint through cold fortune, the kingdome receiueeth losse, and the enemy getteth aduantage, as may appeare by the sequelle of this great preparation.

## CHAP. XXIX.

The Caulrie of the *Gaules* do set vpon  
the *Romaine* army, and are beaten.

*Cæsar.*



WHILE these things were a doing, the enemies forces and the horsemen that were commaunded to be leauied in all *Gallia*, met together, and came out of the territories of the *Aruerni*. A great number of these being gathered together, as *Cæsar* marched against the *Sequani* by the borders of the *Lingones*, to the end he might the easier releue the Prouince, *Vercingetorix* sate downe about ten miles from the *Romaines* in three severall camps, and calling the Captaines and Colonels of horse to counsell, he told them that the time of victorie was now come: for the

*Romaines*

Romaines left Gallia, and fled into the Province: which was sufficient for the obtaining of their present libertie, but auailed little for the peace and quiet of future time, forasmuch as the Romaines did not purpose to make an end of the warre, but to returne againe with greater forces. And therefore it was necessarie to set vpon them in their march laden with cariages. If the foote did assist their horse, then they were not able to make any way or proceede in their iourney. But if (which he hoped would rather happen) forsaking their cariages euery man shifted for himselfe, they would depart both robbed of their necessaries and of their honour: for they need not doubt of the enemies horse, of whom he was most assured that they durst not go out fro amongst the foote forces. And to the end they might be the better encouraged, he would draw all the forces in a readines out of the campe; and place them so as they might be a terror to the enemy. The horsemen cryed out all together, that this resolution might be strengthened with an holy oath: Let him neuer be receined vnder any rooffe, or haue access to his wife and children, that did not twice runne through the armie of the enemy. The thing being well liked of, and euery man forced to take that oath, the next day he deuided his caualrie into three parts: two armies shewed themselues on each side, and the third began to make stay of the vaward: which being knowne, Cæsar deuided his horses likewise into three parts, and sent them to make head against the enemy. At the same time they fought in all parts, the army stood still, the cariages were receined within the Legions: if our men were ouercharged any where, Cæsar bent the Legions that way, which did both hinder the enemy from following them, and assure our men of hope of rescue. At length the Germaines hauing possesst themselves of a hill on the right side, did put the enemy from their place, and followed them as they fled euen to the riuer, where Vercingetorix stayed with the foote companies, and slue many of them: whereupon the rest fearing lest they should be encompassed about, betooke themselves to flight: execution was done in all places. Three of the Nobilitie of the Hedui were taken and brought to Cæsar, Cotus the Generall of the horse, who at the last election of Magistrates stood in controuersie with Conuictolitanis, and Cauarillus who after the revolt of Litauius, commaunded the foote troopes, and Eporedorix vnder whose commaund, before Cæsars comming into Gallia, the Hedui made warre with the Sequani: all the caualrie being put to flight Vercingetorix drew in his forces which he had imbattelled before his campe, and immediatly after began to march towards Alesia a towne of the Mandubij, commaunding the baggage to be speedily brought out of the campe and to follow him. Cæsar hauing conueyed his cariages to the next hill vnder the custodie of two Legions, he followed the enemy as long as the day would giue him leane: and hauing slaine some two thousand of the reareward, the day following he encamped at Alesia.

## OBSERVATIONS.



HE Gaules were much stronger then the Romaines in Caualry, both according to quantitie and qualitie, but the Romaine Infanterie was greater in vertue and worth then any foote forces of the Gaules, notwithstanding their inequality in number: which sheweth that the Romaines did more relye vpon their legionarie

Whether the caualrie or infanterie be of greater importance and vse in a warre.



souldiers, then vpon their *Equites*: and may serue for an argument in the handling of that question, which is so much debated amongst men of warre, whether the horse or the foote companies be of greater importance in the cariage of a warre? Which indeed is a question *a male diuisis*: being both so necessarie for the perfect execution of martiall purposes, as they cannot well be dis-ioyned. And if we looke particularly in the nature of their seuerall seruices, we shall easily discerne the differences, and be able to iudge of the validitie of their parts.

*Footmen fitter for more seruices then horsemen.*

*The maine stroke in a day of battell is giuen by the footmen.*

*The vse of horsemen.*

*The Dictator forbidden the vse of a horse in the warres: and why.*

Wherein first it cannot be denyed, but that foote companies are seruiceable to more purposes then troupes of horse: for the horsemen are of no vse, but in open and champion places: whereas footmen are not onely of importance in fielden countries, but are necessarie also in mountenous or woodie places, in valleys, in ditches, in seiges, and in all other parts of what site or nature soeuer, where the horsemen cannot shew themselves. Whereby it appeareth, that the infanterie extendeth it seruice to more purposes then the caualrie, and maketh the warre complet, which otherwise would proue lame and vneffectuall.

Touching the waight of the businesse when it commeth to a day of battell, it resteth for the most part vpon the foote troopes: for the horsemen are profitable to the armie wherein they serue, by making discoueries, by harrying the enemies countrey, by giuing succour or rescue vpon a suddaine, by doing execution vpon an ouerthrow, and by confronting the enemies horse: but these are but as secōd seruices, & far short of the maine stroke, which for the most part is giuen by the footmen. Neither doth a rowt giuen to the caualrie seruing an armie royall, concerne the bodie of that armie further then the seruices before mentioned: but the armie doth oftentimes go on notwithstanding, and may well atchieue a happie victorie: whereas vpon the ouerthrow of the infanterie, the horsemen haue nothing to do, but to shift for themselves, and get away to their owne home. So that it appeareth that the foote companies are the bulke and bodie of the armie, and the horse as the armes and outward parts hauing expedient and necessarie offices, but alwaies subordinate to the maine stroke giuen by the foote.

If any man looke for prooffe hereof by example, he shall not need to seeke further then the *Romaines*, being maisters of the art militarie, who by an auncient law interdicting the Dictator to haue the vse of a horse in the warres for his priuate ease: intimated as *Plutarke* saith, The strength of their armie to consist in their footmen, which the Generall in a day of battell should assist with his presence, and in no wise forsake them if he would. But touching the vse of war amongst them, their *Equites* were so farre short of the seruice performed by their foote troopes, that when they would stand to it indeed, they forooke their horses and fought on foote: as in the battell with the *Latines* at the lake *Regillus*, which I haue already mentioned in my former obseruations. Neither were the *Romaines* good horsemen, as it seemeth by *Caesar*: for he tooke the horses from the Tribunes and the *Romaine Equites*, and gaue them to the *Germanes*, as better Rufflers then any *Romaines*. But howsoeuer a State that aboundeth in horse, and trusteth more in them then in foote companies, may harrie a cham-

a champion country, but shall neuer be able to follow a war with that strength, as is requisite to make it fortunate.

## CHAP. XXX.

*Cæsar besiegeth Aleſia, and fighteth  
with the enemies caualrie.*



**C**ÆSAR hauing viewed the site of the towne, and knowing the enemye to be much troubled for the ouerthrow of their horse in whom they put all their hopes, adhorting the souldiers to take a litle paines, he determined to inclose the towne round about with a ditch and a rampier. Aleſia was sited on the top of a hill, in a very eminent place, and not to be taken but by a continuall siege: at the foote of the hill ran two riuers on each side of the towne: before the towne there lay a plaine of three miles in length, the other sides were enclosed round about in a reasonable distance with hills of equall height with the towne. Vnder the wall on the East side lay all the forces of the Gaules, hauing drawne a ditch and a drie wall on that part of eight foote in height: the whole circuit of the workes which the Romaines made to inclose the town about, contained eleuen miles. Their campe was sited in a conuenient place, where there were made three and twentie castles, which in the day time were kept by garriſons, and in the night by strong watches. The worke being begun, there happened a skirmish betweene the caualrie of both sides in that plaine which lay before the towne of three miles in length: they fought eagerly on both sides: our men being ouercharged, Cæsar sent the Germaines to second them, and set the Legions before the campe, lest there might happen any sudden salley by the foote troupes of the enemye. Vpon the safegard of the Legions our men tooke courage, the enemye was put to flight, and being many in number one hindred another, and stucke in heapes in the straight passage of their gates. The Germaines followed them close to their fortifications, and made a great execution amongst them: many of them forsaking their horses attempted to leape the ditch, and to clime ouer the drie wall. Cæsar commaunded the legions imbattelled before the campe to aduance a litle forward. The Gaules that were within the fortification were no litle troubled: for thinking the enemye would presently haue come vnto them, they made an alarme: some were so frightened that they brake into the towne. Vercingetorix commaunded the gates to be shut lest the campe should be left naked of defendants: many of the enemye being slaine, and very many horses taken the Germaines fell off and returned to Cæsar.

*Cæsar:*

## OBSERVATIONS.

One event is  
not so certaine  
for the appro-  
ping of a  
cause, as when  
it is seconded  
with another  
of like condi-  
tion.



Orasmuch as casualtie and chaunce haue oftentimes the prerogative of a service, and in misdeeming opinions do carie away the honour from vertue and valour: the first triall of a fortune is not of that assurance, nor so much to be trusted, as when it is seconded againe with the like effect: for when a matter by often triall falleth out to be of one and the same qualitie, it sheweth a certaintie of a cause, producing ends of like condition. The *Gauls* (as it seemeth) were much discouraged vpon the first ouerthrow of their horse, in whom they so much beleueed, and altered the course of their high resolutions so farre, as where before they sware the ouerthrow of the *Romains*, they were now content to take the protection of a strong towne: but this second foile which they receiued, did so assure them of a harder confrontment and stronger opposition then they were able to beare, that they neuer thought of any further triall, but were content to go away losers, rather then to hazard their liues in a third combat. And thus, when a second euent backeth a former fortune, it taketh away the suspicion of casualtie, and maketh the winner bold, and the loser desperate. *Pompey* was so transported with ioy for the blow which he gaue *Caesar* at *Dyrrachiu*, that he sent letters of that daies victorie into all parts of the world, and made his souldiers so secure touching the issue of that warre, *ut non de ratione belli cogitarent, sed vicisse iam sibi viderentur*: not remembring as *Caesar* saith, the ordinary chaunges of warre, wherein oftentimes a small matter, either of a false suspicion, or of a sudden fright, or some other accident, doth indanger an armie, which the enemy taketh to himselfe, *perinde ac si virtute vicissent*.

## CHAP. XXXI.

Vercingetorix sendeth away the horse: *Caesar*  
incloseth *Alesia* with a strong wall.

*Caesar.*



**V**ERCINGETORIX thought it best to dismisse all the horse, and send them away in the night before the fortifications were perfited by the *Romains*. At their departure he commanded them, that euery man should repaire vnto his owne State, and send all to that warre that were able to beare armes: he layeth open his deserts towards them, and doth adiure them to haue regard to his safetie, and not to suffer him to be deliuered ouer to the torture of the enemy, that had so wel deserved of the common libertie; wherein if they should proue negligent, fourescore thousand chosen



men would perish with him in that place: and looking into their provisions, he found that they had corne scarce for thirty dayes, but by sparing and good husbandry it might be made to serue longer. With these mandates he sent out the horsemen in silence about the second watch of the night, at that part of the towne where the workes were not perfited: he commanded all the corne to be brought vnto him vpon paine of death. The cattel he distributed to the souldiers by pole, whereof there was great store brought out from the Mandubij: the corne he began to measure out very sparingly. All the forces which he had placed before the towne, he receiued within the walles; and so he purposed to attend the supplies of Gallia: which being knowne by the runne-aways and captiues, Cæsar appointed to make these fortifications: he drew a ditch of twenty foot in breadth and depth, with straite sides, as broad at the bottome as at the top. The rest of the worke he made forty foote short of that ditch, which he did for these reasons; that the whole body of the Romanes might not easily be inclosed about with an army of souldiers, which he thought to preuent by taking in so great a circuit of ground; and secondly, lest the enemy sallying out vpon a sodaine, should in the night come to destroy the workes, or in the day time trouble the souldiers with darts and casting weapons as they were busied about the workes. This space of fortie foote being left, he made two ditches of fiftene foote in breadth and depth, the inermost whereof being caried through the fields, and the lower ground he filled with water drawne out of the riuer: behind them he made a ditch and a rampier of twelue foote, and strengthened it with a parapet and pinacles, and with great boughes of trees cut in cags like vnto a Harts horne, which he set where the howels were ioyned to the rampier, to hinder the enemy from climbing vp, and made towers round about the whole worke, in the distance of fourescore foote one from another. At the same time the Romaine souldiers were both to get stufte for the fortification, to go a harueisting for prouision of corne, and to make such great workes: our forces being much weakened, and were to seeke corne and stufte far off from the campe, the Gauls oftentimes attempting to destroy the workes, and to sally out of the towne at diuers ports: and therefore Cæsar thought it fit to adde this much more to the the foresaid workes, that the fortifications might be made good with the lesse number of men. He made ditches round about the workes of fise foote deepe, and in them he planted either the bodies of trees or great firme boughs sharpened into many pikes and snags, being bound together at the bottome, that they might not be easily plucked vp, and spreading themselues at the top into very sharpe cags. There were of these fise rankes, so combined and infolded one in another, that which way soener the enemy should enter vpon them, he would necessarily runne himselfe vpon a sharpe stake, these they called Cippos. Before these in oblique courses, after the manner of a quincunce were digged holes of three foote deepe, narrow at the bottome like a suger loafe: these they set with round stakes of the bignesse of a mans thigh, with a sharpe hardned point, in such sort that they sticke not aboue foure fingers out of the earth, and for the better fastening of them they stueke all a foote within the ground, the rest of the hole for the better ordering of the matter, was hid with osiers and spreads: of these were eight courses three foote distant one from another, and these they called Lillies, from the resemblance they had to the figure of that flower. Before these were galthrops of a foote long fastened in the earth, and headed at the top with barbed hookes of iron, sowed vp and downe in all places in a reasonable distance one from



another, and these they called *Stimulos*. The inner fortifications being thus perfited, he followed the even and level ground as much as the nature of the place would giue him leaue, and tooke in foureteene miles in circuit, and made the like fortifications in all points against the enemie without, as he had done against the towne, to the end that if he were driuen upon occasion to depart and leaue the workes, it might be no daunger for him to leaue the campe: forasmuch as a few men would defend it, he commaunded euery man to haue forrage and prouision of corne for thirty dayes.

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

The Romaine  
workes.



Promised in my former obseruation to speake somewhat touching the *Romaine* workes, and to shew the vse they made of them in their greatest occasions: but this description of the workes at *Alesia*, doth so farre exceede the enlargement of commenting words, that it hath drowned the eloquence of great Historians, and in stead of expositions and inforcements, hath drawne from them speechès expressing greater admiration then beleefe: *circa Alesiam* (saith *Paterculus*) *tanta res gesta, quantas audere vix hominis* perficere nullius nisi *Dei fuerit*. To inclose a towne with a ditch and a rampier of eleuen miles in circuit, was a matter worthie the *Romaine* armie: but to adde such varietie of workes, and to make such strange trapes and oppositions against an enemie, was admirable to the hearer; and not that onely, but to make the like workes without, to keepe the *Gaules* from raising the siege, did double the wonder: by which workes he did besiege and was besieged, tooke the towne and ouerthrew the enemie in the field.

Such as since that time haue imitated this industrie onely by a small ditch and a rampier (for I thinke no man euer made such workes) haue wrought wonders in matter of warre. *Castruccio* got the name of renewing the auncient militarie discipline in *Italy*, chiefly for that he besieged *Pistoia*, and with the helpe of a double trench according to the exāple of *Cæsar*, he kept in the *Pistoyans* on the one side, and kept out an armie on the other side of thirtie thousand foote and three thousand horse, in such maner as in the end he tooke the citie and made their succours of no effect. The States armie of the vnited Prouinces vnder the leading of *Græue Maurice*, did the like at the towne of *Græue* in the year 1602. But of this at *Alesia* may well be said that which *Livy* speaketh of the battell at *Nola*: *Ingens eo die res ac nescio an maxima illo bello gesta sit*.

THE

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



It is here deliuered, that the outward circuit of the workes contained foureteene miles, and the circuit of the inward workes eleuen miles: vpon which ground *Iustus Lipsius* maketh an vniust coniecture of the space betweene the outward and the inward workes where the *Romaines* lay incamped. For according to the proportion betweene the circumference and the diameter, he maketh the diameter of the greater circle foure, and of the lesser three miles: and then he taketh the lesser diameter out of the greater, and concludeth the space to be almost a mile betweene the inner and the outward rampier where the *Romaines* lay incamped betweene the workes: and least the matter might be mistaken in ciphers, he doth expresse it at large in significant words, whereby he maketh the space twise as much as indeede it was: for the two circles hauing one and the same center, the semidiameter of the one was to be taken out of the semidiameter of the other, and the remainder would amount almost to halfe a mile; which according to the ground here deliuered, was the true distance between the workes, if the nature of the place (whereunto they had a respect) would suffer them to keepe the same distance in all parts; but *aliquando bonus dormitat Homerus*, and no disgrace neither to the excellencie of his learning, deseruing all honour for the great light which he hath brought to the knowledge of Histories, and for redeeming the truth from blots and Barbarisme.

*Iustus Lipsius  
mistaken.  
Poliorceticon.  
Lib. 2. Dial. 2.*

## CHAP. XXXII.

The Gaules raise an armie of 248000. to  
raise the siege at Alesia.



WHILE these things were a doing at Alesia, the Gaules ha-  
uing summoned a Conncell of the Princes and chiefeſt men of  
each State, they thought it not conuenient to take all that were  
able to beare armes according to Vercingetorix direction:  
but to proportion out a certaine number for euery State, lest  
that of ſuch a confuſed multitude there would be no gouern-  
ment, being not able to know their ſouldiers, or to martiall the  
in any good order, or to make prouiſion of victuall for ſo great  
a bodie. The Hedui and their clients were commaunded to ſend out ſiue and thirtie  
thouſand, the Aruerni with their clients as many: the Senones, Sequani, Bituri-  
ges, Santones, Rutheni, Carnutes, twelue thouſand: the Bellouaci, ten thouſand,  
the Lemouices as many, the Pariſij & Heluetij eight thouſand, the Senones, Am-

*Cæſar.*

biani, Medionatrices *five thousand*, the Attrebates *four thousand*, the Vellocassi Lexonij, Aulerci, Eburones *three thousand*, the Raucaci and Boij *thirtie thousand*, the States bordering upon the Ocean, whom by the custome of Gallia they call Aremoricæ, such as are the Curiosolites, Rhedones, Ambibarri, Caletes, Ossiffimi, Lemouices, Vuelli *sixe thousand*: of these the Bellouaci refused to give their number, saying, that they would make warre with the Romaines in their owne name, and according to their owne directions, neither would they serue vnder any mans commaund. Notwithstanding being intreated by Comius for his sake they sent *two thousand*. Cæsar as we haue heretofore deliuered, had vsed the helpe of this Comius the yeares before in Brittain, being both faithfull and seruiceable: for the recompence of which seruice he had freed his state of all duties to the Romaine Empire, and restored vnto them their auncient lawes and customes, and to himselfe he had giuen the Morini. Notwithstanding such was the vniuersall consent of all Gallia, to redeeme their auncient honour in matter of warre, as neither friendship, nor the memorie of former benefites could any way moue them, euery man intending that war as farre as either the power of his mind or the possibilitie of his meanes would reach vnto: and hauing drawn together *eight thousand horse, 2. hundred & forty thousand foote*, they mustered their forces in the confines of the Hedui, there they appointed captains, and the chiefe commaund was giuen to Comius of Arras, and to Viridomarus, and Eporedorix Hedui: and to Vergasilanus of the Aruerni, and consin germane to Vercingetorix. To these there were certaine chosen out of euery State to giue assistance in counsell of warre, and all of them went iocondly and full of hope to Alesia. Neither was there any man that did thinke, that the very sight of such a multitude were able to be endured, especially when the fight would grow doubtfull by sallies made out of the towne, and so great forces of horse and foote should be seene without.

## OBSERVATIONS.



Vercingetorix desire was to haue had as many of the Gauls sent to his rescue as were able to beare armes, grounding himselfe vpon that maxime; where the whole state is in question, there the whole forces of that State are to be employed. But the other Princes of Gallia, thought it not expedient to raise so great a number: for they would haue accrewed to such a multitude of people, as could not haue bene contained within the rules of gouernement: which may bring to our consideration that which the course of these times doth not often bring into dispute: What number of men well martialled and with good discipline, are a competent proportion for any seruice? Xerxes armie which he carried into Greece, was famous for two respects: first, in regard of the multitude which was so great, that when he himselfe returned backe into Asia, he left behind him *three hundred thousand* of the best souldiers chosen out of the whole armie, vnder the conduct of one Mardonius. Secondly, that of so many fighting men, there were *two hundred and threescore thousand* slaine in

one

What number of men are a competent proportion for any seruice.

one battel, with the losse of one thousand & three hundred *Grecians*. Whereby it appeareth, that the conquest of a kingdome doth not necessarily follow the multitude of souldiers in an armie; for either *Xerxes* armie was too few in number to conquer *Greece*, or too many to be well martialled.

*Marius* with fiftie thousand men defeated the *Cimbri* that were so many in number, as they made a battel of thirtie furlong square, and of them he slue a hundred and twentie thousand, and tooke threescore thousand prisoners. And for that I do remember of that which I haue read, the greatest conquests that euer were made, were atchieued with armies vnder fifty thousand fighting mē. The great *Alexander* subdued all *Asia*, and set the Monarchy from the *Persian* into *Greece* with thirtie thousand men.


*Plutarke in the life of Marius.*

The *Romaines* had very seldome ten legions in an armie which was about that rate, but commonly their conquering armies were faire vnder that proportion. *Paulus Emilius* onely had a hundred thousand in his armie against *Perseus*, and wonne the battell in an houre. The condition of our times requirereth no dispute touching this point, for we seldome see an army of fiftie thousand men in the field, vnlesse it be the *Turke* or some such Monarke.

*Plutarke in the life of Paulus Emilius.*

### CHAP. XXXIII.

#### Critognatus speech at Alefia, touching the keeping of the towne.



**T**HEY that were besieged in Alefia, the day being past by which they looked for succour, their corne being spent, and not knowing what was done abroad, entred into consultations touching the end of their fortune; and diuers opinions being deliuered, some of them tending to the yeelding vp of the towne, and others perswading that as long as strength lasted there might be sallies continually made vpon the exemie: I will not omit the speech of Critognatus for the singular and wicked crueltie which it imported, a man of great birth and authoritie amongst the *Aruerni*. I will say nothing (saith he) of their opinion that call base seruitude by the name of rendry: neither do I thinke them fit to be accompted citizens, or to be admitted to counsell of State: with them will I deale withall that like well of sallies, in whose aduice and counsell enen by all your consents the memory of auncient vertue seemeth to consist. It is no vertue but a weaknesse of the mind, not to be able to endure want a litle while. It is an easier matter to find men that will offer themselues willingly to death, then such as will endure labour with patience. For mine owne part, I could like well of that opinion (for honour much preuaileth with me) if I did not see a further losse then of our liues, but in these our consultations let vs looke vpon all *Gallia*, whom we haue called together to succour vs. What spirits do you thinke would our friends and kinse-

*Cesar:*



men conceive, fourescore thousand men being slaine, in a place if they were constrained to wage battel vpon their dead carcases? I would not haue you to defraud them of your helpe, that do neglect all perill for your sake, nor by your foolishnesse and your rashnesse, or the weaknesse of your mind, throw downe all Gallia, and cast it into perpetuall bondage. Do you doubt of their faith and constancie, because they came not by a day? What do the Romaines then meane in these outward workes? Do you thinke they make them for exercise, or to passe away the time? If you cannot then receiue assurance by their messengers all passage being stopt, vse them for witnesses that their coming is at hand, for feare whereof they labour night and day. What then? my aduice is that we do as our forefathers did in a war against the Cimbri and Teutons not equal to this, who being shut vp within their townes, and brought to the like necessitie, did satisfie their hunger with the bodies of such as were found unfit for warre, neither did they yeeld themselves vnto the enemy, whereof if we had not an example, yet I would iudge it an excellent thing to be begun now for liberties sake, and to be left to posterity: for what warre was like this? Gallia being wasted and dispeopled, and the kingdome brought into great misery, the Cimbri at length forsooke our country, and sought out other territories, and left vnto vs our lawes, customes, lands and libertie: for the Romaines, what is it they desire, or what would they haue? But being drawne on with malice and enuie, whom they vnderstood to be a noble and a warlike nation, their fields and cities they did desire to take from them, and to yoke them with eternall bondage, as neuer making warre with other condition: for if you be ignorant what they do farre off in other countries, looke at home in that part of Gallia which is reduced into a Province. Their lawes and customes being changed, it is subiected to the axe and to perpetuall seruitude. Their opinions being deliuered, they decree that such as through age or sicknesse were unfit for war should depart the towne, and that they should prone all meanes before they yeelded to Critognatus opinion, and yet if the matter so required, to consent vnto it, and to attend their succours rather then to yeeld to any rendry and condition of peace.

## OBSERVATIONS.

How long a  
Commander  
may hold out  
in a siege.



IT is oftentimes made questionable in the extremitie of a siege, how farre the Commanders may go in continuing their resistance to the danger and hazard of the people besieged: whether they may not in honour proceede as farre as Critognatus opinion would draw them: or how they may know when to leaue it, in the very point of discreete and valiant cariage: which is to be answered according to the qualitie of the enemy that giueth siege to the place; for against a trecherous and disloyall enemy, that maketh profession of infidelitie, and would not sticke after a composition to insnare them in a greater danger then the perill of death, there would be much endured rather then to vndergo so hard a fortune: and yet I do no way approoue the cruell resolution of this

this *Gaule*, but do rather commend the example of the *Hungarians* at the siege of *Agria*; for in the year 1562. *Mahomet Bassa* lay before that towne with an armie of three score thousand *Turkes*, and layd batterie to it with fiftie canons. There were within the Towne two thousand *Hungarians*, who endured and put off thirteene most terrible assaults of the enimie: and for the better strengthening of their high resolution, they tooke a mutuall oath that no man vpon paine of death should once speake of a treatie, or of giuing vp the Towne, or to make any answer to the enimie but by the hargebuse or the canon. And if the siege should happen to continue long, rather to die for hunger then to put themselves in the hands of so cruell and barbarous an enimie. They determined further, that such amongst them that were not seruiceable with a weapon, should attend continually to reenforce the rampier and repaire the ruines. And to auoide trecherie, they tooke order that there might be no assemblies in the citie about the number of three together. They commaunded likewise that all the victuall as was either publique or priuate, should be diuided into equall portions amongst the souldiers, and the best of it should be reserved for such as were hurt in fight. It is further reported, that the *Bassa* hauing oftentimes offered a treatie, they onely shewed for an answer to his sommons a funerall beare couered with blacke, lifted vp aboue the wall betweene two pikes, to signifie thereby that they would not come out but by death.

*Agria.*

As this is a degree short of *Critognatus* resolution, so I do not denie but that a Generall may giue vp a Towne before he come to these tearmes with true honour and wisdom. But the matter (as I haue said) consisteth altogether vpon the circumstances interlaced. But that which is further to be obserued in this place, is the extreame contrarietie of opinions, which are vsually deliuered vpon dispute of such difficult cases, wherein *Quantum alteri sententia deest animi, tantum alteri superesse solet*; as *Curio* said vpon the like occasion: *A medio tutissimius ibis*, was *Phaebus* direction to his sonne *Phaeton* in a matter of difficultie and great hazard, and obserued in this place by the *Gaules*.


*Lib. 2. bel. cin*

CHAP.

## CHAP. XXXIIII.

The Gaules do set vpon Cæsars campe,  
both from the towne and the field side.

Cæsar.



HE Mandubij who had receiued the armie into the towne, were themselues thrust out with their wiues and children: they comming to the Romaine workes, did with weeping teares beseech them to receiue them into bondage, and releue them with food. Cæsar gaue order they should not be receiued, and set a guard on the rampier to keep them out. In the meane time Comius, and the rest of the Captaines, that had the chiefe command giuen them, came to Alesia with all their forces, and hauing taken a hill on the outside, they sate downe not aboue halfe a mile from our workes. The next day bringing their caualrie out of their campe, they filled all that plaine, which as I haue already said, extended three miles in length before the towne, setting their foot-forces a litle distant from that place, and hiding them vpon higher ground, the prospect lay open out of the towne into the field: and vpon the sight of these succours they ran together and congratulated each other, and all their minds were filled with gladnesse. And thereupon the next day they brought their forces and placed them before the towne, and began to couer the next ditch vnto them with hurdles, and to fill it up with earth, and to provide themselues to sally out, and to endure all channes. Cæsar hauing disposed of all his armie on each side of the workes, that if there were occasion, euery man might both know and keepe his place. He commaunded the caualrie to be caried out of the campe and to charge the enemy. There was a faire view out of all the campes, which were seated round about vpon the ridge of the hill, and all mens minds were bent vpon the expectation of the euent of the fight. The Gaules had mingled amongst their horse some few archers and light armed souldiers, which might releue their fellowes, being ouercharged, and to sustaine the force and assault of our horse: by these were many hurt vpon a sudden and forsooke the fight. The Gaules being perswaded that their men had the better of the fight, perceiuing our men to be ouercharged with multitude on all sides, as well those that were besieged, as the other that came to relieue them, they tooke vp a shout and a howling to encourage their people: and forasmuch as the matter was caried in the sight of all men, so that nothing could be hid whether it were well or ill done: the desire of honour and the feare of ignominie did stirre vp both sides to prowesse and valour. And hauing fought with a doubtfull fortune from noone tide vntill almost Sun setting, the Germanes on the one side with thicke thronged troupes gaue a fierce charge vpon the enemy, and put them to flight: whereby it happened that the archers were circumuented and slaine. In like manner on the other side, our men finding them to giue ground, did follow the euen to their campes, and gaue them no time to recover themselues: such as were come out of Alesia, returned backe sad into the towne dispaireing of victorie: one day being inter-

intermitted, in which time they made prouision of great store of hurdles, ladders and hookes, about midnight they marched silently out of their campe, and came to the workes on the field side, and taking vp a sudden shout to giue notice of their comming to them of the towne, they cast their hurdles vpon the ditches, and with slings, arrows, and stones they began to put our men from the rampier, and to put in practife such things as belong to a siege. At the same time the shout being heard, Vercingetorix sounded the trumpet, and brought his men out of the towne: our men betooke themselves to the fortifications according as euery mans place was allotted him the day before, and with slings and bullets which they had laid readie vpon the workes, they did beate downe the Gaules, their sight being taken away through the darknesse of the night. Many wounds were receiued on both sides, and many weapons were cast out of engines. M. Antonius, and C. Trebonius Legates, who had the charge of those parts where our men were most laid to, caused men to be taken out of the further Castles, and to be brought to second them. The Gaules being a good way distant from the workes, did much hurt with multitude of weapons: but approaching nearer, either they stricke themselves vniuitingly vpon the galthrops, or falling into the holes, were struck through the bodies with the sharpe stakes, or dyed with murall piles, being cast from the rampier and the towers. Many wounds being receiued on all sides, as the day appeared, the Gaules fearing lest they should be charged on the open side by a fallie from the upper campe, retired backe againe to their fellows. On the inner side, whilst they brought out such things as were prepared beforehand by Vercingetorix, and were filling vp the first ditches, being somewhat long in the execution of these things, did vnderstand that the other Gaules were departed before they themselves could come neare the workes: and thereupon they returned into the towne without doing any thing.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**T**HE Gaules committed the commaund of this great armie to foure Generals, contrarie to practife of warlike nations, and the order which nature obserueth throughout all the feuerall kinds of creatures: amongst whom there was neuer bodie found of many heades, but one *Hidra*, being made as it seemeth, or rather fained to be made, to the end that *Hercules* might haue a taske answerable to himselfe, and make it one of his twelue labours to kill the beast. The serpent *Amphisibana* is said to haue two heades, whereby she either loofeth the vse of locall motion, or at the least moueth so imperfectly, one head taking one way and the other another way, as there is no certaine or direct passage in her creeping.

These many-headed armies do resemble these serpents, being caried according to the sence of their feuerall heades, and distracted by the diuersitie of their many Leaders. The gouernment of *Rome* consisting of feuerall magistrates, hauing soueraigne authoritie, gaue occasion oftentimes to make two heades to one bodie, but with such successe, as they were forced in the end to create one head for the repairing of that losse, which the multiplicitie of leaders had

One armie  
would haue  
one Generall.

Et gravis in  
genuum caput  
*Amphisibana*



Tacitus.

brought vpon their state, as it happened in the warre against the *Fidenates* revolted, which nothing but their recourse to a Dictator, could make happie to their Empire: whereupon *Linie* saith: *Tres Tribuni, potestate consulari, documento suere quàm plurimum imperium bello inutile esset, tentando ad sua quisque consilia, cum alij aliud videretur, apparuerunt ad occasionem locum hosti.* In the time of their Consuls, *Quintius* and *Agrippa* being sent against the *Equi*, *Agrippa* referred the businesse wholly to his colleague, concluding as *Linie* saith: *Saluberum in administratione magnarum rerum est summum imperij ad unum esse.* And therefore as one bodie requireth but one head, so one businesse would haue but one director, forasmuch as *Æmulatio inter pares & ex eo impedimentum.*

## CHAP. XXXV.

The Gaules do chuse out sixtie thousand of  
their best men, and do assault the weakest  
part of Cæsars campe.

Cæsar.



HE Gaules being repelled twice with great losse, do fall into consideration what they were next to do: they call vnto them such as were well acquainted with the nature and site of the place, by whom they vnderstand of the situation of the upper campe. On the north side there lay a hill, which by reason of the greatnesse of the circuit, our men could not take in within the compasse of their workes: and thereupon were necessarily constrained to lay their campe in an vnequall place somewhat shelving. This part was kept by *Caius Antistius Rheginus*, and *Caius Caninius Regulus* with two Legions. This being knowne by the discoverers, the Captaines of the enemy chose out sixtie thousand of those States which caried the greatest opinion of manhood, and did secretly determine amongst themselves, how and in what sort they would haue the service caried, and do determine to put it in execution when the Sunne should be neare about the noone meridian, appointing *Vergasilaunus* to command those forces, being one of the foure Captaines, and kinsman to *Vercingetorix*. He going out of the campe in the first watch of the night, came to the end of his iourney a litle before day, and hiding himselfe behind a hill, commanded his souldiers to refresh themselves from the former nights trauell. And when it beganne to be towards noone: he made towards that part of the campe which I haue before mentioned: and at the same time the horsemen began to approach towards the workes, and the rest of the forces shewed themselves before the campe. *Vercingetorix* perceiuing this out of the watch-tower of *Alesia*, went out of the towne, and caried with him long poles, hookes and such other prouisions which he had made readie beforehand for a salley: they fought at one instant in all places, all waies were tryed: where they thought it to be weakest, thither they ran, the Romaine forces were dismembred by reason of the large extension

extension of their workes, and the shout which was made behind their backs, did much affright our men, forasmuch as they perceiued that their daunger did consist in other mens valour: for such things as are absent do for the most part greatly perplexe and trouble mens minds. Cæsar hauing got a conuenient place, doth see what is done in euery part: if any were ouercharged he sent them succour, and was readie to answer all occasions on both sides the campe: he told them that that was the time, wherein it was behouefull for the to fight: the Gauls wold despaire of all good successe, vnlesse they brake downe the workes. The Romaines if they obtained their purpose, might expect an end of their labours: the greatest contention was about that place to which Vergasilaunus was sent; a small rising in a place doth giue much aduantage in a sheluing descent: some cast weapons, others put themselues into a Testudo, and came vnder the workes, the wearied and ouerlaboured were seconded by fresh supplies: euery man cast earth into the workes, which raised it so high, that the Gauls had aduantage of assent: and the pikes and sharpe stakes which the Romaines had cunningly hid vnder the earth to annoy the enemy, were thereby couered: it came at last to that passe that our men wanted both strength and weapons: which being knowne, Cæsar sent Labienus with sixe cohorts to releue those that were ouercharged, commanding him (if he could not beare out the charge) to sally out vpon them, but not vnlesse he were constrained vnto it: he himselfe went about to the rest, adhorting them not to faint vnder their labour, forasmuch as the fruite and benefite of all their former battels consisted in that day and that houre. The enemy within being out of hope of doing any good vpon the workes made in plaine and champion places, by reason of the strength of the fortifications, tried what they could do in steepe and broken places, and thither they brought those things, which they had prepared, with the multitude of their casting weapons, they cast out such as fought from turrets, they fitted their passages with hurdles and earth, they brake downe the parapet and the rampier with hooles. Cæsar sent first young Brutus with sixe cohorts, and after him Fabius a Legate with seuen more, and at length as the fight waxed hote, he went himselfe with a fresh supply. The fight being renued and the enemy beaten off, he hasted to that place whither he had sent Labienus, and tooke foure cohorts out of the next Castle. Part of the horsemen he commaunded to follow him, and the rest to compasse about the outward workes, and to set vpon the enemy behind. Labienus finding that neither rampier nor ditches were able to keepe out the enemy, hauing got such forces together as were drawne by chaunce from the workes nearest hand, he acquainted Cæsar by messengers what he thought fit to be done. Cæsar made hast to be at the fight: his coming being knowne by the colour of his garment, which he was accustomed to weare in time of battell, and the troupes of horse and the cohorts being discovered which he had commaunded to follow him, as the sheluing and declining places were subiect to the view of higher grounds: the enemy begun the fight, a great shout was taken vpon both sides: our men hauing throwne their piles, betooke themselues to their swords: suddenly the horsemen were discovered behind them, and other cohorts made their approches towards them. The enemy turned his backe and fled, the horsemen met them as they fled, the slaughter was great in that place. Sedulius, a Captaine and Prince of the Lemouici was slaine, Vergasilaunus was taken aline, threescore and fourteene ensignes were brought vnto Cæsar, and very few of so great a number returned safe

into their campe. Those of the towne beholding the slaughter and flight of their friends, being out of all hope, drew backe their forces from the workes. This being knowne, the Gaules fled presently out of their campe: and if the souldiers had not bene wearied with that daies labour, they might easily haue destroyed all their enemies. About midnight the horse being sent out to fall vpon the reareward, a great number was taken and slaine, the rest escaped into their countries.

## OBSERVATIONS.



T is an old saying of a hungry man, that it is an easier matter to fill his belly then his eye, which is as true in other cases: wherein our desires are oftentimes so great, that we thinke no meanes sufficient to accomplish the same: but when we shall come to put it in triall, and suffer euery man to be measured with his owne foote, it will appeare that our desires are better applyed to the infinitie of the mind, then to the necessarie occasions of our life. *Vercingetorix* was so farre interested in the successe of this warre, that he thought all the able men of *Gallia* not inough to make it happie vnto him: but the other Princes that were not so deeply touched, and yet stood as well affected to the cause, refused to inrole all that were able to beare armes, but thought two hundred fortie and eight thousand men to be a competent force for this seruice. But comming to the execution of the businesse, they employed onely but sixtie thousand: and whē they failed of their indeuour, and were rowted and ouerthrowne by the *Romaines*, the rest staid no longer to dispute the matter, but fled all away by night: which sheweth the difference betweene the affections which are forerunners of a cause, and such as grow and increase with a businesse, and are not commonly found in one and the same subiect in their greatest strengths. For these antecedent desires, are like womens longings, strong and violent at first: but decaying as fast againe before they come to any ripenesse: whereas such affections as rise from the cariage of a businesse, and grow from the occurrences of that proceeding, are not so easily abated, but do hold out strong either for constancie or obstinacie.

*A little is enough to saue a longing.*



## CHAP. XXXVI.

Vercingetorix yeeldeth himselfe, and  
the Towne to Caesar

HE next day Vercingetorix hauing called a Councell, told them, that he had not vnderooke that warre for his owne occasions, but for the cause of common libertie, and forasmuch as they were necessarily to yeeld to fortune, he made offer of himselfe vnto them, either to satisfie the Romaines with his death, or to be deliuered vnto them alieue. Ambassadors were sent to Caesar touching that point: he commaunded their armes to be deliuered, and the Princes to be brought out: he himselfe sate in the fortifications before the campe: thither the Captaines were brought, Vercingetorix was deliuered, their weapons were cast out. The Hedui and the Aruerni being reserved, to the end he might recouer the rest of the States by them: of the rest of the captiues, he gaue throughout all the army, to euery man a prisoner, by the name of a bootie. These things being ended, he went to the Hedui and receiued in the State: thither did the Aruerni send Ambassadors vnto him, promising to obey whatsoeuer he commaunded: he demaunded a great number of hostages, and sent the Legions into their wintering campes: he sent home twenty thousand captiues to the Hedui and Aruerni, he sent T. Labienus with two Legions into the Sequani, and gaue him M. Sempronius Rutilius to assist him: he lodged C. Fabius and Lucius Minutius Basilus with two legions amongst the men of Rhemes, lest they should receiue any dammage by the neare bordering Bellouaci: he sent C. Antistius Reginus to the Ambiuariti, and T. Sextius to the Bituriges, and C. Caninius Rebilus to the Rutheni, with each of them a Legion: he placed Quintus Tullius Cicero and Paulus Sulpitius at Cauillonis and Matiscona of the Hedui upon the riuer Arar for prouision of corne: he himselfe determined to winter at Bibract. These yeares seruice being knowne at Rome, there was a feast of thanksgiuing appointed for twentie dayes together.

Caesar.

## OBSERVATIONS.



VERCINGETORIX notwithstanding a hard fortune, entertained a noble resolution: for hauing first acquainted the Gauls that he had not vnderooke that warre for any respect to himselfe, but for the cause of Gallia, and the auncient libertie of that continent, he made offer to satisfie the angry Romaines with his body dead or alieue.

Plutarke reciteth the maner of his deliuerie to be in this sort: being armed at all parts, and mounted on a horse furnished with a rich caparison, he came to

Plutarke in the  
life of Caesar.



*Cæsar* and rode round about him as he sat in his chaire of Estate; then lighting off his horse, he tooke off his capparison and furniture, and vnarmed himselfe and laid all on the ground, and went and sat downe at *Cæsars* feete, and said neuer a word. *Cæsar* at length committed him as a prisoner taken in the warres, to be led afterwards in his triumph at *Rome*: but the ciuill wars did cut off that solemnitie.

Plutark in the  
life of *Paulus  
Emilius*.

If it be demaunded, what became of these great Princes and personages after the triumph, it will appeare that they did not stroke their heads, or make more of them then of miserable captiues: for *Paulus Emilius* after the noble triumph for king *Perseus*, pittying his fortune and desiring to help him, could neuer obtaine other grace for him, then onely to remoue him from the common prison, which they called *Carcer*, into a more cleanly and sweeter house: where being straightly guarded, he died, either by abstinence, or being kept from sleepe by the souldiers. Two of his sonnes died also, but the third became an excellent Turner or Ioyner, and could write the *Romaine* tongue so well, that afterwards he became Chancellor to the Magistrates of *Rome*. And thus the *Romaines* dealt with their captiue Princes, making them examples of Fortunes vnconstancie, and turning their diadems into shakels of iron.

And thus far did *Cæsar* comment himselfe vpon the warres he made against the *Gaules*, being a noble and a worthy people, and bred in a large & fertile continent; the inhabitants whereof haue in all ages, euen to these times, challenged an eminencie, both for politticke gouernment and martiall prowesse, amongst the Westerne kingdomes of the world: their actions and cariage from time to time deseruing as honorable memory as these warres recorded by *Cæsars* owne hand; whereof *Paulus Emilius*, *Philip Commynes*, and of late *Iohn de Seres* are very pregnant witnesses: they continued vnder the *Romaine* gouernement foure hundred fortie and one yeares, according to the computation made by *Iohn Tillius*, reckoning from the last victorie in *Cæsars* Proconsulship, to the time of *Marcomerus* a General of the *French*, by whose prowesse and meanes they denied to pay that homage and tribute to the Emperour *Valentinianus*, which *Vercingetorix* had lost to *Cæsar*.


The next Sommers seruice compiled by *Hirtius*, I haue purposely omitted, as intending no further matter then what *Cæsar* hath related, who best knew the whole proiect of that businesse.

And thus endeth the seuenth and last Commentarie, written by *Cæsar* of the warre he made  
in *Gallia*.

*Laus Deo in æternum.*

FINIS.





## THE MANER OF OVR MODERNE TRAINING, OR TACTICKE PRACTISE.



OR as much as my purpose was to make this taske of Obseruations as a paralel to our moderne Discipline, I did not thinke it fit to mingle the Tacticke Practise of these times with the vse of foregoing ages, but rather to shut vp these Discourses therewith, as the second line of this warlike paralell, which is thus drawne in the best fashion of moderne Art.

In the knowledge of marshalling an Armie, there is nothing more especially to be regarded, then that from a confused companie of men, hauing chosen the fittest for the warres, we should so place and digest a conuenient number of them, that in marches, in incamping, in battels we may be able with a few well ordered to incounter a farre greater armie in confusion, and to ouerthrow them. From hence *Aeneas* did define the Art of warre, to be the knowledge of warlike motions.

Before this vnexpert armie shall be able to be moued in such fashion, it shall not be amisse to acquaint it with the most vsuall termes, wherewith they shall be often commanded into diuerse postures as occasion shall be offered. For as in the art of Fencing, no man shall be able to turne and wind his bodie for his best aduantage to offend his enemie, or defend himselfe, vnlesse first his maister shall instruct him in the seuerall parts and postures thereof: so euery souldier or the whole troope as one bodie, or one souldier shall neuer be readily instructed to transforme or turne it selfe by diuerse motions into different formes, vnlesse they first vnderstand what is meant by Fronts and Flanckes, by Files and Ranckes, what by Leaders and Followers, by Middlemen and Bringers vp. By this meanes each souldier vnderstanding what the terme doth signifie, shall readily both apprehend and execute such commandements as the Captaine or Officer shall direct them.

A File is a certaine number of men following singly one Leader vnto the depth of 8 or 10, as they shall be commaunded. The auncients haue called this File *Seriem*, *ordinationem*, or *decuriam*: it consisteth of Leaders and Followers, placed according to their worth and valor: and especially there ought to be regarded, the Leader or *Decurio*, the fifth, sixth or Middlemē, & the tenth

*A File.*



and last called the Bringer-*vp* or *Tergiductor*.

*The Leader.* First therefore every souldier being aptly fitted vnto his seuerall armes according to his worth, age and stature, they are to be disposed into seuerall files, wherein every one is especially to acknowledge his leader or foremost man to be the author of all his motions, and therefore duely attending what directions shall be commaunded, each follower shall according to the motions of his leader or foremost man, order his owne; and is to be excused if he attend the motions of his leader before he moue himselfe.

*A Ranke or Front. Battallion.* When many files are thus disposed together, all the leaders making one and the same front, and their followers obseruing likewise one and the same proportion of distance before, and after, and on each side; these Files thus ioyned make one Battallion, the front whereof is called a Rancke, and so likewise the second and third in depth, according to the number of men in each file. The first, second and third, and so forward in each file, are called Sidemen in respect of the same numbers in the next file. Neither must every souldier onely regard the motions of their Leader, but he must also diligently respect his sidemen, and such as shall be placed on his right and left hand called his ranckes: so that both in files and ranckes he may alwaies be found in the same distance wherein he is commaunded.

*The number of souldiers in a Battallion uncertaine. The length.* It should be impertinent to the purpose to prescribe a certaine nūber of souldiers vnto these Battallions, onely thus much for the proportion: that it ought neuer to exceed so much, but that it may easily vpon any occasiō be changed into such a forme or fashio to fight, as may be thought fittest for the present.

The length of this Battallion is diuersly tearmed amongst the Latines, as *Frons, Facies, Adstructio, Iugum, &c.* but in our moderne practise, most familiarly the Front or Rancke.

*Breadth or depth.* The breadth of the Battallion, which is from the leader to the bringer *vp* with the distance betweene all the followers, is said to be the length or depth of one file or flank.

*Dignities in places to be obserued.* In the disposing of souldiers into files and ranckes, besides their obseruing a right line in their places and standing, we must likewise especially respect the different worth and qualitie of the souldiers, that every one according to his woorth may be suted vnto his proper place, and accordingly receiue aduancement, as the death of his Leaders, and true value of his desert by his Commaunder shall giue occasion.

*The first ranke.* First therefore there must be especiall choice made of the leaders of each file, or first front or ranckes of the Battallion, of the most expert, ablest and best armed men: because that as from them the rest are to receiue directions of their after motions: so in them the greatest hope of the day doth consist.

*The bringers vp or Tergiductores or last ranke.* Next vnto the first it must be provided, that the bringers *vp* or last rancke called *Tergiductores* be litle inferiour, well experienced, wise and valiant, that they may both know when to reprehend their former Ranckes, and vrge the forward, if they see them declining or yeelding vpon false occasions, as also to be able vpon any sudden allarme giuen in the reare, to turne faces about and make themselves a Front for the best resistance.

Neither

Neither must it be neglected concerning the second and ninth ranckes, that they also may be furnished with the next most sufficient men, both because of their nearenesse vnto daunger, as also that if their leaders or bringers vp shall either be slaine or disabled by wounds, they may presently succeed in their places and make them good.

*The second & ninth ranckes.*

There is also a good decorū to be obserued in the middlemen, or fift and sixt ranckes, both for the men themselues and their armes, that in our marches when the middlemen or sixt ranckes shall be called vp to front with their leaders, they may in some sort and proportion answer their places, as also when we double our front by calling vp middlemen to fight in a greater breadth, they may not be vsfutable: but especially in marches, that they may be able to make the best resistance, when they shall become the flankes of the Battallions.

*The fift and sixt ranckes.*

As these respects ought to be obserued in ranckes, so the files also are not without their different degrees of dignitie. As the leader of the right hand file is accounted to haue the first place of honour in the Battallion: for he doth not onely leade the rest in his owne file, but he is the author and beginner of the motions of the whole Battallion.

*Files.  
The right hand file.*

The leader of the left hand file hath the next place, because that he with the leader of the right hand file do alwaies in their marching and imbattelling rectifie or rancke the whole front of the battallion: & so consequently all the next of their files as they stand in order, euen vntill the middle, who are accounted the last in dignitie.

*The left hand file.*

The Battallion being thus disposed into files and ranckes, and each file and rancke according to his worth and experience rightly aduanced: it followeth that there should be a iust distance proportioned betweene either, that at all times vpon all occasions, they might be found readie, and in comeliest fashon, either to offend their enemy, or defend themselues. These distances which euery follower must obserue in respect of his leader: and euery leader and follower in respect of the sidemen, may be reduced vnto three seuerall Orders, as followeth.

*Distances betweene files and ranckes.*

The first is called open Order; the distance whereof is twelue feete betweene euery follower and his leader, or betweene euery rancke; and sixe feete betweene them and the sidemen, or betweene euery file. This order is commonly vsed vpon marches when the enemy is knowne to be farre off, as also in priuate exercising of souldiers for their seuerall managing of their armes. It differeth somewhat from the *Ordinatus Miles* amongst the *Romaines*, who alwayes obserued but foure cubits in files and ranckes.

*Open order.*

The second distance is called Order, when we contract the battallion both in length and breadth, and gather the souldiers within a nearer scantling both in files and ranckes, that is, by obseruing sixe feete in their files betweene the follower and leader, and three feete betweene the ranks or sidemen. This distance is vsed when we march toward an enemy neare at hand, or in marches by reason of the oportunitie of the place suspiciously dangerous. This is also neare vnto *Densatus ordo*, but onely that that was but two cubits in both files

*Order.*

and rankes.

*Close order,  
pouldron to  
pouldron.*

The third & last order, is when either we attend the enemy his present assault, or that we intend to charge him vpon our securest and best distance; when euery follower standeth three feete or his rapier length behind his leader, and a foote and a halfe from the sidemen or files; or when euery souldier occupieth but one foot and a halfe for his owne station, ioyning pouldron to pouldron, or target to target. This differeth from *Conspicatus ordo*, because that alloweth but one cubit for files and rankes, and this close order alloweth one cubite in the file, but two in the rankes.

*The maner of  
charging with  
foure rankes.*

This distance doth agree also best with the length of our pikes of 15 or 16 feet long. For it is thought fit oftentimes that the battallion consisting of ten rankes, there should not charge more at one time then the 5 formost, so that the pikes of the fift ranke might be three feete ouer the formost shoulder, and the other foure rankes should in this close order or nearer if it be possible, follow the other charging, with their pikes aduanced, vntill some occasion should require their charge. In the meane time they should performe their dutie in keeping the foure formost rankes from retiring, and besides adde strength vnto the charge or shooke.

### *The maner of exercising of composed Battallions with their different motions.*



HE files and rankes being thus vnderstood, disposed and ordered, and all parts and members of the battallion being ioyned in their iust proportion and distance, able and fit to be altered vpon any sodaine occasion (as if it were but one entire body) into seuerall and diuers postures, and to make resistance vnto what forces soeuer shall oppugne the same: it might be thought needlesse to haue made the disposition of the members so exact, vnlesse by continuall practise and exercise they might be made nimble and ready, not only to defend themselves and their whole body on all sides, but also to be able to offend whensoever they shall espie the least occasion of aduantage.

The termes of direction or commaund, which are commonly vsed in this moderne discipline of martiall exercise, as they are not many, onely answering to the different postures which are required in the Battallion, so they are and must be short and perspicuously plaine, that by this meanes being sodainly vttered, easily apprehended and vnderstood, they may as speedily be put in execution by those which shall be commaunded.

*Stand in front.  
In arecto stare.*

First therefore that the Battallion may be commaunded into some one fashion or posture, from whence it shall be fit to conuert it selfe into all other, the Captaine or Officer shall bid them stand in front. When euery particular souldier composing himselfe after his foremost leader, standeth comely in file and rancke, fronting vnto some certaine place, or to the Captaine, as shall be thought best for the present.

In



In this and all other directions whatsoeuer, it shall be especially obserued, that euery follower attending what is commanded, marke his next leader, and accordingly moue himselfe, as he shall see him moue first.

The Battallion therefore thus fronting, if the enemy should suddenly either assault the right or left flank, it shall be commaunded to turne faces to the right or left hand, when euery souldier obseruing his leader shall turne his face and make his flank his front according to the direction.

There is also a doubled motion or declination to the right or left hand, when euery souldier obseruing his leader shall turne their bodies twise to the right or left hand, and by that meanes become turned with their faces where their backs were, as if they expected an enemy in the rere, or being to performe some other motion that may be offered: beginning this alteration from the right or left hand as shall be commaunded.

As euery particular souldier in the troope is thus commanded at sometimes to turne his face to the right or left hand, or about, the Battallion standing in order, that is, according to the distance before named; so the whole Battallion being reduced into their close order, is commaunded to turne as one body to the right or left hand. It is performed thus: imagine the Battallion stand first in order, it shall be commaunded that they close their files to the right hand, when the right file standing still, the rest turning their faces to the right hand, march into their close order & returne as they were: next that they close their ranks from behind, when euery follower marcheth forward to his leader vnto his rapiers point as is said before. This done, (the leader of the right file standing immouable) all the rest (as the body of a ship or a great gate) turne about that leader, as about the hinge or center, euery one keeping the same distance and order wherein they were first placed, as if they were but one entire body.

When the same Battallion is to be restored into the same station wherein it was first, it is commaunded; Faces about to the left hand, and march into your order from whence you were closed. Then let your leaders or first ranks stand still, and the rest turning faces about, march ranks in order as before: then turn as you were, and you are restored.

When the whole Battallion being in their close order should turne about & make the Rere the Front, it is done by a double turning or declination, and commaunded to wheele about, which is answerable to the former faces about or mutation.

There is also another wheeling in this sort, when the front changeth the aspect thrise, for as wheeling about maketh the Front the Rere, so this wheeleth from the right hand to the left, or contrariwise: which fashion is so seldome vfed, that we scarce afford it a name.

In all such motions and alterations, it is most fit that all men performe their directions with their pikes aduanced, being in that sort most easie to be commaunded, as also lesse troublesome to their followers and leaders.

*Faces to the right or left hand.*

*Declinate in hastam vel in scutum.*

*Faces about to the right or left hand.*

*Duplicata declinatio or mutatio*

*Wheele to the right or left hand.*

*Conuersio in hastam vel scutum.*

*As you were.*

*Reuolutio. Reuersio.*

*Wheele about*

*Inflexio militū.*

*Reflexio.*



*Countermarching Files and Rankes.*

**T**Here is also another meanes to preuent the enemy his assaulting vs in the reare or flanke, lest he should find our worst men least able to make resistance, and this is performed by countermarching both files and rankes three diuers wayes apeece.

*Files.**From the reare  
through.**Euolutio Ma-  
cedonica.*

The first was vsed by the Macedonians, after this fashion: First the leader turneth his face about towards the right or left hand, and so the next follower marching behind his leader turneth also, and so the third and fourth, vntill the bringer vp haue caried himselfe out into a new place in the reare further from the enemy, as he was before next vnto him. But this neither was nor is accounted safe or secure, because it doth somewhat resemble a flying or running away from the enemy, which might giue him no small incouragement, and therefore it is not much in practise.

Only at some times, the bringers vp marching throughout beyond the leaders, vntill they possesse the same space before them which they did behind them, all turning their faces about, make their leaders to affront the enemy, who were before farthest from them.

*From the front  
through.**Laconica euo-  
lutio.**From the front  
and stand.*

The Lacedæmonians vsed the contrarie, as it were pursuing the enemy: the bringer vp first being turned face about, and so the next marching before him, and so the third, vntill the leader himselfe became also turned, and in the foremost front vnto the enemy. Which with vs is somewhat otherwise, but yet both affronting, and as it were pursuing the enemy: because our leaders first begin this motion, and so countermarching through on the right or left hand, become in the front in a new space of ground, who were before in the reare.

*Chorica euolu-  
tio.**Countermar-  
ching of rankes.*

The third and last was inuented by the Persians, whom when the place or neare approach of the enemy would not suffer to change their ground, they were wont to countermarch the front to the right or left hand: & being come vnto the depth of the bringers vp, to stand still vntill the other halfe file had likewise marched forth, and fallen vpon their leaders in euery file. In all these it is especially commaunded, to march still in the same distance, and by whole rankes, to preuent confusion, which (especially the enemy at hand) must needes be most dangerous, and therefore carefully to be auoided.

In like sort the rankes may countermarch, when either the right wing wold be strēghened by the left, or the left by the right, alwayes marching by whole files towards the right or left hand, according as they shall haue the direction, either changing the ground, or vpon the same ground, as in the former countermarches.

*The doubling  
of files to the  
right or left  
hand.*

There is vsed also another kinde of strengthening both the front and flanke when occasion shall be offered, vz. by doubling either files or rankes. And this, either by doubling the number of souldiers in the same files or rankes, keeping still the same bredth and depth of ground, or else by doubling the ground keeping the same number of souldiers. The files are doubled, when the second file shall insert it selfe into the first, the leader thereof putting him-  
selfe

selfe a follower vnto the leader of the first, and the next follower follower to the next in the first file, and so forwards. And likewise the fourth file inserting it selfe into the third, and the sixth into the fifth. And this is to be performed when the Battallion standeth in his order.

To double the place or depth, is when the same number of men shall put them selues out of their order into their open order, either by aduancing forward, or by falling backwards, as they shall be commaunded.

The ranks are doubled two manner of wayes, either by inserting the second into the first to the right or left hand, as before in the files; or else (the enemy being at hand) by ioyning whole troopes together to the right or left wing, according as occasion shall be offered: and this is held to be the safest when the enemy is neare, to auoid confusio. It is performed either in the same ground, or by doubling the ground, when either we desire to exceede the front of our enemy his battallion, or to preuent lest we our selues be included. The termes to both are, Double your files or ranks to the right or left hand: and when you would haue them returne againe into their proper places, it is commaunded; As you were.

The ordinarie directions which are especially giuen in these martial exercises are, first that no man in the time of exercising or marshalling shalbe lower then his Officer: but euery one attending to his place, when he is commaunded, shall diligently hearken to such directions as shall be giuen. The Captaine in the front shal speake, and the Sergeants in each flanke shal giue the word vnto the Lieutenant or Ensigne in the rere: who as in his proper place, seeth all things executed accordingly as the Captaine shall commaund. It shall be vnpossible to performe any thing herein, vnlesse first euery one do exactly obserue his leader and his sideman: and to this purpose it is often commaunded, Keepe your files, Keepe your ranks.

*Of Marches.*

**I**N champions there needs no great labour to marshall particular troopes for their after marches: because they may march either by whole diuisions, obseruing onely their course of indifferencie, that euery diuision may euery third day haue the vanguard; or else in such forme and fashion as the Generall hath proposed for a day of battell, according as the danger of an expected enemy shall giue occasion. But because all countries will not afford a champion for the marching of an armie, and therefore not possible to march farre with many troopes in front, nor many files of any one troope or diuision, by reason of often straights, and passages betwixt hilles, woods, or waters. It is prouided, though by long induction, the whole armie shall be extended into a thinn length and few files, yet the souldiers well disposed shalbe as readily able to defend them selues and offend the enemy on their flanks (from whence only in such streights the daunger is eminent) as if they were to affront an enemy with an entire battallion in a champion country.

*By men.*

*Duplicare altitudinem.*

*By ground.*

*Doubling of ranks by inserting, or adding newe troopes.*

*Duplicare longitudinem.*

*Silence to be kept.*

*In a champio.*

*In streights or narrow passages.*

*How to mar-  
shall a diuision  
for such a  
march.*

*To reduce the  
again into  
their first  
Front.*

*The manner  
of charging  
pikes with  
pikes.*

*Five ranks  
only.*

*By the whole  
depth.*

*To charge  
with musket-  
ters.*

*There must  
not be too ma-  
ny in a ranke.*

*In the retreat.*

First therefore a diuision or Battallion being ordred and drawne before the Quarter, into one euen front of iust files, ten in depth; the musketers equally diuided on the right and left flanks of the pikes, all standing in their order, that is to say, sixe feete distant in files and ranks; the Captaine carefully pro- uideth, that the first, fifth, sixth and tenth ranks be alwayes well filled and furnished with his most able and best armed souldiers. Which done, he com- maundeth first the middlemen or halfe files to come a front with their leaders; so that the diuision becommeth but fve in depth. Next he commaundeth to turne faces to the right or left hand, as direction shall be to march from that quarter: and so the whole diuision resteth readie in his fashion to march fve in front, the one halfe of the musketers in the vanguard & the other in the rere, the pikes in the battell, and both flanks well furnished with the ablest and best men to offend or defend as there shalbe occasion: that is to say, the right flanks with the first and fifth ranks, and the left with the sixth and tenth ranks. If occasion afterwards shall be giuen of a halt in a champion or before the quar- tering, the Captaine commaundeth first vnto all, (they being first closed into their order) Faces as you were; next vnto the halfe files; Faces about, & march out, and fall againe vpon your files. By which meanes the diuision becometh againe reduced into the same front and fashion from whence it was first trans- formed, readie to encounter an enemy, or to be drawne into the Quarter.

When pikes are to charge pikes in a champion, it vseth to be performed two seuerall wayes: first the whole diuision being commanded into their close order, the fve first ranks charging their pikes, euery follower ouer his leaders shoulder directeth his pike as equally as he can, and the first ranke shall haue three feet of his pike ouer the formost shoulder. The other fve ranks with their pikes aduanced follow close vp in the rere, either readie to second the formost, or to be employed in the rere as occasion shall be offered. Otherwise and most vsuall, when the whole depth of the files throughout the diuision shall charge together, all fast locked and vnited together, and therefore most able to make the strongest shooke offensiue or defensiue: provided alwayes that none mingle their pikes in others files, but the whole file one in anothers shoulder.

In charging with musketers, it is obserued no way conuenient that there should be too many in a ranke, or that the ranks should be too long. For the first ranke is commanded to aduance ten paces before the second, and then to discharge, and wheeling either to the right or left hand, falleth into the rere; and so the second aduancing to the same distance, dischargeth and wheeleth as before; and likewise the third, and so forward as long as the Officer shall be commaunded. Which shal not so well be performed the ranks being extraor- dinary long, because it will require so long a time to wheele from the front that the second may succeed, vnlesse by direction the ranke may diuide it selfe the one halfe to the right hand and the other to the left in wheeling to the rere.

In the retreat the whole ranks hauing turned their faces about, are to march three or foure paces forward, their chiefe officer coming in the rere, first commaundeth the last ranke to make readie and then to turne faces about and discharge, and wheele about to the head or front of the diuision: and being clearly



clearly passed the next ranke to performe as much : and so the rest in order.

Where the passages are narrow, and the diuision can not come to charge in front, as betweene two waters or woods, the manner of charging is different, for there being fīue or ten files led in the induction, that file which flanketh the enemy dischargeth first onely, & the rest marching continually forwards, it standeth firme vntill the last ranke be passed, and then sleeueth it selfe on the left flanke and makes readie; and so the second file and the third, so long as the enemy shall continue, there being a continuall discharging by files as before by ranks. Vnlesse it be in the pases of Irelād, meeting with an irregular enemy, where they vse to intermingle their files of shot with pikes, that the one may be a defence for the other, when the enemy shal come vp to the sword, as they vse there verie often.

*The manner of charging by files in narrow passages.*

*In the pases of Ireland.*

*How directions are deliuered in the warres.*

ALL directions in the warres haue euer bene deliuered either by signes subiect to the eye, by word of mouth, or the sound of a drumme, or some such warlike instrument. Concerning those visible signes displayed vnto the souldiers, the falling of mists, the raising of dust, showers of raine and snowe, the beames of the Sunne, hillie, vneuen and crooked passages, by long experience haue found them to be most doubtfull and vncertaine; as also because as it was a matter of great difficultie to inuent different signes vpon all sodaine occasions, so it is almost an impossibilitie, that the common souldier (who oftentimes is found scarce capable of the vnderstanding of plaine words distinctly pronounced) should both apprehend and vnderstand sodainly, and execute directly the true sense and meaning of his Commanders signes.

*By signes.*

The Drumme & Trumpet are yet vsed, but because many different sounds are not easily distinguished in souldiers vnderstanding without some daunger of confusion, we onely commaund by the inarticulate soundes, to arme, to march, to troope, to charge, and to retreat: with all which seuerall notes the souldier is so familiarly to be acquainted, that so soone as he heares them beaten, he may be readie sodainly to put them in execution, as if he heard his Captaine pronouncing as much.

*By drumme or trumpet.*

The directions by word of mouth are infinite, according to the different occasions which shall be offered; yet alwayes with this caucat, that they be short, yet perspicuous, without all ambiguitie, and plainly pronounced, first by the Captaine, then deriued by the Sergeants through the diuision or Battallion. Though infinite, yet the most vsuall are these: To your armes: Keepe your files, keepe your ranks: Follow your leader: Leaders looke to your files: Keepe your distance: Faces to your right hand: Faces to your left hand: Close your files: Close your ranks: Stand as you are: As you were: Faces about to the right hand: Wheele about to the right or left hand: Double your ranks: Double your files: Leaders countermarch through to the right or left hand: Leaders countermarch to the right or left hand and stand: Middlemen

*By word of mouth.*

*The most vsual directing termes in exercising a battallio or diuision*



come foorth and fall vpon your leaders. Besides many fit termes commanded in managing particular armes, as pikes and muskets, which are omitted.

And this much touching the Tacticke practise of our moderne warres, which I haue the rather added in regard that diuerse souldiers, as vnacquainted both with the manner and the value thereof, do thinke a heape of people vnmartialled, to be as auailable for a great desaigne, as any other number distinguished in files and parts, and disposed for facile and easie motions, according to the powerfull circumstances of time and place. Wherein, howsoeuer the practise of the Turke and the Hungarian may seeme to giue warrant to that opinion, yet the vse of Armes amongst the Græcians and the Romaines, whose conquering armies are pregnant witnesses of the excellencie of their militarie discipline, shall speake sufficiently for order and Tacticke motion as most necessarie partes in a well ordered warre.

*There are diuerse faults escaped in printing, as it often falleth out in such works, which the Reader may be pleased to amend.*

FINIS.



